libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86137
PATCH 1/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86137
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86137
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch | 59 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch new file +59 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From a9d489b86e46188d1c0fde7dbd0aa8281596e6d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hieu Le Minh <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 21:18:24 +0700 +Subject: [PATCH] xmlregexp: Prevent out-of-bounds read in NXT macro + +Fixes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/1099 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86137 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2] + +Backport Changes: +- Add the parser-context length field and allocation-failure guard required by the Scarthgap 2.12.10 source, which lacks both pieces of the upstream context. +- The allocation-failure guard is completed by the subsequent CVE-2026-86141.patch, which moves strlen() after the xmlStrdup() null check; keep that patch after this one in SRC_URI. + +(cherry picked from commit 76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xmlregexp.c | 13 +++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xmlregexp.c b/xmlregexp.c +index f434a0cf..320a35ce 100644 +--- a/xmlregexp.c ++++ b/xmlregexp.c +@@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ + xmlRegexpErrCompile(ctxt, str); + #define NEXT ctxt->cur++ + #define CUR (*(ctxt->cur)) +-#define NXT(index) (ctxt->cur[index]) ++#define NXT(index) \ ++ (((size_t)(ctxt->cur + index - ctxt->string) < ctxt->len) \ ++ ? ctxt->cur[index] : 0) + + #define NEXTL(l) ctxt->cur += l; + #define XML_REG_STRING_SEPARATOR '|' +@@ -245,6 +247,7 @@ typedef xmlRegParserCtxt *xmlRegParserCtxtPtr; + struct _xmlAutomata { + xmlChar *string; + xmlChar *cur; ++ size_t len; + + int error; + int neg; +@@ -698,8 +701,14 @@ xmlRegNewParserCtxt(const xmlChar *string) { + if (ret == NULL) + return(NULL); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xmlRegParserCtxt)); +- if (string != NULL) ++ if (string != NULL) { + ret->string = xmlStrdup(string); ++ ret->len = strlen((const char *) ret->string); ++ if (ret->string == NULL) { ++ xmlFree(ret); ++ return(NULL); ++ } ++ } + ret->cur = ret->string; + ret->neg = 0; + ret->negs = 0;
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-0992-03.patch \ file://CVE-2026-1757.patch \ file://CVE-2026-11979.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 2/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86138
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/a4cba4b5b5a8c42e155ed42d2d2a44955465a2e4
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86138
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86138.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86138.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86138.patch new file +52 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From d2e3efc8502313a1099ccc4aac19e8e03734e8c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mohammadmseet-hue <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 02:54:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix: add overflow checks to xmlDictAddQString in dict.c + +xmlDictAddString has overflow guards for pool size calculations, but its +sibling xmlDictAddQString lacks these entirely. The namelen + plen + 1 +addition can overflow unsigned int, and 4 * (overflowed_value) produces +a small allocation, leading to heap buffer overflow when memcpy writes +the prefix and name. + +Add the same SIZE_MAX-based overflow guards and safe size_t cast. + +CVE: CVE-2026-86138 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/a4cba4b5b5a8c42e155ed42d2d2a44955465a2e4] + +(cherry picked from commit a4cba4b5b5a8c42e155ed42d2d2a44955465a2e4) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + dict.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dict.c b/dict.c +index d7156ed3..ae0210ea 100644 +--- a/dict.c ++++ b/dict.c +@@ -225,10 +225,21 @@ xmlDictAddQString(xmlDictPtr dict, const xmlChar *prefix, unsigned int plen, + return(NULL); + } + +- if (size == 0) size = 1000; +- else size *= 4; /* exponential growth */ +- if (size < 4 * (namelen + plen + 1)) +- size = 4 * (namelen + plen + 1); /* just in case ! */ ++ if (size == 0) { ++ size = 1000; ++ } else { ++ if (size < (SIZE_MAX - sizeof(xmlDictStrings)) / 4) ++ size *= 4; /* exponential growth */ ++ else ++ size = SIZE_MAX - sizeof(xmlDictStrings); ++ } ++ if (size / 4 < namelen + plen + 1) { ++ if ((size_t) namelen + plen + 1 < ++ (SIZE_MAX - sizeof(xmlDictStrings)) / 4) ++ size = 4 * ((size_t) namelen + plen + 1); /* just in case ! */ ++ else ++ return(NULL); ++ } + pool = (xmlDictStringsPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlDictStrings) + size); + if (pool == NULL) + return(NULL);
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-1757.patch \ file://CVE-2026-11979.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 3/8 libxml2: mark CVE-2026-86139 fixed
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
The fix for CVE-2026-86139 adds a zero-length guard in xmlURIEscapeStr, as shown in the upstream commit [1].
The libxml2 2.12.10 source already contains the equivalent guard, so no additional patch is required. Mark the CVE as fixed in the recipe.
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/8edbbdb09f24d26a2f900141fddc2b9d014f53b0
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86139
--- meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +4 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-45322] = "disputed: issue requires memory allocation to fail # https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/958 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-8732] = "disputed: the code maintainer explains, that the issue can only be triggered with untrusted SGML catalogs and it makes absolutely no sense to use untrusted catalogs. The issue triggers a crash if an invalid file is provided. https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/958" +# The Scarthgap 2.12.10 source already contains the equivalent zero-length +# guard required for the xmlURIEscapeStr integer-overflow issue. +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-86139] = "fixed-version: xmlURIEscapeStr returns NULL when xmlStrlen returns zero" + BINCONFIG = "${bindir}/xml2-config" PACKAGECONFIG ??= "python \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 3/8] libxml2: mark CVE-2026-86139 fixed
Quoted 8 lines · On Tue Sep 29, 2026 at 6:18 AM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
The fix for CVE-2026-86139 adds a zero-length guard in xmlURIEscapeStr, as shown in the upstream commit [1].
The libxml2 2.12.10 source already contains the equivalent guard, so no additional patch is required. Mark the CVE as fixed in the recipe.
Can you provide a link to the function so this can be quickly verified?
Quoted 14 lines
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/8edbbdb09f24d26a2f900141fddc2b9d014f53b0
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86139Signed-off-by Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>--- meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +0
-0
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-45322] = "disputed: issue requires memory allocation to fail · line 55
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +4
-0@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-45322] = "disputed: issue requires memory allocation to fail # https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/958 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-8732] = "disputed: the code maintainer explains, that the issue can only be triggered with untrusted SGML catalogs and it makes absolutely no sense to use untrusted catalogs. The issue triggers a crash if an invalid file is provided. https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/958" +# The Scarthgap 2.12.10 source already contains the equivalent zero-length +# guard required for the xmlURIEscapeStr integer-overflow issue. +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-86139] = "fixed-version: xmlURIEscapeStr returns NULL when xmlStrlen returns zero" + BINCONFIG = "${bindir}/xml2-config" PACKAGECONFIG ??= "python \
Thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
PATCH 4/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86140
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/d1686f91dbda141a752200419d35639fd6b38340
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86140
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86140.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86140.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86140.patch new file +56 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 7d324fcfa71e8567678ad254c0e10e509ebae99b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mohammadmseet-hue <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 02:54:37 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix: add bounds checks to xmlSnprintfElements in valid.c + +CVE-2025-24928 fixed xmlSnprintfElementContent for unchecked strcat() +writes, but the sibling function xmlSnprintfElements has the identical +unfixed pattern. The strcat(buf, "(") before the while loop and +strcat(buf, ")") after the loop exit have no bounds checks. + +Add remaining-space checks before both strcat calls, with early return +and ellipsis when space is insufficient. + +CVE: CVE-2026-86140 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/d1686f91dbda141a752200419d35639fd6b38340] + +(cherry picked from commit d1686f91dbda141a752200419d35639fd6b38340) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + valid.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/valid.c b/valid.c +index ae4bb822..718e6d85 100644 +--- a/valid.c ++++ b/valid.c +@@ -5047,7 +5047,15 @@ xmlSnprintfElements(char *buf, int size, xmlNodePtr node, int glob) { + int len; + + if (node == NULL) return; +- if (glob) strcat(buf, "("); ++ len = strlen(buf); ++ if (glob) { ++ if (size - len < 50) { ++ if ((size - len > 4) && (buf[len - 1] != '.')) ++ strcat(buf, " ..."); ++ return; ++ } ++ strcat(buf, "("); ++ } + cur = node; + while (cur != NULL) { + len = strlen(buf); +@@ -5111,7 +5119,11 @@ xmlSnprintfElements(char *buf, int size, xmlNodePtr node, int glob) { + } + cur = cur->next; + } +- if (glob) strcat(buf, ")"); ++ if (glob) { ++ len = strlen(buf); ++ if (size - len > 1) ++ strcat(buf, ")"); ++ } + } + + /**
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-11979.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 5/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86141
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e89a8aae4c9b40cdafcf66b3f9e57c62db37bb55
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86141
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86141.patch | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86141.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86141.patch new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From adb9287ae35770d9b281ed8f2160774198fbaf25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 07:56:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xmlregexp: Calc string length after null checking + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1107 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86141 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e89a8aae4c9b40cdafcf66b3f9e57c62db37bb55] + +(cherry picked from commit e89a8aae4c9b40cdafcf66b3f9e57c62db37bb55) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xmlregexp.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xmlregexp.c b/xmlregexp.c +index 320a35ce..72e8e459 100644 +--- a/xmlregexp.c ++++ b/xmlregexp.c +@@ -702,12 +702,12 @@ xmlRegNewParserCtxt(const xmlChar *string) { + return(NULL); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xmlRegParserCtxt)); + if (string != NULL) { +- ret->string = xmlStrdup(string); +- ret->len = strlen((const char *) ret->string); ++ ret->string = xmlStrdup(string); + if (ret->string == NULL) { + xmlFree(ret); + return(NULL); + } ++ ret->len = strlen((const char *) ret->string); + } + ret->cur = ret->string; + ret->neg = 0;
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86137.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 6/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86142
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86142
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 51f0e78349cbbc9081f14e02f440733e5880fb3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 09:32:43 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xpointer: Check overflow in xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1113 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86142 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58] + +Backport Changes: +- Use xmlXPathErr(ctxt, XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR) because the Scarthgap xpointer implementation does not provide the newer xmlXPathPErrMemory() call shape. This preserves the XPath parser error state as well as reporting the allocation failure. + +(cherry picked from commit 6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xpointer.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xpointer.c b/xpointer.c +index 6e1e5f46..f5457c9f 100644 +--- a/xpointer.c ++++ b/xpointer.c +@@ -956,6 +956,13 @@ xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name) { + level = 1; + + len = xmlStrlen(ctxt->cur); ++ /* Overflow in xmlStrlen */ ++ if (len == 0 && ctxt->cur != NULL && *ctxt->cur != 0) { ++ xmlXPathErr(ctxt, XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR); ++ xmlFree(name); ++ return; ++ } ++ + len++; + buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(len); + if (buffer == NULL) {
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 6/8] libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86142
Quoted 23 lines · On Tue Sep 29, 2026 at 6:18 AM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86142Signed-off-by Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patchmeta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 51f0e78349cbbc9081f14e02f440733e5880fb3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]>
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch line 12
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch new file +10
-0+Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 09:32:43 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xpointer: Check overflow in xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1113 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86142 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58] + +Backport Changes: +- Use xmlXPathErr(ctxt, XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR) because the Scarthgap xpointer implementation does not provide the newer xmlXPathPErrMemory() call shape. This preserves the XPath parser error state as well as reporting the allocation failure.
^ wrap at 80 chars please.
Quoted 30 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86142.patch new file +25
-0+ +(cherry picked from commit 6b3a736c0edc74ceec3d82f5252499d7911b3a58) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xpointer.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xpointer.c b/xpointer.c +index 6e1e5f46..f5457c9f 100644 +--- a/xpointer.c ++++ b/xpointer.c +@@ -956,6 +956,13 @@ xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name) { + level = 1; + + len = xmlStrlen(ctxt->cur); ++ /* Overflow in xmlStrlen */ ++ if (len == 0 && ctxt->cur != NULL && *ctxt->cur != 0) { ++ xmlXPathErr(ctxt, XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR); ++ xmlFree(name); ++ return; ++ } ++ + len++; + buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(len); + if (buffer == NULL) {meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +0
-0
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt · line 42
Quoted 7 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1
-0@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86138.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
PATCH 7/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86143
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86143
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch | 91 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch new file +91 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +From 83259eee08067b547d2aaedd436504939b2c343b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 09:54:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xmlIO: Check for int overflow before calling writecallback + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1111 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86143 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35] + +Backport Changes: +- Change nbchars to size_t in both Scarthgap write functions before assigning the size_t result of xmlBufUse(). Add the INT_MAX guard to both xmlOutputBufferWrite() callback paths. The upstream commit assumes earlier refactoring that changed nbchars to size_t and routed xmlOutputBufferWriteEscape() through the protected write path; the existing flush guards are retained. + +(cherry picked from commit 90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + xmlIO.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xmlIO.c b/xmlIO.c +index 95d27157..de227d8c 100644 +--- a/xmlIO.c ++++ b/xmlIO.c +@@ -3318,7 +3318,7 @@ + */ + int + xmlOutputBufferWrite(xmlOutputBufferPtr out, int len, const char *buf) { +- int nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ ++ size_t nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ + int ret; /* return from function call */ + int written = 0; /* number of char written to I/O so far */ + int chunk; /* number of byte current processed from buf */ +@@ -3378,6 +3378,10 @@ + if ((nbchars < MINLEN) && (len <= 0)) + goto done; + ++ if (nbchars >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + /* + * second write the stuff to the I/O channel + */ +@@ -3487,7 +3491,7 @@ + int + xmlOutputBufferWriteEscape(xmlOutputBufferPtr out, const xmlChar *str, + xmlCharEncodingOutputFunc escaping) { +- int nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ ++ size_t nbchars = 0; /* number of chars to output to I/O */ + int ret; /* return from function call */ + int written = 0; /* number of char written to I/O so far */ + int oldwritten=0;/* loop guard */ +@@ -3572,6 +3576,10 @@ + if ((nbchars < MINLEN) && (len <= 0)) + goto done; + ++ if (nbchars >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + /* + * second write the stuff to the I/O channel + */ +@@ -3667,15 +3675,25 @@ + */ + if ((out->conv != NULL) && (out->encoder != NULL) && + (out->writecallback != NULL)) { ++ size_t bufsize = xmlBufUse(out->conv); ++ if (bufsize >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + ret = out->writecallback(out->context, + (const char *)xmlBufContent(out->conv), +- xmlBufUse(out->conv)); ++ bufsize); + if (ret >= 0) + xmlBufShrink(out->conv, ret); + } else if (out->writecallback != NULL) { ++ size_t bufsize = xmlBufUse(out->buffer); ++ if (bufsize >= INT_MAX) { ++ out->error = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return(-1); ++ } + ret = out->writecallback(out->context, + (const char *)xmlBufContent(out->buffer), +- xmlBufUse(out->buffer)); ++ bufsize); + if (ret >= 0) + xmlBufShrink(out->buffer, ret); + }
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86140.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86143.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 7/8] libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86143
Quoted 23 lines · On Tue Sep 29, 2026 at 6:18 AM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86143Signed-off-by Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch | 91 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patchmeta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +From 83259eee08067b547d2aaedd436504939b2c343b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Garcia Moreno <[email protected]>
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch line 12
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch new file +10
-0+Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 09:54:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xmlIO: Check for int overflow before calling writecallback + +Fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/work_items/1111 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86143 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35] + +Backport Changes: +- Change nbchars to size_t in both Scarthgap write functions before assigning the size_t result of xmlBufUse(). Add the INT_MAX guard to both xmlOutputBufferWrite() callback paths. The upstream commit assumes earlier refactoring that changed nbchars to size_t and routed xmlOutputBufferWriteEscape() through the protected write path; the existing flush guards are retained.
^ wrap at 80 chars please. Also, this is not easy to understand,
can you make it clearer?
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch line 15
Quoted 3 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86143.patch new file +3
-0+ +(cherry picked from commit 90f293ba74d28b1d570920382e707586f68ebf35) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
Thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
PATCH 8/8 libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86144
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86144
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch | 219 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 220 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +219 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +From 8d0c6eb94f8a32a49e3c9122a6da82c519198063 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ruben Thijssen <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 15:42:18 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] fix(xinclude): propagate parseFlags in xmlXIncludeProcess and + xmlXIncludeProcessTree + +CVE: CVE-2026-86144 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61] + +Backport Changes: +- Use xmlLoadExternalEntity() with xmlCtxtUseOptions() because Scarthgap 2.12.10 predates xmlLoadResource() and resource-loader callbacks. +- Adapt the regression tests for 2.12.10 by using the global structured-error handler, matching 2.12.10 loader network-entity diagnostics, and restoring the test handler after xmlXIncludeProcess(). +- Omit the upstream XML_IO_NETWORK_ATTEMPT filter because the 2.12.10 xmlLoadExternalEntity() path has no corresponding post-load error-filtering block. +- Add a parser-context allocation guard because the target version can return NULL from xmlNewParserCtxt(). + +(cherry picked from commit b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml | 4 ++ + result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err | 1 + + result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml | 4 ++ + result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err | 1 + + runtest.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml | 6 ++ + test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml | 6 ++ + xinclude.c | 9 ++- + 8 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err + create mode 100644 test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml + create mode 100644 test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml + +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..5d83cc96 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ Network access is not allowed ++</doc> +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..c134bed1 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++I/O error : Attempt to load network entity http://example.invalid/file.txt +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..af5bde91 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ <p>Network access is not allowed</p> ++</doc> +diff --git a/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..051f5928 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++I/O error : Attempt to load network entity http://example.invalid/file.xml +diff --git a/runtest.c b/runtest.c +index e91e2dfd..297cb5e2 100644 +--- a/runtest.c ++++ b/runtest.c +@@ -2444,6 +2444,75 @@ noentParseTest(const char *filename, const char *result, + return(res); + } + ++#ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED ++/** ++ * Parse a file and run xmlXIncludeProcess() to verify that doc->parseFlags ++ * is propagated properly. ++ * ++ * @param filename the file to parse ++ * @param result the file with expected result ++ * @param err the file with error messages ++ * @returns 0 in case of success, an error code otherwise ++ */ ++static int ++xincludeProcessTest(const char *filename, const char *result, const char *err, ++ int options) { ++ xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt; ++ xmlDocPtr doc; ++ xmlChar *base = NULL; ++ int size, res; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ nb_tests++; ++ ++ /* Create a new parser context */ ++ ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt(); ++ if (ctxt == NULL) ++ return(-1); ++ ++ /* Load the data from `filename` into a parser context */ ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler); ++ doc = xmlCtxtReadFile(ctxt, filename, NULL, options); ++ xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt); ++ ++ /* Check if `doc` was created successfully */ ++ if (doc == NULL) { ++ testErrorHandler(NULL, "%s : failed to parse\n", filename); ++ return(-1); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Run xmlXIncludeProcess() with a structured error handler to check that ++ * the parse flags are propagated. ++ */ ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler); ++ xmlXIncludeProcess(doc); ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler); ++ ++ /* Check the result and for any errors */ ++ if (result) { ++ xmlDocDumpMemory(doc, &base, &size); ++ res = compareFileMem(result, (char *) base, size); ++ xmlFree(base); ++ if (res != 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Result for %s failed in %s\n", filename, result); ++ ret = -1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if ((ret == 0) && (err != NULL)) { ++ res = compareFileMem(err, testErrors, testErrorsSize); ++ if (res != 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error for %s failed\n", filename); ++ ret = -1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ xmlFreeDoc(doc); ++ return(ret); ++} ++#endif ++ + /** + * errParseTest: + * @filename: the file to parse +@@ -5134,6 +5203,12 @@ testDesc testDescriptions[] = { + { "XInclude regression tests without reader", + errParseTest, "./test/XInclude/without-reader/*", "result/XInclude/", "", + ".err", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE }, ++ { "XInclude issue1120 regression tests", ++ errParseTest, "./test/XInclude/issue1120/*", "result/XInclude/", "", ++ ".err", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE | XML_PARSE_NONET }, ++ { "XInclude xmlXIncludeProcess() issue1120 regression tests", ++ xincludeProcessTest, "./test/XInclude/issue1120/*", "result/XInclude/", ++ "", ".err", XML_PARSE_NONET }, + #endif + #ifdef LIBXML_XPATH_ENABLED + #ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED +diff --git a/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..b0b8feef +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ <xi:include href="http://example.invalid/file.txt" parse="text"> ++ <xi:fallback>Network access is not allowed</xi:fallback> ++ </xi:include> ++</doc> +diff --git a/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..b4c9fe5e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<doc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> ++ <xi:include href="http://example.invalid/file.xml"> ++ <xi:fallback><p>Network access is not allowed</p></xi:fallback> ++ </xi:include> ++</doc> +diff --git a/xinclude.c b/xinclude.c +index b6581558..0d57f5a1 100644 +--- a/xinclude.c ++++ b/xinclude.c +@@ -1688,6 +1688,11 @@ xmlXIncludeLoadTxt(xmlXIncludeCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *url, + * Load it. + */ + pctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt(); ++ if (pctxt == NULL) { ++ xmlXIncludeErrMemory(ctxt, ref->elem, NULL); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ xmlCtxtUseOptions(pctxt, ctxt->parseFlags); + inputStream = xmlLoadExternalEntity((const char*)URL, NULL, pctxt); + if(inputStream == NULL) + goto error; +@@ -2416,7 +2421,7 @@ xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(xmlDocPtr doc, int flags) { + */ + int + xmlXIncludeProcess(xmlDocPtr doc) { +- return(xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(doc, 0)); ++ return(xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(doc, doc ? doc->parseFlags : 0)); + } + + /** +@@ -2461,7 +2466,7 @@ xmlXIncludeProcessTreeFlags(xmlNodePtr tree, int flags) { + */ + int + xmlXIncludeProcessTree(xmlNodePtr tree) { +- return(xmlXIncludeProcessTreeFlags(tree, 0)); ++ return(xmlXIncludeProcessTreeFlags(tree, (tree && tree->doc) ? tree->doc->parseFlags : 0)); + } + + /**
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86143.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86144.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 8/8] libxml2: Fix CVE-2026-86144
Quoted 25 lines · On Tue Sep 29, 2026 at 6:18 AM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86144Signed-off-by Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch | 219 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 220 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patchmeta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +4
-0@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +From 8d0c6eb94f8a32a49e3c9122a6da82c519198063 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ruben Thijssen <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 15:42:18 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] fix(xinclude): propagate parseFlags in xmlXIncludeProcess and
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch line 14
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +10
-0+ xmlXIncludeProcessTree + +CVE: CVE-2026-86144 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61] + +Backport Changes: +- Use xmlLoadExternalEntity() with xmlCtxtUseOptions() because Scarthgap 2.12.10 predates xmlLoadResource() and resource-loader callbacks. +- Adapt the regression tests for 2.12.10 by using the global structured-error handler, matching 2.12.10 loader network-entity diagnostics, and restoring the test handler after xmlXIncludeProcess(). +- Omit the upstream XML_IO_NETWORK_ATTEMPT filter because the 2.12.10 xmlLoadExternalEntity() path has no corresponding post-load error-filtering block. +- Add a parser-context allocation guard because the target version can return NULL from xmlNewParserCtxt().
^ Please wrap this at 80 chars
Quoted 38 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +38
-0+(cherry picked from commit b63cd517afecb76582dd9488c55e54ceaf50de61) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml | 4 ++ + result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err | 1 + + result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml | 4 ++ + result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err | 1 + + runtest.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml | 6 ++ + test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml | 6 ++ + xinclude.c | 9 ++- + 8 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-1.xml.err + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml + create mode 100644 result/XInclude/issue1120-2.xml.err + create mode 100644 test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-1.xml + create mode 100644 test/XInclude/issue1120/issue1120-2.xml + +diff --git a/runtest.c b/runtest.c +index e91e2dfd..297cb5e2 100644 +--- a/runtest.c ++++ b/runtest.c +@@ -2444,6 +2444,75 @@ noentParseTest(const char *filename, const char *result, + return(res); + } + ++#ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED ++/** ++ * Parse a file and run xmlXIncludeProcess() to verify that doc->parseFlags ++ * is propagated properly. ++ * ++ * @param filename the file to parse ++ * @param result the file with expected result ++ * @param err the file with error messages ++ * @returns 0 in case of success, an error code otherwise ++ */ ++static int
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch line 120
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +9
-0++xincludeProcessTest(const char *filename, const char *result, const char *err, ++ int options) { ++ /* ++ * Run xmlXIncludeProcess() with a structured error handler to check that ++ * the parse flags are propagated. ++ */ ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler); ++ xmlXIncludeProcess(doc); ++ xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, testStructuredErrorHandler);
Upstream commit calls "xmlSetStructuredErrorFunc(NULL, NULL);" here but this change is not explained.
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch line 197
Quoted 13 lines
[...]
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +12
-0+diff --git a/xinclude.c b/xinclude.c +index b6581558..0d57f5a1 100644 +--- a/xinclude.c ++++ b/xinclude.c +@@ -1688,6 +1688,11 @@ xmlXIncludeLoadTxt(xmlXIncludeCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *url, + * Load it. + */ + pctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt(); ++ if (pctxt == NULL) { ++ xmlXIncludeErrMemory(ctxt, ref->elem, NULL); ++ goto error; ++ }
This if statement comes from another commit:78eab7a1 - xinclude: Report malloc failures
It look a bit intrusive to be backported but at least we need to reference it in the changelog.
Quoted 10 lines
++
xmlCtxtUseOptions(pctxt, ctxt->parseFlags);meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86144.patch new file +3
-0+ inputStream = xmlLoadExternalEntity((const char*)URL, NULL, pctxt); + if(inputStream == NULL) + goto error;meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +0
-0
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt · line 44
Quoted 7 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1
-0@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2026-86141.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86142.patch \ file://CVE-2026-86143.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-86144.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
Quoted 9 lines · On Tue Sep 29, 2026 at 6:18 AM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86137Signed-off-by Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
Hello,
Note that a similar series was already sent here:
[OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 1/6] libxml2: Security Fix for CVE-2026-86137
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/#t
I would have prefered that you improve upon it instead of creating a fully new one (with changelogs).
That said, since this one does not break ptests I'll continue reviewing it...
Regards,
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
Quoted 24 lines · On Tue Sep 29, 2026 at 6:18 AM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…
From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86137Signed-off-by Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch | 59 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patchmeta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch new file +3
-0@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From a9d489b86e46188d1c0fde7dbd0aa8281596e6d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hieu Le Minh <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 21:18:24 +0700
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch line 13
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2026-86137.patch new file +10
-0+Subject: [PATCH] xmlregexp: Prevent out-of-bounds read in NXT macro + +Fixes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/1099 + +CVE: CVE-2026-86137 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/76fe08d97de88bfaef2f7d5cd27f11954cc5bee2] + +Backport Changes: +- Add the parser-context length field and allocation-failure guard required by the Scarthgap 2.12.10 source, which lacks both pieces of the upstream context. +- The allocation-failure guard is completed by the subsequent CVE-2026-86141.patch, which moves strlen() after the xmlStrdup() null check; keep that patch after this one in SRC_URI.
Please wrap this at 80 characters, we are flexible on this but, here, this is too long.
Note that this also applies to other patches in this series.
Since there are actual dependencies between patches in this series, I hold the whole series and wait for you to send a fixed v2.
Thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS