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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

PATCH New [email protected] 2 participants 2 messages Jul 16 – Jul 22

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author maintainer
#0 lore raw

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026071658-gone-jawless-67b1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhenhao Wan <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 01:15:54 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in
rdma_write_sg

When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:

  plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len);

rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size.

A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol permits and is driven by a remote peer.

Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE).

drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c +3 -2
index f2fd80c8a044..7d8e4422cc57 100644
@@ -225,8 +225,9 @@ static int rdma_write_sg(struct rtrs_srv_op *id)
 	/* WR will fail with length error
 	 * if this is 0
 	 */
-	if (plist->length == 0) {
-		rtrs_err(s, "Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length 0\n");
+	if (plist->length == 0 || plist->length > max_chunk_size) {
+		rtrs_err(s, "Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length %u\n",
+			 plist->length);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg

From: Zhenhao Wan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1 ]

When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:

  plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len);

rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size.

A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol permits and is driven by a remote peer.

Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE).

---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c +3 -2
index bb19bbc5644131..0558ea8f874c55 100644
@@ -258,8 +258,9 @@ static int rdma_write_sg(struct rtrs_srv_op *id)
 	/* WR will fail with length error
 	 * if this is 0
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(plist->length == 0)) {
-		rtrs_err(s, "Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length 0\n");
+	if (unlikely(plist->length == 0 || plist->length > max_chunk_size)) {
+		rtrs_err(s, "Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length %u\n",
+			 plist->length);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
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