A bugfix patchset for NetLabel
cover A bugfix patchset for NetLabel
This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.
Please apply these for 2.6.20 and they should probably be pushed to the 2.6.19 stable tree as well; is there anything special I need to do for that?
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paul moore
linux security @ hp
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PATCH 1/2 NetLabel: perform input validation earlier on CIPSOv4 DOI add ops
From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
There are a couple of cases where the user input for a CIPSOv4 DOI add operation was not being done soon enough; the result was unexpected behavior which was resulting in oops/panics/lockups on some platforms. This patch moves the existing input validation code earlier in the code path to protect against bogus user input.
--- net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c +17 -11
@@ -185,20 +185,31 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct ret_val =netlbl_cipsov4_add_common (info, doi_def);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto add_std_failure; + ret_val = -EINVAL ;nla_for_each_nested (nla_a, info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLST ], nla_a_rem)if (nla_a->nla_type ==NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVL ) { +if (nla_validate_nested (nla_a, +NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX , + netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) !=0 ) + goto add_std_failure;nla_for_each_nested (nla_b, nla_a, nla_b_rem)switch (nla_b->nla_type) {case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLOC : +if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) > +CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_LVLS ) + goto add_std_failure;if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) >= doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size) doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size =nla_get_u32 (nla_b) +1 ;break ;case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLREM : +if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) > +CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_LVLS ) + goto add_std_failure;if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) >= doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size) doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size =
@@ -206,9 +217,6 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(structbreak ; } } -if (doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size >CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_LVLS || - doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size >CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_LVLS ) - goto add_std_failure; doi_def->map.std->lvl.local =kcalloc (doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size,sizeof (u32),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -230,11 +238,6 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(structstruct nlattr *lvl_loc;struct nlattr *lvl_rem; -if (nla_validate_nested (nla_a, -NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX , - netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) !=0 ) - goto add_std_failure; - lvl_loc =nla_find_nested (nla_a,NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLOC ); lvl_rem = nla_find_nested(nla_a,
@@ -264,12 +267,18 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(structnla_for_each_nested (nla_b, nla_a, nla_b_rem)switch (nla_b->nla_type) {case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSCATLOC : +if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) > +CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_CATS ) + goto add_std_failure;if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) >= doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size) doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size =nla_get_u32 (nla_b) +1 ;break ;case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSCATREM : +if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) > +CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_CATS ) + goto add_std_failure;if (nla_get_u32 (nla_b) >= doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size) doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size =
@@ -277,9 +286,6 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(structbreak ; } } -if (doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size >CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_CATS || - doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size >CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_CATS ) - goto add_std_failure; doi_def->map.std->cat.local = kcalloc( doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size, sizeof(u32),
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paul moore
linux security @ hp
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PATCH 2/2 NetLabel: correctly fill in unused CIPSOv4 level and category mappings
In reply to [email protected]From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Back when the original NetLabel patches were being changed to use Netlink attributes correctly some code was accidentially dropped which set all of the undefined CIPSOv4 level and category mappings to a sentinel value. The result is the mappings data in the kernel contains bogus mappings which always map to zero. This patch restores the old/correct behavior by initializing the mapping data to the correct sentinel value.
--- net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c +9 -0
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(structstruct nlattr *nla_b;int nla_a_rem;int nla_b_rem; +u32 iter;if (!info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST ] || !info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLST ])
@@ -231,6 +232,10 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct ret_val = -ENOMEM ; goto add_std_failure; } +for (iter =0 ; iter < doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size; iter++) + doi_def->map.std->lvl.local[iter] =CIPSO_V4_INV_LVL ; +for (iter =0 ; iter < doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size; iter++) + doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso[iter] =CIPSO_V4_INV_LVL ;nla_for_each_nested (nla_a, info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLST ], nla_a_rem)
@@ -302,6 +307,10 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct ret_val = -ENOMEM ; goto add_std_failure; } +for (iter =0 ; iter < doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size; iter++) + doi_def->map.std->cat.local[iter] =CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT ; +for (iter =0 ; iter < doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size; iter++) + doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso[iter] =CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT ;nla_for_each_nested (nla_a, info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSCATLST ], nla_a_rem)
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paul moore
linux security @ hp
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James Morris
AppliedQuoted 3 lines · On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, [email protected] wrote:
This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.
Applied to git://git.infradead.org/~jmorris/selinux-2.6#fixes
Quoted 2 lines
Please apply these for 2.6.20 and they should probably be pushed to the 2.6.19 stable tree as well; is there anything special I need to do for that?
I'm not sure that they qualify.
The first is a privileged operation, right?
For the second, what are the implications of mapping to zero?
Also review Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt.
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
David Miller
maintainerFrom: James Morris <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2006 20:19:56 -0500 (EST)
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 4 lines
This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.
Applied to
git://git.infradead.org/~jmorris/selinux-2.6#fixes
James, let me know when you want me to pull some stuff in.
Thanks.
Quoted 7 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, [email protected] wrote:
This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.
Applied to
git://git.infradead.org/~jmorris/selinux-2.6#fixes
Thanks.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Please apply these for 2.6.20 and they should probably be pushed to the 2.6.19 stable tree as well; is there anything special I need to do for that?
I'm not sure that they qualify.
The first is a privileged operation, right?
Yes it is, you need CAP_NET_ADMIN. I guess this probably isn't that important for 2.6.19 then ...
Quoted 3 lines
For the second, what are the implications of mapping to zero?
Also review
Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt.
[Thanks for the pointer, didn't know that file was there]
... however, I still think this might qualify for the 2.6.19 stable kernel. When a MLS sensitivity level or category maps to zero then whenever the NetLabel subsystem is called to resolve the security attributes of a packet it will, in certain configurations, return security attributes/contexts which are incorrect.
Please let me know if you think that has merit for the stable tree and I'll send the patch to the stable mailing list.
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paul moore linux security @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore
... however, I still think this might qualify for the 2.6.19 stable kernel. When a MLS sensitivity level or category maps to zero then whenever the NetLabel subsystem is called to resolve the security attributes of a packet it will, in certain configurations, return security attributes/contexts which are incorrect.
Please let me know if you think that has merit for the stable tree and I'll send the patch to the stable mailing list.
I really don't know. Try submitting them and see what happens :-)
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James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.