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support for duplicate measurement of integrity critical data

PATCH In review Tushar Sugandhi 2 participants 13 messages Jan 30, 2021 – Feb 9, 2021

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cover support for duplicate measurement of integrity critical data

IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the system.

This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy.

This series is based on the following repo/branch/commit:
repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
branch: next-integrity-testing
commit b3f82afc1041 ("IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot")

Tushar Sugandhi (3):
IMA: add policy condition to measure duplicate critical data
IMA: update functions to read allow_dup policy condition
IMA: add support to measure duplicate buffer for critical data hook

 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy  |  4 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  8 +++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 15 +++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c     |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  9 ++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c    |  5 +++--
 8 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 IMA: add policy condition to measure duplicate critical data

IMA needs to support duplicate measurements of integrity critical data to accurately determine the current state of that data on the system. Further, since measurement of duplicate data is not required for all the use cases, it needs to be policy driven.

Define "allow_dup", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow duplicate buffer measurement of integrity critical data.

Limit the ability to measure duplicate buffer data when action is "measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  4 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +3 -1
index bc8e1cbe5e61..9598287e3bbf 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Description:
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
-				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
+				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=] [allow_dup]
 		  base:
 			func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK]
 			        [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ Description:
 			label:= [selinux]|[kernel_info]|[data_label]
 			data_label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
 			For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux.
+			allow_dup allows measurement of duplicate data.  Only valid
+			when action is "measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA.
 
 		  default policy:
 			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +22 -2
index 9b45d064a87d..b89eb768dd05 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #define IMA_FSNAME	0x0200
 #define IMA_KEYRINGS	0x0400
 #define IMA_LABEL	0x0800
+#define IMA_ALLOW_DUP	0x1000
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	char *fsname;
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */
+	bool allow_dup; /* Allow duplicate buffer entry measurement */
 	struct ima_template_desc *template;
 };
 
@@ -942,7 +944,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
 	Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
-	Opt_label, Opt_err
+	Opt_label, Opt_allow_dup, Opt_err
 };
 
 static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -980,6 +982,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
 	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
 	{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+	{Opt_allow_dup, "allow_dup"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -1148,7 +1151,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			return false;
 
 		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
-				     IMA_LABEL))
+				     IMA_LABEL | IMA_ALLOW_DUP))
 			return false;
 
 		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
@@ -1184,6 +1187,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	entry->uid_op = &uid_eq;
 	entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq;
 	entry->action = UNKNOWN;
+	entry->allow_dup = false;
 	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 		int token;
@@ -1375,6 +1379,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 			entry->flags |= IMA_LABEL;
 			break;
+		case Opt_allow_dup:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "allow_dup", NULL);
+
+			if ((entry->func != CRITICAL_DATA) ||
+			    (entry->action != MEASURE)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->allow_dup = true;
+
+			entry->flags |= IMA_ALLOW_DUP;
+			break;
 		case Opt_fsuuid:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
 
@@ -1761,6 +1778,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, " ");
 	}
 
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_ALLOW_DUP)
+		seq_puts(m, "allow_dup");
+
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
 		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
 		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
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#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] IMA: add policy condition to measure duplicate critical data

Hi Tushar,

Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi

IMA needs to support duplicate measurements of integrity critical data to accurately determine the current state of that data on the system. Further, since measurement of duplicate data is not required for all the use cases, it needs to be policy driven.

Define "allow_dup", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow duplicate buffer measurement of integrity critical data.

Limit the ability to measure duplicate buffer data when action is "measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA.

Why?!

Quoted 17 lines

---

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -0
index 9b45d064a87d..b89eb768dd05 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #define IMA_FSNAME	0x0200
 #define IMA_KEYRINGS	0x0400
 #define IMA_LABEL	0x0800
+#define IMA_ALLOW_DUP	0x1000
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c struct ima_rule_entry { · line 90

Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	char *fsname;
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */

Defining a new boolean entry shouldn't be necessary. The other
boolean values are just stored in "flags".

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c struct ima_rule_entry { · line 93

Quoted 2 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
 	struct ima_template_desc *template;
 };

thanks,

Mimi

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#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] IMA: add policy condition to measure duplicate critical data

Quoted 8 lines · Mimi Zohar

Hi Tushar,

Quoted 5 lines · Tushar Sugandhi

IMA needs to support duplicate measurements of integrity critical data to accurately determine the current state of that data on the system. Further, since measurement of duplicate data is not required for all the use cases, it needs to be policy driven.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Define "allow_dup", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow duplicate buffer measurement of integrity critical data.

Limit the ability to measure duplicate buffer data when action is "measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA.

Why?!

I wasn't sure if it would break any use-case by supporting this for all the files / buffers. That's why I only wanted to address the scenario that we discussed in the last series (critical data measurement). But as you suggested in this series' cover letter response, I am happy to extend it to other scenarios (by disabling "htable" using new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines

---

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -0
index 9b45d064a87d..b89eb768dd05 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
  #define IMA_FSNAME	0x0200
  #define IMA_KEYRINGS	0x0400
  #define IMA_LABEL	0x0800
+#define IMA_ALLOW_DUP	0x1000
 
Quoted 10 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c struct ima_rule_entry { · line 90

Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
  #define UNKNOWN		0
  #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  	char *fsname;
  	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
  	struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */

Defining a new boolean entry shouldn't be necessary. The other
boolean values are just stored in "flags".

Thanks. Will do the same here.
Thanks,
Tushar

Quoted 7 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c struct ima_rule_entry { · line 93

Quoted 2 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
  	struct ima_template_desc *template;
  };

thanks,

Mimi

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#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 IMA: update functions to read allow_dup policy condition

In reply to Tushar Sugandhi

IMA functions ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy() do not consume the policy condition to allow measuring duplicate entries for integrity critical data.

Update ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy() to consume the IMA policy condition to measure duplicate buffer entries for integrity critical data.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 6 ++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 6 +++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 7 ++++++-
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -2
index aa312472c7c5..59324173497f 100644
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
-		   const char *func_data);
+		   const char *func_data, bool *allow_dup);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
-		     const char *func_data);
+		     const char *func_data, bool *allow_dup);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +4 -2
index 1dd70dc68ffd..d273373e6be9 100644
@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
  * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
  * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allow_dup: pointer filled in to decide if a duplicate buffer entry
+ *             should be measured
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -186,14 +188,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
-		   const char *func_data)
+		   const char *func_data, bool *allow_dup)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
-				template_desc, func_data);
+				template_desc, func_data, allow_dup);
 }
 
 /*
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -1
index 46ffa38bab12..e317a7698a47 100644
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
-				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3 -3
index 6a429846f90a..2774139845b6 100644
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
 	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
-				&template_desc, NULL);
+				&template_desc, NULL, NULL);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
 	action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
-				MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0);
+				MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0, NULL);
 
 	/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
 	if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 	if (func) {
 		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
 		action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
-					&pcr, &template, func_data);
+					&pcr, &template, func_data, NULL);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
 			return;
 	}
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -1
index b89eb768dd05..4147c677eb24 100644
@@ -644,6 +644,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
  * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
  * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allow_dup: pointer filled in to decide if a duplicate buffer entry
+ *             should be measured
  *
  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
  * conditions.
@@ -655,7 +657,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
-		     const char *func_data)
+		     const char *func_data, bool *allow_dup)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -673,6 +675,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 				     func_data))
 			continue;
 
+		if ((allow_dup) && (func == CRITICAL_DATA))
+			*allow_dup = entry->allow_dup;
+
 		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
 
 		action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
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#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 IMA: add support to measure duplicate buffer for critical data hook

In reply to Tushar Sugandhi

process_buffer_measurement() and the underlying functions do not use the policy condition to measure duplicate buffer entries for integrity critical data.

Update process_buffer_measurement(), ima_add_template_entry(), and ima_store_template() to use the policy condition to decide if a duplicate buffer entry for integrity critical data should be measured.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h       | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c   | 9 +++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c  | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c  | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 5 +++--
 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -2
index 59324173497f..b06732560949 100644
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int ima_init(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
-			   const unsigned char *filename);
+			   const unsigned char *filename, bool allow_dup);
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
 			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode,
-		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr);
+		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, bool allow_dup);
 void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -4
index d273373e6be9..f84369f9905e 100644
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
  */
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
-		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr)
+		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, bool allow_dup)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
 	static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
@@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		}
 	}
 	entry->pcr = pcr;
-	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
+	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename,
+					allow_dup);
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		goto err_out;
 	}
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode,
-				    filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+				    filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, false);
 	if (result < 0)
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 err_out:
@@ -330,7 +331,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr, false);
 	if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) {
 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
 		iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +1 -1
index 6e8742916d1d..d0a79d7b8d89 100644
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
 				    boot_aggregate_name,
-				    CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+				    CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, false);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 		audit_cause = "store_entry";
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3 -2
index 2774139845b6..ff6d15d7594c 100644
@@ -843,6 +843,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 	int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 	int violation = 0;
 	int action = 0;
+	bool allow_dup = false;
 	u32 secid;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag)
@@ -865,7 +866,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 	if (func) {
 		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
 		action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
-					&pcr, &template, func_data, NULL);
+					&pcr, &template, func_data, &allow_dup);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
 			return;
 	}
@@ -903,7 +904,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr);
+	ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr, allow_dup);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		audit_cause = "store_entry";
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +3 -2
index c096ef8945c7..fbf359495fa8 100644
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
  */
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+			   const unsigned char *filename, bool allow_dup)
 {
 	u8 *digest = entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest;
 	struct tpm_digest *digests_arg = entry->digests;
@@ -169,7 +169,8 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 
 	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
 	if (!violation) {
-		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
+		if (!allow_dup &&
+		    ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
 			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
 			result = -EEXIST;
 			goto out;
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#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] IMA: add support to measure duplicate buffer for critical data hook

Hi Tushar,

Quoted 6 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +0 -0

index c096ef8945c7..fbf359495fa8 100644

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr) · line 164

Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
  */
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+			   const unsigned char *filename, bool allow_dup)
 {
 	u8 *digest = entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest;
 

struct tpm_digestate_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, · line 173

Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +2 -1
 	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
 	if (!violation) {
-		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
+		if (!allow_dup &&
+		    ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {

Can't this change be simplified to "if (!violation && !allow_dup)"?

Also perhaps instead of passing another variable "allow_dup" to each of these functions, pass a mask containing violation and allow_dup.

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, · line 176

Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +0 -0
 			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
 			result = -EEXIST;
 			goto out;

thanks,

Mimi

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#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] IMA: add support to measure duplicate buffer for critical data hook

Quoted 6 lines · Mimi Zohar

Hi Tushar,

Quoted 2 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +0 -0
Quoted 13 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr) · line 164

Quoted 12 lines

index c096ef8945c7..fbf359495fa8 100644

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
   */
  int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
  			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+			   const unsigned char *filename, bool allow_dup)
  {
  	u8 *digest = entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest;
 

struct tpm_digestate_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,

Not sure I understand this. Maybe a typo? Could you please explain?

Quoted 9 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, · line 173

Quoted 6 lines
  
  	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
  	if (!violation) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +2 -1
-		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
+		if (!allow_dup &&
+		    ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {

Can't this change be simplified to "if (!violation && !allow_dup)"?

Sure. Will do.

Earlier I wasn't sure if 'violation' would touch any other use-cases inadvertently. That's why I localized the change as above.

But now since we are supporting other scenarios as well, I believe "if (!violation && !allow_dup)" would be cleaner.

Quoted 3 lines

Also perhaps instead of passing another variable "allow_dup" to each of these functions, pass a mask containing violation and allow_dup.

There were examples of both approaches in ima_match_policy().
- int *pcr/ima_template_desc **template_desc as an out-param;
- and various actions as flags in return int.

Earlier I couldn't decide one way or the other, so I picked the out-param approach.

But since allow_dup is just a single bit info, returning it as a bit in the action flag is a cleaner solution. Will implement it with flag in the next iteration.

Thanks again for reviewing the series. Really appreciate it.

Thanks,
Tushar

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
  			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
  			result = -EEXIST;
  			goto out;

thanks,

Mimi

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maintainer
#8 lore raw
In reply to Tushar Sugandhi

Hi Tushar,

Quoted 10 lines · Tushar Sugandhi

IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the system.

Quoted 2 lines

This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy.

The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it
already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to
just buffer data.

thanks,

Mimi

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#9 lore raw

Hi Tushar,

Quoted 11 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 10 lines · Tushar Sugandhi

IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the system.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy.

The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it
already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to
just buffer data.

Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry().

thanks,

Mimi

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#10 lore raw

Thank you Mimi for reviewing this series.

Quoted 23 lines · Mimi Zohar

Hi Tushar,

Quoted 18 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 10 lines · Tushar Sugandhi

IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the system.

Quoted 2 lines

This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy.

The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it
already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to
just buffer data.

Agreed. I wasn't sure if you wanted the support for files, or other buffer measurement scenarios, except critical data. So I started the implementation with supporting just critical data. Happy to extend it to files and other buffer measurement scenarios as you suggested.

Quoted 5 lines

Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry().

Agreed. Earlier I wasn't sure if you wanted allow_dup support for all the scenarios. Now that it is clear, I will implement it as you suggested. Thank you so much for the pointers. Appreciate it.

Thanks,
Tushar

Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

Mimi

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#11 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
Quoted 12 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
Quoted 10 lines

IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the system.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy.

The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it
already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to
just buffer data.

Agreed. I wasn't sure if you wanted the support for files, or other buffer measurement scenarios, except critical data. So I started the implementation with supporting just critical data. Happy to extend it to files and other buffer measurement scenarios as you suggested.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry().

Agreed. Earlier I wasn't sure if you wanted allow_dup support for all the scenarios. Now that it is clear, I will implement it as you suggested. Thank you so much for the pointers. Appreciate it.

There are two different solutions - per measurement rule, disabling
htable - being discussed. Disabling htable requires miminumal
changes. Which version are you thinking of implementing?

thanks,

Mimi

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#12 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 30 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
Quoted 12 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
Quoted 10 lines

IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the system.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy.

The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it
already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to
just buffer data.

Agreed. I wasn't sure if you wanted the support for files, or other buffer measurement scenarios, except critical data. So I started the implementation with supporting just critical data. Happy to extend it to files and other buffer measurement scenarios as you suggested.

Quoted 5 lines

Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry().

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Agreed. Earlier I wasn't sure if you wanted allow_dup support for all the scenarios. Now that it is clear, I will implement it as you suggested. Thank you so much for the pointers. Appreciate it.

There are two different solutions - per measurement rule, disabling
htable - being discussed. Disabling htable requires miminumal
changes. Which version are you thinking of implementing?

I am thinking of implementing "disabling 'htable' using a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)". That is, not using the var ima_htable or ima_lookup_digest_entry() if that CONFIG is set. So the duplicate measurements are allowed when the CONFIG is set.
This would cover all the measurement scenarios through a single CONFIG setting.

I am not planning to implement it as a "per measurement rule".

Sorry it wasn't clear in my earlier response.

Thanks,
Tushar

Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

Mimi

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