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cve-exclusions: triage nine kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data

PATCH Superseded Junjie Cao 2 participants 22 messages Aug 12 – Aug 24

v3 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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Junjie Cao

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#0 lore raw

v3 cover cve-exclusions: triage nine kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data

This is v3 of the kernel CVE triage from Paul Barker's "linux-yocto CVEs in need of triage" request, reworked according to his review of v2 [1].

Main changes since v2:

- Dropped the CVE-2023-4010 (imon) patch. The identification rested on inferring the reporter's intent from a screenshot, which the review rejected. The CVE record names a function that does not exist in the kernel (usb_giveback_urb()); I have reported that defect to the assigning CNA and left the CVE untriaged here.

- Moved the four entries that used "upstream-wontfix" (CVE-2019-14899, CVE-2021-3714, CVE-2021-3864, CVE-2022-4543) to "unpatched". None has an upstream kernel-community wontfix statement; the WONTFIX and deferred positions are distribution ones. "unpatched" keeps them visible in reports.

- CVE-2022-1247 now leads with the v7.1 removal of net/rose and keeps the v6.17 refcount commits, which are what cover the 6.18 kernel on master. Upstream has since assigned those two commits CVE-2025-39826 and CVE-2025-39827, so the identification no longer rests on reading the diff alone.

- CVE-2023-3397: corrected the claim that only one fix was proposed and withdrawn; further fixes were posted in 2026 but none is merged, and syzbot still reproduces the txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race.

- CVE-2023-6240: dropped the Marvell/s390 aside and an unrelated commit reference flagged in review.

CVE-2022-0400 and CVE-2023-6238 are unchanged since v2.

AI assistance is disclosed with the AI-Generated trailer on each patch.

Summary of the nine verdicts:

  fixed-version   CVE-2022-1247   6.17, rose_neigh refcount conversion
  disputed        CVE-2022-0400   never substantiated, closed by three vendors
  unpatched       CVE-2019-14899  weak host model, config-only mitigation
                  CVE-2021-3714   inherent to KSM deduplication
                  CVE-2021-3864   two mitigation attempts, neither merged
                  CVE-2022-4543   KASLR not a boundary against local attackers
                  CVE-2023-3397   JFS txEnd UAF, no fix merged
                  CVE-2023-6238   NVMe fix applied then reverted
                  CVE-2023-6240   RSA timing oracle, fixed only in RHEL

Once these are settled I can prepare the wrynose and scarthgap backports.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

Junjie Cao (9):
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2019-14899
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3714
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3864
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-0400
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-1247
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-4543
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-3397
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6238
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6240

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2019-14899

A network-adjacent attacker can send packets addressed to a host's VPN tunnel address over the physical interface. Because Linux uses the weak host model by default, the host replies, which lets the attacker infer the tunnel address, confirm active connections and eventually inject into the tunneled TCP stream.

No upstream kernel fix exists. The disclosure notes that reverse path filtering is not a complete solution because the attack also works over IPv6, which has no rp_filter; the mitigation that shipped was a firewall rule added to wg-quick(8) in userspace:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/05/1
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Distribution trackers record the same state: Ubuntu has it deferred since 2019-12-13, Debian does not track it against the kernel, and Red Hat scopes it to openvpn:

https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2019-14899

Record it unpatched so it stays visible rather than excluded.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix": there is no upstream statement, only distribution and disclosure sources

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
index d27d764..5ed4a00 100644
@@ -192,3 +192,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-68195] = "fixed-version: Fixed from 6.18"
 # Fix https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4b64fda4d30a83a7f00e92a0c8a1d47699609f3
 # Backport https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75c5d9bce072abbbc09b701a49869ac23c34a906
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3"
+
+# Consequence of the default weak host model, not a specific defect;
+# mitigation is firewall configuration only (rp_filter for IPv4, a
+# strong host model rule such as wg-quick(8)'s, which also covers IPv6).
+# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: consequence of the default weak \
+host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 1/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2019-14899

Quoted 10 lines · Junjie Cao

A network-adjacent attacker can send packets addressed to a host's VPN tunnel address over the physical interface. Because Linux uses the weak host model by default, the host replies, which lets the attacker infer the tunnel address, confirm active connections and eventually inject into the tunneled TCP stream.

No upstream kernel fix exists. The disclosure notes that reverse path filtering is not a complete solution because the attack also works over IPv6, which has no rp_filter; the mitigation that shipped was a firewall rule added to wg-quick(8) in userspace:

We should drop the discussion of mitigations here - none of them are complete mitigations and there are more nuances.

Quoted 31 lines

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/05/1
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Distribution trackers record the same state: Ubuntu has it deferred since 2019-12-13, Debian does not track it against the kernel, and Red Hat scopes it to openvpn:

https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2019-14899

Record it unpatched so it stays visible rather than excluded.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix": there is no upstream statement, only distribution and disclosure sources

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index d27d764..5ed4a00 100644

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-68195] = "fixed-version: Fixed from 6.18" · line 201

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -192,3 +192,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-68195] = "fixed-version: Fixed from 6.18"
 # Fix https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4b64fda4d30a83a7f00e92a0c8a1d47699609f3
 # Backport https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75c5d9bce072abbbc09b701a49869ac23c34a906
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3"
+
+# Consequence of the default weak host model, not a specific defect;
+# mitigation is firewall configuration only (rp_filter for IPv4, a
+# strong host model rule such as wg-quick(8)'s, which also covers IPv6).
+# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: consequence of the default weak \
+host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration"

I recommend slightly different wording. Include the triage date, drop discussion of mitigation.

# Triaged August 2026 - no upstream fix, Ubuntu fix deferred
# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: Consequence of the default weak host \
model, no upstream fix"

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3714

In reply to Junjie Cao

KSM merges identical anonymous pages across processes. An attacker who can place chosen page-sized content in a victim's memory can detect the merge through the timing of the resulting copy-on-write fault, and so leak memory contents.

There is no upstream fix; removing the side channel means removing deduplication. Distribution trackers describe it the same way - Debian marks src:linux unfixed with "Inherent design limitation, can be avoided by not using KSM", Red Hat closed its bug WONTFIX, and Ubuntu records no upstream fix as of 2024-06-17:

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714

Exposure requires two runtime opt-ins: ksmd must be started by the administrator (ksm_run defaults to KSM_RUN_STOP in mm/ksm.c) and memory is only eligible when a process asks with madvise(MADV_MERGEABLE) or prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE). CONFIG_KSM=y is set in yocto-kernel-cache (bsp/intel-x86 and the paravirt_kvm fragments), so this is not a configuration exclusion.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix": the WONTFIX is a distribution position, not an upstream one

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
index 5ed4a00..af3576d 100644
@@ -199,3 +199,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3"
 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: consequence of the default weak \
 host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration"
+
+# Timing side channel inherent to KSM page deduplication. Reachable only
+# when ksmd is started (/sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run defaults to 0) and the
+# workload opts in via MADV_MERGEABLE or prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE).
+# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: timing side channel inherent to \
+KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#4 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 2/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3714

Quoted 15 lines · Junjie Cao

KSM merges identical anonymous pages across processes. An attacker who can place chosen page-sized content in a victim's memory can detect the merge through the timing of the resulting copy-on-write fault, and so leak memory contents.

There is no upstream fix; removing the side channel means removing deduplication. Distribution trackers describe it the same way - Debian marks src:linux unfixed with "Inherent design limitation, can be avoided by not using KSM", Red Hat closed its bug WONTFIX, and Ubuntu records no upstream fix as of 2024-06-17:

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714

Quoted 6 lines

Exposure requires two runtime opt-ins: ksmd must be started by the administrator (ksm_run defaults to KSM_RUN_STOP in mm/ksm.c) and memory is only eligible when a process asks with madvise(MADV_MERGEABLE) or prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE). CONFIG_KSM=y is set in yocto-kernel-cache (bsp/intel-x86 and the paravirt_kvm fragments), so this is not a configuration exclusion.

We should drop this third paragraph - it's time consuming to validate.

Quoted 19 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix": the WONTFIX is a distribution position, not an upstream one

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index 5ed4a00..af3576d 100644

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3" · line 208

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -199,3 +199,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3"
 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: consequence of the default weak \
 host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration"
+
+# Timing side channel inherent to KSM page deduplication. Reachable only
+# when ksmd is started (/sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run defaults to 0) and the
+# workload opts in via MADV_MERGEABLE or prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE).
+# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: timing side channel inherent to \
+KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into"

I recommend we change the wording, add more links and include the triage date:

    # Triaged August 2026 - no upstream fix, Debian says "Inherent design
    # limitation, can be avoided by not using KSM", Red Hat closed their bug as
    # WONTFIX.
    # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
    # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327
    # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714
    CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: Timing side channel inherent to Kernel \
    Same-page Merging (KSM) page deduplication"

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#5 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3864

In reply to Junjie Cao

begin_new_exec() resets dumpability to owner-dumpable whenever the real and effective ids match at exec time. A binary exec'd by a setuid program that has already called setuid(0) therefore becomes dumpable as root, and with a relative core_pattern plus an attacker-controlled working directory the resulting core file can be dropped into a privileged directory such as /etc/logrotate.d.

Full report with proof of concept:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2

Two fixes were proposed and neither was merged. Waiman Long's patch was judged an ineffective mitigation by Eric W. Biederman and the discussion went quiet in early 2022; Wander Lairson Costa's RFC v2 received design feedback and no v3 followed:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

The flagged logic is unchanged: fs/exec.c still selects TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER in that case, and fs/coredump.c only applies the suid-safe restriction when dumpable is TASK_DUMPABLE_ROOT, so the dumpable==1 case this CVE describes is not covered. Images that set an absolute path, a pipe or a socket core_pattern are not exploitable.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix"; a NAK of one mitigation is not an upstream wontfix of the issue
- drop the "NAKed" wording: the discussion went quiet, it was not formally rejected

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
index af3576d..ba8e467 100644
@@ -206,3 +206,11 @@ host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration"
 # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: timing side channel inherent to \
 KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into"
+
+# Two mitigation attempts, neither merged; the fs/exec.c logic is
+# unchanged. An absolute, piped or socket kernel.core_pattern (for
+# example systemd-coredump) prevents exploitation.
+# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2
+# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: no accepted mainline fix, \
+exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#6 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 3/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3864

Quoted 16 lines · Junjie Cao

begin_new_exec() resets dumpability to owner-dumpable whenever the real and effective ids match at exec time. A binary exec'd by a setuid program that has already called setuid(0) therefore becomes dumpable as root, and with a relative core_pattern plus an attacker-controlled working directory the resulting core file can be dropped into a privileged directory such as /etc/logrotate.d.

Full report with proof of concept:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2

Two fixes were proposed and neither was merged. Waiman Long's patch was judged an ineffective mitigation by Eric W. Biederman and the discussion went quiet in early 2022; Wander Lairson Costa's RFC v2 received design feedback and no v3 followed:

Quoted 8 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

The flagged logic is unchanged: fs/exec.c still selects TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER in that case, and fs/coredump.c only applies the suid-safe restriction when dumpable is TASK_DUMPABLE_ROOT, so the dumpable==1 case this CVE describes is not covered. Images that set an absolute path, a pipe or a socket core_pattern are not exploitable.

This third paragraph is unnecessary detail.

Quoted 22 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix"; a NAK of one mitigation is not an upstream wontfix of the issue
- drop the "NAKed" wording: the discussion went quiet, it was not formally rejected

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index af3576d..ba8e467 100644
@@ -206,3 +206,11 @@ host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration"
 # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration" · line 216

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: timing side channel inherent to \
 KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into"
+
+# Two mitigation attempts, neither merged; the fs/exec.c logic is
+# unchanged. An absolute, piped or socket kernel.core_pattern (for
+# example systemd-coredump) prevents exploitation.
+# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2
+# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: no accepted mainline fix, \
+exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern"

Suggested wording, links, and include triage date:

    # Triaged August 2026 - Two fixes proposed upstream but neither was merged,
    # attempts to fix seem to have petered out. Unfixed in Debian/Ubuntu.
    # https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
    # https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
    # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3864
    # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864
    CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: Proposed fixes were not merged upstream"

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#7 lore raw

PATCH v3 4/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-0400

In reply to Junjie Cao

The CVE describes an out-of-bounds read in the SMC protocol stack, but no vulnerable code was ever identified. The MITRE record lists the affected version as "Not Known" and references only two Red Hat bugzillas, the originating one of which was never made public.

The public bugzilla is closed as NOTABUG, with the statement "There was no shipped kernel version that was seen affected by this problem":

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-0400

SUSE reached the same conclusion independently, closing bsc#1195329 as RESOLVED / INVALID:

https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-0400.html

So did Debian, which marks it unimportant with the note "non issue, no security impact":

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-0400

There is no commit in mainline referencing this CVE. The net/smc out-of-bounds fixes that landed in v5.18 (b1871fd48efc, 0558226cebee) are in local, privileged paths and are not linked to this CVE by any tracker.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3: no functional change since v2

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
index ba8e467..be74672 100644
@@ -214,3 +214,10 @@ KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into"
 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: no accepted mainline fix, \
 exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern"
+
+# Never substantiated: no affected version, reproducer or commit was ever
+# identified. Closed NOTABUG by Red Hat, INVALID by SUSE (bsc#1195329) and
+# "non issue, no security impact" by Debian.
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-0400] = "disputed: the reported net/smc out-of-bounds read \
+was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#8 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 4/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-0400

Quoted 10 lines · Junjie Cao

The CVE describes an out-of-bounds read in the SMC protocol stack, but no vulnerable code was ever identified. The MITRE record lists the affected version as "Not Known" and references only two Red Hat bugzillas, the originating one of which was never made public.

The public bugzilla is closed as NOTABUG, with the statement "There was no shipped kernel version that was seen affected by this problem":

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-0400

The second sentence of the statement in the Red Hat CVE entry is "These files are not built in our source code". The "no shipped kernel version was affected" statement is specific to Red Hat's configuration, and without further info it doesn't really help anyone.

Drop the reference to that statement and the second of the two links, it's misleading as it's easy to read it as a universal statement instead of a Red Hat specific statement. Keep the first link as the report being closed NOTABUG is interesting.

Quoted 5 lines

SUSE reached the same conclusion independently, closing bsc#1195329 as RESOLVED / INVALID:

https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-0400.html

Include a link to https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1195329.

Quoted 5 lines

So did Debian, which marks it unimportant with the note "non issue, no security impact":

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-0400

I read "non issue..." in the context of "Vulnerable code not present". So the relevant thing is that Debian doesn't build the affected code. As above we should be careful as the way you've referenced this makes it sound like a blanket statement that there was no security impact in any configuration.

It's also worth mentioning that Debian links to Red Hat bug #2040604, but that's not public.

Quoted 5 lines

There is no commit in mainline referencing this CVE. The net/smc out-of-bounds fixes that landed in v5.18 (b1871fd48efc, 0558226cebee) are in local, privileged paths and are not linked to this CVE by any tracker.

I would drop the references to unrelated commits.

Quoted 17 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3: no functional change since v2

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index ba8e467..be74672 100644

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into" · line 223

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -214,3 +214,10 @@ KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into"
 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: no accepted mainline fix, \
 exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern"
+
+# Never substantiated: no affected version, reproducer or commit was ever
+# identified. Closed NOTABUG by Red Hat, INVALID by SUSE (bsc#1195329) and
+# "non issue, no security impact" by Debian.
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-0400] = "disputed: the reported net/smc out-of-bounds read \
+was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian"

We should try to get Red Hat to release more info before we close this as disputed.

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#9 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-1247

In reply to Junjie Cao

The CVE describes a race between rose_connect() and the code that frees a rose_neigh once its count and use fields reach zero.

net/rose, and rose_connect() with it, was removed entirely in v7.1:

https://git.kernel.org/linus/dd8d4bc28ad7252610d8e79c1313a2d1e3499a51
("net: remove ax25 and amateur radio (hamradio) subsystem", v7.1)

The linux-yocto kernel on master is 6.18, which still carries net/rose. There the race is closed by Takamitsu Iwai's August 2025 refcount conversion, which converts the 'use' field to refcount_t and removes the unlocked rose->neighbour->use++ in rose_connect() that the CVE describes:

https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061
("net: rose: convert 'use' field to refcount_t", v6.17)
https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
("net: rose: include node references in rose_neigh refcount", v6.17)

Both are in v6.17 and were backported to 6.1.y, 6.6.y, 6.12.y and 6.16.y in the 2025-09-02 stable round. Upstream assigned these two commits their own identifiers, CVE-2025-39826 and CVE-2025-39827 (both fixed in v6.17-rc4), so the identification does not rest on this reading of the diff alone. The Red Hat record for CVE-2022-1247 still shows it open and lists no fix.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- lead with the v7.1 removal of net/rose per review; keep the v6.17 commits, which are what covers the 6.18 kernel on master
- cite the upstream CVE-2025-39826 / CVE-2025-39827 assignments for the two fixing commits instead of relying on the diff match alone

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
index be74672..b08eaa1 100644
@@ -221,3 +221,11 @@ exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern"
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-0400] = "disputed: the reported net/smc out-of-bounds read \
 was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian"
+
+# net/rose and rose_connect() were removed entirely in v7.1 (dd8d4bc28ad7).
+# The 6.18 kernel on master still carries net/rose; there the race is
+# closed by the v6.17 refcount conversion, which upstream tracks as
+# CVE-2025-39826 / CVE-2025-39827.
+# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061
+# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#10 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 5/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-1247

Quoted 18 lines · Junjie Cao

The CVE describes a race between rose_connect() and the code that frees a rose_neigh once its count and use fields reach zero.

net/rose, and rose_connect() with it, was removed entirely in v7.1:

https://git.kernel.org/linus/dd8d4bc28ad7252610d8e79c1313a2d1e3499a51
("net: remove ax25 and amateur radio (hamradio) subsystem", v7.1)

The linux-yocto kernel on master is 6.18, which still carries net/rose. There the race is closed by Takamitsu Iwai's August 2025 refcount conversion, which converts the 'use' field to refcount_t and removes the unlocked rose->neighbour->use++ in rose_connect() that the CVE describes:

https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061
("net: rose: convert 'use' field to refcount_t", v6.17)
https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
("net: rose: include node references in rose_neigh refcount", v6.17)

Quoted 6 lines

Both are in v6.17 and were backported to 6.1.y, 6.6.y, 6.12.y and 6.16.y in the 2025-09-02 stable round. Upstream assigned these two commits their own identifiers, CVE-2025-39826 and CVE-2025-39827 (both fixed in v6.17-rc4), so the identification does not rest on this reading of the diff alone. The Red Hat record for CVE-2022-1247 still shows it open and lists no fix.

We can simplify the explanation here. The issue reported in CVE-2022-1247 was independently fixed in v6.17 via two commits, these were assigned CVE-2025-39826 & CVE-2025-39827 by the Linux kernel CVE assignment team. The race condition described in the original report for CVE-2022-1247 [1] exactly matches what was fixed.

[1]: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2066799

Quoted 22 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- lead with the v7.1 removal of net/rose per review; keep the v6.17 commits, which are what covers the 6.18 kernel on master
- cite the upstream CVE-2025-39826 / CVE-2025-39827 assignments for the two fixing commits instead of relying on the diff match alone

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index be74672..b08eaa1 100644
@@ -221,3 +221,11 @@ exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern"
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern" · line 231

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-0400] = "disputed: the reported net/smc out-of-bounds read \
 was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian"
+
+# net/rose and rose_connect() were removed entirely in v7.1 (dd8d4bc28ad7).
+# The 6.18 kernel on master still carries net/rose; there the race is
+# closed by the v6.17 refcount conversion, which upstream tracks as
+# CVE-2025-39826 / CVE-2025-39827.
+# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061
+# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"

The comment and CVE_STATUS wording looks good to me. We don't need a triage date on this one as we're effectively resolving it.

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#11 lore raw

PATCH v3 6/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-4543

In reply to Junjie Cao

KPTI clones the kernel entry text into the user page tables at its KASLR-slid address and, on CPUs with PGE, sets the global bit on those PTEs. The mapping survives the CR3 write on kernel exit, and a local attacker can time prefetch instructions across the kernel range to recover the KASLR base in well under a second.

Disclosure and write-up:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/16/3
https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html

The disclosure states that after discussion with [email protected] and linux-distros "a fix for this is currently not available", and none has appeared since; arch/x86/mm/pti.c still clones the entry text and sets _PAGE_GLOBAL on the cloned PTEs. This is an unfixed issue, not a stated wontfix - Debian notes "Ignored upstream and KASLR is not expected to be resistant to local attacks", Ubuntu has it deferred since 2023-01-10:

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4543
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-4543

97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area", v6.2) randomizes the separate cpu_entry_area; it predates this disclosure and does not change the offset of entry_SYSCALL_64 from the KASLR base.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix": the security-team discussion produced no clear wontfix decision

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
index b08eaa1..a909aef 100644
@@ -229,3 +229,11 @@ was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian"
 # Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061
 # Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"
+
+# "EntryBleed": KPTI maps the entry text into the user page tables with
+# the global bit set, leaking the KASLR base by prefetch timing. Discussed
+# with the kernel security team; no fix, KASLR is not treated as a boundary
+# against local attackers. Distinct from CVE-2023-3640 (cpu_entry_area).
+# https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: no upstream fix, KASLR is not \
+treated as a defence against local attackers"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#12 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 6/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-4543

Quoted 18 lines · Junjie Cao

KPTI clones the kernel entry text into the user page tables at its KASLR-slid address and, on CPUs with PGE, sets the global bit on those PTEs. The mapping survives the CR3 write on kernel exit, and a local attacker can time prefetch instructions across the kernel range to recover the KASLR base in well under a second.

Disclosure and write-up:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/16/3
https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html

The disclosure states that after discussion with [email protected] and linux-distros "a fix for this is currently not available", and none has appeared since; arch/x86/mm/pti.c still clones the entry text and sets _PAGE_GLOBAL on the cloned PTEs. This is an unfixed issue, not a stated wontfix - Debian notes "Ignored upstream and KASLR is not expected to be resistant to local attacks", Ubuntu has it deferred since 2023-01-10:

Quoted 6 lines

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4543
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-4543

97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area", v6.2) randomizes the separate cpu_entry_area; it predates this disclosure and does not change the offset of entry_SYSCALL_64 from the KASLR base.

There's too much unnecessary detail here. Drop the mention of a commit that doesn't fix the issue, you don't need to say "not a stated wontfix", etc.

Quoted 20 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix": the security-team discussion produced no clear wontfix decision

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index b08eaa1..a909aef 100644
@@ -229,3 +229,11 @@ was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian"
 # Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian" · line 239

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
 # Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"
+
+# "EntryBleed": KPTI maps the entry text into the user page tables with
+# the global bit set, leaking the KASLR base by prefetch timing. Discussed
+# with the kernel security team; no fix, KASLR is not treated as a boundary
+# against local attackers. Distinct from CVE-2023-3640 (cpu_entry_area).
+# https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: no upstream fix, KASLR is not \
+treated as a defence against local attackers"

Suggested wording, links and include triage date:

# Triaged August 2026 - "EntryBleed", discussed with the kernel security team # but no fix appears to have been published since then. Debian says "Ignored # upstream and KASLR is not expected to be resistant to local attacks", fix # deferred in Ubuntu.
# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/16/3
# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4543
# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-4543
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: No fix has been proposed"

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#13 lore raw

PATCH v3 7/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-3397

In reply to Junjie Cao

txEnd() in fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c reads the log pointer from the superblock info, drops TXN_LOCK and then takes log->gclock, while lmLogClose() can free that log during umount.

No fix has been merged. The 2023 proposal was withdrawn by its author ("I think my fix method is not a good solution"), and the 2026 proposals for the same unmount race are unreviewed:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

The txEnd() sequence is unchanged in linux-next 20260727, and the use-after-free was reported again in June 2026 against 7.0-rc1, with the free stack in lmLogClose() via jfs_umount(); syzbot still lists it open:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb

CONFIG_JFS_FS=n in both ktypes/standard and ktypes/preempt-rt in yocto-kernel-cache, and no fragment enables it.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- correct the claim that only one fix was proposed and withdrawn:
further fixes were posted in 2026 but none is merged
- add the syzbot dashboard and the June 2026 report as evidence the race is still live in mainline

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
index a909aef..c4a9dea 100644
@@ -237,3 +237,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"
 # https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: no upstream fix, KASLR is not \
 treated as a defence against local attackers"
+
+# JFS txEnd()/lmLogClose() use-after-free on unmount. No fix merged: the
+# 2023 proposal was withdrawn, the 2026 proposals are unreviewed, and the
+# racy code is unchanged; syzbot still reproduces it.
+# https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: no upstream fix merged, the \
+affected fs/jfs txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race is unchanged"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#14 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 7/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-3397

Quoted 11 lines · Junjie Cao

txEnd() in fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c reads the log pointer from the superblock info, drops TXN_LOCK and then takes log->gclock, while lmLogClose() can free that log during umount.

No fix has been merged. The 2023 proposal was withdrawn by its author ("I think my fix method is not a good solution"), and the 2026 proposals for the same unmount race are unreviewed:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

The proposed patches from this year are certainly for a similar slab use-after-free race, but I can't be sure it's exactly the same. So please re-word this.

Quoted 7 lines

The txEnd() sequence is unchanged in linux-next 20260727, and the use-after-free was reported again in June 2026 against 7.0-rc1, with the free stack in lmLogClose() via jfs_umount(); syzbot still lists it open:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb

Again, may be a similar use-after-free, validating that it is exactly the same one is time consuming.

Quoted 2 lines

CONFIG_JFS_FS=n in both ktypes/standard and ktypes/preempt-rt in yocto-kernel-cache, and no fragment enables it.

Yes, but users may enable this, so it's not relevant to the analysis.

Quoted 21 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- correct the claim that only one fix was proposed and withdrawn:
further fixes were posted in 2026 but none is merged
- add the syzbot dashboard and the June 2026 report as evidence the race is still live in mainline

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index a909aef..c4a9dea 100644

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17" · line 246

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -237,3 +237,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"
 # https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: no upstream fix, KASLR is not \
 treated as a defence against local attackers"
+
+# JFS txEnd()/lmLogClose() use-after-free on unmount. No fix merged: the
+# 2023 proposal was withdrawn, the 2026 proposals are unreviewed, and the
+# racy code is unchanged; syzbot still reproduces it.
+# https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: no upstream fix merged, the \
+affected fs/jfs txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race is unchanged"

Recommended wording, links and include triage date:

    # Triaged August 2026 - Originally proposed fix was withdrawn, similar
    # slab-use-after-free appears to have been re-found by syzkaller in 2026.
    # Unfixed in Debian, "needs evaluation" in Ubuntu.
    # https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAJedcCzmx02bfa22QezE8mu-iDsSdSy_oApT2ozCWO8O-8MJEQ@mail.gmail.com/
    # https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb
    # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-3397
    # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-3397
    CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was withdrawn"

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#15 lore raw

PATCH v3 8/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6238

In reply to Junjie Cao

NVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD and the io_uring passthrough path accept a metadata length from userspace without checking it against the number of blocks and the namespace metadata size that the device uses to size the transfer, so the device can DMA past the end of the buffer.

Kanchan Joshi posted a stopgap removing unprivileged passthrough, reviewed by Christoph Hellwig and applied for nvme-6.6:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/

It was then backed out. Keith Busch wrote "I believe this large change is a bit too late for 6.6 ... It's backed out now", to which Christoph Hellwig replied "We leave an exploitable hole in, so I don't think waiting any longer is an option". No replacement has been merged: the commits the patch would have reverted are all still present, and nvme_map_user_request() still passes the user-supplied metadata length straight to blk_rq_integrity_map_user() with no cross-check.

The exposure was introduced by
855b7717f44b ("nvme: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands") in v6.2, so branches carrying older kernels are not affected. Debian reached the same conclusion independently, marking the older suites "Vulnerable code not present":

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6238

Red Hat rates it Low because the device node is root-only by default:

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6238

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3: no functional change since v2

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
index c4a9dea..35e0a66 100644
@@ -244,3 +244,11 @@ treated as a defence against local attackers"
 # https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: no upstream fix merged, the \
 affected fs/jfs txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race is unchanged"
+
+# The user metadata length is not checked against the length the device
+# derives from the command. The fix was applied to nvme-6.6 and then backed
+# out; nothing has landed since. Kernels before v6.2 predate unprivileged
+# passthrough (855b7717f44b) and are not affected.
+# https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: the proposed fix was applied to \
+nvme-6.6 and then reverted, no upstream fix has landed since"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#16 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 8/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6238

Quoted 24 lines · Junjie Cao

NVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD and the io_uring passthrough path accept a metadata length from userspace without checking it against the number of blocks and the namespace metadata size that the device uses to size the transfer, so the device can DMA past the end of the buffer.

Kanchan Joshi posted a stopgap removing unprivileged passthrough, reviewed by Christoph Hellwig and applied for nvme-6.6:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/

It was then backed out. Keith Busch wrote "I believe this large change is a bit too late for 6.6 ... It's backed out now", to which Christoph Hellwig replied "We leave an exploitable hole in, so I don't think waiting any longer is an option". No replacement has been merged: the commits the patch would have reverted are all still present, and nvme_map_user_request() still passes the user-supplied metadata length straight to blk_rq_integrity_map_user() with no cross-check.

The exposure was introduced by
855b7717f44b ("nvme: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands") in v6.2, so branches carrying older kernels are not affected. Debian reached the same conclusion independently, marking the older suites "Vulnerable code not present":

Quoted 5 lines

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6238

Red Hat rates it Low because the device node is root-only by default:

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6238

The explanation is confusing here as it misses what actually introduced a vulnerability. NVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD has always passed through metadata length without validation. Commit 855b7717f44b allowed less privileged users to issue NVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD if they have write access to the nvme device node.

We don't need to recount the story of the patch being applied to the nvme tree then backed out. It never landed in mainline, that's what matters.

Quoted 18 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3: no functional change since v2

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index c4a9dea..35e0a66 100644
@@ -244,3 +244,11 @@ treated as a defence against local attackers"
 # https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc treated as a defence against local attackers" · line 254

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: no upstream fix merged, the \
 affected fs/jfs txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race is unchanged"
+
+# The user metadata length is not checked against the length the device
+# derives from the command. The fix was applied to nvme-6.6 and then backed
+# out; nothing has landed since. Kernels before v6.2 predate unprivileged
+# passthrough (855b7717f44b) and are not affected.
+# https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: the proposed fix was applied to \
+nvme-6.6 and then reverted, no upstream fix has landed since"

Recommended wording, links and include triage date:

# Triaged August 2026 - Issue was introducted by kernel commit 855b7717f44b # ("nvme: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands") in Linux v6.2. # Linux 6.1 and earlier not affected. Unfixed in recent Debian/Ubuntu releases # which use affected kernels. There was a fix proposed, but it was not merged # to mainline.
# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6238
# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6238
# https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was withdrawn"

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#17 lore raw

PATCH v3 9/9 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6240

In reply to Junjie Cao

"Marvin" is Hubert Kario's Bleichenbacher-style timing oracle research:

https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/

The affected code is the generic software RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 unpadding in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete() has three secret-dependent early exits (leading zero byte, block type, minimum padding length) and a loop whose trip count depends on the position of the separator, so the time taken reveals padding validity. There is no constant-time unpadding or implicit-rejection fallback in the tree.

Red Hat classifies it CWE-203 and has shipped fixes only in RHEL errata (RHSA-2024:2758, RHSA-2024:3618 and others); the bugzilla is still NEW. Ubuntu records it unfixed upstream as of 2024-08-24 and Debian lists src:linux vulnerable in all suites:

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6240
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6240
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6240

Practical exposure is narrow: kernel PKCS#1 v1.5 use is dominated by signature verification rather than decryption, and an attacker needs a service driving KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT with a long-lived key. The leaky primitive is nevertheless reachable.

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- drop the Marvell/s390 aside and the unrelated e8829ef1f73f paragraph flagged in review as LLM confusion artifacts

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
index 35e0a66..637f8b6 100644
@@ -252,3 +252,10 @@ affected fs/jfs txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race is unchanged"
 # https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: the proposed fix was applied to \
 nvme-6.6 and then reverted, no upstream fix has landed since"
+
+# "Marvin": the PKCS#1 v1.5 unpadding in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c branches on
+# secret-derived data, leaking padding validity by timing. Still present in
+# mainline; fixed only in RHEL errata.
+# https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6240] = "unpatched: Bleichenbacher-style timing oracle in \
+crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c is still present in mainline, fixed only downstream in RHEL"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#18 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][PATCH v3 9/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6240

Quoted 16 lines · Junjie Cao

"Marvin" is Hubert Kario's Bleichenbacher-style timing oracle research:

https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/

The affected code is the generic software RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 unpadding in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete() has three secret-dependent early exits (leading zero byte, block type, minimum padding length) and a loop whose trip count depends on the position of the separator, so the time taken reveals padding validity. There is no constant-time unpadding or implicit-rejection fallback in the tree.

Red Hat classifies it CWE-203 and has shipped fixes only in RHEL errata (RHSA-2024:2758, RHSA-2024:3618 and others); the bugzilla is still NEW. Ubuntu records it unfixed upstream as of 2024-08-24 and Debian lists src:linux vulnerable in all suites:

Quoted 8 lines

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6240
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6240
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6240

Practical exposure is narrow: kernel PKCS#1 v1.5 use is dominated by signature verification rather than decryption, and an attacker needs a service driving KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT with a long-lived key. The leaky primitive is nevertheless reachable.

I'd drop this paragraph. Validating its claims would be time consuming.

Quoted 19 lines

CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)

---
v3:
- drop the Marvell/s390 aside and the unrelated e8829ef1f73f paragraph flagged in review as LLM confusion artifacts

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +0 -0
index 35e0a66..637f8b6 100644

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc affected fs/jfs txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race is unchanged" · line 261

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -252,3 +252,10 @@ affected fs/jfs txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race is unchanged"
 # https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: the proposed fix was applied to \
 nvme-6.6 and then reverted, no upstream fix has landed since"
+
+# "Marvin": the PKCS#1 v1.5 unpadding in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c branches on
+# secret-derived data, leaking padding validity by timing. Still present in
+# mainline; fixed only in RHEL errata.
+# https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6240] = "unpatched: Bleichenbacher-style timing oracle in \
+crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c is still present in mainline, fixed only downstream in RHEL"

Recommended wording, links and include triage date:

    # Triaged August 2026 - "Marvin" attack, Red Hat reports this fixed but the
    # exact patch is unidentified (see RHSA-2024:2758, RHSA-2024:3618 & others).
    # Unfixed in Debian, "Needs evaluation" in Ubuntu.
    # https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/
    # https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2023-6240
    # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6240
    # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6240
    CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6240] = "unpatched: Fixed in RHEL but patch not identified \
    publicly"

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
#19 lore raw
In reply to Junjie Cao
Quoted 46 lines · Junjie Cao

This is v3 of the kernel CVE triage from Paul Barker's "linux-yocto CVEs in need of triage" request, reworked according to his review of v2 [1].

Main changes since v2:

- Dropped the CVE-2023-4010 (imon) patch. The identification rested on inferring the reporter's intent from a screenshot, which the review rejected. The CVE record names a function that does not exist in the kernel (usb_giveback_urb()); I have reported that defect to the assigning CNA and left the CVE untriaged here.

- Moved the four entries that used "upstream-wontfix" (CVE-2019-14899, CVE-2021-3714, CVE-2021-3864, CVE-2022-4543) to "unpatched". None has an upstream kernel-community wontfix statement; the WONTFIX and deferred positions are distribution ones. "unpatched" keeps them visible in reports.

- CVE-2022-1247 now leads with the v7.1 removal of net/rose and keeps the v6.17 refcount commits, which are what cover the 6.18 kernel on master. Upstream has since assigned those two commits CVE-2025-39826 and CVE-2025-39827, so the identification no longer rests on reading the diff alone.

- CVE-2023-3397: corrected the claim that only one fix was proposed and withdrawn; further fixes were posted in 2026 but none is merged, and syzbot still reproduces the txEnd()/lmLogClose() unmount race.

- CVE-2023-6240: dropped the Marvell/s390 aside and an unrelated commit reference flagged in review.

CVE-2022-0400 and CVE-2023-6238 are unchanged since v2.

AI assistance is disclosed with the AI-Generated trailer on each patch.

Summary of the nine verdicts:

  fixed-version   CVE-2022-1247   6.17, rose_neigh refcount conversion
  disputed        CVE-2022-0400   never substantiated, closed by three vendors
  unpatched       CVE-2019-14899  weak host model, config-only mitigation
                  CVE-2021-3714   inherent to KSM deduplication
                  CVE-2021-3864   two mitigation attempts, neither merged
                  CVE-2022-4543   KASLR not a boundary against local attackers
                  CVE-2023-3397   JFS txEnd UAF, no fix merged
                  CVE-2023-6238   NVMe fix applied then reverted
                  CVE-2023-6240   RSA timing oracle, fixed only in RHEL
Quoted 1 line

Once these are settled I can prepare the wrynose and scarthgap backports.

Hi,

I have spent some time validating the status of all the issues and I think we're nearly there. I've suggested changes to the commit messages, comments and CVE_STATUS wordings, with those addressed I think 8/9 of these will be ready to merge.

CVE-2022-0400 still bothers me. There was clearly something reported, there's a non-public Red Hat bugzilla entry referenced by Debian [1]. It looks like it was closed by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian as they don't build the affected code, not because it was an invalid report. We should ask Red Hat to release more details.

[1]: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2040604

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
author
#20 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines

I have spent some time validating the status of all the issues and I think we're nearly there. I've suggested changes to the commit messages, comments and CVE_STATUS wordings, with those addressed I think 8/9 of these will be ready to merge.

Will send v4 with those eight using your wordings, with one deviation:
for CVE-2023-6238 the fix was backed out by the nvme maintainer rather than withdrawn by its author, so the status reads "Proposed fix was not merged" to match the comment above it.

Quoted 5 lines

CVE-2022-0400 still bothers me. There was clearly something reported, there's a non-public Red Hat bugzilla entry referenced by Debian [1]. It looks like it was closed by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian as they don't build the affected code, not because it was an invalid report. We should ask Red Hat to release more details.

Agreed - dropped from v4; with no CVE_STATUS entry it stays visible as Unpatched in cve-check reports. I've asked on the public bug 2044575 and via [email protected] for bug 2040604 to be opened or the affected files named, and will follow up here when Red Hat responds.

All other comments will be addressed in v4 as suggested.

Thanks a lot for your time and help.

author
#21 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Junjie Cao

I've asked on the public bug 2044575 and via [email protected] for bug 2040604 to be opened or the affected files named, and will follow up here when Red Hat responds.

Red Hat PSIRT responded and named the affected code: an unvalidated v2_ext_offset in the SMC CLC proposal parsing, which is the issue fixed in v6.13 and tracked upstream as CVE-2024-49568. Details are on the public bug:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575

v4 with the eight reviewed entries follows as agreed; CVE-2022-0400 comes as a separate fixed-version patch, since it is new analysis rather than a rework of the reviewed one.