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ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

PATCH Applied Ibrahim Hashimov 4 participants 4 messages Jul 24 – Aug 11

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:

	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))

The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most

	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)

bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size). verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder() is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.

snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.

Fixes 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
Assisted-by AuditCode-AI:2026.07
---
 fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ubifs/auth.c +1 -1
index a4a0158f712d..1f770795ee70 100644
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c,
 
 	signode = snod->node;
 
-	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
+	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "invalid signature len %d", le32_to_cpu(signode->len));
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_destroy;

--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----

Quoted 33 lines

Von: "Ibrahim Hashimov" <[email protected]>
An: "richard" <[email protected]>
CC: "chengzhihao1" <[email protected]>, "Sascha Hauer" <[email protected]>, "linux-mtd" <[email protected]>, "linux-kernel" <[email protected]>, "stable" <[email protected]>
Gesendet: Freitag, 24. Juli 2026 09:43:27
Betreff: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:

	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))

The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most

	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)

bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size). verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder() is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.

snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.

Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
Assisted-by AuditCode-AI:2026.07

---
fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-

1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Thanks,
//richard

reviewer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Ibrahim Hashimov
Quoted 26 lines · Ibrahim Hashimov

ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:

	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))

The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most

	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)

bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size). verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder() is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.

snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.

Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
Assisted-by AuditCode-AI:2026.07
---
  fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 18 lines
fs/ubifs/auth.c +1 -2
index a4a0158f712d..1f770795ee70 100644
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c,
 
  	signode = snod->node;
 
-	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
+	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
  		ubifs_err(c, "invalid signature len %d", le32_to_cpu(signode->len));
  		err = -EINVAL;
  		goto out_destroy;
--

2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Ibrahim Hashimov
Quoted 10 lines · Ibrahim Hashimov

ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign:

	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))

The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

      commit: d68851fbac230fabaeeae25b19fe60ece173da88