cve-exclusion: triage ten kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data
v2 cover cve-exclusion: triage ten kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data
This is v2 of the triage of the CVEs from Paul Barker's "linux-yocto CVEs in need of triage" request [1], reworked according to his review [2]:
one patch per CVE, primary sources cited in every commit message, and the three CVEs which have no upstream fix recorded as "unpatched" rather than left out.
CVE-2023-3640 is not included; Adhitya is handling that one.
Summary of the ten verdicts:
fixed-version CVE-2022-1247 v6.17, rose_neigh refcount conversion
CVE-2023-4010 v6.18, imon URB resubmit loop
disputed CVE-2022-0400 never substantiated, closed by three vendors
upstream-wontfix CVE-2019-14899 weak host model, config-only mitigation
CVE-2021-3714 inherent to KSM deduplication
CVE-2021-3864 two fix attempts, neither merged
CVE-2022-4543 KASLR not a boundary against local attackers
unpatched CVE-2023-3397 JFS txEnd UAF, proposed fix withdrawn
CVE-2023-6238 NVMe fix applied then reverted
CVE-2023-6240 RSA timing oracle, fixed only in RHELEvery commit referenced above was verified to exist and to be contained in the stated release using git tag --contains against mainline history at linux-next 20260727.
Two points for reviewer attention:
- CVE-2023-4010 (patch 8) is the one identification that rests on inference rather than an authoritative statement: the fixing commit carries no CVE reference. The reasoning is spelled out in the commit message; "disputed" would also be defensible and I am happy to respin that patch if preferred.
- CVE-2022-1247 (patch 5) is fixed in v6.17, but no distribution tracker has connected the fix to the CVE yet. If the conclusion looks right it would be worth reporting back to Ubuntu, Debian and Red Hat.
The AI-Generated trailer on each patch covers source research and the drafting of the commit messages. Every commit hash, release attribution and quotation was verified against mainline git history and the cited sources before submission, and I take responsibility for the conclusions.
Once these are settled I am happy to prepare the wrynose and scarthgap backports.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
Junjie Cao (10):
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2019-14899
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2021-3714
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2021-3864
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-0400
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-1247
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-4543
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-3397
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-4010
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-6238
cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-6240
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 1/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2019-14899
A network-adjacent attacker can send packets addressed to a host's VPN tunnel address over the physical interface. Because Linux uses the weak host model by default, the host replies, which lets the attacker infer the tunnel address, confirm active connections and eventually inject into the tunneled TCP stream.
No kernel fix exists. The original disclosure states that reverse path filtering is not a solution because the attack also works over IPv6, which has no rp_filter at all:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/05/1
Kernel-level mitigations were discussed on netdev and the WireGuard list in December 2019 but nothing was merged; the mitigation that shipped was a firewall rule added to wg-quick(8) in userspace:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Ubuntu has the issue deferred for every release since 2019-12-13 and records "No current fix from upstream":
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
Debian does not track it against the kernel source package at all, and Red Hat scopes it to openvpn rather than the kernel:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2019-14899
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2019-14899
The NVD entry carries an unversioned linux_kernel CPE, so no fixed version can ever match it.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -192,3 +192,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-68195] = "fixed-version: Fixed from 6.18" # Fix https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4b64fda4d30a83a7f00e92a0c8a1d47699609f3 # Backport https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75c5d9bce072abbbc09b701a49869ac23c34a906 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3" + +# Consequence of the default weak host model, not a specific defect. +# Mitigation is configuration only: rp_filter for IPv4, or a strong host +# model rule such as the one wg-quick(8) installs, which also covers IPv6. +# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/05/1 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "upstream-wontfix: consequence of the default weak \ +host model, no kernel fix exists or is planned, mitigated by firewall configuration"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 2/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2021-3714
In reply to Junjie CaoKSM merges identical anonymous pages across processes. An attacker who can place chosen page-sized content in a victim's memory can detect the merge through the timing of the resulting copy-on-write fault, and so leak memory contents remotely.
This cannot be fixed without removing deduplication, and the affected projects have said so explicitly. Red Hat closed the issue WONTFIX:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327
Debian marks src:linux unfixed with the note "Inherent design limitation, can be avoided by not using KSM":
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
Ubuntu records "there is no upstream fix available as of 2024-06-17" and lists disabling KSM as the only mitigation:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714
CONFIG_KSM=y is set in yocto-kernel-cache (bsp/intel-x86 and the paravirt_kvm fragments), so this is not a configuration exclusion. It does however require two runtime opt-ins: ksm_run defaults to KSM_RUN_STOP in mm/ksm.c, so ksmd must be started by the administrator, and memory is only eligible if the process asks for it with madvise(MADV_MERGEABLE) or prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE).
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -199,3 +199,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3" # https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/05/1 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "upstream-wontfix: consequence of the default weak \ host model, no kernel fix exists or is planned, mitigated by firewall configuration" + +# Inherent to KSM deduplication, closed WONTFIX by Red Hat. Exposure needs +# ksmd started at runtime (/sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run defaults to 0) and the +# workload to opt in via MADV_MERGEABLE or prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE). +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "upstream-wontfix: inherent design limitation of \ +KSM page deduplication, closed WONTFIX by Red Hat, no upstream fix planned"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 3/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2021-3864
In reply to Junjie Caobegin_new_exec() resets dumpability to owner-dumpable whenever the real and effective ids match at exec time. A binary exec'd by a setuid program that has already called setuid(0) therefore becomes dumpable as root, and with a relative core_pattern plus an attacker-controlled working directory the resulting core file can be dropped into a privileged directory such as /etc/logrotate.d.
Full report with proof of concept:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2
Two fixes were proposed and neither was merged. Waiman Long's patch was NAKed by Eric W. Biederman as an ineffective mitigation:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Wander Lairson Costa's RFC v2 received design feedback and no v3 ever followed:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
The flagged logic is unchanged today: fs/exec.c still selects TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER in that case, and fs/coredump.c only rejects relative core paths when dumpable is 2, so the dumpable==1 case this CVE describes is not covered.
Ubuntu records "no fix upstream as of 2022-01-27" and defers it for all releases; Debian lists src:linux as unfixed:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3864
Red Hat rates RHEL 8 and later "Not affected" purely because their default core_pattern does not write relative to the current directory:
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-3864
Images that set an absolute path, a pipe or a socket core_pattern (for example systemd-coredump) are not exploitable for the same reason.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +6 -0
@@ -206,3 +206,9 @@ host model, no kernel fix exists or is planned, mitigated by firewall configurat # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "upstream-wontfix: inherent design limitation of \ KSM page deduplication, closed WONTFIX by Red Hat, no upstream fix planned" + +# Two fix attempts, neither merged; the fs/exec.c logic is unchanged. +# An absolute, piped or socket kernel.core_pattern prevents exploitation. +# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "upstream-wontfix: no accepted mainline fix after \ +several attempts, exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 4/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-0400
In reply to Junjie CaoThe CVE describes an out-of-bounds read in the SMC protocol stack, but no vulnerable code was ever identified. The MITRE record lists the affected version as "Not Known" and references only two Red Hat bugzillas, the originating one of which was never made public.
The public bugzilla is closed as NOTABUG, with the statement "There was no shipped kernel version that was seen affected by this problem":
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-0400
SUSE reached the same conclusion independently, closing bsc#1195329 as RESOLVED / INVALID:
https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-0400.html
So did Debian, which marks it unimportant with the note "non issue, no security impact":
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-0400
There is no commit in mainline referencing this CVE. The net/smc out-of-bounds fixes that landed in v5.18 (b1871fd48efc, 0558226cebee) are in local, privileged paths and are not linked to this CVE by any tracker.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -212,3 +212,10 @@ KSM page deduplication, closed WONTFIX by Red Hat, no upstream fix planned" # https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "upstream-wontfix: no accepted mainline fix after \ several attempts, exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern" + +# Never substantiated: no affected version, reproducer or commit was ever +# identified. Closed NOTABUG by Red Hat, INVALID by SUSE (bsc#1195329) and +# "non issue, no security impact" by Debian. +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-0400] = "disputed: the reported net/smc out-of-bounds read \ +was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 5/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-1247
In reply to Junjie CaoThe CVE describes a race between rose_connect() and the code that frees a rose_neigh once its count and use fields reach zero.
Takamitsu Iwai's August 2025 series converts that field to a proper reference count and removes the unlocked increment in rose_connect() which is exactly the operation the CVE describes:
https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061
("net: rose: convert 'use' field to refcount_t", v6.17)
https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
("net: rose: include node references in rose_neigh refcount", v6.17)
The first commit message states the premise of the CVE almost verbatim:
"The 'use' field in struct rose_neigh is used as a reference counter but lacks atomicity. This can lead to race conditions where a rose_neigh structure is freed while still being referenced by other code paths", and its diff deletes the "rose->neighbour->use++;" statement from rose_connect(). The second merges the separate count and use counters, which is the other half of the condition described by the CVE, and closes a syzbot-reported slab-use-after-free.
Both are in v6.17 and were backported to 6.1.y, 6.6.y, 6.12.y and 6.16.y in the 2025-09-02 stable round.
Kernels from v7.1 onwards are unaffected by construction, since the AX.25 and hamradio subsystems were removed:
https://git.kernel.org/linus/dd8d4bc28ad7252610d8e79c1313a2d1e3499a51
The commits predate the association of this CVE with
any fix, so no tracker links them yet - Ubuntu, Debian and Red Hat all still show the CVE as open. The identification above is based on the commit contents matching the CVE description; the two 2022 rose patches from Duoming Zhou that Ubuntu's tracker references fix different rose bugs and are not the fix for this issue.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +6 -0
@@ -219,3 +219,9 @@ several attempts, exploitation requires a relative kernel.core_pattern" # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-0400] = "disputed: the reported net/smc out-of-bounds read \ was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian" + +# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061 +# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45 +# Also in 6.1.150, 6.6.104, 6.12.y and 6.16.5 via the 2025-09-02 stable round. +# The rose/hamradio subsystem was removed entirely in v7.1 (dd8d4bc28ad7). +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 6/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-4543
In reply to Junjie CaoKPTI clones the kernel entry text into the user page tables at its KASLR-slid address and, on CPUs with PGE, sets the global bit on those PTEs. The mapping therefore survives the CR3 write on kernel exit, and a local attacker can time prefetch instructions across the kernel range to recover the KASLR base in well under a second.
Disclosure and technical write-up:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/16/3
https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html
The disclosure states that after discussion with [email protected] and linux-distros "a fix for this is currently not available", and none has appeared since. arch/x86/mm/pti.c still clones the entry text and still sets _PAGE_GLOBAL on the cloned PTEs as of v7.2, and no commit in mainline references the issue.
Debian marks it unimportant with the note "Ignored upstream and KASLR is not expected to be resistant to local attacks":
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4543
Ubuntu has it deferred since 2023-01-10 with "unfixed upstream", and Red Hat lists current RHEL as Affected with no mitigation available:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-4543
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-4543
97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area", v6.2) randomizes the CPU entry area, which is CVE-2023-3640. It predates this disclosure and does not address it - the offset of entry_SYSCALL_64 from the KASLR base is unchanged by that commit.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -225,3 +225,10 @@ was never substantiated and was closed as not-a-bug by Red Hat, SUSE and Debian" # Also in 6.1.150, 6.6.104, 6.12.y and 6.16.5 via the 2025-09-02 stable round. # The rose/hamradio subsystem was removed entirely in v7.1 (dd8d4bc28ad7). CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17" + +# "EntryBleed": KPTI maps __entry_text into the user page tables with the +# global bit set, leaking the KASLR base by prefetch timing. Intel only. +# Not CVE-2023-3640, which is the separate cpu_entry_area (fixed in v6.2). +# https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "upstream-wontfix: no fix planned, KASLR is not \ +considered a defence against local attackers"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 7/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-3397
In reply to Junjie CaotxEnd() in fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c reads the log pointer from the superblock info, drops TXN_LOCK and then takes log->gclock, while lmLogClose() can free that log during umount.
The subsystem in the public CVE data is misleading: the "slub" association comes from the KASAN slab report, but the affected code is JFS. Red Hat's own title for the issue is "slab-use-after-free write in txend due to race condition".
A fix adding a new mutex was posted, reviewed, and then withdrawn by its author, who wrote "I think my fix method is not a good solution":
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
No other fix has been posted, and the sequence in txEnd() is unchanged in mainline as of linux-next 20260727. syzkaller was still reporting "KASAN: slab-use-after-free Write in txEnd" in June 2026.
Ubuntu records "unfixed upstream as of 2023-09-01"; Debian lists src:linux as vulnerable in every suite:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-3397
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-3397
CONFIG_JFS_FS=n in both ktypes/standard/standard.cfg and ktypes/preempt-rt/preempt-rt.cfg in yocto-kernel-cache, and no fragment there enables it; the only other occurrence is CONFIG_JFS_SECURITY in the selinux feature, which has no effect without JFS_FS.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -232,3 +232,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17" # https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "upstream-wontfix: no fix planned, KASLR is not \ considered a defence against local attackers" + +# JFS txEnd()/lmLogClose() use-after-free, not slub as the CVE data says. +# The only proposed fix was withdrawn by its author; the racy code is +# unchanged and syzbot still reproduces it as of June 2026. +# https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: no upstream fix, the only proposed \ +patch was withdrawn by its author and the affected fs/jfs code is unchanged"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 8/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-4010
In reply to Junjie CaoThe CVE text attributes a system lockup to usb_giveback_urb() in the USB HCD framework. That function does not exist in the kernel; the closest name is usb_giveback_urb_bh(). Ubuntu's security team noted the same discrepancy when triaging the issue.
The reporter's proof of concept identifies the actual driver. Its output shows the imon driver repeatedly printing errors and consuming CPU:
https://github.com/wanrenmi/a-usb-kernel-bug
usb_rx_callback_intf0() and usb_rx_callback_intf1() in drivers/media/rc/imon.c resubmitted the RX URB after logging an error, so a device returning -EPROTO caused an unbounded warning loop. That is fixed by:
https://git.kernel.org/linus/eecd203ada43a4693ce6fdd3a58ae10c7819252c
("media: imon: make send_packet() more robust", v6.18)
whose commit message describes the same mechanism: "usb_rx_callback_intf0() resubmits urb after printk(), and resubmitted urb causes usb_rx_callback_intf0() to again get -EPROTO error. This results in printk() flooding (RCU stalls)". The fix returns early for those error codes instead of resubmitting.
The impact is lower than the CVE suggests. It needs physical access to attach a malicious device, and Ubuntu's triage concluded "There is no system lockup happening", only unthrottled logging:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-4010
Ubuntu's tracker data reaches the same conclusion about which driver is at fault: it records "break-fix: 21677cfc562a -" for this CVE, and 21677cfc562a is "V4L/DVB: ir-core: add imon driver", the commit that introduced the driver. Their note explains the choice: "The imon driver has been issuing those warnings since its inception, so using that as the break commit."
The tie to the fixing commit is an inference: eecd203ada43 carries no CVE reference or Fixes tag, so no tracker links the two. It rests on the reported function not existing, Ubuntu and the reporter's PoC both pointing at imon, and the mechanism the commit fixes matching the report.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +5 -0
@@ -239,3 +239,8 @@ considered a defence against local attackers" # https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: no upstream fix, the only proposed \ patch was withdrawn by its author and the affected fs/jfs code is unchanged" + +# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/eecd203ada43a4693ce6fdd3a58ae10c7819252c +# The CVE names usb_giveback_urb(), which does not exist; the reporter's PoC +# and Ubuntu's break-fix data both point at drivers/media/rc/imon.c. +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-4010] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.18"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 9/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-6238
In reply to Junjie CaoNVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD and the io_uring passthrough path accept a metadata length from userspace without checking it against the number of blocks and the namespace metadata size that the device uses to size the transfer, so the device can DMA past the end of the buffer.
Kanchan Joshi posted a stopgap removing unprivileged passthrough, reviewed by Christoph Hellwig and applied for nvme-6.6:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/
It was then backed out. Keith Busch wrote "I believe this large change is a bit too late for 6.6 ... It's backed out now", to which Christoph Hellwig replied "We leave an exploitable hole in, so I don't think waiting any longer is an option". No replacement has been merged: the commits the patch would have reverted are all still present, and nvme_map_user_request() still passes the user-supplied metadata length straight to blk_rq_integrity_map_user() with no cross-check.
The exposure was introduced by855b7717f44b ("nvme: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands") in v6.2, so branches carrying older kernels are not affected. Debian reached the same conclusion independently, marking the older suites "Vulnerable code not present":
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6238
Red Hat rates it Low because the device node is root-only by default:
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6238
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
@@ -244,3 +244,11 @@ patch was withdrawn by its author and the affected fs/jfs code is unchanged" # The CVE names usb_giveback_urb(), which does not exist; the reporter's PoC # and Ubuntu's break-fix data both point at drivers/media/rc/imon.c. CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-4010] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.18" + +# The user metadata length is not checked against the length the device +# derives from the command. The fix was applied to nvme-6.6 and then backed +# out; nothing has landed since. Kernels before v6.2 predate unprivileged +# passthrough (855b7717f44b) and are not affected. +# https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/ +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: the proposed fix was applied to \ +nvme-6.6 and then reverted, no upstream fix has landed since"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 10/10 cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-6240
In reply to Junjie Cao"Marvin" is Hubert Kario's Bleichenbacher-style timing oracle research, not a Marvell or s390 issue as some data sets suggest:
https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/
The affected code is the generic software RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 unpadding in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete() has three secret-dependent early exits (leading zero byte, block type, minimum padding length) and a loop whose trip count depends on the position of the separator, so the time taken reveals padding validity. There is no constant-time unpadding and no implicit-rejection fallback in the tree, and no commit touching that file addresses decryption timing.
Red Hat classifies it CWE-203 and has shipped fixes only in RHEL errata (RHSA-2024:2758 for 9.4, RHSA-2024:3618 for 8.10 and others); the corresponding bugzilla is still NEW:
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6240
Ubuntu records "appears unfixed in upstream as of 2024.08.24" and Debian lists src:linux as vulnerable in all suites:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6240
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6240
Practical exposure is narrow: kernel PKCS#1 v1.5 use is dominated by signature verification rather than decryption, and an attacker needs a service driving KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT with a long-lived key. The leaky primitive is nevertheless reachable.
e8829ef1f73f ("crypto: rsa - restrict plaintext/ciphertext values more", v6.9) is unrelated: it enforces SP800-56B value restrictions and is not a timing fix.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +7 -0
@@ -252,3 +252,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-4010] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.18" # https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: the proposed fix was applied to \ nvme-6.6 and then reverted, no upstream fix has landed since" + +# "Marvin": the PKCS#1 v1.5 unpadding in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c branches on +# secret-derived data, leaking padding validity by timing. Not a Marvell or +# s390 issue despite some data sets. Fixed only in RHEL downstream. +# https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6240] = "unpatched: Bleichenbacher-style timing oracle in \ +crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c is still present in mainline, fixed only downstream in RHEL"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 5 lines · Junjie Cao
This is v2 of the triage of the CVEs from Paul Barker's "linux-yocto CVEs in need of triage" request [1], reworked according to his review [2]:
one patch per CVE, primary sources cited in every commit message, and the three CVEs which have no upstream fix recorded as "unpatched" rather than left out.
Hi Junjie,
We briefly discussed this patch series on the review call today. We're concerned about taking CVE status changes based on AI-Generated analysis from a new contributor, when there are multiple ways to interpret the various discussions online about these issues and it's not immediately clear what the "right" answer is. So we need to give these patches a thorough review. As we often point out in the weekly status emails, we have limited bandwidth to do this sort of in-depth review, so we may not be able to handle these patches quickly.
Some quick thoughts below:
Quoted 3 lines
Summary of the ten verdicts:
fixed-version CVE-2022-1247 v6.17,
rose_neighrefcount conversion
rose_connect() is now gone from mainline, so we can easily say this was fixed with the removal of net/rose. Pointing at an earlier fix requires more detailed review.
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2023-4010 v6.18, imon URB resubmit loop
This sounds like we're trying to infer the reporter's intent based on 'imon' being visible in a screenshot. We shouldn't be making guesses just because the initial report quality is poor.
Quoted 1 line
disputed CVE-2022-0400 never substantiated, closed by three vendors
This is probably right, but needs another look.
Quoted 1 line
upstream-wontfix CVE-2019-14899 weak host model, config-only mitigation
We shouldn't use upstream-wontfix unless that is an actual upstream opinion. Ubuntu/RedHat are not upstream for the Linux kernel.
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2021-3714 inherent to KSM deduplication
As above.
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2021-3864 two fix attempts, neither merged
As above. Was the fix actually rejected by upstream or did it just go quiet?
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2022-4543 KASLR not a boundary against local attackers
Sounds like there was some discussion with the kernel security team but probably not a clear wontfix decision.
Quoted 1 line
unpatched CVE-2023-3397 JFS txEnd UAF, proposed fix withdrawn
Unclear if there is still a real problem here in mainline.
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2023-6238 NVMe fix applied then reverted
Probably correct but not completely sure.
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2023-6240 RSA timing oracle, fixed only in RHEL
Also probably correct but not completely sure. The commit message has artifacts of the LLM being confused (Marvell/s390/unrelated commit reference), those can be dropped.
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
Hi Paul,
Quoted 8 lines · Paul Barker
We briefly discussed this patch series on the review call today. We're concerned about taking CVE status changes based on AI-Generated analysis from a new contributor, when there are multiple ways to interpret the various discussions online about these issues and it's not immediately clear what the "right" answer is. So we need to give these patches a thorough review. As we often point out in the weekly status emails, we have limited bandwidth to do this sort of in-depth review, so we may not be able to handle these patches quickly.
Thanks very much for your time and reply - understood, and no urgency from my side. For v3 I'll drop the one inferred verdict and downgrade the four "upstream-wontfix" entries to "unpatched", so what's left should be checkable from the links in each commit message. Happy to go through any of these on a review call if that's easier.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
fixed-version CVE-2022-1247 v6.17,
rose_neighrefcount conversion
rose_connect()is now gone from mainline, so we can easily say this was fixed with the removal of net/rose. Pointing at an earlier fix requires more detailed review.
I'll lead with the removal in the entry. Since master's linux-yocto is 6.18 and the removal (dd8d4bc28ad7) is v7.1, the entry still needs the v6.17 commits to cover 6.18. The kernel CNA later assigned those two commits CVEs of their own (CVE-2025-39826/39827), which ties them to this rose_neigh race in upstream's records.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2023-4010 v6.18, imon URB resubmit loopThis sounds like we're trying to infer the reporter's intent based on 'imon' being visible in a screenshot. We shouldn't be making guesses just because the initial report quality is poor.
OK, I'll drop this patch and leave the CVE untriaged. The record names a function that does not exist in the kernel, so I'll raise that with the assigning CNA; if the record gets corrected or disputed the status can follow it.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
upstream-wontfix CVE-2019-14899 weak host model, config-only mitigation
We shouldn't use upstream-wontfix unless that is an actual upstream opinion. Ubuntu/RedHat are not upstream for the Linux kernel.
Right. None of the four has an upstream wontfix statement, so I'll move CVE-2019-14899, CVE-2021-3714, CVE-2021-3864 and CVE-2022-4543 to "unpatched" and put the distro references in the comments.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2021-3864 two fix attempts, neither merged
As above. Was the fix actually rejected by upstream or did it just go quiet?
Went quiet, mostly. Eric Biederman called Waiman Long's patch "not a particularly effective mitigation", Linus suggested a different approach, Willy Tarreau posted WIP patches for it, and that petered out in early 2022 with nothing merged. Wander Lairson Costa's RFC v2 got design feedback and no v3 followed. The "NAKed" in my patch 3 message overstates this - I'll fix that wording in v3.
Quoted 3 lines
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unpatched CVE-2023-3397 JFS txEnd UAF, proposed fix withdrawn
Unclear if there is still a real problem here in mainline.
The txEnd() sequence is unchanged in linux-next 20260727, and the use-after-free was reported again this June against 7.0-rc1, with the free stack in lmLogClose() via jfs_umount(), which is the race this CVE describes:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I'll add the link to the commit message.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
CVE-2023-6240 RSA timing oracle, fixed only in RHEL
Also probably correct but not completely sure. The commit message has artifacts of the LLM being confused (Marvell/s390/unrelated commit reference), those can be dropped.
Will drop those.
Best regards,
Junjie