ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check
PATCH 1/1 ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check
ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:
if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))
The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most
snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)
bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size). verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder() is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.
snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.
--- fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ubifs/auth.c +1 -1
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c, signode = snod->node; -if (le32_to_cpu (signode->len) > snod->len +sizeof (struct ubifs_sig_node )) { +if (le32_to_cpu (signode->len) > snod->len -sizeof (struct ubifs_sig_node )) {ubifs_err (c,"invalid signature len %d" ,le32_to_cpu (signode->len)); err = -EINVAL ; goto out_destroy;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
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Quoted 33 lines
Von: "Ibrahim Hashimov" <[email protected]>
An: "richard" <[email protected]>
CC: "chengzhihao1" <[email protected]>, "Sascha Hauer" <[email protected]>, "linux-mtd" <[email protected]>, "linux-kernel" <[email protected]>, "stable" <[email protected]>
Gesendet: Freitag, 24. Juli 2026 09:43:27
Betreff: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check
ubifs_sb_verify_signature()bounds the on-diskubifs_sig_node->lenfield before handing the signature payload toverify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))The signature bytes start
sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)(UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at mostsnod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 *
UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZlarger than the node actually holds -- past the end ofc->sbuf, which isvmalloc(c->leb_size).verify_pkcs7_signature()->pkcs7_parse_message()->asn1_ber_decoder()is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this viaubifs_read_superblock()before the signature is cryptographically checked.
snod->lenis guaranteed to be >=UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZby the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len ==UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.
Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")Signed-off-by Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>Assisted-by AuditCode-AI:2026.07---
fs/ubifs/auth.c| 2 +-1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Thanks,
//richard
Quoted 26 lines · Ibrahim Hashimov
ubifs_sb_verify_signature()bounds the on-diskubifs_sig_node->lenfield before handing the signature payload toverify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))The signature bytes start
sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)(UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at mostsnod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 *
UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZlarger than the node actually holds -- past the end ofc->sbuf, which isvmalloc(c->leb_size).verify_pkcs7_signature()->pkcs7_parse_message()->asn1_ber_decoder()is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this viaubifs_read_superblock()before the signature is cryptographically checked.
snod->lenis guaranteed to be >=UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZby the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len ==UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.
Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")Signed-off-by Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>Assisted-by AuditCode-AI:2026.07--- fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 18 lines
fs/ubifs/auth.c +1
-2@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c, signode = snod->node; -if (le32_to_cpu (signode->len) > snod->len +sizeof (struct ubifs_sig_node )) { +if (le32_to_cpu (signode->len) > snod->len -sizeof (struct ubifs_sig_node )) {ubifs_err (c,"invalid signature len %d" ,le32_to_cpu (signode->len)); err = -EINVAL ; goto out_destroy; --2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
.
Richard Weinberger
AppliedQuoted 10 lines · Ibrahim Hashimov
ubifs_sb_verify_signature()bounds the on-diskubifs_sig_node->lenfield before handing the signature payload toverify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))The signature bytes start
sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)(UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most[...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/1] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check
commit: d68851fbac230fabaeeae25b19fe60ece173da88