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Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

PATCH Applied Harald Freudenberger 4 participants 5 messages Aug 7 – Aug 26

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Harald Freudenberger

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v7 cover Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.

Rework zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11() and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.

Changelog:
v1 - initial patch
v2 - fixed typo in header check_for_overflow -> check_add_overflow. v3 - rephrased and smoothed subject and text of the patch. It is now
"s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks" and the text does not talk about malicious cards any more. Updated Reviewed-by tags
v4 - As sashiko clearly states the addition of two 32 bit values can
mathematically never overflow a 64 bit value and thus the check_add_overflow() was total overkill - removed.
v5 - Sashiko had a by-catch related to the very same fields. Under
some circumstances the fields count1 and offset1 of the CPRB where not checked but used for a memcpy to userspace. So again a rework of the check of these x86 header fields in the receiving function before the CPRB is processed to be copied in parts to userspace. Removed all reviewed-by as I want to have another developer look onto this patch again.
v6 - Again reworked and re-structured the code. As the very same
pattern appears with message type 50 also reworked the receive function there.
v7 - Reworked the debug messages based on feedback from Finn. These
messages should be real debug messages (so use pr_debug) as the intended consumer is a developer. Thus the somehow cryptic debug message text. Picked Finn's suggestion to avoid hard coded ERRNO message strings and use %d with the real rc instead.

Harald Freudenberger (1):
s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c |  39 ++++---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c  | 149 ++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

--
2.43.0

author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v7 1/1 s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.

Rework zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11() and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.

---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c |  39 ++++---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c  | 149 ++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c +26 -13
index d6fc2d8e7fad..3c5fc97f7399 100644
@@ -416,26 +416,39 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype50_receive(struct ap_queue *aq,
 		.reply_code = REP82_ERROR_MACHINE_FAILURE,
 	};
 	struct type80_hdr *t80h;
-	int len;
+	size_t len;
 
 	/* Copy the reply message to the request message buffer. */
 	if (!reply)
 		goto out;	/* ap_msg->rc indicates the error */
+
 	t80h = reply->msg;
-	if (t80h->type == TYPE80_RSP_CODE) {
-		len = t80h->len;
-		if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize ||
-		    len != reply->len) {
-			pr_debug("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n");
-			msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
-		msg->len = len;
-	} else {
-		memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, sizeof(error_reply));
+
+	if (t80h->type != TYPE80_RSP_CODE) {
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(error_reply))
+			memcpy(msg->msg, &error_reply, sizeof(error_reply));
+		else
+			memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, sizeof(error_reply));
 		msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	len = t80h->len;
+	if (len != reply->len) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu rpl.len %zu mismatch, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->len, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
 	}
+	if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu exceeds buf %zu/%zu, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->bufsize, msg->bufsize, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
+	msg->len = len;
+
 out:
 	complete(&msg->response.work);
 }
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +98 -51

186 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v7 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
Quoted 16 lines

Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.

Rework zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11() and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.

Quoted 1 line

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Reviewed-by on v7 1/1
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v7 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

In reply to Harald Freudenberger
Quoted 21 lines · Harald Freudenberger

Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.

Rework zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11() and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.

---
  drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c |  39 ++++---
  drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c  | 149 ++++++++++++++++---------
  2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

[ snip ]

maintainer Applied
#4 lore raw
In reply to Harald Freudenberger
Quoted 42 lines · Harald Freudenberger

Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.

Rework zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11() and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.

Changelog:
v1 - initial patch
v2 - fixed typo in header check_for_overflow -> check_add_overflow. v3 - rephrased and smoothed subject and text of the patch. It is now
"s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks" and the text does not talk about malicious cards any more. Updated Reviewed-by tags
v4 - As sashiko clearly states the addition of two 32 bit values can
mathematically never overflow a 64 bit value and thus the check_add_overflow() was total overkill - removed.
v5 - Sashiko had a by-catch related to the very same fields. Under
some circumstances the fields count1 and offset1 of the CPRB where not checked but used for a memcpy to userspace. So again a rework of the check of these x86 header fields in the receiving function before the CPRB is processed to be copied in parts to userspace. Removed all reviewed-by as I want to have another developer look onto this patch again.
v6 - Again reworked and re-structured the code. As the very same
pattern appears with message type 50 also reworked the receive function there.
v7 - Reworked the debug messages based on feedback from Finn. These
messages should be real debug messages (so use pr_debug) as the intended consumer is a developer. Thus the somehow cryptic debug message text. Picked Finn's suggestion to avoid hard coded ERRNO message strings and use %d with the real rc instead.

Quoted 6 lines

Harald Freudenberger (1):
s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c |  39 ++++---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c  | 149 ++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

Applied, thank you!