FAILED: patch "[PATCH] net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree
Subsystems (3)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 883b56ae58fe657d8497806c7059646e9ba6dbd0
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026081710-bronco-grumpily-43a9@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 883b56ae58fe657d8497806c7059646e9ba6dbd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hyunjung Ko <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 19:12:52 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback
control action
tcf_action_check_ctrlact() range checks the primary control action:
if (!opcode) ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0;
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX is TC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it cannot be set that way. But act_gact and act_police each carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only reject TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned verbatim from the action.
In particular user space can store TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. That verdict tells every caller the action took ownership of the skb, so nobody frees it: sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for it. The result is one leaked sk_buff plus its data buffer per packet traversing the filter, unbounded, for all traffic on the chain including kernel-generated packets.
Both are trivially deterministic. act_gact clamps tcfg_pval to >= 1, so with pval = 1 gact_determ() returns the fallback for every packet. act_police has no mandatory rate, so rate = 0 leaves tcfp_mtu = ~0 and tcf_police_mtu_check() always passes.
TC_ACT_CONSUMED was added by commit 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action"), after both goto-chain guards were written:
commit 9469f375ab09 ("net/sched: act_gact: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action") and
commit c08f5ed5d625 ("net/sched: act_police: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action"). Neither guard was widened when the new verdict appeared.
Factor the existing range test out of tcf_action_check_ctrlact() as tcf_action_valid() and apply it to both fallbacks. The helper cannot call tcf_action_check_ctrlact() directly because that also allocates a goto_chain, which is exactly what these two sites must not do.
Reproduced on v7.2-rc6: kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet. With this patch both configurations are rejected with -EINVAL and kmemleak reports none.
include/net/act_api.h +19 -0
@@ -270,6 +270,25 @@ int tcf_action_check_ctrlact(int action, struct tcf_proto *tp,struct tcf_chain *tcf_action_set_ctrlact (struct tc_action *a,int action,struct tcf_chain *newchain); +/* Range check for a control action supplied by user space. +* +* This is the same test tcf_action_check_ctrlact() applies to the primary +* control action, factored out for the *fallback* control actions +* (act_gact's TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and act_police's TCA_POLICE_RESULT), +* which must not reach tcf_action_check_ctrlact() because they have no +* goto_chain to allocate. Without it, user space can store kernel-internal +* verdicts such as TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is +* deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. +*/ +static inline bool tcf_action_valid (int action) +{ +int opcode =TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE (action); + +if (!opcode) +return action <=TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ; +return opcode <=TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE_MAX || action ==TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_INET DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (tcf_frag_xmit_count);#endif
net/sched/act_gact.c +5 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ static int tcf_gact_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, p_parm =nla_data (tb[TCA_GACT_PROB ]);if (p_parm->ptype >=MAX_RAND )return -EINVAL ; +if (!tcf_action_valid (p_parm->paction)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (p_parm->paction,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" );
net/sched/act_police.c +6 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ static int tcf_police_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,if (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]) { tcfp_result =nla_get_u32 (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]); +if (!tcf_action_valid (tcfp_result)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); + err = -EINVAL ; + goto failure; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (tcfp_result,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" );
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/1 net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback control action
From: Hyunjung Ko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 883b56ae58fe657d8497806c7059646e9ba6dbd0 ]
tcf_action_check_ctrlact() range checks the primary control action:
if (!opcode) ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0;
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX is TC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it cannot be set that way. But act_gact and act_police each carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only reject TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned verbatim from the action.
In particular user space can store TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. That verdict tells every caller the action took ownership of the skb, so nobody frees it: sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for it. The result is one leaked sk_buff plus its data buffer per packet traversing the filter, unbounded, for all traffic on the chain including kernel-generated packets.
Both are trivially deterministic. act_gact clamps tcfg_pval to >= 1, so with pval = 1 gact_determ() returns the fallback for every packet. act_police has no mandatory rate, so rate = 0 leaves tcfp_mtu = ~0 and tcf_police_mtu_check() always passes.
TC_ACT_CONSUMED was added by commit 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action"), after both goto-chain guards were written:
commit 9469f375ab09 ("net/sched: act_gact: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action") and
commit c08f5ed5d625 ("net/sched: act_police: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action"). Neither guard was widened when the new verdict appeared.
Factor the existing range test out of tcf_action_check_ctrlact() as tcf_action_valid() and apply it to both fallbacks. The helper cannot call tcf_action_check_ctrlact() directly because that also allocates a goto_chain, which is exactly what these two sites must not do.
Reproduced on v7.2-rc6: kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet. With this patch both configurations are rejected with -EINVAL and kmemleak reports none.
--- include/net/act_api.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ net/sched/act_gact.c | 5 +++++ net/sched/act_police.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
include/net/act_api.h +20 -0
@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ int tcf_action_check_ctrlact(int action, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *newchain);struct tcf_chain *tcf_action_set_ctrlact (struct tc_action *a,int action,struct tcf_chain *newchain); + +/* Range check for a control action supplied by user space. +* +* This is the same test tcf_action_check_ctrlact() applies to the primary +* control action, factored out for the *fallback* control actions +* (act_gact's TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and act_police's TCA_POLICE_RESULT), +* which must not reach tcf_action_check_ctrlact() because they have no +* goto_chain to allocate. Without it, user space can store kernel-internal +* verdicts such as TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is +* deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. +*/ +static inline bool tcf_action_valid (int action) +{ +int opcode =TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE (action); + +if (!opcode) +return action <=TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ; +return opcode <=TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE_MAX || action ==TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT */ static inline void tcf_action_stats_update(struct tc_action *a, u64 bytes,
net/sched/act_gact.c +5 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ static int tcf_gact_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, p_parm =nla_data (tb[TCA_GACT_PROB ]);if (p_parm->ptype >=MAX_RAND )return -EINVAL ; +if (!tcf_action_valid (p_parm->paction)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (p_parm->paction,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" );
net/sched/act_police.c +6 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,12 @@ static int tcf_police_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,if (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]) { tcfp_result =nla_get_u32 (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]); +if (!tcf_action_valid (tcfp_result)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); + err = -EINVAL ; + goto failure; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (tcfp_result,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0