7.1.6-rc1 review

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chancel Liu <[email protected]>

commit d091132889c1378dd0944a72f86eae3e4da1e4fa upstream.

When the BCLK divider ratio is 1:1, fsl_sai_set_bclk() enables bypass mode by setting BYP, but never clears the bit. The BYP=1 value remains in the regcache, and is restored by regcache_sync() on the next runtime resume.

Since BYP=1 combined with BCD=1 immediately outputs the ungated MCLK as BCLK without waiting for BCE/TE/RE to be enabled, the clock is driven prematurely before the stream is fully configured, causing noise on some codecs.

Fix this by clearing BYP and BCI in fsl_sai_hw_free() taking into account sync mode and the opposite stream's state, so that the regcache holds BYP=0 before runtime suspend and regcache_sync() on resume will not restore bypass mode prematurely.

---
 sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.c |   29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -804,6 +804,8 @@ static int fsl_sai_hw_free(struct snd_pc
 	struct fsl_sai *sai = snd_soc_dai_get_drvdata(cpu_dai);
 	bool tx = substream->stream == SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK;
 	unsigned int ofs = sai->soc_data->reg_offset;
+	int adir = tx ? RX : TX;
+	int dir  = tx ? TX : RX;
 
 	/* Clear xMR to avoid channel swap with mclk_with_tere enabled case */
 	regmap_write(sai->regmap, FSL_SAI_xMR(tx), 0);

@@ -811,10 +813,29 @@ static int fsl_sai_hw_free(struct snd_pc
 	regmap_update_bits(sai->regmap, FSL_SAI_xCR3(tx, ofs),
 			   FSL_SAI_CR3_TRCE_MASK, 0);
 
-	if (!sai->is_consumer_mode[tx] &&
-	    sai->mclk_streams & BIT(substream->stream)) {
-		clk_disable_unprepare(sai->mclk_clk[sai->mclk_id[tx]]);
-		sai->mclk_streams &= ~BIT(substream->stream);
+	if (!sai->is_consumer_mode[tx]) {
+		bool adir_active = !!(sai->mclk_streams & BIT(!substream->stream));
+		/*
+		 * If opposite stream provides clocks for synchronous mode and
+		 * it is inactive, Clear BYP and BCI
+		 */
+		if (fsl_sai_dir_is_synced(sai, adir) && !adir_active)
+			regmap_update_bits(sai->regmap, FSL_SAI_xCR2(!tx, ofs),
+					   FSL_SAI_CR2_BCI | FSL_SAI_CR2_BYP, 0);
+		/*
+		 * Clear BYP and BCI of current stream if either of:
+		 * 1. current stream doesn't provide clocks for synchronous mode
+		 * 2. current stream provides clocks for synchronous mode but no
+		 *    more stream is active.
+		 */
+		if (!fsl_sai_dir_is_synced(sai, dir) || !adir_active)
+			regmap_update_bits(sai->regmap, FSL_SAI_xCR2(tx, ofs),
+					   FSL_SAI_CR2_BCI | FSL_SAI_CR2_BYP, 0);
+
+		if (sai->mclk_streams & BIT(substream->stream)) {
+			clk_disable_unprepare(sai->mclk_clk[sai->mclk_id[tx]]);
+			sai->mclk_streams &= ~BIT(substream->stream);
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 3349ef6a366a61d631f6a263d12cea240957719d upstream.

The program header scan handles PT_INTERP from a switch nested in the scan loop, so its break leaves the switch and not the loop. A binary carrying more than one PT_INTERP runs the case again and overwrites both interpreter_name and interpreter. The previous name allocation leaks and so does the previous interpreter reference, along with the write denial open_exec() took on it. The denial is never released, so the file stays unwritable for as long as the system runs.

An unprivileged caller reaches this with a crafted binary and repeats it at will. binfmt_elf stops at the first PT_INTERP. Do the same here.

The flaw dates back to the driver's introduction in the pre-git history tree introduced in v2.6.11 by 91808d6ebe39 ("[PATCH] FRV: Add FDPIC ELF binary format driver").

---
 fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct
 	for (i = 0; i < exec_params.hdr.e_phnum; i++, phdr++) {
 		switch (phdr->p_type) {
 		case PT_INTERP:
+			/* elf ABI allows only one interpreter */
+			if (interpreter_name)
+				continue;
+
 			retval = -ENOMEM;
 			if (phdr->p_filesz > PATH_MAX)
 				goto error;

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Changcheng <[email protected]>

commit 503d67fbaec6fdeaba391cb497675071db9d16ea upstream.

do_thaw_all() iterates over all superblocks via __iterate_supers() with SUPER_ITER_EXCL, which acquires s_umount exclusively before calling the callback and releases it afterwards. However, the callback do_thaw_all_callback() calls thaw_super_locked() which unconditionally releases s_umount on every code path. This results in a second unlock attempt in __iterate_supers() that corrupts the rwsem state, triggering a DEBUG_RWSEMS warning:

[  182.601148] sysrq: Emergency Thaw of all frozen filesystems
[  182.601865] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  182.602375] DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE)): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff99b1011e5870, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff99b101b06c80, list not empty
[  182.603817] WARNING: kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1412 at up_write+0xa3/0x170, CPU#2: kworker/2:1/53
[  182.604578] Modules linked in:
[  182.604864] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00001-gbd3bd93ea98a-dirty #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
[  182.605711] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[  182.606417] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[  182.606750] RIP: 0010:up_write+0xaf/0x170
[  182.607076] Code: 19 3a 92 48 0f 44 c2 48 8b 55 08 48 8b 55 00 4c 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 48 8d 3d ad 91 e0 01 48 8b 4d 20 50 48 c7 c6 f0 8c 26 92 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 d7 93 4e 00 58 eb 81 48 83 7f 18 00 48 c7 c2 8d
[  182.608563] RSP: 0018:ffffb670001d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  182.609007] RAX: ffffffff92349e8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff99b1011e5870
[  182.609595] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff92268cf0 RDI: ffffffff92914d10
[  182.610283] RBP: ffff99b1011e5870 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff99b101b06c80
[  182.610847] R10: ffff99b10139a808 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: 0000000000000000
[  182.611414] R13: ffffffff90cf74d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff99b1011e5800
[  182.612009] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99b1eaaee000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  182.612670] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  182.613146] CR2: 00000000005c631c CR3: 00000000013ee000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  182.613722] Call Trace:
[  182.613946]  <TASK>
[  182.614130]  __iterate_supers+0x128/0x150
[  182.614463]  do_thaw_all+0x1b/0x30
[  182.614759]  process_scheduled_works+0xbb/0x3f0
[  182.615150]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  182.615499]  worker_thread+0x129/0x270
[  182.615816]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  182.616201]  kthread+0xe2/0x120
[  182.616469]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  182.616792]  ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x240
[  182.617115]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  182.617426]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  182.617761]  </TASK>
[  182.617968] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  182.618412] Emergency Thaw complete

Fix this by switching to SUPER_ITER_UNLOCKED and acquiring s_umount in the callback via super_lock_excl() before calling thaw_super_locked(). This matches the locking pattern expected by thaw_super_locked() and eliminates the double unlock.

While at it, remove the dead 'return;' at the end of do_thaw_all_callback().

---
 fs/super.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1145,16 +1145,19 @@ void emergency_remount(void)
 
 static void do_thaw_all_callback(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
 {
+	if (!super_lock_excl(sb))
+		return;
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLOCK))
 		while (sb->s_bdev && !bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev))
 			pr_warn("Emergency Thaw on %pg\n", sb->s_bdev);
+
 	thaw_super_locked(sb, FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE, NULL);
-	return;
 }
 
 static void do_thaw_all(struct work_struct *work)
 {
-	__iterate_supers(do_thaw_all_callback, NULL, SUPER_ITER_EXCL);
+	__iterate_supers(do_thaw_all_callback, NULL, SUPER_ITER_UNLOCKED);
 	kfree(work);
 	printk(KERN_WARNING "Emergency Thaw complete\n");
 }

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

commit 4b9a5458d02e214ef2b384124ca626e3e381d778 upstream.

The ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode for filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching.

Commit facd61053cff1 ("fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api") used this facility to opt out of posix acl caching for fuse inodes with fuse server that does not negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL (fc->posix_acl).

The commit also takes care to gate the forget_all_cached_acls() call in fuse_set_acl() on fc->posix_acl because there is no need for it, but there are other placed in fuse code which call forget_all_cached_acls() unconditional to fc->posix_acl and those cause the loss of the ACL_DONT_CACHE state.

This is not only a functional bug. Properly timed, a get_acl() from this fuse filesystem can return a stale cached value, as was observed in tests, because set_acl() does not invalidate the unintentional acl cache.

We could fix this in fuse, but it actually makes no sense for the vfs helper forget_cached_acl() to invalidate the ACL_DONT_CACHE state, so let it not do that to fix fuse and future users of ACL_DONT_CACHE.

---
 fs/posix_acl.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static void __forget_cached_acl(struct p
 {
 	struct posix_acl *old;
 
+	/*
+	 * ACL_DONT_CACHE is expected to be a "const" value and xchg it with
+	 * ACL_NOT_CACHED would enable acl caching for the inode -
+	 * clearly not what the caller has intended.
+	 */
+	if (READ_ONCE(*p) == ACL_DONT_CACHE)
+		return;
 	old = xchg(p, ACL_NOT_CACHED);
 	if (!is_uncached_acl(old))
 		posix_acl_release(old);

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit b5fa40226e71c17847b9ff2816c6ca4133d0d994 upstream.

The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY. It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys).

The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when the last inode that references the key is evicted.

However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later.

Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct super_block structs.

Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent ("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block.

---
 fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -147,13 +147,19 @@ find_or_insert_direct_key(struct fscrypt
 		if (memcmp(ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
 			   dk->dk_descriptor, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0)
 			continue;
+		/* The sb is used at eviction time, so it must be the same. */
+		if (ci->ci_inode->i_sb != dk->dk_sb)
+			continue;
 		if (ci->ci_mode != dk->dk_mode)
 			continue;
 		if (!fscrypt_is_key_prepared(&dk->dk_key, ci))
 			continue;
 		if (crypto_memneq(raw_key, dk->dk_raw, ci->ci_mode->keysize))
 			continue;
-		/* using existing tfm with same (descriptor, mode, raw_key) */
+		/*
+		 * Use an existing prepared key with the same (descriptor, sb,
+		 * mode, inlinecrypt, raw_key) combination.
+		 */
 		refcount_inc(&dk->dk_refcount);
 		spin_unlock(&fscrypt_direct_keys_lock);
 		free_direct_key(to_insert);

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit 6fe4e4b8259e1330945b5f3c9476e08473b8e0e8 upstream.

When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.

Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:

- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.

- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.

For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.

(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)

---
 fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c |   57 ++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
 fs/f2fs/super.c          |   25 +++++++++++---------
 include/linux/fscrypt.h  |   20 +++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)

@@ -22,22 +22,14 @@
 
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
-static struct block_device **fscrypt_get_devices(struct super_block *sb,
-						 unsigned int *num_devs)
+static unsigned int
+fscrypt_get_devices(struct super_block *sb,
+		    struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES])
 {
-	struct block_device **devs;
-
-	if (sb->s_cop->get_devices) {
-		devs = sb->s_cop->get_devices(sb, num_devs);
-		if (devs)
-			return devs;
-	}
-	devs = kmalloc_obj(*devs);
-	if (!devs)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	if (sb->s_cop->get_devices)
+		return sb->s_cop->get_devices(sb, devs);
 	devs[0] = sb->s_bdev;
-	*num_devs = 1;
-	return devs;
+	return 1;
 }
 
 static unsigned int fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)

@@ -96,7 +88,7 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struc
 	const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	struct blk_crypto_config crypto_cfg;
-	struct block_device **devs;
+	struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES];
 	unsigned int num_devs;
 	unsigned int i;
 

@@ -135,20 +127,15 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struc
 	crypto_cfg.key_type = is_hw_wrapped_key ?
 		BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_HW_WRAPPED : BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
 
-	devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
-	if (IS_ERR(devs))
-		return PTR_ERR(devs);
-
+	num_devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, devs);
 	for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) {
 		if (!blk_crypto_config_supported(devs[i], &crypto_cfg))
-			goto out_free_devs;
+			return 0;
 	}
 
 	fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(ci->ci_mode, devs, num_devs, &crypto_cfg);
 
 	ci->ci_inlinecrypt = true;
-out_free_devs:
-	kfree(devs);
 
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -164,7 +151,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(str
 	enum blk_crypto_key_type key_type = is_hw_wrapped ?
 		BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_HW_WRAPPED : BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
 	struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key;
-	struct block_device **devs;
+	struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES];
 	unsigned int num_devs;
 	unsigned int i;
 	int err;

@@ -182,17 +169,12 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(str
 	}
 
 	/* Start using blk-crypto on all the filesystem's block devices. */
-	devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
-	if (IS_ERR(devs)) {
-		err = PTR_ERR(devs);
-		goto fail;
-	}
+	num_devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, devs);
 	for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) {
 		err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(devs[i], blk_key);
 		if (err)
 			break;
 	}
-	kfree(devs);
 	if (err) {
 		fscrypt_err(inode, "error %d starting to use blk-crypto", err);
 		goto fail;

@@ -210,20 +192,21 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(st
 				      struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key)
 {
 	struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key = prep_key->blk_key;
-	struct block_device **devs;
+	struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES];
 	unsigned int num_devs;
 	unsigned int i;
 
 	if (!blk_key)
 		return;
 
-	/* Evict the key from all the filesystem's block devices. */
-	devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
-	if (!IS_ERR(devs)) {
-		for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++)
-			blk_crypto_evict_key(devs[i], blk_key);
-		kfree(devs);
-	}
+	/*
+	 * Evict the key from all the filesystem's block devices.
+	 * This *must* be done before the key is freed.
+	 */
+	num_devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, devs);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++)
+		blk_crypto_evict_key(devs[i], blk_key);
+
 	kfree_sensitive(blk_key);
 }
 

@@ -3731,24 +3731,27 @@ static bool f2fs_has_stable_inodes(struc
 	return true;
 }
 
-static struct block_device **f2fs_get_devices(struct super_block *sb,
-					      unsigned int *num_devs)
+static unsigned int
+f2fs_get_devices(struct super_block *sb,
+		 struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES])
 {
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
-	struct block_device **devs;
+	int ndevs;
 	int i;
 
-	if (!f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi))
-		return NULL;
+	static_assert(MAX_DEVICES <= FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES);
 
-	devs = kmalloc_objs(*devs, sbi->s_ndevs);
-	if (!devs)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	if (!f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi)) {
+		devs[0] = sb->s_bdev;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	ndevs = sbi->s_ndevs;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ndevs > FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES))
+		ndevs = FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++)
 		devs[i] = FDEV(i).bdev;
-	*num_devs = sbi->s_ndevs;
-	return devs;
+	return ndevs;
 }
 
 static const struct fscrypt_operations f2fs_cryptops = {

@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ struct fscrypt_name {
 /* Maximum value for the third parameter of fscrypt_operations.set_context(). */
 #define FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE	40
 
+/* Maximum supported number of block devices per filesystem */
+#define FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES	8
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
 
 /* Crypto operations for filesystems */

@@ -181,21 +184,20 @@ struct fscrypt_operations {
 	bool (*has_stable_inodes)(struct super_block *sb);
 
 	/*
-	 * Return an array of pointers to the block devices to which the
-	 * filesystem may write encrypted file contents, NULL if the filesystem
-	 * only has a single such block device, or an ERR_PTR() on error.
-	 *
-	 * On successful non-NULL return, *num_devs is set to the number of
-	 * devices in the returned array.  The caller must free the returned
-	 * array using kfree().
+	 * Retrieve the list of block devices to which the filesystem may write
+	 * encrypted file contents.
+	 *
+	 * This writes the block_device pointers to @devs and returns the count
+	 * (between 1 and FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES inclusively).
 	 *
 	 * If the filesystem can use multiple block devices (other than block
 	 * devices that aren't used for encrypted file contents, such as
 	 * external journal devices), and wants to support inline encryption,
 	 * then it must implement this function.  Otherwise it's not needed.
 	 */
-	struct block_device **(*get_devices)(struct super_block *sb,
-					     unsigned int *num_devs);
+	unsigned int (*get_devices)(
+		struct super_block *sb,
+		struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES]);
 };
 
 int fscrypt_d_revalidate(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tengda Wu <[email protected]>

commit 7720b63bcef3f54c7fe288774b720a227d54a306 upstream.

In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release handlers to parse user input.

The affected handler paths and their specific functions are:
- Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open()
- Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write()
- Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release()

If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state, specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted input or undefined behavior.

Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent corruption of parser state.

---
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

@@ -1098,6 +1098,12 @@ struct ftrace_ops global_ops = {
 };
 
 /*
+ * parser_lock - Protects trace_parser state against concurrent operations.
+ * Held across trace_get_user() and subsequent buffer parsing to prevent races.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(parser_lock);
+
+/*
  * Used by the stack unwinder to know about dynamic ftrace trampolines.
  */
 struct ftrace_ops *ftrace_ops_trampoline(unsigned long addr)

@@ -5824,6 +5830,8 @@ ftrace_regex_write(struct file *file, co
 	/* iter->hash is a local copy, so we don't need regex_lock */
 
 	parser = &iter->parser;
+
+	guard(mutex)(&parser_lock);
 	read = trace_get_user(parser, ubuf, cnt, ppos);
 
 	if (read >= 0 && trace_parser_loaded(parser) &&

@@ -6961,12 +6969,14 @@ int ftrace_regex_release(struct inode *i
 		iter = file->private_data;
 
 	parser = &iter->parser;
+	mutex_lock(&parser_lock);
 	if (trace_parser_loaded(parser)) {
 		int enable = !(iter->flags & FTRACE_ITER_NOTRACE);
 
 		ftrace_process_regex(iter, parser->buffer,
 				     parser->idx, enable);
 	}
+	mutex_unlock(&parser_lock);
 
 	trace_parser_put(parser);
 

@@ -7298,10 +7308,12 @@ ftrace_graph_release(struct inode *inode
 
 		parser = &fgd->parser;
 
+		mutex_lock(&parser_lock);
 		if (trace_parser_loaded((parser))) {
 			ret = ftrace_graph_set_hash(fgd->new_hash,
 						    parser->buffer);
 		}
+		mutex_unlock(&parser_lock);
 
 		trace_parser_put(parser);
 

@@ -7414,6 +7426,7 @@ ftrace_graph_write(struct file *file, co
 
 	parser = &fgd->parser;
 
+	guard(mutex)(&parser_lock);
 	read = trace_get_user(parser, ubuf, cnt, ppos);
 
 	if (read >= 0 && trace_parser_loaded(parser) &&

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yitang Yang <[email protected]>

commit ab05caca123c6d0b41850b7c05b246e4dca4a770 upstream.

Both read and write may receive internal restart error codes from the filesystem layer and should be converted to -EINTR. However, when multishot read support was added, the error code normalization was lost for both io_read() and io_read_mshot().

Extract the conversion into io_fixup_restart_res() and apply it in all three locations: io_rw_done(), io_read(), and io_read_mshot().

---
 io_uring/rw.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

@@ -615,6 +615,24 @@ static void io_complete_rw_iopoll(struct
 	smp_store_release(&req->iopoll_completed, 1);
 }
 
+static inline ssize_t io_fixup_restart_res(ssize_t ret)
+{
+	switch (ret) {
+	case -ERESTARTSYS:
+	case -ERESTARTNOINTR:
+	case -ERESTARTNOHAND:
+	case -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK:
+		/*
+		 * We can't just restart the syscall, since previously
+		 * submitted sqes may already be in progress. Just fail
+		 * this IO with EINTR.
+		 */
+		return -EINTR;
+	default:
+		return ret;
+	}
+}
+
 static inline void io_rw_done(struct io_kiocb *req, ssize_t ret)
 {
 	struct io_rw *rw = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_rw);

@@ -624,21 +642,8 @@ static inline void io_rw_done(struct io_
 		return;
 
 	/* transform internal restart error codes */
-	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
-		switch (ret) {
-		case -ERESTARTSYS:
-		case -ERESTARTNOINTR:
-		case -ERESTARTNOHAND:
-		case -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK:
-			/*
-			 * We can't just restart the syscall, since previously
-			 * submitted sqes may already be in progress. Just fail
-			 * this IO with EINTR.
-			 */
-			ret = -EINTR;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
+	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+		ret = io_fixup_restart_res(ret);
 
 	if (req->flags & REQ_F_IOPOLL)
 		io_complete_rw_iopoll(&rw->kiocb, ret);

@@ -1034,7 +1039,8 @@ int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req, unsign
 
 	if (req->flags & REQ_F_BUFFERS_COMMIT)
 		io_kbuf_recycle(req, sel.buf_list, issue_flags);
-	return ret;
+
+	return io_fixup_restart_res(ret);
 }
 
 int io_read_mshot(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)

@@ -1068,8 +1074,10 @@ int io_read_mshot(struct io_kiocb *req,
 		return IOU_RETRY;
 	} else if (ret <= 0) {
 		io_kbuf_recycle(req, sel.buf_list, issue_flags);
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			ret = io_fixup_restart_res(ret);
 			req_set_fail(req);
+		}
 	} else if (!(req->flags & REQ_F_APOLL_MULTISHOT)) {
 		cflags = io_put_kbuf(req, ret, sel.buf_list);
 	} else {

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>

commit 9c7d8f7c8994c790fca501dc45ce66e7356cbe05 upstream.

ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk as (off + len - 1) >> i_blkbits. When off is 0 and len is 0, the unsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge last_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far beyond the ifs->state allocation.

Regarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len cannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is reachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic() returns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate, the guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because !folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called with copied == 0.

Add a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a zero-length range is a no-op.

---
 fs/iomap/buffered-io.c |   22 ++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -67,11 +67,13 @@ static bool ifs_set_range_uptodate(struc
 		struct iomap_folio_state *ifs, size_t off, size_t len)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
-	unsigned int first_blk = off >> inode->i_blkbits;
-	unsigned int last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
-	unsigned int nr_blks = last_blk - first_blk + 1;
+	unsigned int first_blk, last_blk;
 
-	bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk, nr_blks);
+	if (len) {
+		first_blk = off >> inode->i_blkbits;
+		last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
+		bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk, last_blk - first_blk + 1);
+	}
 	return ifs_is_fully_uptodate(folio, ifs);
 }
 

@@ -203,13 +205,17 @@ static void ifs_set_range_dirty(struct f
 {
 	struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
 	unsigned int blks_per_folio = i_blocks_per_folio(inode, folio);
-	unsigned int first_blk = (off >> inode->i_blkbits);
-	unsigned int last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
-	unsigned int nr_blks = last_blk - first_blk + 1;
+	unsigned int first_blk, last_blk;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	if (!len)
+		return;
+
+	first_blk = off >> inode->i_blkbits;
+	last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&ifs->state_lock, flags);
-	bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk + blks_per_folio, nr_blks);
+	bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk + blks_per_folio,
+		   last_blk - first_blk + 1);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ifs->state_lock, flags);
 }
 

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>

commit 780dfed688622ea01be3c9c2c55eec2207f05e04 upstream.

Hardware implementations report Scalable-Mode Page-walk Coherency Support via the SMPWCS field in the extended capability register. If the hardware does not support page-walk coherency, a clflush is required every time the page table entries (which are walked by the IOMMU hardware) are updated.

In the SVA case, page tables are managed by the CPU mm core, not by the IOMMU driver. Because the IOMMU driver has no way of knowing whether the CPU page table management code has ensured coherency via clflush, the driver must deny SVA if the hardware does not support coherent paging.

---
 drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 
 void intel_svm_check(struct intel_iommu *iommu)
 {
-	if (!pasid_supported(iommu))
+	if (!pasid_supported(iommu) || !ecap_smpwc(iommu->ecap))
 		return;
 
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) &&

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shengming Hu <[email protected]>

commit af9ea231c0b4530edc389a3126a69e0699b7699d upstream.

In free_to_pcs_bulk(), when remote_objects[] fills to PCS_BATCH_MAX, the code jumps to flush_remote to free the batch. If all remote entries have already been compacted out of p[] via tail swaps while local objects remain, the flush_remote path returns early since i < size no longer holds. The leftover local objects are then neither cached in the sheaf nor returned to the slab freelist, causing a memory leak.

For illustration:
size = 64, local objects at p[0..31], remote objects at p[32..63] After scanning all remotes: i = 32, size = 32
p[0..31] local objects are dropped.

Harry pointed out that, although the logic contains a real leak, it does not appear to be triggerable with the current in-tree users. To hit this path, at least PCS_BATCH_MAX objects, currently hardcoded to 32, need to be collected in remote_objects[]. Looking at current kmem_cache_free_bulk() users:

* maple_node has sheaf_capacity = 32
* skbuff_head_cache has sheaf_capacity = 28
* panthor and msm drivers have sheaf_capacity = 4

The sheaf capacity is, at least for now, derived purely from the object size, with the user-requested capacity used as a minimum. Therefore, among the current users, only maple_node has a sheaf_capacity large enough to reach PCS_BATCH_MAX.

However, for the bug to trigger in maple_node, all objects in the sheaf would have to be from remote nodes. In that case, there would be no local objects left to leak. So this issue was found by code review rather than from a runtime report, and it does not seem to be triggerable by current users.

Still, the bug could become reachable with future users, a different sheaf capacity, or a change to PCS_BATCH_MAX. Fix the logic by freeing a full remote batch in place during the scan and then continuing to process the compacted array. This keeps all local objects on the normal fast path, while the tail path only handles any leftover partial remote batch. The redundant next_remote_batch jump label is removed as well.

---
 mm/slub.c |   12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -6066,7 +6066,6 @@ static void free_to_pcs_bulk(struct kmem
 	void *remote_objects[PCS_BATCH_MAX];
 	unsigned int remote_nr = 0;
 
-next_remote_batch:
 	while (i < size) {
 		struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(p[i]);
 

@@ -6081,8 +6080,11 @@ next_remote_batch:
 		if (unlikely(!can_free_to_pcs(slab))) {
 			remote_objects[remote_nr] = p[i];
 			p[i] = p[--size];
-			if (++remote_nr >= PCS_BATCH_MAX)
-				goto flush_remote;
+			if (++remote_nr >= PCS_BATCH_MAX) {
+				__kmem_cache_free_bulk(s, remote_nr, &remote_objects[0]);
+				stat_add(s, FREE_SLOWPATH, remote_nr);
+				remote_nr = 0;
+			}
 			continue;
 		}
 

@@ -6166,10 +6168,6 @@ flush_remote:
 	if (remote_nr) {
 		__kmem_cache_free_bulk(s, remote_nr, &remote_objects[0]);
 		stat_add(s, FREE_SLOWPATH, remote_nr);
-		if (i < size) {
-			remote_nr = 0;
-			goto next_remote_batch;
-		}
 	}
 }
 

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Yoo (Oracle) <[email protected]>

commit 1dba91a0493b7ffe9cbbcf7a8df1b361ddcac515 upstream.

When kmalloc caches are aliased, multiple cache pointers reference the same kmem_cache. As a result, iterating over kmalloc indices and bootstrapping sheaves can bootstrap the same cache more than once and leak memory.

Currently, this could happen when the architecture specifies minimum alignment for slab caches that is larger than ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN.

Bootstrap sheaves only when the cache does not have them already. Add a warning when bootstrap_cache_sheaves() is called for a cache that already has sheaves enabled.

---
 mm/slub.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -8423,6 +8423,8 @@ static void __init bootstrap_cache_sheav
 	bool failed = false;
 	int node, cpu;
 
+	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(cache_has_sheaves(s));
+
 	capacity = calculate_sheaf_capacity(s, &empty_args);
 
 	/* capacity can be 0 due to debugging or SLUB_TINY */

@@ -8473,8 +8475,11 @@ static void __init bootstrap_kmalloc_she
 
 	for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type <= KMALLOC_RANDOM_END; type++) {
 		for (int idx = 0; idx < KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1; idx++) {
-			if (kmalloc_caches[type][idx])
-				bootstrap_cache_sheaves(kmalloc_caches[type][idx]);
+			struct kmem_cache *s = kmalloc_caches[type][idx];
+
+			/* Do not bootstrap twice when caches are aliased */
+			if (s && !cache_has_sheaves(s))
+				bootstrap_cache_sheaves(s);
 		}
 	}
 }

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Markus Breitenberger <[email protected]>

commit 0ab78ead2481adb52f9eb5b403865c529f6f2348 upstream.

intel_mac_finish() is registered as the phylink mac_finish() callback for the Elkhart Lake SGMII ports. phylink calls it at the end of every major link reconfiguration, including the initial one during probe.

The callback selects the PMC ModPHY LCPLL programming for the requested MAC-side interface and then power-cycles the SerDes. On Elkhart Lake that ModPHY is also used by the on-die AHCI SATA PHY. Reapplying the programming during the initial boot-time link-up disturbs the shared analog block while it is still driving SATA, so the SATA link fails to train:

ata1: SATA link down (SStatus 1 SControl 300)

The disk carrying the root filesystem is never detected and the system hangs at rootwait. Ethernet itself comes up normally, which makes the failure look unrelated to the network driver.

Before mac_finish() runs, the legacy SerDes power-up path has already programmed SERDES_GCR0 for the current interface. The 1G and 2.5G ModPHY tables selected by mac_finish() correspond to the SerDes lane rate, so read that rate back from SERDES_GCR0 and skip the PMC reprogramming and SerDes power-cycle when it already matches the selected interface.

This keeps the disruptive reprogramming out of the boot path when the SerDes is configured correctly, while preserving the previous behavior when a real SGMII/1000BASE-X to 2500BASE-X rate change is needed. If the register read fails, reconfigure as before.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-intel.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)

@@ -524,6 +524,32 @@ static int intel_set_reg_access(const st
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return true if the SerDes lane rate must change to serve @interface.
+ * If the current rate cannot be determined, reconfigure as before.
+ */
+static bool intel_serdes_needs_reconfig(struct stmmac_priv *priv,
+					struct intel_priv_data *intel_priv,
+					phy_interface_t interface)
+{
+	u32 cur_rate, want_rate;
+	int data;
+
+	if (!intel_priv->mdio_adhoc_addr)
+		return true;
+
+	data = mdiobus_read(priv->mii, intel_priv->mdio_adhoc_addr,
+			    SERDES_GCR0);
+	if (data < 0)
+		return true;
+
+	cur_rate = (data & SERDES_RATE_MASK) >> SERDES_RATE_PCIE_SHIFT;
+	want_rate = interface == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_2500BASEX ?
+			SERDES_RATE_PCIE_GEN2 : SERDES_RATE_PCIE_GEN1;
+
+	return cur_rate != want_rate;
+}
+
 static int intel_mac_finish(struct net_device *ndev,
 			    void *intel_data,
 			    unsigned int mode,

@@ -535,6 +561,11 @@ static int intel_mac_finish(struct net_d
 	int max_regs = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (!intel_serdes_needs_reconfig(priv, intel_priv, interface)) {
+		priv->plat->phy_interface = interface;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	ret = intel_tsn_lane_is_available(ndev, intel_priv);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		netdev_info(priv->dev, "No TSN lane available to set the registers.\n");

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

commit 0f71f852a96af9685858ce59fda34ecbf85c283d upstream.

pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF.

Reproduced under KASAN:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
  Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157
   pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
   pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10
   pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410
   __sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0
   phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0
   __netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0

Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one.

---
 net/phonet/pep.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ static unsigned char *pep_get_sb(struct
 	ph = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, 2, &h);
 	if (ph == NULL || ph->sb_len < 2 || !pskb_may_pull(skb, ph->sb_len))
 		return NULL;
+	/* pskb_may_pull() may have reallocated the head; refetch ph. */
+	ph = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, 2, &h);
 	ph->sb_len -= 2;
 	*ptype = ph->sb_type;
 	*plen = ph->sb_len;

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 3a61bd9637f3d929aa846e4eb3d98b48c26fcb0e upstream.

A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns vxlan->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in vxlan->net can rewrite a vxlan device whose underlay lives in vxlan->net.

vxlan_changelink() validates and applies the new configuration against vxlan->net (vxlan_config_validate(vxlan->net, ...)) and can reopen the underlay socket in that netns, so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here.

Gate vxlan_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -4422,6 +4422,9 @@ static int vxlan_changelink(struct net_d
 	struct vxlan_rdst *dst;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, vxlan->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
 	err = vxlan_nl2conf(tb, data, dev, &conf, true, extack);
 	if (err)

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sungmin Kang <[email protected]>

commit ee7f9bb9320add61f7b367d7e6cd55e3a3a4d65d upstream.

sl_realloc_bufs() replaces rbuff and updates buffsize while holding sl->lock. slip_receive_buf() reads those fields and writes through rbuff without holding the lock.

An MTU change can therefore race with receive processing. An MTU shrink can expose the new smaller rbuff with the old larger bound, causing an out-of-bounds write. A receive callback which already loaded the old rbuff can instead continue writing after that buffer has been freed.

Serialize receive processing with sl_realloc_bufs() by holding sl->lock while consuming each receive batch.

---
 drivers/net/slip/slip.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -693,6 +693,8 @@ static void slip_receive_buf(struct tty_
 	if (!sl || sl->magic != SLIP_MAGIC || !netif_running(sl->dev))
 		return;
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&sl->lock);
+
 	/* Read the characters out of the buffer */
 	while (count--) {
 		if (fp && *fp++) {

@@ -708,6 +710,8 @@ static void slip_receive_buf(struct tty_
 #endif
 			slip_unesc(sl, *cp++);
 	}
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sl->lock);
 }
 
 /************************************

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 8efb8f8bbb353b8f2fdf4f37534c6d96c9f69e01 upstream.

A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns geneve->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in geneve->net can rewrite a geneve device whose underlay lives in geneve->net.

geneve_changelink() applies the new configuration against geneve->net:
geneve_link_config() and the geneve_quiesce()/geneve_unquiesce() pair reopen the underlay sockets in that netns (geneve_sock_add() uses geneve->net), so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here.

Gate geneve_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/geneve.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -2251,6 +2251,9 @@ static int geneve_changelink(struct net_
 	struct geneve_config cfg;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, geneve->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If the geneve device is configured for metadata (or externally
 	 * controlled, for example, OVS), then nothing can be changed.
 	 */

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hidayath Khan <[email protected]>

commit 47a5116e56a6b6fe1e909f244e39cd0fc26ceee4 upstream.

afiucv_hs_callback_syn() allocates the child socket with GFP_ATOMIC. If the allocation fails, nsk is NULL.

The connection-refused path is entered when the listen state check fails, the accept backlog is full, or nsk is NULL. The code unconditionally calls iucv_sock_kill(nsk) in that path.

iucv_sock_kill() does not accept a NULL socket pointer and immediately dereferences sk via sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED). When nsk is NULL, calling iucv_sock_kill(nsk) results in a NULL pointer dereference.

Only call iucv_sock_kill() when a child socket was successfully allocated.

---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1874,7 +1874,8 @@ static int afiucv_hs_callback_syn(struct
 		afiucv_swap_src_dest(skb);
 		trans_hdr->flags = AF_IUCV_FLAG_SYN | AF_IUCV_FLAG_FIN;
 		err = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
-		iucv_sock_kill(nsk);
+		if (nsk)
+			iucv_sock_kill(nsk);
 		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 		goto out;
 	}

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

commit be7cc4656eb1f54029610e82d1f0fdd3f9b5ec0a upstream.

af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q, each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg() drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path.

Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued.

---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static void iucv_sever_path(struct sock
 	unsigned char user_data[16];
 	struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
 	struct iucv_path *path = iucv->path;
+	struct sock_msg_q *p, *n;
 
 	/* Whoever resets the path pointer, must sever and free it. */
 	if (xchg(&iucv->path, NULL)) {

@@ -347,6 +348,19 @@ static void iucv_sever_path(struct sock
 		} else
 			pr_iucv->path_sever(path, NULL);
 		iucv_path_free(path);
+
+		/*
+		 * Message notifications queued on message_q still reference
+		 * the now freed path; drop them, otherwise a later recvmsg()
+		 * would pass the freed iucv_path to message_receive() via
+		 * iucv_process_message_q().
+		 */
+		spin_lock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &iucv->message_q.list, list) {
+			list_del(&p->list);
+			kfree(p);
+		}
+		spin_unlock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
 	}
 }
 

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manjunath Patil <[email protected]>

commit e32649b4bad90a6216d8e93cd7dd050af8ac9740 upstream.

After PCIe DPC recovery, mlx5 reloads the affected functions and replays multiport affiliation events. In the reported failure, the first relevant device error was:

pcieport 0000:10:01.1: DPC: containment event
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Fatal)
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: [ 5] SDES (First)

mlx5 recovered the PCI functions and resumed 0000:11:00.1. During that resume, RDMA multiport binding replayed MLX5_DRIVER_EVENT_AFFILIATION_DONE and mlx5e sent MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP. The host then panicked with:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
  RIP: mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready+0x5/0x40 [mlx5_core]
  RDI: 0000000000000000

Call trace included:

mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready
mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv
mlx5_devcom_send_event
mlx5_ib_bind_slave_port
mlx5r_mp_probe
mlx5_pci_resume

MPV devcom registration publishes mlx5e private data to the component peer list before mlx5e_devcom_init_mpv() stores the returned component device in priv->devcom. A concurrent master-up event can therefore reach a peer whose private data is visible but whose priv->devcom backpointer is still NULL.

MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP already carries the sender/master mlx5e private data as event_data. The ready bit is stored on the shared devcom component, not on an individual peer. Use the sender devcom when marking the MPV component ready.

This preserves the readiness transition while avoiding a NULL dereference of the peer devcom pointer during affiliation replay after PCI error recovery.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -211,11 +211,11 @@ static void mlx5e_disable_async_events(s
 
 static int mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv(int event, void *my_data, void *event_data)
 {
-	struct mlx5e_priv *slave_priv = my_data;
+	struct mlx5e_priv *master_priv = event_data;
 
 	switch (event) {
 	case MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP:
-		mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready(slave_priv->devcom, true);
+		mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready(master_priv->devcom, true);
 		break;
 	case MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_DOWN:
 		/* no need for comp set ready false since we unregister after

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aldo Ariel Panzardo <[email protected]>

commit f43ee0c0730d6191629b5ee1ceae27b1ebfdc047 upstream.

qdisc_get_rtab() and qdisc_put_rtab() mutate the process-global singly linked list qdisc_rtab_list and a plain non-atomic 'int refcnt' with no lock. This was only safe because every caller historically held the RTNL mutex, which serialized all rate-table lookups, inserts and frees.

That invariant no longer holds. cls_flower sets TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED, so tc_new_tfilter() keeps rtnl_held == false for it and sets TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL. That flag propagates through tcf_exts_validate_ex() -> tcf_action_init() -> tcf_action_init_1() -> tcf_police_init(), which calls qdisc_get_rtab()/qdisc_put_rtab() with the RTNL mutex NOT held. Two RTM_NEWTFILTER requests on different CPUs, each adding a flower filter with a police action carrying the same rate, then race on qdisc_rtab_list and on the non-atomic refcnt, leading to a use-after-free / double-free of the kmalloc-2k struct qdisc_rate_table. qdisc_rtab_list is a single global (not per-netns), so the corrupted object is shared system-wide.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
   qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
   tcf_police_init+0xda9/0x1590
   tcf_action_init_1+0x460/0x6b0
   tcf_action_init+0x439/0xa40
   tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x42d/0x550
   fl_change+0xddd/0x7da0
   tc_new_tfilter+0xaa7/0x2420
   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048

Protect qdisc_rtab_list and the refcount with a dedicated spinlock. The (sleeping, GFP_KERNEL) allocation in qdisc_get_rtab() is performed before taking the lock; if a concurrent inserter added an identical table in the meantime the freshly allocated one is freed under the lock, so no duplicate is leaked. qdisc_put_rtab() now decrements the refcount and unlinks under the same lock.

---
 net/sched/sch_api.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -415,12 +415,13 @@ static __u8 __detect_linklayer(struct tc
 }
 
 static struct qdisc_rate_table *qdisc_rtab_list;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(qdisc_rtab_lock);
 
 struct qdisc_rate_table *qdisc_get_rtab(struct tc_ratespec *r,
 					struct nlattr *tab,
 					struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
-	struct qdisc_rate_table *rtab;
+	struct qdisc_rate_table *rtab, *new_rtab;
 
 	if (tab == NULL || r->rate == 0 ||
 	    r->cell_log == 0 || r->cell_log >= 32 ||

@@ -429,15 +430,20 @@ struct qdisc_rate_table *qdisc_get_rtab(
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
+	new_rtab = kmalloc_obj(*new_rtab);
+
+	spin_lock(&qdisc_rtab_lock);
 	for (rtab = qdisc_rtab_list; rtab; rtab = rtab->next) {
 		if (!memcmp(&rtab->rate, r, sizeof(struct tc_ratespec)) &&
 		    !memcmp(&rtab->data, nla_data(tab), TC_RTAB_SIZE)) {
 			rtab->refcnt++;
+			spin_unlock(&qdisc_rtab_lock);
+			kfree(new_rtab);
 			return rtab;
 		}
 	}
 
-	rtab = kmalloc_obj(*rtab);
+	rtab = new_rtab;
 	if (rtab) {
 		rtab->rate = *r;
 		rtab->refcnt = 1;

@@ -449,6 +455,7 @@ struct qdisc_rate_table *qdisc_get_rtab(
 	} else {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Failed to allocate new qdisc rate table");
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qdisc_rtab_lock);
 	return rtab;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_get_rtab);

@@ -457,18 +464,25 @@ void qdisc_put_rtab(struct qdisc_rate_ta
 {
 	struct qdisc_rate_table *rtab, **rtabp;
 
-	if (!tab || --tab->refcnt)
+	if (!tab)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&qdisc_rtab_lock);
+	if (--tab->refcnt) {
+		spin_unlock(&qdisc_rtab_lock);
 		return;
+	}
 
 	for (rtabp = &qdisc_rtab_list;
 	     (rtab = *rtabp) != NULL;
 	     rtabp = &rtab->next) {
 		if (rtab == tab) {
 			*rtabp = rtab->next;
-			kfree(rtab);
-			return;
+			break;
 		}
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qdisc_rtab_lock);
+	kfree(tab);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_put_rtab);
 

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Lee <[email protected]>

commit 5499e0602d2faafd42c580d25f615903c3fbe11b upstream.

x25_kill_by_neigh() walks the global X.25 socket list looking for sockets attached to a terminating neighbour. x25_list_lock protects list membership while the lookup is in progress, but it does not pin a socket's lifetime after the lock is dropped.

The function currently drops x25_list_lock before calling lock_sock(s). A concurrent close can run x25_release(), remove the same socket from x25_list, and drop the last socket reference in that window. The neighbour teardown path can then lock or inspect a freed struct sock/struct x25_sock.

Take sock_hold(s) while x25_list_lock still proves that the list entry is live, then drop the temporary reference after the socket has been locked, rechecked, and released. Recheck x25_sk(s)->neighbour after lock_sock(), because another path may have disconnected the socket before this path acquired the socket lock. Restart the list walk after each disconnect because the list lock was dropped and the previous iterator state may no longer be valid.

A QEMU/KASAN run against origin/master reproduced a slab-use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh().

---
 net/x25/af_x25.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1772,15 +1772,19 @@ void x25_kill_by_neigh(struct x25_neigh
 {
 	struct sock *s;
 
+again:
 	write_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
 
 	sk_for_each(s, &x25_list) {
 		if (x25_sk(s)->neighbour == nb) {
+			sock_hold(s);
 			write_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
 			lock_sock(s);
-			x25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, 0, 0);
+			if (x25_sk(s)->neighbour == nb)
+				x25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, 0, 0);
 			release_sock(s);
-			write_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
+			sock_put(s);
+			goto again;
 		}
 	}
 	write_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shiming Cheng <[email protected]>

commit e751256486d0ded20f5a9f9863467f1dce65142f upstream.

Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation.

As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated.

This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.

Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding):
1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list
2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set
3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called
4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag
5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs)
6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list

Root cause in skb_segment():
The check at line ~4891:

    if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
        (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {

When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.

Call Trace:
 skb_headlen(NULL skb)
 skb_segment
 tcp_gso_segment
 tcp4_gso_segment
 inet_gso_segment
 skb_mac_gso_segment
 __skb_gso_segment
 skb_gso_segment
 validate_xmit_skb
 validate_xmit_skb_list
 sch_direct_xmit
 qdisc_restart
 __qdisc_run
 qdisc_run
 net_tx_action

Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive().

---
 net/core/gro.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -229,7 +229,9 @@ done:
 
 int skb_gro_receive_list(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536))
+	/* make sure to check flush flag and to not merge */
+	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536 ||
+		     NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush))
 		return -E2BIG;
 
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb))) {

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>

commit 14fa65d10f5696b063a7d8d26e8291ea84a2c6ed upstream.

When build_skb() fails in hip04_rx_poll(), the driver jumps to the refill path without releasing the current RX buffer and its DMA mapping. Installing a replacement buffer then overwrites the slot references and leaks both resources.

Keep the current slot intact and return budget so NAPI retries the same buffer. Also free a newly allocated RX fragment when dma_map_single() fails.

This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -594,7 +594,11 @@ static int hip04_rx_poll(struct napi_str
 		skb = build_skb(buf, priv->rx_buf_size);
 		if (unlikely(!skb)) {
 			net_dbg_ratelimited("build_skb failed\n");
-			goto refill;
+			/* Retain the slot; return budget so NAPI retries this
+			 * buffer. Refill would overwrite rx_buf[]/rx_phys[]
+			 * and leak them.
+			 */
+			return budget;
 		}
 
 		dma_unmap_single(priv->dev, priv->rx_phys[priv->rx_head],

@@ -622,14 +626,15 @@ static int hip04_rx_poll(struct napi_str
 			rx++;
 		}
 
-refill:
 		buf = netdev_alloc_frag(priv->rx_buf_size);
 		if (!buf)
 			goto done;
 		phys = dma_map_single(priv->dev, buf,
 				      RX_BUF_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
-		if (dma_mapping_error(priv->dev, phys))
+		if (dma_mapping_error(priv->dev, phys)) {
+			skb_free_frag(buf);
 			goto done;
+		}
 		priv->rx_buf[priv->rx_head] = buf;
 		priv->rx_phys[priv->rx_head] = phys;
 		hip04_set_recv_desc(priv, phys);

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Coia Prant <[email protected]>

commit def9a4745e105145133e442dd8a1c126caf0f553 upstream.

Commit 2a22b7ae2fa3 ("net: pcs: xpcs: adapt Wangxun NICs for SGMII mode") added a path in xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii() that reads speed/duplex from BMCR after AN completes. However, BMCR does not reflect the negotiated result on the hardware where this has been tested:

- On RK3568 (MAC side SGMII), BMCR returns a fixed hardware reset value
- Wangxun engineer Jiawen Wu confirmed that on their side, "BMCR looks like it only wants to be return as 0" [0]

The correct information is available in CL37_ANSGM_STS, which contains the actual link status and negotiated speed/duplex.

This bug was previously masked by phylink core, which overrides the PCS link state with the PHY state when a PHY is present:

        /* If we have a phy, the "up" state is the union of both the
         * PHY and the MAC
         */
        if (phy)
                link_state.link &= pl->phy_state.link;

Thus, when the link is down, the PHY's link_down state is applied on top of whatever the PCS reports, hiding the broken PCS state reading path.

Modify xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii() to:
1. Read link state from CL37_ANSGM_STS
2. If link is up, report speed/duplex from CL37_ANSGM_STS
3. Remove the broken BMCR reading path entirely

Also properly set state->an_complete to reflect the AN completion status, and clear CL37_ANCMPLT_INTR when link is down to avoid stale state.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

---
 drivers/net/pcs/pcs-xpcs.c |   32 +++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ static int xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii(stru
 
 	/* Reset link_state */
 	state->link = false;
+	state->an_complete = false;
 	state->speed = SPEED_UNKNOWN;
 	state->duplex = DUPLEX_UNKNOWN;
 	state->pause = 0;

@@ -1069,6 +1070,8 @@ static int xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii(stru
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	state->an_complete = ret & DW_VR_MII_AN_STS_C37_ANCMPLT_INTR;
+
 	if (ret & DW_VR_MII_C37_ANSGM_SP_LNKSTS) {
 		int speed_value;
 

@@ -1086,34 +1089,13 @@ static int xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii(stru
 			state->duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
 		else
 			state->duplex = DUPLEX_HALF;
-	} else if (ret == DW_VR_MII_AN_STS_C37_ANCMPLT_INTR) {
-		int speed, duplex;
-
-		state->link = true;
-
-		speed = xpcs_read(xpcs, MDIO_MMD_VEND2, MII_BMCR);
-		if (speed < 0)
-			return speed;
 
-		speed &= BMCR_SPEED100 | BMCR_SPEED1000;
-		if (speed == BMCR_SPEED1000)
-			state->speed = SPEED_1000;
-		else if (speed == BMCR_SPEED100)
-			state->speed = SPEED_100;
-		else if (speed == 0)
-			state->speed = SPEED_10;
-
-		duplex = xpcs_read(xpcs, MDIO_MMD_VEND2, MII_ADVERTISE);
-		if (duplex < 0)
-			return duplex;
-
-		if (duplex & ADVERTISE_1000XFULL)
-			state->duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
-		else if (duplex & ADVERTISE_1000XHALF)
-			state->duplex = DUPLEX_HALF;
+		return 0;
+	}
 
+	/* Clear AN complete status or interrupt */
+	if (state->an_complete)
 		xpcs_write(xpcs, MDIO_MMD_VEND2, DW_VR_MII_AN_INTR_STS, 0);
-	}
 
 	return 0;
 }

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Youssef Samir <[email protected]>

commit ff194cffd586cbd4cc49eccb002c65f2a902a277 upstream.

The current node limit of 64 breaks the functionality for a number of AI200 deployments that have up to 384 nodes. Raise the limit to 512.

---
 net/qrtr/ns.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ struct qrtr_node {
  * requirements. If the requirement changes in the future, these values can be
  * increased.
  */
-#define QRTR_NS_MAX_NODES   64
+#define QRTR_NS_MAX_NODES   512
 #define QRTR_NS_MAX_SERVERS 256
 #define QRTR_NS_MAX_LOOKUPS 64
 
-static u8 node_count;
+static u16 node_count;
 
 static struct qrtr_node *node_get(unsigned int node_id)
 {

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit 425224c2d700391729be7fe6929a88ef4e2d7a4e upstream.

Don't return the return value of down_read_killable() (0) when a ptrace access check fails, return -EACCES as intended.

---
 fs/proc/namespaces.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(stru
 	const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops = PROC_I(inode)->ns_ops;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct path ns_path;
-	int error = -EACCES;
+	int error;
 
 	if (!dentry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(stru
 	if (error)
 		goto out_put_task;
 
+	error = -EACCES;
 	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
 		goto out;
 

@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentr
 	if (res)
 		goto out_put_task;
 
+	res = -EACCES;
 	if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
 		res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops);
 		if (res >= 0)

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>

commit e78f1ac37afcb16cb6fef8a2c92591eab6558956 upstream.

Only register the physical clock when facility 28 is installed and PTFF QAF returns that PTFF QPT is available.

---
 drivers/ptp/ptp_s390.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ static __init int ptp_s390_init(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(ptp_stcke_clock))
 		return PTR_ERR(ptp_stcke_clock);
 
+	if (!test_facility(28) || !ptff_query(PTFF_QPT))
+		return 0;
+
 	ptp_qpt_clock = ptp_clock_register(&ptp_s390_qpt_info, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(ptp_qpt_clock)) {
 		ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_stcke_clock);

@@ -117,7 +120,8 @@ static __init int ptp_s390_init(void)
 
 static __exit void ptp_s390_exit(void)
 {
-	ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_qpt_clock);
+	if (ptp_qpt_clock)
+		ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_qpt_clock);
 	ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_stcke_clock);
 }
 

Ah, good catch, now queued up. How did you find that thing?

greg k-h

It broke openSUSE kernel build. We have:
config/s390x/default:CONFIG_PTP_S390=m

thanks,

js
suse labs

Maybe we should change the documentation. I was wondering whether I have to mark that as a dependency, looked up ./process/stable-kernel-rules.rst which says:

Note that for a patch series, you do not have to list as prerequisites the patches present in the series itself. For example, if you have the following patch series::

patch1
patch2

where patch2 depends on patch1, you do not have to list patch1 as prerequisite of patch2 if you have already marked patch1 for stable inclusion.

Which lead me to believe that I don't have to add stable@ to the the other patch, but looks like this was wrong?

The issue is that was no link that I could find between 9de445d8296a ("s390/ptff: Export ptff_function_mask[]") and e78f1ac37afc ("ptp:
ptp_s390: Add missing facility check")

i.e. no "Fixes:" tag, or dependancy info, so if I took the "add missing..." patch, I didn't know that the export patch was required.

Not a big deal, happens at times, just if you know a commit fixes an older patch, a "Fixes:" tag is helpful.

thanks,

greg k-h

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Greenwalt <[email protected]>

commit f6a7e00b81e35ef1325234925f2fe1e53b466f92 upstream.

If a PF reset occurs when the PTP state is ICE_PTP_UNINIT, then ice_ptp_rebuild() will update the state to ICE_PTP_ERROR. This will result in the following PTP release call trace during driver unload:

    kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52!
    ice_ptp_release+0x332/0x3c0 [ice]
    ice_deinit_features.part.0+0x10e/0x120 [ice]
    ice_remove+0x100/0x220 [ice]

This was observed when passing PF1 through to a VM. ice_ptp_init() fails because ctrl_pf is NULL and sets the state to ICE_PTP_UNINIT.

Fix by detecting the ICE_PTP_UNINIT state in ice_ptp_rebuild() and returning without error, preventing the invalid state transition to ICE_PTP_ERROR. The only valid path to ICE_PTP_ERROR is from ICE_PTP_RESETTING after a failed rebuild.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -3035,6 +3035,11 @@ void ice_ptp_rebuild(struct ice_pf *pf,
 	struct ice_ptp *ptp = &pf->ptp;
 	int err;
 
+	if (ptp->state == ICE_PTP_UNINIT) {
+		dev_dbg(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "PTP was not initialized, skipping rebuild\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (ptp->state == ICE_PTP_READY) {
 		ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset(pf, reset_type);
 	} else if (ptp->state != ICE_PTP_RESETTING) {

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 1a087033a6bad73b4140020b40e819b0933aafc3 upstream.

When running instance tests, 'ftracetest' creates a new ftrace instance and runs the tests inside it. Before starting each test, it executes 'initialize_system()' to reset the ftrace state to initial-state.

However, since 'initialize_system()' is executed in the context of the instance directory, it only cleans up triggers and filters of that instance.
Any triggers or dynamic events left behind in the top-level instance by previous failed top-level tests, are left completely untouched. These top-level leftovers can cause subsequent instance-based tests to fail or even crash the kernel.

Fix this by executing 'initialize_system()' in the top-level tracing directory once before entering the instance loop.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/ftracetest |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ for t in $TEST_CASES; do
 done
 
 # Test on instance loop
+(cd $TRACING_DIR; initialize_system)
 INSTANCE=" (instance) "
 for t in $TEST_CASES; do
   test_on_instance $t || continue

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 749d7aa0377aae32af8c0a4ad43371e7bf830ab5 upstream.

do_thaw_all_callback() calls bdev_thaw() while holding sb->s_umount exclusively. If the block device was frozen via bdev_freeze() dropping the last block layer freeze reference calls fs_bdev_thaw() which reacquires s_umount:

do_thaw_all_callback(sb)

    super_lock_excl(sb)                     # holds sb->s_umount
    bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev)
      mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex)
      # bd_fsfreeze_count drops 1 -> 0
      bd_holder_ops->thaw == fs_bdev_thaw
        get_bdev_super(bdev)
          bdev_super_lock(bdev, true)
            super_lock(sb, true)
              down_write(&sb->s_umount)     # same task: deadlock

The emergency thaw worker deadlocks against itself holding both s_umount and bd_fsfreeze_mutex. That fscks any subsequent unmount, freeze, or thaw of that filesystem and block device.

  [   81.878470] sysrq: Show Blocked State
  [   81.880140] task:kworker/0:1     state:D stack:0     pid:11    tgid:11    ppid:2      task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000
  [   81.884876] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
  [   81.886656] Call Trace:
  [   81.887759]  <TASK>
  [   81.888763]  __schedule+0x579/0x1420
  [   81.890372]  schedule+0x3a/0x100
  [   81.891794]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
  [   81.893848]  rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x1ea/0x900
  [   81.895191]  ? __pfx_do_thaw_all_callback+0x10/0x10
  [   81.896528]  down_write+0xbd/0xc0
  [   81.897505]  super_lock+0x91/0x180
  [   81.898457]  ? __mutex_lock+0xa99/0x1140
  [   81.900748]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1f/0x400
  [   81.902069]  bdev_super_lock+0x5b/0x150
  [   81.903132]  get_bdev_super+0x10/0x60
  [   81.904042]  fs_bdev_thaw+0x23/0xf0
  [   81.904755]  bdev_thaw+0x82/0x100
  [   81.905484]  do_thaw_all_callback+0x2c/0x50
  [   81.906298]  __iterate_supers+0x5d/0x130
  [   81.907067]  do_thaw_all+0x20/0x40
  [   81.907739]  process_one_work+0x206/0x5e0
  [   81.908545]  worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0
  [   81.909339]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  [   81.910171]  kthread+0xf4/0x130
  [   81.910799]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [   81.911528]  ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3b0
  [   81.912259]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [   81.913010]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  [   81.913806]  </TASK>

bdev_super_lock() even documents the violated requirement with lockdep_assert_not_held(&sb->s_umount).

Acquiring bd_fsfreeze_mutex under s_umount also inverts the bd_fsfreeze_mutex vs. s_umount ordering established by bdev_{freeze,thaw}() and can thus ABBA against a concurrent block-layer freeze even when the recursive path isn't hit.

Fix this by not holding s_umount around the bdev_thaw() loop at all. Pin the superblock with an active reference instead as filesystems_freeze_callback() does. The active reference keeps the superblock from being shut down and so ->s_bdev stays valid without holding s_umount. The block-layer-held freeze is dropped by fs_bdev_thaw() with FREEZE_MAY_NEST | FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE exactly as a regular unfreeze would and thaw_super_locked() handles filesystem-level freezes as before.

The emergency thaw path has deadlocked like this in one form or another for a long long time but the current exclusively-held shape dates back to commit [1] where thaw_bdev() already ended in thaw_super() with s_umount held by do_thaw_all_callback().

---
 fs/super.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -1143,16 +1143,30 @@ void emergency_remount(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static inline bool get_active_super(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	bool active = false;
+
+	if (super_lock_excl(sb)) {
+		active = atomic_inc_not_zero(&sb->s_active);
+		super_unlock_excl(sb);
+	}
+	return active;
+}
+
 static void do_thaw_all_callback(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
 {
-	if (!super_lock_excl(sb))
+	if (!get_active_super(sb))
 		return;
 
+	/* fs_bdev_thaw() acquires s_umount so it must not be held here */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLOCK))
 		while (sb->s_bdev && !bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev))
 			pr_warn("Emergency Thaw on %pg\n", sb->s_bdev);
 
-	thaw_super_locked(sb, FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE, NULL);
+	if (super_lock_excl(sb))
+		thaw_super_locked(sb, FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE, NULL);
+	deactivate_super(sb);
 }
 
 static void do_thaw_all(struct work_struct *work)

@@ -1178,17 +1192,6 @@ void emergency_thaw_all(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static inline bool get_active_super(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	bool active = false;
-
-	if (super_lock_excl(sb)) {
-		active = atomic_inc_not_zero(&sb->s_active);
-		super_unlock_excl(sb);
-	}
-	return active;
-}
-
 static const char *filesystems_freeze_ptr = "filesystems_freeze";
 
 static void filesystems_freeze_callback(struct super_block *sb, void *freeze_all_ptr)

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>

commit a6c4250b81bd30beae94e1b7a4b26fa1193ad2e4 upstream.

In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in __rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() -> __rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From __rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore, the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request() and the assertion triggers.

This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for this case.

---
 drivers/block/rbd.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1957,10 +1957,15 @@ static int rbd_object_map_update_finish(
 	bool has_current_state;
 	void *p;
 
-	if (osd_req->r_result)
+	if (osd_req->r_result < 0)
 		return osd_req->r_result;
 
 	/*
+	 * Writes aren't allowed to return a data payload.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(osd_req->r_result > 0);
+
+	/*
 	 * Nothing to do for a snapshot object map.
 	 */
 	if (osd_req->r_num_ops == 1)

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carl Johnson <[email protected]>

commit 2eb74eef4b7eda8df593d22fb48e94ef959ec8a5 upstream.

The macOS built-in SMB server returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK for a CREATE on a path whose final component is a symlink, but it does not include a Symbolic Link Error Response in the error data: both ErrorContextCount and ByteCount are zero, so the symlink target is not present in the response at all. Per [MS-SMB2] section 2.2.2 such a response should carry a valid Symbolic Link Error Response, so this is a server bug, but the target can still be retrieved with FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT.

Frame from a capture against macOS 26.5.2 (build 25F84):

SMB2 hdr : Status=0x8000002d STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, Cmd=Create Error Rsp: StructureSize=0x0009
Error Context Count: 0
Byte Count: 0
Error Data: 00

symlink_data() cannot find a struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp in such a response and returns -EINVAL, which parse_create_response() propagates, so smb2_query_path_info() bails out at

	if (rc || !data->reparse_point)
		goto out;

before it can retry with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE. stat(), readlink() and ls of any server-side symlink then fail with -EINVAL:

  $ ls -la Config
  l????????? ? ? ? ? ? Config.json
  $ stat Config/Config.json
  stat: cannot statx 'Config/Config.json': Invalid argument

A 5.10 client resolves these symlinks correctly against the same server and share, so this is a regression for Apple SMB servers.

Handle it in several places:

- symlink_data() detects the empty response (ErrorContextCount and ByteCount both zero) and returns a distinct -ENODATA, so that "server did not send the target" can be told apart from a genuinely malformed response and only this case is worked around.

- parse_create_response() treats -ENODATA like STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, which does not carry the target
either: leave the reparse tag unset and clear rc, so the existing SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE path retrieves the target.

- smb2_query_path_info() only fixes up the symlink target type when the target is already known. SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE sets data->reparse.tag but does not parse the target out of the reparse buffer; that happens later, in reparse_info_to_fattr(). Without this check smb2_fix_symlink_target_type() is called with a NULL target and returns -EIO. This could not happen with servers that send the target inline and therefore skip SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE.

- smb2_open_file() maps -ENODATA to -EIO, matching STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, so its callers retrieve the target with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE as well.

Tested on Debian 13, kernel 6.18.38 (armv7), against macOS 26.5.2:
symlinks now resolve, including relative, parent-traversing and directory symlinks, and reads through symlinks succeed.

---
 fs/smb/client/smb2file.c  |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -30,6 +30,19 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *syml
 	u8 *end = (u8 *)err + iov->iov_len;
 	u32 len;
 
+	/*
+	 * Per [MS-SMB2] section 2.2.2, a STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK response has to
+	 * carry a Symbolic Link Error Response, so ByteCount cannot be zero.  Some
+	 * servers (e.g. the macOS built-in SMB server) violate this and return an
+	 * empty error response, with both ErrorContextCount and ByteCount set to
+	 * zero, i.e. without the symlink target.  Detect this and return -ENODATA
+	 * so that callers can tell "server did not send the target" apart from a
+	 * malformed response, and retrieve the target with FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT
+	 * instead.
+	 */
+	if (!err->ErrorContextCount && !le32_to_cpu(err->ByteCount))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENODATA);
+
 	if (err->ErrorContextCount) {
 		struct smb2_error_context_rsp *p;
 

@@ -201,6 +214,14 @@ int smb2_open_file(const unsigned int xi
 			rc = smb2_parse_symlink_response(oparms->cifs_sb, &err_iov,
 							 oparms->path,
 							 &data->symlink_target);
+			/*
+			 * If smb2_parse_symlink_response returned -ENODATA then the
+			 * symlink_target was not sent. Treat this as if the SMB2_open()
+			 * failed with STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED status, which is
+			 * indicated by the -EIO errno.
+			 */
+			if (rc == -ENODATA)
+				rc = -EIO;
 			if (!rc) {
 				memset(smb2_data, 0, sizeof(*smb2_data));
 				oparms->create_options |= OPEN_REPARSE_POINT;

@@ -792,9 +792,19 @@ static int parse_create_response(struct
 		rc = smb2_parse_symlink_response(cifs_sb, iov,
 						 full_path,
 						 &data->symlink_target);
-		if (rc)
+		if (rc != 0 && rc != -ENODATA)
 			return rc;
-		tag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK;
+		/*
+		 * -ENODATA means that the response was parsed but did not contain
+		 * the symlink target at all (see symlink_data()).  Treat it like
+		 * STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, which does not contain it
+		 * either: leave the tag unset and clear rc, so that the caller
+		 * retrieves the target with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE.
+		 */
+		if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			rc = 0;
+		else
+			tag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK;
 		reparse_point = true;
 		break;
 	case STATUS_SUCCESS:

@@ -987,7 +997,14 @@ int smb2_query_path_info(const unsigned
 				rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		}
 
-		if (data->reparse.tag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK && !rc) {
+		/*
+		 * If the symlink was already parsed in create response then it is needed to fix
+		 * its type now (after the second call with OPEN_REPARSE_POINT which filled the
+		 * data->fi.Attributes). If the symlink was not parsed in create response then
+		 * the data->symlink_target was not filled yet and then the type will be fixed
+		 * later after data->symlink_target is filled.
+		 */
+		if (data->reparse.tag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK && !rc && data->symlink_target) {
 			bool directory = le32_to_cpu(data->fi.Attributes) & ATTR_DIRECTORY;
 			rc = smb2_fix_symlink_target_type(&data->symlink_target, directory, cifs_sb);
 		}

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: James Montgomery <[email protected]>

commit c74801ee524f477c174a1899782b6c3b6918d407 upstream.

In ntlm_authenticate(), destroy_previous_session() is called using a user pointer resolved from the client-supplied NTLM blob username field before the NTLMv2 response is validated. An authenticated attacker can set the NTLM blob username to match a victim account and set PreviousSessionId to the victim's session ID; destroy_previous_session() destroys the victim's session while ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() subsequently rejects the request with -EPERM.

Move destroy_previous_session() and the prev_id assignment to after ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() returns success and use sess->user rather than the pre-authentication lookup result. This matches the ordering already used by krb5_authenticate(), where destroy_previous_session() is called only after ksmbd_krb5_authenticate() returns success.

---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c |    9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1535,11 +1535,6 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmb
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
 
-	/* Check for previous session */
-	prev_id = le64_to_cpu(req->PreviousSessionId);
-	if (prev_id && prev_id != sess->id)
-		destroy_previous_session(conn, user, prev_id);
-
 	if (sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID) {
 		/*
 		 * Reuse session if anonymous try to connect

@@ -1579,6 +1574,10 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmb
 		}
 	}
 
+	prev_id = le64_to_cpu(req->PreviousSessionId);
+	if (prev_id && prev_id != sess->id)
+		destroy_previous_session(conn, sess->user, prev_id);
+
 	/*
 	 * If session state is SMB2_SESSION_VALID, We can assume
 	 * that it is reauthentication. And the user/password

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>

commit cfc0b8e5080aec87700774e8568765eaa4b7b92b upstream.

The receive path applies the minimum SMB2 PDU size check only when ProtocolId is SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER. A packet carrying SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM bypasses the check even when the negotiated dialect does not provide transform handling.

On an SMB 2.1 connection, a short transform packet therefore reaches init_smb2_rsp_hdr(), which interprets the request as a full SMB2 header and reads beyond the request allocation. The copied fields can then be returned to the unauthenticated client.

Compression transforms are converted to ordinary SMB2 messages before protocol validation. After that conversion, validate ordinary SMB2 requests against SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE and require encryption transform requests to contain both a transform header and an SMB2 header. This rejects truncated requests before work allocation.

---
 fs/smb/server/connection.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -440,6 +440,8 @@ bool ksmbd_conn_alive(struct ksmbd_conn
 /* "+2" for BCC field (ByteCount, 2 bytes) */
 #define SMB1_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE (sizeof(struct smb_hdr) + 2)
 #define SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE (sizeof(struct smb2_pdu))
+#define SMB2_TRANSFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE	\
+	(sizeof(struct smb2_transform_hdr) + sizeof(struct smb2_hdr))
 
 /**
  * ksmbd_conn_handler_loop() - session thread to listen on new smb requests

@@ -454,6 +456,7 @@ int ksmbd_conn_handler_loop(void *p)
 	struct ksmbd_conn *conn = (struct ksmbd_conn *)p;
 	struct ksmbd_transport *t = conn->transport;
 	unsigned int pdu_size, max_allowed_pdu_size, max_req;
+	__le32 proto;
 	char hdr_buf[4] = {0,};
 	int size;
 

@@ -534,11 +537,14 @@ recheck:
 		if (!ksmbd_smb_request(conn))
 			break;
 
-		if (((struct smb2_hdr *)smb_get_msg(conn->request_buf))->ProtocolId ==
-		    SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER) {
-			if (pdu_size < SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE)
-				break;
-		}
+		proto = *(__le32 *)smb_get_msg(conn->request_buf);
+		if (proto == SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER &&
+		    pdu_size < SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE)
+			break;
+
+		if (proto == SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM &&
+		    pdu_size < SMB2_TRANSFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE)
+			break;
 
 		if (!default_conn_ops.process_fn) {
 			pr_err("No connection request callback\n");

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eddie Phillips <[email protected]>

commit b65352a1bac64442ad95e64f385b40ccb9f1b0db upstream.

When the system is under extreme memory pressure, page allocations can fail during the Rx buffer refill loop. If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low threshold and the refill loop exits due to allocation failures, the queue can stall:

1. The device drops incoming packets because there are no descriptors.
2. Since no packets are processed, no Rx completions are generated.
3. Because no completions occur, NAPI is never scheduled, preventing the refill loop from running again even after memory is freed.

This results in a permanent queue stall.

Resolve this by introducing a starvation recovery timer for each Rx queue. If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low threshold, start a timer to periodically reschedule NAPI. Once NAPI runs and successfully refills the queue above the threshold, the timer is not rescheduled.

The threshold is set to 32 because a single maximum-sized Receive Segment Coalescing (RSC) packet can consume up to 19 descriptors in the Rx path. Lower thresholds (such as 8 or 16) would be insufficient to process a complete maximum-sized RSC packet, risking packet drops or unexpected hardware behavior under memory pressure. Setting the threshold to 32 guarantees a safe margin to handle at least one full RSC packet.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve.h        |    3 ++
 drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_rx_dqo.c |   34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
 #include <linux/net_tstamp.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/timer.h>
 #include <linux/ptp_clock_kernel.h>
 #include <linux/u64_stats_sync.h>
 #include <net/page_pool/helpers.h>

@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@
 
 /* Interval to schedule a stats report update, 20000ms. */
 #define GVE_STATS_REPORT_TIMER_PERIOD	20000
+#define GVE_RX_NAPI_RESCHED_MS 20 /* msecs */
 
 /* Numbers of NIC tx/rx stats in stats report. */
 #define NIC_TX_STATS_REPORT_NUM	0

@@ -341,6 +343,7 @@ struct gve_rx_ring {
 	struct xdp_rxq_info xdp_rxq;
 	struct xsk_buff_pool *xsk_pool;
 	struct page_frag_cache page_cache; /* Page cache to allocate XDP frames */
+	struct timer_list starvation_timer; /* for queue starvation recovery */
 };
 
 /* A TX desc ring entry */

@@ -18,6 +18,16 @@
 #include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <net/xdp_sock_drv.h>
 
+static void gve_rx_starvation_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+{
+	struct gve_rx_ring *rx = timer_container_of(rx, t, starvation_timer);
+	struct gve_priv *priv = rx->gve;
+	struct gve_notify_block *block;
+
+	block = &priv->ntfy_blocks[rx->ntfy_id];
+	napi_schedule(&block->napi);
+}
+
 static void gve_rx_free_hdr_bufs(struct gve_priv *priv, struct gve_rx_ring *rx)
 {
 	struct device *hdev = &priv->pdev->dev;

@@ -120,6 +130,7 @@ void gve_rx_stop_ring_dqo(struct gve_pri
 
 	if (rx->dqo.page_pool)
 		page_pool_disable_direct_recycling(rx->dqo.page_pool);
+	timer_shutdown_sync(&rx->starvation_timer);
 	gve_remove_napi(priv, ntfy_idx);
 	gve_rx_remove_from_block(priv, idx);
 	gve_rx_reset_ring_dqo(priv, idx);

@@ -208,8 +219,10 @@ static int gve_rx_alloc_hdr_bufs(struct
 void gve_rx_start_ring_dqo(struct gve_priv *priv, int idx)
 {
 	int ntfy_idx = gve_rx_idx_to_ntfy(priv, idx);
+	struct gve_rx_ring *rx = &priv->rx[idx];
 
 	gve_rx_add_to_block(priv, idx);
+	timer_setup(&rx->starvation_timer, gve_rx_starvation_timer, 0);
 	gve_add_napi(priv, ntfy_idx, gve_napi_poll_dqo);
 }
 

@@ -365,6 +378,7 @@ void gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo(struct gve_
 	struct gve_rx_compl_queue_dqo *complq = &rx->dqo.complq;
 	struct gve_rx_buf_queue_dqo *bufq = &rx->dqo.bufq;
 	struct gve_priv *priv = rx->gve;
+	u32 num_bufs_avail_to_hw;
 	u32 num_avail_slots;
 	u32 num_full_slots;
 	u32 num_posted = 0;

@@ -400,6 +414,26 @@ void gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo(struct gve_
 	}
 
 	rx->fill_cnt += num_posted;
+
+	/* If the queue has fewer than GVE_RX_BUF_THRESH_DQO descriptors
+	 * visible to the hardware, the hardware is in danger of starving
+	 * and cannot trigger interrupts.
+	 *
+	 * We use a threshold of 32 because a single maximum-sized RSC
+	 * packet can consume up to 19 descriptors in the Rx path. Lower
+	 * thresholds (e.g., 8 or 16) would be unsafe as they could cause
+	 * the device to drop/stall on a maximum-sized RSC packet.
+	 *
+	 * Start the timer to periodically reschedule NAPI and recover.
+	 */
+	num_bufs_avail_to_hw =
+		((bufq->tail & ~(GVE_RX_BUF_THRESH_DQO - 1)) -
+		 bufq->head) & bufq->mask;
+
+	if (num_bufs_avail_to_hw < GVE_RX_BUF_THRESH_DQO) {
+		mod_timer(&rx->starvation_timer,
+			  jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(GVE_RX_NAPI_RESCHED_MS));
+	}
 }
 
 static void gve_rx_skb_csum(struct sk_buff *skb,

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]>

commit 59abb87159c53605c063f6e2ceb215b5eba43ee6 upstream.

set_bit(rslt->ptype, prof->ptypes) operates on a DECLARE_BITMAP of ICE_FLOW_PTYPE_MAX (1024) bits. Nothing prevents a malicious VF from providing ptype >= 1024 through VIRTCHNL, resulting in a write past the end of the bitmap and a kernel page fault.

Reproduced with a custom kernel module injecting a crafted VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_RSS_CFG on E810-C QSFP (8086:1592), FW 4.91 0x800214af 1.3909.0, ICE COMMS DDP 1.3.53.0, kernel 7.1.0-rc1.

crash_parser: ice_parser_profile_init @ ffffffffc0d61b60
crash_parser: setting ptype=0xffff (max valid=1023)
crash_parser: calling ice_parser_profile_init -- expect OOB crash!

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 56 UID: 0 PID: 165011 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S U OE 7.1.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB
RIP: 0010:ice_parser_profile_init+0x2d/0x1d0 [ice]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __pfx_ice_parser_profile_init+0x10/0x10 [ice]
 crash_init+0x127/0xff0 [crash_parser]
 do_one_initcall+0x45/0x310
 do_init_module+0x64/0x270
 init_module_from_file+0xcc/0xf0
 idempotent_init_module+0x17b/0x280
 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x6e/0xe0

Bail out early with -EINVAL when ptype is out of range.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_parser.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -2368,6 +2368,9 @@ int ice_parser_profile_init(struct ice_p
 	u16 proto_off = 0;
 	u16 off;
 
+	if (rslt->ptype >= ICE_FLOW_PTYPE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	memset(prof, 0, sizeof(*prof));
 	set_bit(rslt->ptype, prof->ptypes);
 	if (blk == ICE_BLK_SW) {

Hi

kernel build / boot test on x86_64 (Intel).

No regressions here.

Thanks

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergey Temerkhanov <[email protected]>

commit 2915681b89f817677ab9f1166d95b595bc144f5f upstream.

ptp.cached_phc_time is a 64-bit value updated by a periodic work item on one CPU and read locklessly on another. On 32-bit or non-atomic architectures this can result in a torn read. Use READ_ONCE() to enforce a single atomic load.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static u64 ice_ptp_extend_40b_ts(struct
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	return ice_ptp_extend_32b_ts(pf->ptp.cached_phc_time,
+	return ice_ptp_extend_32b_ts(READ_ONCE(pf->ptp.cached_phc_time),
 				     (in_tstamp >> 8) & mask);
 }
 

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 92d3817649df2b0b6a008a686c8275c88d7ef594 upstream.

ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head() and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator() uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.

Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are unauthenticated once it exists.

Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport() before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map modes never pull and keep their cached pointers.

---
 net/ipv6/ila/ila_common.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 			struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
+			ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 			diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 			inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&th->check, skb,
 							diff, true, true);

@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
 			if (uh->check || skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
+				ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 				diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 				inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&uh->check, skb,
 								diff, true, true);

@@ -110,6 +112,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 			struct icmp6hdr *ih = (struct icmp6hdr *)
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
+			ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 			diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 			inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&ih->icmp6_cksum, skb,
 							diff, true, true);

@@ -127,6 +130,15 @@ void ila_update_ipv6_locator(struct sk_b
 	switch (p->csum_mode) {
 	case ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT:
 		ila_csum_adjust_transport(skb, p);
+		/*
+		 * ila_csum_adjust_transport() calls pskb_may_pull(), which can
+		 * reallocate the skb head and leave ip6h (and the iaddr derived
+		 * from it) dangling; reload both before the write below.  The
+		 * other csum modes do not pull, so their cached pointers stay
+		 * valid.
+		 */
+		ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+		iaddr = ila_a2i(&ip6h->daddr);
 		break;
 	case ILA_CSUM_NEUTRAL_MAP:
 		if (sir2ila) {

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>

commit 234e5e898b713bc0b3a631b6f002897f43d046c8 upstream.

mac802154_scan_worker() captures the scanning sub-interface under RCU and then keeps dereferencing sdata->dev after rcu_read_unlock() and outside the rtnl -- in the failure traces, in mac802154_transmit_beacon_req() (skb->dev = sdata->dev), and in the end_scan cleanup. Nothing keeps that netdev alive across the worker iteration.

A concurrent DEL_INTERFACE or PHY removal can unregister the interface once the worker drops the rtnl between its two drv_set_channel() sections. unregister_netdevice() frees the netdev asynchronously from netdev_run_todo() with the rtnl already dropped, so neither holding the rtnl nor the per-PHY IEEE802154_IS_SCANNING flag prevents a stale worker iteration from dereferencing the freed netdev -- a KASAN slab-use-after-free, reachable by racing TRIGGER_SCAN against DEL_INTERFACE (both CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Pin the netdev with netdev_hold() while the RCU read lock is still held, and release it at every worker exit.

---
 net/mac802154/scan.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
 	enum nl802154_scan_types scan_req_type;
 	struct ieee802154_sub_if_data *sdata;
 	unsigned int scan_duration = 0;
+	netdevice_tracker dev_tracker;
 	struct wpan_phy *wpan_phy;
 	u8 scan_req_duration;
 	u8 page, channel;

@@ -209,6 +210,14 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * sdata->dev is dereferenced below after rcu_read_unlock() and outside
+	 * the rtnl, and a concurrent DEL_INTERFACE / PHY teardown can free it
+	 * asynchronously from netdev_run_todo(). Pin it with a reference taken
+	 * while the RCU read lock is still held, and drop it at every exit.
+	 */
+	netdev_hold(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
 	wpan_phy = scan_req->wpan_phy;
 	scan_req_type = scan_req->type;
 	scan_req_duration = scan_req->duration;

@@ -262,12 +271,14 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
 		"Scan page %u channel %u for %ums\n",
 		page, channel, jiffies_to_msecs(scan_duration));
 	queue_delayed_work(local->mac_wq, &local->scan_work, scan_duration);
+	netdev_put(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker);
 	return;
 
 end_scan:
 	rtnl_lock();
 	mac802154_scan_cleanup_locked(local, sdata, false);
 	rtnl_unlock();
+	netdev_put(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker);
 }
 
 int mac802154_trigger_scan_locked(struct ieee802154_sub_if_data *sdata,

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b upstream.

llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as

	assoclen += datalen - authlen;

where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame.

The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.

Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.

---
 net/mac802154/llsec.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -891,6 +891,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *sk
 	data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
 	datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
 
+	if (datalen < authlen) {
+		kfree_sensitive(req);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
 	sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
 
 	if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 793b9b729f1e8de57be8c8daf1a9838be96cabed upstream.

The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:

	if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) {
		dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR;
	} else {
		dev->rxlen = c;
		dev->rxpos = 0;
		dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
		...
	}

A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is tested:

	dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c;
	dev->rxpos++;
	dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
	if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) {
		dev->rxpos = 0;
		dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER;
	}

With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.

Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.

Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur.

KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change):

  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370
  index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]'
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
  Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0
   mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
   tty_ldisc_receive_buf
   flush_to_ldisc
  Allocated by task 152:
   alloc_netdev_mqs
   mctp_serial_open

v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so
the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static void mctp_serial_push_header(stru
 		} else {
 			dev->rxlen = c;
 			dev->rxpos = 0;
-			dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
+			dev->rxstate = c > 0 ? STATE_DATA : STATE_TRAILER;
 			dev->rxfcs = crc_ccitt_byte(dev->rxfcs, c);
 		}
 		break;

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>

commit 4032f8ed10fcb84d41c508dfb04be96589f78dfe upstream.

OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().

Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it.

---
 net/openvswitch/actions.c  |   19 +++++++------------
 net/openvswitch/datapath.c |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 net/openvswitch/datapath.h |    2 +-
 net/openvswitch/vport.c    |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

@@ -837,12 +837,8 @@ static void do_output(struct datapath *d
 		u16 mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru;
 		u32 cutlen = OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen;
 
-		if (unlikely(cutlen > 0)) {
-			if (skb->len - cutlen > ovs_mac_header_len(key))
-				pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - cutlen);
-			else
-				pskb_trim(skb, ovs_mac_header_len(key));
-		}
+		if (unlikely(cutlen < skb->len))
+			pskb_trim(skb, max(cutlen, ovs_mac_header_len(key)));
 
 		if (likely(!mru ||
 		           (skb->len <= mru + vport->dev->hard_header_len))) {

@@ -1234,7 +1230,7 @@ static void execute_psample(struct datap
 
 	psample_group.net = ovs_dp_get_net(dp);
 	md.in_ifindex = OVS_CB(skb)->input_vport->dev->ifindex;
-	md.trunc_size = skb->len - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen;
+	md.trunc_size = min(skb->len, OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen);
 	md.rate_as_probability = 1;
 
 	rate = OVS_CB(skb)->probability ? OVS_CB(skb)->probability : U32_MAX;

@@ -1284,22 +1280,21 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct dat
 			clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (clone)
 				do_output(dp, clone, port, key);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC: {
 			struct ovs_action_trunc *trunc = nla_data(a);
 
-			if (skb->len > trunc->max_len)
-				OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = skb->len - trunc->max_len;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = trunc->max_len;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE:
 			output_userspace(dp, skb, key, a, attr,
 						     len, OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			if (nla_is_last(a, rem)) {
 				consume_skb(skb);
 				return 0;

@@ -1453,7 +1448,7 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct dat
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PSAMPLE:
 			execute_psample(dp, skb, a);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			if (nla_is_last(a, rem)) {
 				consume_skb(skb);
 				return 0;

@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ void ovs_dp_process_packet(struct sk_buf
 			upcall.portid = ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid(p, skb);
 
 		upcall.mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru;
-		error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, 0);
+		error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, U32_MAX);
 		switch (error) {
 		case 0:
 		case -EAGAIN:

@@ -457,7 +457,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	struct sk_buff *nskb = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *user_skb = NULL; /* to be queued to userspace */
 	struct nlattr *nla;
-	size_t len;
+	size_t msg_size;
+	size_t skb_len;
 	unsigned int hlen;
 	int err, dp_ifindex;
 	u64 hash;

@@ -478,7 +479,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 		skb = nskb;
 	}
 
-	if (nla_attr_size(skb->len) > USHRT_MAX) {
+	skb_len = min(skb->len, cutlen);
+	if (nla_attr_size(skb_len) > USHRT_MAX) {
 		err = -EFBIG;
 		goto out;
 	}

@@ -493,13 +495,13 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	 * padding logic. Only perform zerocopy if padding is not required.
 	 */
 	if (dp->user_features & OVS_DP_F_UNALIGNED)
-		hlen = skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb);
+		hlen = min(skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb), cutlen);
 	else
-		hlen = skb->len;
+		hlen = skb_len;
 
-	len = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen - cutlen,
-			      OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen);
-	user_skb = genlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	msg_size = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen,
+				   OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen);
+	user_skb = genlmsg_new(msg_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!user_skb) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;

@@ -560,7 +562,7 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	}
 
 	/* Add OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN when packet is truncated */
-	if (cutlen > 0 &&
+	if (skb_len < skb->len &&
 	    nla_put_u32(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN, skb->len)) {
 		err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto out;

@@ -585,9 +587,9 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 		err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb->len - cutlen);
+	nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb_len);
 
-	err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb->len - cutlen, hlen);
+	err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb_len, hlen);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 

@@ -644,6 +646,7 @@ static int ovs_packet_cmd_execute(struct
 		packet->ignore_df = 1;
 	}
 	OVS_CB(packet)->mru = mru;
+	OVS_CB(packet)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 
 	if (a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_HASH]) {
 		hash = nla_get_u64(a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_HASH]);

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ struct datapath {
  * @mru: The maximum received fragement size; 0 if the packet is not
  * fragmented.
  * @acts_origlen: The netlink size of the flow actions applied to this skb.
- * @cutlen: The number of bytes from the packet end to be removed.
+ * @cutlen: The number of bytes in the packet to preserve on output.
  * @probability: The sampling probability that was applied to this skb; 0 means
  * no sampling has occurred; U32_MAX means 100% probability.
  * @upcall_pid: Netlink socket PID to use for sending this packet to userspace;

@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ int ovs_vport_receive(struct vport *vpor
 
 	OVS_CB(skb)->input_vport = vport;
 	OVS_CB(skb)->mru = 0;
-	OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+	OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 	OVS_CB(skb)->probability = 0;
 	OVS_CB(skb)->upcall_pid = 0;
 	if (unlikely(dev_net(skb->dev) != ovs_dp_get_net(vport->dp))) {

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavitra Jha <[email protected]>

commit 63bbe18fc03062f483c627838a566a707b62da79 upstream.

When either the TCP RX or TX error path calls ovpn_peer_hold() followed by schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work), and the work item is already pending from the other path, schedule_work() returns false and the work runs only once. Since ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work() calls ovpn_peer_put() exactly once, the extra reference taken by the losing path is never dropped, leaking the peer object.

The race window:

CPU0 (strparser/RX error): CPU1 (tcp_tx_work/TX error):
ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+1 ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+2
schedule_work() <- queued schedule_work() <- NO-OP
(work already pending)
ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work runs:

    ovpn_peer_del()
    ovpn_peer_put()  <- refcnt+1
                                   <- peer never freed

Fix by checking the return value of schedule_work() in both paths and calling ovpn_peer_put() to drop the extra reference if the work was already pending. ovpn_peer_hold() is kept unconditional in the TX path as it cannot fail at that point.

---
 drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ err:
 	/* take reference for deferred peer deletion. should never fail */
 	if (WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer)))
 		goto err_nopeer;
-	schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work);
+	if (!schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work))
+		ovpn_peer_put(peer);
 	ovpn_dev_dstats_rx_dropped(peer->ovpn->dev);
 err_nopeer:
 	kfree_skb(skb);

@@ -283,7 +284,8 @@ static void ovpn_tcp_send_sock(struct ov
 			 * stream therefore we abort the connection
 			 */
 			ovpn_peer_hold(peer);
-			schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work);
+			if (!schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work))
+				ovpn_peer_put(peer);
 
 			/* we bail out immediately and keep tx_in_progress set
 			 * to true. This way we prevent more TX attempts

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuvam Pandey <[email protected]>

commit a4710ae2e7e322fdaefb4be8604228279cfaf48c upstream.

ovpn_peer_keepalive_send() passes its peer reference to ovpn_xmit_special(), which ultimately drops it. The keepalive scheduler currently queues the work first and takes the reference only after schedule_work() reports that the work was queued.

Once schedule_work() queues the item, another CPU may run the worker before the caller gets to ovpn_peer_hold(). In that case the worker can consume a reference that was not acquired for it, corrupting the peer lifetime accounting.

Take the peer reference before queueing the work and drop it again when the work was already pending.

---
 drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1285,8 +1285,10 @@ static time64_t ovpn_peer_keepalive_work
 		netdev_dbg(peer->ovpn->dev,
 			   "sending keepalive to peer %u\n",
 			   peer->id);
-		if (schedule_work(&peer->keepalive_work))
-			ovpn_peer_hold(peer);
+		if (WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer)))
+			return 0;
+		if (!schedule_work(&peer->keepalive_work))
+			ovpn_peer_put(peer);
 	}
 
 	if (next_run1 < next_run2)

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <[email protected]>

commit e9c238f6fe42fb1b4dba3a578277de32cb487937 upstream.

pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the skb head, invalidating pointers into it.

This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head.

Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it relocates the head.

---
 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -824,6 +824,7 @@ static int pppoe_sendmsg(struct socket *
 	dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ETH_P_PPP_SES,
 			po->pppoe_pa.remote, NULL, total_len);
 
+	ph = pppoe_hdr(skb);
 	memcpy(ph, &hdr, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr));
 
 	ph->length = htons(total_len);

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Justin Lai <[email protected]>

commit 1c50efa1faf3a1a96e100b07ec7a2f3164d90bee upstream.

The hardware performs packet parsing before packet transmission. Parsing incomplete IPv4, IPv6, TCP, or UDP headers may trigger a TX hang because the hardware parser expects additional protocol header data that is not present in the packet.

The hardware performs additional PTP parsing on UDP packets identified by destination ports 319/320 at the expected UDP destination port offset.

If such a packet has transport data smaller than RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN, the hardware parser expects additional packet data and may trigger a TX hang.

To avoid these hardware issues, the driver applies the following workarounds.

Drop malformed packets that may trigger this hardware issue before transmission.

For IPv4 non-initial fragments, the hardware does not check the fragment offset before parsing the expected transport header location. As a result, these packets are still subject to transport header parsing even though they do not contain a transport header. If the transport data is shorter than the minimum transport header required by the hardware parser, pad the transport data to the minimum transport header length required by the hardware parser. Packets that also match the hardware PTP parsing conditions continue to follow the corresponding workaround.

For IPv6 fragmented packets, neither of the above hardware issues occurs because the hardware only continues packet parsing when the IPv6 Base Header Next Header field directly indicates UDP. Packets carrying a Fragment Header do not continue through the subsequent packet parsing stages.

For packets identified for hardware PTP parsing, pad the transport data so it reaches RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN before transmission.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase.h      |    8 
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase_main.c |  197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 205 insertions(+)

@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ enum rtase_sw_flag_content {
 	RTASE_SWF_MSIX_ENABLED = BIT(2),
 };
 
+enum rtase_parse_result {
+	RTASE_PARSE_OK,
+	RTASE_PARSE_SKIP,
+	RTASE_PARSE_DROP,
+};
+
 #define RSVD_MASK 0x3FFFC000
 
 struct rtase_tx_desc {

@@ -359,4 +365,6 @@ struct rtase_private {
 
 #define RTASE_MSS_MASK GENMASK(28, 18)
 
+#define RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN 47
+
 #endif /* RTASE_H */

7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yizhou Zhao <[email protected]>

commit e1a9d3cc11829c5414a75eb39c704f461936eb24 upstream.

tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a four-byte boundary.

tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.

Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path. This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid authenticated header.