memory leak in crypto_create_tfm
syzbot
syzbotHello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: 19409891 Merge tag 'pnp-5.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/p.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13165aa6100000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6d41e63a2c7e0715 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2e635807decef724a1fa compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17f00ef2100000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=170f2ef2100000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
executing program
executing program
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc480 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor064", pid 6388, jiffies 4294941622 (age 13.280s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .~V.............
backtrace:
[<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
[<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
[<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448
[<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
[<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
[<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
[<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
[<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
[<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
[<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc040 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .~V.............
backtrace:
[<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
[<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
[<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448
[<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
[<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
[<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
[<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
[<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
[<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
[<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88811b3ca080 (size 96):
comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
89 c7 08 cb 8a 12 10 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .......n........
71 51 5a c2 1b 00 00 00 35 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 qQZ.....5}......
backtrace:
[<000000008ec3eca0>] jent_entropy_collector_alloc+0x1b/0xf8 crypto/jitterentropy.c:662
[<0000000026ed401a>] jent_kcapi_init+0x17/0x40 crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:119
[<00000000be7d6b06>] crypto_create_tfm+0x89/0x100 crypto/api.c:459
[<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
[<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
[<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
[<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
[<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
[<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
[<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
[<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
[<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at [email protected].
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Probably a bug in crypto/drbg.c. Stephan, can you take a look?
Quoted 106 lines · syzbot
Hello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: 19409891 Merge tag 'pnp-5.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/p.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13165aa6100000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6d41e63a2c7e0715 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2e635807decef724a1fa compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17f00ef2100000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=170f2ef2100000IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by [email protected]executing program
executing programBUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc480 (size 64): comm "syz-executor064", pid 6388, jiffies 4294941622 (age 13.280s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .~V............. backtrace: [<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline] [<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline] [<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448 [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527 [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline] [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline] [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980 [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53 [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline] [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255 [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132 [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline] [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline] [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145 [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc040 (size 64): comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .~V............. backtrace: [<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline] [<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline] [<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448 [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527 [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline] [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline] [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980 [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53 [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline] [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255 [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132 [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline] [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline] [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145 [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88811b3ca080 (size 96): comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 89 c7 08 cb 8a 12 10 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .......n........ 71 51 5a c2 1b 00 00 00 35 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 qQZ.....5}...... backtrace: [<000000008ec3eca0>] jent_entropy_collector_alloc+0x1b/0xf8 crypto/jitterentropy.c:662 [<0000000026ed401a>] jent_kcapi_init+0x17/0x40 crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:119 [<00000000be7d6b06>] crypto_create_tfm+0x89/0x100 crypto/api.c:459 [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527 [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline] [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline] [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980 [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53 [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline] [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255 [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132 [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline] [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline] [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145 [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at [email protected].syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
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PATCH 1/1 crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
In reply to syzbotThe Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.
--- crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (drbg->jent) {crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Quoted 15 lines · Stephan Müller
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>--- crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)crypto/drbg.c +0
-0
crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639
Quoted 9 lines
crypto/drbg.c +3
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (drbg->jent) {crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }
free_everything functions never work. For example, "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer at this point.
crypto/drbg.c
1577 if (!drbg->core) {
1578 drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
1579 drbg->pr = pr;
1580 drbg->seeded = false;
1581 drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
1582
1583 ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
1584 if (ret)
1585 goto unlock;
1586
1587 ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg);
1588 if (ret)
1589 goto free_everything;
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^If we hit two failures inside drbg_prepare_hrng() then "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer.
1590
1591 if (IS_ERR(drbg->jent)) {
1592 ret = PTR_ERR(drbg->jent);
1593 drbg->jent = NULL;
1594 if (fips_enabled || ret != -ENOENT)
1595 goto free_everything;
1596 pr_info("DRBG: Continuing without Jitter RNG\n");
1597 }
1598
1599 reseed = false;
1600 }
1601
1602 ret = drbg_seed(drbg, pers, reseed);
1603
1604 if (ret && !reseed)
1605 goto free_everything;
1606
1607 mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
1608 return ret;
1609
1610 unlock:
1611 mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
1612 return ret;
1613
1614 free_everything:
1615 mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
1616 drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
^^^^Leading to an Oops.
1617 return ret;
1618 }
regards,
dan carpenter
Re: [PATCH] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Am Mittwoch, 3. Juni 2020, 13:09:19 CEST schrieb Dan Carpenter:
Hi Dan,
Quoted 79 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 26 lines
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>---
crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)crypto/drbg.c +3
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)> if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (drbg->jent) {crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639
Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0
-0crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }
free_everythingfunctions never work. For example, "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer at this point.
crypto/drbg.c
1577 if (!drbg->core) {1578 drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref]; 1579 drbg->pr = pr; 1580 drbg->seeded = false; 1581 drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); 1582 1583 ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg); 1584 if (ret) 1585 goto unlock; 1586 1587 ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg); 1588 if (ret) 1589 goto free_everything; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^If we hit two failures inside
drbg_prepare_hrng()then "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer.1590
1591 if (IS_ERR(drbg->jent)) {1592 ret = PTR_ERR(drbg->jent); 1593 drbg->jent = NULL; 1594 if (fips_enabled || ret != -ENOENT)1595 goto
free_everything;
1596 pr_info("DRBG: Continuing without Jitter
RNG\n"); 1597 }
1598
1599 reseed = false;
1600 }
1601
1602 ret =drbg_seed(drbg, pers, reseed);
1603
1604 if (ret && !reseed)
1605 gotofree_everything;
1606
1607mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
1608 return ret;
1609
1610 unlock:
1611mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
1612 return ret;
1613
1614free_everything:
1615mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
Quoted 3 lines
1616 drbg_uninstantiate(drbg); ^^^^Leading to an Oops.
Thanks a lot for the hint - a version 2 should come shortly.
Quoted 6 lines
1617 return ret;
1618 }regards,
dan carpenter
Ciao
Stephan
PATCH v2 1/1 crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
In reply to Dan CarpenterThe Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.
--- crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (drbg->jent)) {crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Quoted 15 lines · Stephan Müller
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>--- crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)crypto/drbg.c +0
-0
crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639
Quoted 9 lines
crypto/drbg.c +3
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (drbg->jent)) {crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }
It it okay that ->jent can be left as an ERR_PTR() value?
Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?
- Eric
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
Quoted 27 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 26 lines
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>---
crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)crypto/drbg.c +3
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)> if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (drbg->jent)) {
Quoted 8 lines
crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639
Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0
-0crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }It it okay that ->jent can be left as an
ERR_PTR()value?Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?
The error value is used in the drbg_instantiate function. There it is checked whether -ENOENT (i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.
Thanks for the review.
Quoted 2 lines
- Eric
Ciao
Stephan
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Quoted 38 lines · Stephan Mueller
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
Quoted 34 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 26 lines
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>---
crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)crypto/drbg.c +3
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)> if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (drbg->jent)) {crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639
Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0
-0crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }It it okay that ->jent can be left as an
ERR_PTR()value?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?
The error value is used in the
drbg_instantiatefunction. There it is checked whether-ENOENT(i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.Thanks for the review.
Quoted 1 line
drbg_seed() and drbg_async_seed() check for drbg->jent being NULL.
Will that now break due it drbg->jent possibly being an ERR_PTR()?
Hence why I'm asking whether drbg_uninstantiate() should set it to NULL.
- Eric
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 08:16:46 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
Quoted 47 lines · Stephan Mueller
Quoted 46 lines
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
Quoted 29 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 28 lines
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B...")
Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>---
crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)crypto/drbg.c +3
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)> if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (drbg->jent)) {Quoted 8 lines
crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639
Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0
-0crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }It it okay that ->jent can be left as an
ERR_PTR()value?Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?
The error value is used in the
drbg_instantiatefunction. There it is checked whether-ENOENT(i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks for the review.
drbg_seed()anddrbg_async_seed()check fordrbg->jentbeing NULL.Will that now break due it
drbg->jentpossibly being anERR_PTR()?Hence why I'm asking whether
drbg_uninstantiate()should set it to NULL.
The allocation happens in drbg_prepare_hrng that is only invoked by drbg_instantiate.
drbg_instantiate checks for the ERR_PTR and sets it to NULL in case the error is deemed ok.
Thus, any subsequent functions would see either a valid pointer or NULL. The only exception is drbg_uninstantiate when invoked from the error case
ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg);
if (ret)
goto free_everything;Thus, I think that the two functions you mention will never see any values other than NULL or a valid pointer.
Thanks
Ciao
Stephan
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Quoted 68 lines · Stephan Mueller
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 08:16:46 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
Quoted 47 lines · Stephan Mueller
Quoted 46 lines
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
Quoted 29 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 28 lines
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B...")
Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>---
crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)crypto/drbg.c +3
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)> if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); + } + +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (drbg->jent)) {Quoted 8 lines
crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639
Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0
-0crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); drbg->jent =NULL ; }It it okay that ->jent can be left as an
ERR_PTR()value?Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?
The error value is used in the
drbg_instantiatefunction. There it is checked whether-ENOENT(i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks for the review.
drbg_seed()anddrbg_async_seed()check fordrbg->jentbeing NULL.Will that now break due it
drbg->jentpossibly being anERR_PTR()?Hence why I'm asking whether
drbg_uninstantiate()should set it to NULL.The allocation happens in
drbg_prepare_hrngthat is only invoked bydrbg_instantiate.
drbg_instantiatechecks for theERR_PTRand sets it to NULL in case the error is deemed ok.Thus, any subsequent functions would see either a valid pointer or NULL. The only exception is
drbg_uninstantiatewhen invoked from the error case
Quoted 7 lines
ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg); if (ret) goto free_everything;Thus, I think that the two functions you mention will never see any values other than NULL or a valid pointer.
To be concrete, I'm suggesting:
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); drbg->jent = NULL;
This would be similar to how drbg_dealloc_state() sets lots of other fields of the drbg_state to NULL.
It's your call though. I haven't properly read this code; the above is just what makes sense to me at first glance...
- Eric
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 18:21:49 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
Quoted 5 lines
To be concrete, I'm suggesting:
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); drbg->jent = NULL;
I currently do not see that this could lead to an issue. But you are right, we should use defensive programming everywhere.
I will send a v3 shortly.
Thanks.
Ciao
Stephan
PATCH v3 1/1 crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
In reply to Stephan MüllerThe Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.
--- crypto/drbg.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/drbg.c +4 -2
@@ -1631,10 +1631,12 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)if (drbg->random_ready.func) {del_random_ready_callback (&drbg->random_ready);cancel_work_sync (&drbg->seed_work); -crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); - drbg->jent =NULL ; } +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (drbg->jent)) +crypto_free_rng (drbg->jent); + drbg->jent =NULL ; +if (drbg->d_ops) drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini (drbg);drbg_dealloc_state (drbg);
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Quoted 9 lines · Stephan Müller
The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch
97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")Signed-off-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>--- crypto/drbg.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Patch applied. Thanks.
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt