FAILED: patch "[PATCH] RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree
Subsystems (3)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026071658-gone-jawless-67b1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhenhao Wan <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 01:15:54 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in
rdma_write_sg
When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:
plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len);
rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size.
A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol permits and is driven by a remote peer.
Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE).
drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c +3 -2
@@ -225,8 +225,9 @@ static int rdma_write_sg(struct rtrs_srv_op *id)/* WR will fail with length error * if this is 0 */ -if (plist->length ==0 ) { -rtrs_err (s,"Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length 0\n" ); +if (plist->length ==0 || plist->length > max_chunk_size) { +rtrs_err (s,"Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length %u\n" , + plist->length);return -EINVAL ; }
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/1 RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg
From: Zhenhao Wan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1 ]
When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:
plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len);
rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size.
A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol permits and is driven by a remote peer.
Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE).
--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c +3 -2
@@ -258,8 +258,9 @@ static int rdma_write_sg(struct rtrs_srv_op *id)/* WR will fail with length error * if this is 0 */ -if (unlikely (plist->length ==0 )) { -rtrs_err (s,"Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length 0\n" ); +if (unlikely (plist->length ==0 || plist->length > max_chunk_size)) { +rtrs_err (s,"Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length %u\n" , + plist->length);return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0