libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86137
PATCH v2 1/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86137
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86137
---
Changes in v2
- limit backport changes to 80 characters
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch new file +63 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From a9d489b86e46188d1c0fde7dbd0aa8281596e6d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hieu Le Minh <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 21:18:24 +0700 +Subject: [PATCH] xmlregexp: Prevent out-of-bounds read in NXT macro + +Fixes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/1099 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86137 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2] + +Backport Changes: +- Add the parser-context length field and allocation-failure guard required by + the Scarthgap 2.12.10 source, which lacks both pieces of the upstream + context. +- The allocation-failure guard is completed by the subsequent + CVE-2026-86141.patch, which moves strlen() after the xmlStrdup() null check; + keep that patch after this one in SRC_URI. + +(cherry picked from commit 76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xmlregexp.c | 13 +++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xmlregexp.c b/xmlregexp.c +index f434a0cf..320a35ce 100644 +--- a/xmlregexp.c ++++ b/xmlregexp.c +@@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ + xmlRegexpErrCompile(ctxt, str); + #define NEXT ctxt->cur++ + #define CUR (*(ctxt->cur)) +-#define NXT(index) (ctxt->cur[index]) ++#define NXT(index) \ ++ (((size_t)(ctxt->cur + index - ctxt->string) < ctxt->len) \ ++ ? ctxt->cur[index] : 0) + + #define NEXTL(l) ctxt->cur += l; + #define XML_REG_STRING_SEPARATOR '|' +@@ -245,6 +247,7 @@ typedef xmlRegParserCtxt *xmlRegParserCtxtPtr; + struct _xmlAutomata { + xmlChar *string; + xmlChar *cur; ++ size_t len; + + int error; + int neg; +@@ -698,8 +701,14 @@ xmlRegNewParserCtxt(const xmlChar *string) { + if (ret == NULL) + return(NULL); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xmlRegParserCtxt)); +- if (string != NULL) ++ if (string != NULL) { + ret->string = xmlStrdup(string); ++ ret->len = strlen((const char *) ret->string); ++ if (ret->string == NULL) { ++ xmlFree(ret); ++ return(NULL); ++ } ++ } + ret->cur = ret->string; + ret->neg = 0; + ret->negs = 0;
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-0992-03.patch \ file://CVE-2026-1757.patch \ file://CVE-2026-11979.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH v2 2/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86138
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/a4cba4b5b5a8c42e155ed42d2d2a44955465a2e4
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86138
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86138.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86138.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86138.patch new file +52 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From d2e3efc8502313a1099ccc4aac19e8e03734e8c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mohammadmseet-hue <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 02:54:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix: add overflow checks to xmlDictAddQString in dict.c + +xmlDictAddString has overflow guards for pool size calculations, but its +sibling xmlDictAddQString lacks these entirely. The namelen + plen + 1 +addition can overflow unsigned int, and 4 * (overflowed_value) produces +a small allocation, leading to heap buffer overflow when memcpy writes +the prefix and name. + +Add the same SIZE_MAX-based overflow guards and safe size_t cast. + +CVE: CVE-2026-86138 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/a4cba4b5b5a8c42e155ed42d2d2a44955465a2e4] + +(cherry picked from commit a4cba4b5b5a8c42e155ed42d2d2a44955465a2e4) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + dict.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dict.c b/dict.c +index d7156ed3..ae0210ea 100644 +--- a/dict.c ++++ b/dict.c +@@ -225,10 +225,21 @@ xmlDictAddQString(xmlDictPtr dict, const xmlChar *prefix, unsigned int plen, + return(NULL); + } + +- if (size == 0) size = 1000; +- else size *= 4; /* exponential growth */ +- if (size < 4 * (namelen + plen + 1)) +- size = 4 * (namelen + plen + 1); /* just in case ! */ ++ if (size == 0) { ++ size = 1000; ++ } else { ++ if (size < (SIZE_MAX - sizeof(xmlDictStrings)) / 4) ++ size *= 4; /* exponential growth */ ++ else ++ size = SIZE_MAX - sizeof(xmlDictStrings); ++ } ++ if (size / 4 < namelen + plen + 1) { ++ if ((size_t) namelen + plen + 1 < ++ (SIZE_MAX - sizeof(xmlDictStrings)) / 4) ++ size = 4 * ((size_t) namelen + plen + 1); /* just in case ! */ ++ else ++ return(NULL); ++ } + pool = (xmlDictStringsPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlDictStrings) + size); + if (pool == NULL) + return(NULL);
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-1757.patch \ file://CVE-2026-11979.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH v2 3/8 libxml2: mark CVE-2026-86139 fixed
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
The fix for CVE-2026-86139 adds a zero-length guard in xmlURIEscapeStr, as shown in the upstream commit [1].
The libxml2 2.12.10 source already contains the equivalent guard [3], so no additional patch is required. Mark the CVE as fixed in the recipe.
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/8edbbdb09f24d26a2f900141fddc2b9d014f53b0
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86139
[3] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/blob/v2.12.10/uri.c#L1689-L1700
---
Changes in v2
- added xmlURIEscapeStr function url
--- meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +5 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-45322] = "disputed: issue requires memory allocation to fail # https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/958 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-8732] = "disputed: the code maintainer explains, that the issue can only be triggered with untrusted SGML catalogs and it makes absolutely no sense to use untrusted catalogs. The issue triggers a crash if an invalid file is provided. https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/958" +# The Scarthgap 2.12.10 source already contains the equivalent zero-length +# guard required for the xmlURIEscapeStr integer-overflow issue. +# https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/blob/v2.12.10/uri.c#L1689-L1700 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-86139] = "fixed-version: xmlURIEscapeStr returns NULL when xmlStrlen returns zero" + BINCONFIG = "${bindir}/xml2-config" PACKAGECONFIG ??= "python \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH v2 4/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86140
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/d1686f91dbda141a752200419d35639fd6b38340
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86140
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86140.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86140.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86140.patch new file +56 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 7d324fcfa71e8567678ad254c0e10e509ebae99b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mohammadmseet-hue <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 02:54:37 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix: add bounds checks to xmlSnprintfElements in valid.c + +CVE-2025-24928 fixed xmlSnprintfElementContent for unchecked strcat() +writes, but the sibling function xmlSnprintfElements has the identical +unfixed pattern. The strcat(buf, "(") before the while loop and +strcat(buf, ")") after the loop exit have no bounds checks. + +Add remaining-space checks before both strcat calls, with early return +and ellipsis when space is insufficient. + +CVE: CVE-2026-86140 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/d1686f91dbda141a752200419d35639fd6b38340] + +(cherry picked from commit d1686f91dbda141a752200419d35639fd6b38340) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + valid.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/valid.c b/valid.c +index ae4bb822..718e6d85 100644 +--- a/valid.c ++++ b/valid.c +@@ -5047,7 +5047,15 @@ xmlSnprintfElements(char *buf, int size, xmlNodePtr node, int glob) { + int len; + + if (node == NULL) return; +- if (glob) strcat(buf, "("); ++ len = strlen(buf); ++ if (glob) { ++ if (size - len < 50) { ++ if ((size - len > 4) && (buf[len - 1] != '.')) ++ strcat(buf, " ..."); ++ return; ++ } ++ strcat(buf, "("); ++ } + cur = node; + while (cur != NULL) { + len = strlen(buf); +@@ -5111,7 +5119,11 @@ xmlSnprintfElements(char *buf, int size, xmlNodePtr node, int glob) { + } + cur = cur->next; + } +- if (glob) strcat(buf, ")"); ++ if (glob) { ++ len = strlen(buf); ++ if (size - len > 1) ++ strcat(buf, ")"); ++ } + } + + /**
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-11979.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH v2 5/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86141
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e89a8aae4c9b40cdafcf66b3f9e57c62db37bb55
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86141
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86141.patch | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86141.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86141.patch new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From adb9287ae35770d9b281ed8f2160774198fbaf25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 07:56:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xmlregexp: Calc string length after null checking + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1107 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86141 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e89a8aae4c9b40cdafcf66b3f9e57c62db37bb55] + +(cherry picked from commit e89a8aae4c9b40cdafcf66b3f9e57c62db37bb55) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xmlregexp.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xmlregexp.c b/xmlregexp.c +index 320a35ce..72e8e459 100644 +--- a/xmlregexp.c ++++ b/xmlregexp.c +@@ -702,12 +702,12 @@ xmlRegNewParserCtxt(const xmlChar *string) { + return(NULL); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xmlRegParserCtxt)); + if (string != NULL) { +- ret->string = xmlStrdup(string); +- ret->len = strlen((const char *) ret->string); ++ ret->string = xmlStrdup(string); + if (ret->string == NULL) { + xmlFree(ret); + return(NULL); + } ++ ret->len = strlen((const char *) ret->string); + } + ret->cur = ret->string; + ret->neg = 0;
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH v2 6/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86142
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86142
---
Changes in v2
- limit backport changes to 80 characters
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 51f0e78349cbbc9081f14e02f440733e5880fb3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 09:32:43 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xpointer: Check overflow in xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1113 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86142 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58] + +Backport Changes: +- Use xmlXPathErr(ctxt, XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR) because the Scarthgap xpointer + implementation does not provide the newer xmlXPathPErrMemory() call shape. + This preserves the XPath parser error state as well as reporting the + allocation failure. + +(cherry picked from commit 6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xpointer.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xpointer.c b/xpointer.c +index 6e1e5f46..f5457c9f 100644 +--- a/xpointer.c ++++ b/xpointer.c +@@ -956,6 +956,13 @@ xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name) { + level = 1; + + len = xmlStrlen(ctxt->cur); ++ /* Overflow in xmlStrlen */ ++ if (len == 0 && ctxt->cur != NULL && *ctxt->cur != 0) { ++ xmlXPathErr(ctxt, XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR); ++ xmlFree(name); ++ return; ++ } ++ + len++; + buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(len); + if (buffer == NULL) {
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH v2 7/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86143
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86143
---
Changes in v2
- limit backport changes to 80 characters
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch | 96 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch new file +96 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From 83259eee08067b547d2aaedd436504939b2c343b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 09:54:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xmlIO: Check for int overflow before calling writecallback + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1111 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86143 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35] + +Backport Changes: +- Change nbchars to size_t in both Scarthgap write functions before assigning + the size_t result of xmlBufUse(). Add the INT_MAX guard to both + xmlOutputBufferWrite() callback paths. The upstream commit assumes earlier + refactoring that changed nbchars to size_t and routed + xmlOutputBufferWriteEscape() through the protected write path; the existing + flush guards are retained. + +(cherry picked from commit 90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xmlIO.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xmlIO.c b/xmlIO.c +index 95d27157..de227d8c 100644 +--- a/xmlIO.c ++++ b/xmlIO.c +@@ -3318,7 +3318,7 @@ + */ + int + xmlOutputBufferWrite(xmlOutputBufferPtr out, int len, const char *buf) { +- int nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ ++ size_t nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ + int ret; /* return from function call */ + int written = 0; /* number of char written to I/O so far */ + int chunk; /* number of byte current processed from buf */ +@@ -3378,6 +3378,10 @@ + if ((nbchars < MINLEN) && (len <= 0)) + goto done; + ++ if (nbchars >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + /* + * second write the stuff to the I/O channel + */ +@@ -3487,7 +3491,7 @@ + int + xmlOutputBufferWriteEscape(xmlOutputBufferPtr out, const xmlChar *str, + xmlCharEncodingOutputFunc escaping) { +- int nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ ++ size_t nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ + int ret; /* return from function call */ + int written = 0; /* number of char written to I/O so far */ + int oldwritten=0;/* loop guard */ +@@ -3572,6 +3576,10 @@ + if ((nbchars < MINLEN) && (len <= 0)) + goto done; + ++ if (nbchars >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + /* + * second write the stuff to the I/O channel + */ +@@ -3667,15 +3675,25 @@ + */ + if ((out->conv != NULL) && (out->encoder != NULL) && + (out->writecallback != NULL)) { ++ size_t bufsize = xmlBufUse(out->conv); ++ if (bufsize >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + ret = out->writecallback(out->context, + (const char *)xmlBufContent(out->conv), +- xmlBufUse(out->conv)); ++ bufsize); + if (ret >= 0) + xmlBufShrink(out->conv, ret); + } else if (out->writecallback != NULL) { ++ size_t bufsize = xmlBufUse(out->buffer); ++ if (bufsize >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + ret = out->writecallback(out->context, + (const char *)xmlBufContent(out->buffer), +- xmlBufUse(out->buffer)); ++ bufsize); + if (ret >= 0) + xmlBufShrink(out->buffer, ret); + }
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86143.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH v2 8/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86144
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86144
---
Changes in v2
- limit backport changes to 80 characters
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch | 225 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 226 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +225 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +From 8d0c6eb94f8a32a49e3c9122a6da82c519198063 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ruben Thijssen <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 15:42:18 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] fix(xinclude): propagate parseFlags in xmlXIncludeProcess and + xmlXIncludeProcessTree + +CVE: CVE-2026-86144 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61] + +Backport Changes: +- Use xmlLoadExternalEntity() with xmlCtxtUseOptions() because Scarthgap + 2.12.10 predates xmlLoadResource() and resource-loader callbacks. +- Adapt the regression tests for 2.12.10 by using the global structured-error + handler, matching 2.12.10 loader network-entity diagnostics, and restoring + the test handler after xmlXIncludeProcess(). +- Omit the upstream XML_IO_NETWORK_ATTEMPT filter because the 2.12.10 + xmlLoadExternalEntity() path has no corresponding post-load error-filtering + block. +- Add a parser-context allocation guard because the target version can return + NULL from xmlNewParserCtxt(). + +(cherry picked from commit b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml | 4 ++ + result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err | 1 + + result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml | 4 ++ + result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err | 1 + + runtest.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml | 6 ++ + test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml | 6 ++ + xinclude.c | 9 ++- + 8 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err + create mode 100644 test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml + create mode 100644 test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml + +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..5d83cc96 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ Network access is not allowed ++</doc> +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..c134bed1 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++I/O error : Attempt to load network entity http://example.invalid/file.txt +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..af5bde91 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ <p>Network access is not allowed</p> ++</doc> +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..051f5928 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++I/O error : Attempt to load network entity http://example.invalid/file.xml +diff --git a/runtest.c b/runtest.c +index e91e2dfd..297cb5e2 100644 +--- a/runtest.c ++++ b/runtest.c +@@ -2444,6 +2444,75 @@ noentParseTest(const char *filename, const char *result, + return(res); + } + ++#ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED ++/** ++ * Parse a file and run xmlXIncludeProcess() to verify that doc->parseFlags ++ * is propagated properly. ++ * ++ * @param filename the file to parse ++ * @param result the file with expected result ++ * @param err the file with error messages ++ * @returns 0 in case of success, an error code otherwise ++ */ ++static int ++xincludeProcessTest(const char *filename, const char *result, const char *err, ++ int options) { ++ xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt; ++ xmlDocPtr doc; ++ xmlChar *base = NULL; ++ int size, res; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ nb_tests++; ++ ++ /* Create a new parser context */ ++ ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt(); ++ if (ctxt == NULL) ++ return(-1); ++ ++ /* Load the data from `filename` into a parser context */ ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler); ++ doc = xmlCtxtReadFile(ctxt, filename, NULL, options); ++ xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt); ++ ++ /* Check if `doc` was created successfully */ ++ if (doc == NULL) { ++ testErrorHandler(NULL, "%s : failed to parse\n", filename); ++ return(-1); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Run xmlXIncludeProcess() with a structured error handler to check that ++ * the parse flags are propagated. ++ */ ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler); ++ xmlXIncludeProcess(doc); ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler); ++ ++ /* Check the result and for any errors */ ++ if (result) { ++ xmlDocDumpMemory(doc, &base, &size); ++ res = compareFileMem(result, (char *) base, size); ++ xmlFree(base); ++ if (res != 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Result for %s failed in %s\n", filename, result); ++ ret = -1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if ((ret == 0) && (err != NULL)) { ++ res = compareFileMem(err, testErrors, testErrorsSize); ++ if (res != 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error for %s failed\n", filename); ++ ret = -1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ xmlFreeDoc(doc); ++ return(ret); ++} ++#endif ++ + /** + * errParseTest: + * @filename: the file to parse +@@ -5134,6 +5203,12 @@ testDesc testDescriptions[] = { + { "XInclude regression tests without reader", + errParseTest, "./test/XInclude/without-reader/*", "result/XInclude/", "", + ".err", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE }, ++ { "XInclude issue1120 regression tests", ++ errParseTest, "./test/XInclude/issue1120/*", "result/XInclude/", "", ++ ".err", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE | XML_PARSE_NONET }, ++ { "XInclude xmlXIncludeProcess() issue1120 regression tests", ++ xincludeProcessTest, "./test/XInclude/issue1120/*", "result/XInclude/", ++ "", ".err", XML_PARSE_NONET }, + #endif + #ifdef LIBXML_XPATH_ENABLED + #ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED +diff --git a/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..b0b8feef +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ <xi:include href="http://example.invalid/file.txt" parse="text"> ++ <xi:fallback>Network access is not allowed</xi:fallback> ++ </xi:include> ++</doc> +diff --git a/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..b4c9fe5e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ <xi:include href="http://example.invalid/file.xml"> ++ <xi:fallback><p>Network access is not allowed</p></xi:fallback> ++ </xi:include> ++</doc> +diff --git a/xinclude.c b/xinclude.c +index b6581558..0d57f5a1 100644 +--- a/xinclude.c ++++ b/xinclude.c +@@ -1688,6 +1688,11 @@ xmlXIncludeLoadTxt(xmlXIncludeCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *url, + * Load it. + */ + pctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt(); ++ if (pctxt == NULL) { ++ xmlXIncludeErrMemory(ctxt, ref->elem, NULL); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ xmlCtxtUseOptions(pctxt, ctxt->parseFlags); + inputStream = xmlLoadExternalEntity((const char*)URL, NULL, pctxt); + if(inputStream == NULL) + goto error; +@@ -2416,7 +2421,7 @@ xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(xmlDocPtr doc, int flags) { + */ + int + xmlXIncludeProcess(xmlDocPtr doc) { +- return(xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(doc, 0)); ++ return(xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(doc, doc ? doc->parseFlags : 0)); + } + + /** +@@ -2461,7 +2466,7 @@ xmlXIncludeProcessTreeFlags(xmlNodePtr tree, int flags) { + */ + int + xmlXIncludeProcessTree(xmlNodePtr tree) { +- return(xmlXIncludeProcessTreeFlags(tree, 0)); ++ return(xmlXIncludeProcessTreeFlags(tree, (tree && tree->doc) ? tree->doc->parseFlags : 0)); + } + + /**
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86143.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86144.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6