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A bugfix patchset for NetLabel

PATCH Applied [email protected] 3 participants 7 messages Dec 15, 2006 – Dec 18, 2006

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#0 lore raw

cover A bugfix patchset for NetLabel

This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.

Please apply these for 2.6.20 and they should probably be pushed to the 2.6.19 stable tree as well; is there anything special I need to do for that?

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 NetLabel: perform input validation earlier on CIPSOv4 DOI add ops

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

There are a couple of cases where the user input for a CIPSOv4 DOI add operation was not being done soon enough; the result was unexpected behavior which was resulting in oops/panics/lockups on some platforms. This patch moves the existing input validation code earlier in the code path to protect against bogus user input.

---
 net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c |   28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c +17 -11
Index: net-2.6.20_bugfix/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
===================================================================
@@ -185,20 +185,31 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 	ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(info, doi_def);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto add_std_failure;
+	ret_val = -EINVAL;
 
 	nla_for_each_nested(nla_a,
 			    info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLST],
 			    nla_a_rem)
 		if (nla_a->nla_type == NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVL) {
+			if (nla_validate_nested(nla_a,
+					    NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
+					    netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) != 0)
+					goto add_std_failure;
 			nla_for_each_nested(nla_b, nla_a, nla_b_rem)
 				switch (nla_b->nla_type) {
 				case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLOC:
+					if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >
+					    CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_LVLS)
+						goto add_std_failure;
 					if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >=
 					    doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size)
 					     doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size =
 						     nla_get_u32(nla_b) + 1;
 					break;
 				case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLREM:
+					if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >
+					    CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_LVLS)
+						goto add_std_failure;
 					if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >=
 					    doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size)
 					     doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size =
@@ -206,9 +217,6 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 					break;
 				}
 		}
-	if (doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size > CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_LVLS ||
-	    doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size > CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_LVLS)
-		goto add_std_failure;
 	doi_def->map.std->lvl.local = kcalloc(doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size,
 					      sizeof(u32),
 					      GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -230,11 +238,6 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 			struct nlattr *lvl_loc;
 			struct nlattr *lvl_rem;
 
-			if (nla_validate_nested(nla_a,
-					      NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
-					      netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) != 0)
-				goto add_std_failure;
-
 			lvl_loc = nla_find_nested(nla_a,
 						  NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLOC);
 			lvl_rem = nla_find_nested(nla_a,
@@ -264,12 +267,18 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 				nla_for_each_nested(nla_b, nla_a, nla_b_rem)
 					switch (nla_b->nla_type) {
 					case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSCATLOC:
+						if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >
+						    CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_CATS)
+							goto add_std_failure;
 						if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >=
 					      doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size)
 					     doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size =
 						     nla_get_u32(nla_b) + 1;
 						break;
 					case NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSCATREM:
+						if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >
+						    CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_CATS)
+							goto add_std_failure;
 						if (nla_get_u32(nla_b) >=
 					      doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size)
 					     doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size =
@@ -277,9 +286,6 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 						break;
 					}
 			}
-		if (doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size > CIPSO_V4_MAX_LOC_CATS ||
-		    doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size > CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_CATS)
-			goto add_std_failure;
 		doi_def->map.std->cat.local = kcalloc(
 			                      doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size,
 					      sizeof(u32),

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 NetLabel: correctly fill in unused CIPSOv4 level and category mappings

In reply to [email protected]

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

Back when the original NetLabel patches were being changed to use Netlink attributes correctly some code was accidentially dropped which set all of the undefined CIPSOv4 level and category mappings to a sentinel value. The result is the mappings data in the kernel contains bogus mappings which always map to zero. This patch restores the old/correct behavior by initializing the mapping data to the correct sentinel value.

---
 net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c +9 -0
Index: net-2.6.20_bugfix/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
===================================================================
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 	struct nlattr *nla_b;
 	int nla_a_rem;
 	int nla_b_rem;
+	u32 iter;
 
 	if (!info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST] ||
 	    !info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLST])
@@ -231,6 +232,10 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 		ret_val = -ENOMEM;
 		goto add_std_failure;
 	}
+	for (iter = 0; iter < doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size; iter++)
+		doi_def->map.std->lvl.local[iter] = CIPSO_V4_INV_LVL;
+	for (iter = 0; iter < doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size; iter++)
+		doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso[iter] = CIPSO_V4_INV_LVL;
 	nla_for_each_nested(nla_a,
 			    info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSLVLLST],
 			    nla_a_rem)
@@ -302,6 +307,10 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct
 			ret_val = -ENOMEM;
 			goto add_std_failure;
 		}
+		for (iter = 0; iter < doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size; iter++)
+			doi_def->map.std->cat.local[iter] = CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT;
+		for (iter = 0; iter < doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size; iter++)
+			doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso[iter] = CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT;
 		nla_for_each_nested(nla_a,
 				    info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MLSCATLST],
 				    nla_a_rem)

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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Applied
#3 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, [email protected] wrote:

This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.

Applied to git://git.infradead.org/~jmorris/selinux-2.6#fixes

Quoted 2 lines

Please apply these for 2.6.20 and they should probably be pushed to the 2.6.19 stable tree as well; is there anything special I need to do for that?

I'm not sure that they qualify.

The first is a privileged operation, right?

For the second, what are the implications of mapping to zero?

Also review Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt.

Signature · 7 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>

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maintainer
#4 lore raw

From: James Morris <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2006 20:19:56 -0500 (EST)

Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 4 lines

This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.

Applied to git://git.infradead.org/~jmorris/selinux-2.6#fixes

James, let me know when you want me to pull some stuff in.

Thanks.

author
#5 lore raw
In reply to James Morris
Quoted 7 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, [email protected] wrote:

This patch set fixes two bugs that were found recently when adding new CIPSOv4 DOI definitions. These patches are pretty small and have been tested by a few different people on several different platforms.

Applied to git://git.infradead.org/~jmorris/selinux-2.6#fixes

Thanks.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Please apply these for 2.6.20 and they should probably be pushed to the 2.6.19 stable tree as well; is there anything special I need to do for that?

I'm not sure that they qualify.

The first is a privileged operation, right?

Yes it is, you need CAP_NET_ADMIN. I guess this probably isn't that important for 2.6.19 then ...

Quoted 3 lines

For the second, what are the implications of mapping to zero?

Also review Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt.

[Thanks for the pointer, didn't know that file was there]

... however, I still think this might qualify for the 2.6.19 stable kernel. When a MLS sensitivity level or category maps to zero then whenever the NetLabel subsystem is called to resolve the security attributes of a packet it will, in certain configurations, return security attributes/contexts which are incorrect.

Please let me know if you think that has merit for the stable tree and I'll send the patch to the stable mailing list.

Signature · 7 lines
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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#6 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

... however, I still think this might qualify for the 2.6.19 stable kernel. When a MLS sensitivity level or category maps to zero then whenever the NetLabel subsystem is called to resolve the security attributes of a packet it will, in certain configurations, return security attributes/contexts which are incorrect.

Please let me know if you think that has merit for the stable tree and I'll send the patch to the stable mailing list.

I really don't know. Try submitting them and see what happens :-)

Signature · 7 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>


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