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memory leak in crypto_create_tfm

PATCH Superseded syzbot 5 participants 14 messages Jun 3, 2020 – Jun 12, 2020 Crypto API

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author syzbot
#0 lore raw

Hello,

syzbot found the following crash on:

HEAD commit:    19409891 Merge tag 'pnp-5.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/p..
git tree:       upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13165aa6100000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6d41e63a2c7e0715
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2e635807decef724a1fa
compiler:       gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17f00ef2100000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=170f2ef2100000

IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:

Reported-by [email protected]

executing program
executing program

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc480 (size 64):
  comm "syz-executor064", pid 6388, jiffies 4294941622 (age 13.280s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .~V.............
  backtrace:
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448
    [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
    [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
    [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
    [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
    [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc040 (size 64):
  comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .~V.............
  backtrace:
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448
    [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
    [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
    [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
    [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
    [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88811b3ca080 (size 96):
  comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    89 c7 08 cb 8a 12 10 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .......n........
    71 51 5a c2 1b 00 00 00 35 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00  qQZ.....5}......
  backtrace:
    [<000000008ec3eca0>] jent_entropy_collector_alloc+0x1b/0xf8 crypto/jitterentropy.c:662
    [<0000000026ed401a>] jent_kcapi_init+0x17/0x40 crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:119
    [<00000000be7d6b06>] crypto_create_tfm+0x89/0x100 crypto/api.c:459
    [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
    [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
    [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
    [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
    [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at [email protected].

syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches

#1 lore raw

Probably a bug in crypto/drbg.c. Stephan, can you take a look?

Quoted 106 lines · syzbot

Hello,

syzbot found the following crash on:

HEAD commit:    19409891 Merge tag 'pnp-5.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/p..
git tree:       upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13165aa6100000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6d41e63a2c7e0715
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2e635807decef724a1fa
compiler:       gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17f00ef2100000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=170f2ef2100000

IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:

Reported-by [email protected]

executing program
executing program

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc480 (size 64):
  comm "syz-executor064", pid 6388, jiffies 4294941622 (age 13.280s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .~V.............
  backtrace:
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448
    [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
    [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
    [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
    [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
    [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881175bc040 (size 64):
  comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    e0 7e 56 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .~V.............
  backtrace:
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
    [<0000000029c7602f>] crypto_create_tfm+0x31/0x100 crypto/api.c:448
    [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
    [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
    [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
    [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
    [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88811b3ca080 (size 96):
  comm "syz-executor064", pid 6389, jiffies 4294942172 (age 7.780s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    89 c7 08 cb 8a 12 10 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .......n........
    71 51 5a c2 1b 00 00 00 35 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00  qQZ.....5}......
  backtrace:
    [<000000008ec3eca0>] jent_entropy_collector_alloc+0x1b/0xf8 crypto/jitterentropy.c:662
    [<0000000026ed401a>] jent_kcapi_init+0x17/0x40 crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:119
    [<00000000be7d6b06>] crypto_create_tfm+0x89/0x100 crypto/api.c:459
    [<00000000bec8cbdb>] crypto_alloc_tfm+0x79/0x1a0 crypto/api.c:527
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_prepare_hrng crypto/drbg.c:1509 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_instantiate crypto/drbg.c:1587 [inline]
    [<000000002f9791ba>] drbg_kcapi_seed+0x432/0x6a9 crypto/drbg.c:1980
    [<0000000041302bb8>] crypto_rng_reset+0x35/0x1a0 crypto/rng.c:53
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:222 [inline]
    [<000000004758c3c4>] alg_setsockopt+0x149/0x190 crypto/af_alg.c:255
    [<000000008bc4b5cb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x112/0x230 net/socket.c:2132
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2148 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2145 [inline]
    [<00000000cfbf30da>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2145
    [<00000000fc9c2183>] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
    [<0000000040e080a1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at [email protected].

syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches

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#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

In reply to syzbot

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..33d28016da2d 100644
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+	}
+
+	if (drbg->jent) {
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Quoted 15 lines · Stephan Müller

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +0 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..33d28016da2d 100644

crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639

Quoted 9 lines
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+	}
+
+	if (drbg->jent) {
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 	}

free_everything functions never work. For example, "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer at this point.

crypto/drbg.c
1577 if (!drbg->core) {

  1578                  drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
  1579                  drbg->pr = pr;
  1580                  drbg->seeded = false;
  1581                  drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
  1582  
  1583                  ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
  1584                  if (ret)
  1585                          goto unlock;
  1586  
  1587                  ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg);
  1588                  if (ret)
  1589                          goto free_everything;
                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

If we hit two failures inside drbg_prepare_hrng() then "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer.

1590
1591 if (IS_ERR(drbg->jent)) {

  1592                          ret = PTR_ERR(drbg->jent);
  1593                          drbg->jent = NULL;
  1594                          if (fips_enabled || ret != -ENOENT)
  1595                                  goto free_everything;
  1596                          pr_info("DRBG: Continuing without Jitter RNG\n");
  1597                  }
  1598  
  1599                  reseed = false;
  1600          }
  1601  
  1602          ret = drbg_seed(drbg, pers, reseed);
  1603  
  1604          if (ret && !reseed)
  1605                  goto free_everything;
  1606  
  1607          mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
  1608          return ret;
  1609  
  1610  unlock:
  1611          mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
  1612          return ret;
  1613  
  1614  free_everything:
  1615          mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
  1616          drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
                                   ^^^^

Leading to an Oops.

1617 return ret;
1618 }

regards,
dan carpenter

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Am Mittwoch, 3. Juni 2020, 13:09:19 CEST schrieb Dan Carpenter:

Hi Dan,

Quoted 79 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 26 lines

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")

---

 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..33d28016da2d 100644
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state
 *drbg)> 
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
 
+	}
+
+	if (drbg->jent) {

crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639

Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0 -0
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 
 	}

free_everything functions never work. For example, "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer at this point.

crypto/drbg.c
1577 if (!drbg->core) {

  1578                  drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
  1579                  drbg->pr = pr;
  1580                  drbg->seeded = false;
  1581                  drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
  1582
  1583                  ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
  1584                  if (ret)
  1585                          goto unlock;
  1586
  1587                  ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg);
  1588                  if (ret)
  1589                          goto free_everything;
                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

If we hit two failures inside drbg_prepare_hrng() then "drbg->jent" can be an error pointer.

1590
1591 if (IS_ERR(drbg->jent)) {

  1592                          ret = PTR_ERR(drbg->jent);
  1593                          drbg->jent = NULL;
  1594                          if (fips_enabled || ret != -ENOENT)

1595 goto free_everything;
1596 pr_info("DRBG: Continuing without Jitter
RNG\n"); 1597 }
1598
1599 reseed = false;
1600 }
1601
1602 ret = drbg_seed(drbg, pers, reseed);
1603
1604 if (ret && !reseed)
1605 goto free_everything;
1606
1607 mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
1608 return ret;
1609
1610 unlock:
1611 mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
1612 return ret;
1613
1614 free_everything:
1615 mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);

Quoted 3 lines
  1616          drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
                                   ^^^^

Leading to an Oops.

Thanks a lot for the hint - a version 2 should come shortly.

Quoted 6 lines

1617 return ret;
1618 }

regards,
dan carpenter

Ciao
Stephan

#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

In reply to Dan Carpenter

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..8a0f16950144 100644
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) {
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Quoted 15 lines · Stephan Müller

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +0 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..8a0f16950144 100644

crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639

Quoted 9 lines
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) {
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 	}

It it okay that ->jent can be left as an ERR_PTR() value?

Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?

- Eric

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:

Hi Eric,

Quoted 27 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 26 lines

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")

---

 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..8a0f16950144 100644
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state
 *drbg)> 
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
 
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) {
Quoted 8 lines

crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639

Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0 -0
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 
 	}

It it okay that ->jent can be left as an ERR_PTR() value?

Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?

The error value is used in the drbg_instantiate function. There it is checked whether -ENOENT (i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.

Thanks for the review.

Quoted 2 lines

- Eric

Ciao
Stephan

#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Quoted 38 lines · Stephan Mueller

Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:

Hi Eric,

Quoted 34 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 26 lines

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")

---

 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..8a0f16950144 100644
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state
 *drbg)> 
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
 
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) {

crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639

Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0 -0
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 
 	}

It it okay that ->jent can be left as an ERR_PTR() value?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?

The error value is used in the drbg_instantiate function. There it is checked whether -ENOENT (i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.

Thanks for the review.

Quoted 1 line

drbg_seed() and drbg_async_seed() check for drbg->jent being NULL.

Will that now break due it drbg->jent possibly being an ERR_PTR()?

Hence why I'm asking whether drbg_uninstantiate() should set it to NULL.

- Eric

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 08:16:46 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:

Hi Eric,

Quoted 47 lines · Stephan Mueller
Quoted 46 lines

Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:

Hi Eric,

Quoted 29 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 28 lines

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B

...")

---

 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..8a0f16950144 100644
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state
 *drbg)>
 
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
 
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) {
Quoted 8 lines

crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639

Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0 -0
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 
 	}

It it okay that ->jent can be left as an ERR_PTR() value?

Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?

The error value is used in the drbg_instantiate function. There it is checked whether -ENOENT (i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Thanks for the review.

drbg_seed() and drbg_async_seed() check for drbg->jent being NULL.

Will that now break due it drbg->jent possibly being an ERR_PTR()?

Hence why I'm asking whether drbg_uninstantiate() should set it to NULL.

The allocation happens in drbg_prepare_hrng that is only invoked by drbg_instantiate.

drbg_instantiate checks for the ERR_PTR and sets it to NULL in case the error is deemed ok.

Thus, any subsequent functions would see either a valid pointer or NULL. The only exception is drbg_uninstantiate when invoked from the error case

                ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg);
                if (ret)
                        goto free_everything;

Thus, I think that the two functions you mention will never see any values other than NULL or a valid pointer.

Thanks

Ciao
Stephan

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Quoted 68 lines · Stephan Mueller

Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 08:16:46 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:

Hi Eric,

Quoted 47 lines · Stephan Mueller
Quoted 46 lines

Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 02:43:36 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:

Hi Eric,

Quoted 29 lines · Stephan Müller
Quoted 28 lines

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B

...")

---

 crypto/drbg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/drbg.c +3 -0
index 37526eb8c5d5..8a0f16950144 100644
@@ -1631,6 +1631,9 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state
 *drbg)>
 
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
 
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) {
Quoted 8 lines

crypto/drbg.c static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) · line 1639

Quoted 4 lines
crypto/drbg.c +0 -0
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 		drbg->jent = NULL;
 
 	}

It it okay that ->jent can be left as an ERR_PTR() value?

Perhaps it should always be set to NULL?

The error value is used in the drbg_instantiate function. There it is checked whether -ENOENT (i.e. the cipher is not available) or any other error is present. I am not sure we should move that check.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Thanks for the review.

drbg_seed() and drbg_async_seed() check for drbg->jent being NULL.

Will that now break due it drbg->jent possibly being an ERR_PTR()?

Hence why I'm asking whether drbg_uninstantiate() should set it to NULL.

The allocation happens in drbg_prepare_hrng that is only invoked by drbg_instantiate.

drbg_instantiate checks for the ERR_PTR and sets it to NULL in case the error is deemed ok.

Thus, any subsequent functions would see either a valid pointer or NULL. The only exception is drbg_uninstantiate when invoked from the error case

Quoted 7 lines
                ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg);
                if (ret)
                        goto free_everything;

Thus, I think that the two functions you mention will never see any values other than NULL or a valid pointer.

To be concrete, I'm suggesting:

	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
	drbg->jent = NULL;

This would be similar to how drbg_dealloc_state() sets lots of other fields of the drbg_state to NULL.

It's your call though. I haven't properly read this code; the above is just what makes sense to me at first glance...

- Eric

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 18:21:49 CEST schrieb Eric Biggers:

Hi Eric,

Quoted 5 lines

To be concrete, I'm suggesting:

	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
	drbg->jent = NULL;

I currently do not see that this could lead to an issue. But you are right, we should use defensive programming everywhere.

I will send a v3 shortly.

Thanks.

Ciao
Stephan

#12 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

In reply to Stephan Müller

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/drbg.c +4 -2
index 37526eb8c5d5..8d80d93cab97 100644
@@ -1631,10 +1631,12 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
 		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
-		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
-		drbg->jent = NULL;
 	}
 
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
+		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
+	drbg->jent = NULL;
+
 	if (drbg->d_ops)
 		drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
 	drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
maintainer
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3] crypto: DRBG - always try to free Jitter RNG instance

Quoted 9 lines · Stephan Müller

The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...")
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Patch applied. Thanks.

Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt