Updated X object manager policy: Intro
cover Updated X object manager policy: Intro
This patch series is an updated policy for the X server object manager. This is the policy that I was running in Portland for my various demos.
It includes new x_pointer/x_keyboard classes, unconfined-by-default
user types, and other changes. The only thing missing here is updated mls constraints; I am still working on those.
I need the first patch in the series (x_pointer/x_keyboard classes) upstream so that I can use these classes in the X server. Please merge this patch expeditiously if possible.
The remaining 5 patches are NOT independent and breakage will probably result if only some of them are applied. I only broke them up in an attempt to make it easier to review the changes.
This whole thing is also available in a git tree atgit://anongit.freedesktop.org/~ewalsh/refpolicy (branch "master"), for ease of pulling.
Signature · 2 lines
Eamon Walsh<[email protected]> National Security Agency
PATCH 1/6 Add separate x_pointer and x_keyboard classes inheriting from x_device.
Add separate x_pointer and x_keyboard classes inheriting from x_device.
This is needed to allow more fine-grained control over X devices without using different types. Using different types is problematic because devices act as subjects in the X Flask implementation, and subjects cannot be labeled through a type transition (since the output role is hardcoded to object_r).
--- policy/flask/access_vectors | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- policy/flask/security_classes | 4 +++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
policy/flask/access_vectors +34 -21
@@ -94,6 +94,33 @@ common database } # +# Define a common prefix for pointer and keyboard access vectors. +# + +common x_device +{ + getattr + setattr + use + read + write + getfocus + setfocus + bell + force_cursor + freeze + grab + manage + list_property + get_property + set_property + add + remove + create + destroy +} + +# # Define the access vectors. # # class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
@@ -525,27 +552,7 @@ class x_client } class x_device -{ - getattr - setattr - use - read - write - getfocus - setfocus - bell - force_cursor - freeze - grab - manage - list_property - get_property - set_property - add - remove - create - destroy -} +inherits x_device class x_server {
@@ -802,3 +809,9 @@ class kernel_service class tun_socket inherits socket + +class x_pointer +inherits x_device + +class x_keyboard +inherits x_device
policy/flask/security_classes +4 -0
@@ -121,4 +121,8 @@ class kernel_service class tun_socket +# Still More SE-X Windows stuff +class x_pointer # userspace +class x_keyboard # userspace + # FLASK
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
PATCH 1/6 Add separate x_pointer and x_keyboard classes inheriting from x_device.
Quoted 9 lines · Eamon Walsh
Add separate
x_pointerandx_keyboardclasses inheriting fromx_device.This is needed to allow more fine-grained control over X devices without
using different types. Using different types is problematic because devices act as subjects in the X Flask implementation, and subjects cannot be labeled through a type transition (since the output role is hardcoded toobject_r).
Merged.
Quoted 104 lines
Signed-off-by Eamon Walsh<[email protected]>--- policy/flask/access_vectors | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- policy/flask/security_classes | 4 +++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)policy/flask/access_vectors +34
-21@@ -94,6 +94,33 @@ common database } # +# Define a common prefix for pointer and keyboard access vectors. +# + +common x_device +{ + getattr + setattr + use + read + write + getfocus + setfocus + bell + force_cursor + freeze + grab + manage + list_property + get_property + set_property + add + remove + create + destroy +} + +# # Define the access vectors. # # class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }@@ -525,27 +552,7 @@ class x_client } class x_device -{ - getattr - setattr - use - read - write - getfocus - setfocus - bell - force_cursor - freeze - grab - manage - list_property - get_property - set_property - add - remove - create - destroy -} +inherits x_device class x_server {@@ -802,3 +809,9 @@ class kernel_service class tun_socket inherits socket + +class x_pointer +inherits x_device + +class x_keyboard +inherits x_devicepolicy/flask/security_classes +4
-1@@ -121,4 +121,8 @@ class kernel_service class tun_socket +# Still More SE-X Windows stuff +class x_pointer # userspace +class x_keyboard # userspace + # FLASK --1.6.5.rc2
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150
PATCH 2/6 Add a "prefix" parameter to xserver_role and xserver_restricted_role.
In reply to Eamon WalshAdd a "prefix" parameter to xserver_role and xserver_restricted_role.
This is required to call xserver_object_types_template and xserver_common_x_domain_template from within these interfaces.
Additionally, add a call to xserver_unconfined from within xserver_restricted_role. This causes the default user types to be unconfined as far as the X object manager is concerned. Only non-default types such as mozilla_t are now confined.
--- policy/modules/apps/wm.if | 2 +- policy/modules/roles/staff.te | 2 +- policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te | 2 +- policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te | 2 +- policy/modules/services/xserver.if | 201 ++++++++++++++-------------------- policy/modules/system/userdomain.if | 2 +- 6 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
policy/modules/apps/wm.if +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ template(`wm_role_template',` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role($2, $1_wm_t) + xserver_role($1_wm, $2, $1_wm_t) ') ')
policy/modules/roles/staff.te +1 -1
@@ -166,5 +166,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role(staff_r, staff_t) + xserver_role(staff, staff_r, staff_t) ')
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +1 -1
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + xserver_role(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(`
policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +1 -1
@@ -151,5 +151,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role(user_r, user_t) + xserver_role(user, user_r, user_t) ')
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +83 -118
271 lines not on this page · raw message
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +1 -1
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template',` logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_t) - xserver_restricted_role($1_r, $1_t) + xserver_restricted_role($1, $1_r, $1_t) optional_policy(` alsa_read_rw_config($1_t)
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
PATCH 2/6 Add a "prefix" parameter to xserver_role and xserver_restricted_role.
Quoted 1 line · Eamon Walsh
Add a "prefix" parameter to
xserver_roleandxserver_restricted_role.
These need to turn into new xserver_role_template and xserver_restricted_role_template templates, and the current versions need to stay, but as deprecated, for compatibility.
Quoted 397 lines
This is required to call
xserver_object_types_templateandxserver_common_x_domain_templatefrom within these interfaces.Additionally, add a call to
xserver_unconfinedfrom withinxserver_restricted_role. This causes the default user types to be unconfined as far as the X object manager is concerned. Only non-default types such asmozilla_tare now confined.Signed-off-by Eamon Walsh<[email protected]>--- policy/modules/apps/wm.if | 2 +- policy/modules/roles/staff.te | 2 +- policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te | 2 +- policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te | 2 +- policy/modules/services/xserver.if | 201 ++++++++++++++-------------------- policy/modules/system/userdomain.if | 2 +- 6 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)policy/modules/apps/wm.if +1
-1@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ template(`wm_role_template',` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role($2, $1_wm_t) + xserver_role($1_wm, $2, $1_wm_t) ') ')policy/modules/roles/staff.te +1
-1@@ -166,5 +166,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role(staff_r, staff_t) + xserver_role(staff, staff_r, staff_t) ')policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +1
-1@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + xserver_role(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(`policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +1
-1@@ -151,5 +151,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role(user_r, user_t) + xserver_role(user, user_r, user_t) ')policy/modules/services/xserver.if +58
-93@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ ## Rules required for using the X Windows server ## and environment, for restricted users. ##</summary> +##<param name="prefix"> +## <summary> +## The prefix of the X client domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## </summary> +##</param> ##<param name="role"> ## <summary> ## Role allowed access.@@ -22,144 +28,97 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t; type iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t, iceauth_home_t; type xauth_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_home_t; - - type info_xproperty_t, rootwindow_t; - - class x_drawable all_x_drawable_perms; - class x_screen all_x_screen_perms; - class x_gc all_x_gc_perms; - class x_font all_x_font_perms; - class x_colormap all_x_colormap_perms; - class x_property all_x_property_perms; - class x_selection all_x_selection_perms; - class x_cursor all_x_cursor_perms; - class x_client all_x_client_perms; - class x_device all_x_device_perms; - class x_server all_x_server_perms; - class x_extension all_x_extension_perms; - class x_resource all_x_resource_perms; - class x_event all_x_event_perms; - class x_synthetic_event all_x_synthetic_event_perms; ') - role $1 types { xserver_t xauth_t iceauth_t }; + role $2 types { xserver_t xauth_t iceauth_t }; # Xserver read/write client shm - allow xserver_t $2:fd use; - allow xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow xserver_t $3:fd use; + allow xserver_t $3:shm rw_shm_perms; - domtrans_pattern($2, xserver_exec_t, xserver_t) - allow xserver_t $2:process signal; + domtrans_pattern($3, xserver_exec_t, xserver_t) + allow xserver_t $3:process signal; - allow xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow xserver_t $3:shm rw_shm_perms; - allow $2 user_fonts_t:dir list_dir_perms; - allow $2 user_fonts_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $3 user_fonts_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $3 user_fonts_t:file read_file_perms; - allow $2 user_fonts_config_t:dir list_dir_perms; - allow $2 user_fonts_config_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $3 user_fonts_config_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $3 user_fonts_config_t:file read_file_perms; - manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) - manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) + manage_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) - stream_connect_pattern($2, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) - files_search_tmp($2) + stream_connect_pattern($3, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) + files_search_tmp($3) # Communicate via System V shared memory. - allow $2 xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms; - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $3 xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms; + allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; # allow ps to show iceauth - ps_process_pattern($2, iceauth_t) + ps_process_pattern($3, iceauth_t) - domtrans_pattern($2, iceauth_exec_t, iceauth_t) + domtrans_pattern($3, iceauth_exec_t, iceauth_t) - allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $3 iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; - domtrans_pattern($2, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t) + domtrans_pattern($3, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t) - allow $2 xauth_t:process signal; + allow $3 xauth_t:process signal; # allow ps to show xauth - ps_process_pattern($2, xauth_t) - allow $2 xserver_t:process signal; + ps_process_pattern($3, xauth_t) + allow $3 xserver_t:process signal; - allow $2 xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $3 xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; # for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system - allow $2 xdm_t:fd use; - allow $2 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl }; - allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:dir search; - allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write }; - dontaudit $2 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write }; + allow $3 xdm_t:fd use; + allow $3 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl }; + allow $3 xdm_tmp_t:dir search; + allow $3 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write }; + dontaudit $3 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write }; # Client read xserver shm - allow $2 xserver_t:fd use; - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $3 xserver_t:fd use; + allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; # Read /tmp/.X0-lock - allow $2 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read }; + allow $3 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read }; - dev_rw_xserver_misc($2) - dev_rw_power_management($2) - dev_read_input($2) - dev_read_misc($2) - dev_write_misc($2) + dev_rw_xserver_misc($3) + dev_rw_power_management($3) + dev_read_input($3) + dev_read_misc($3) + dev_write_misc($3) # open office is looking for the following - dev_getattr_agp_dev($2) - dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($2) + dev_getattr_agp_dev($3) + dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($3) # GNOME checks for usb and other devices: - dev_rw_usbfs($2) + dev_rw_usbfs($3) - miscfiles_read_fonts($2) + miscfiles_read_fonts($3) - xserver_common_x_domain_template(user, $2) - xserver_xsession_entry_type($2) - xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2) - xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2) + xserver_object_types_template($1) + xserver_common_x_domain_template($1, $3) + xserver_unconfined($3) + xserver_xsession_entry_type($3) + xserver_dontaudit_write_log($3) + xserver_stream_connect_xdm($3) # certain apps want to read xdm.pid file - xserver_read_xdm_pid($2) + xserver_read_xdm_pid($3) # gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/ - xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets($2) + xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets($3) # Needed for escd, remove if we get escd policy - xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files($2) + xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files($3) # Client write xserver shm tunable_policy(`allow_write_xshm',` - allow $2 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; + allow $3 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; ') - - ############################## - # - # User X object manager local policy - # - - # manage: xhost X11:ChangeHosts - # freeze: metacity X11:GrabKey - # force_cursor: metacity X11:GrabPointer - allow $2 xserver_t:x_device { manage freeze force_cursor }; - - # gnome-settings-daemon XKEYBOARD:SetControls - allow $2 xserver_t:x_server manage; - - # gnome-settings-daemon RANDR:SelectInput - allow $2 xserver_t:x_resource write; - - # metacity X11:InstallColormap X11:UninstallColormap - allow $2 rootwindow_t:x_colormap { install uninstall }; - - # read: gnome-settings-daemon RANDR:GetScreenSizeRange - # write: gnome-settings-daemon RANDR:SelectInput - # setattr: gnome-settings-daemon X11:GrabKey - # manage: metacity X11:ChangeWindowAttributes - allow $2 rootwindow_t:x_drawable { read write managesetattr };
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +0
-3- - # setattr: metacity X11:InstallColormap - allow $2 xserver_t:x_screen { saver_getattr saver_setattrsetattr };
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +21
-18- - # xrdb X11:ChangeProperty prop=RESOURCE_MANAGER - allow $2 info_xproperty_t:x_property { create append write }; ') ########################################@@ -167,6 +126,12 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` ## Rules required for using the X Windows server ## and environment. ##</summary> +##<param name="prefix"> +## <summary> +## The prefix of the X client domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## </summary> +##</param> ##<param name="role"> ## <summary> ## Role allowed access.@@ -184,32 +149,32 @@ interface(`xserver_role',` type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t; ') - xserver_restricted_role($1, $2) + xserver_restricted_role($1, $2, $3) # Communicate via System V shared memory. - allow $2 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; + allow $3 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; - allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; - allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; + allow $3 iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $3 iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; - allow $2 xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; - allow $2 xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; + allow $3 xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $3 xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; - manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) - manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) - relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) - relabel_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + manage_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + relabel_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + relabel_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) - manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) - manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) - relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) - relabel_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) + manage_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) + relabel_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) + relabel_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t,
user_fonts_cache_t)- manage_dirs_pattern($2,
user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)
- manage_files_pattern($2,user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)
- relabel_dirs_pattern($2,user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)
- relabel_files_pattern($2,user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)
+ manage_dirs_pattern($3,user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($3,user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)
+ relabel_dirs_pattern($3,user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)
+ relabel_files_pattern($3,user_fonts_config_t,user_fonts_config_t)')
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +0
-0@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@template(
userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template',logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_t)policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +1
-2- xserver_restricted_role($1_r, $1_t) + xserver_restricted_role($1, $1_r, $1_t) optional_policy(` alsa_read_rw_config($1_t) --1.6.5.rc2
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150
PATCH 3/6 Make consolekit_t and system_dbusd_t unconfined in X.
In reply to Eamon WalshMake consolekit_t and system_dbusd_t unconfined in X.
Both of these types have been observed trying to touch the user's X display, one example being through /usr/libexec/ck-get-x11-server-pid and /usr/libexec/ck-get-x11-display-device.
--- policy/modules/services/consolekit.te | 1 + policy/modules/services/dbus.te | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
policy/modules/services/consolekit.te +1 -0
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_pid(consolekit_t) xserver_read_user_xauth(consolekit_t) + xserver_unconfined(consolekit_t) corenet_tcp_connect_xserver_port(consolekit_t) ')
policy/modules/services/dbus.te +2 -0
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ seutil_sigchld_newrole(system_dbusd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(system_dbusd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(system_dbusd_t) +xserver_unconfined(system_dbusd_t) + optional_policy(` bind_domtrans(system_dbusd_t) ')
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
PATCH 4/6 X Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.te.
In reply to Eamon WalshX Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.te.
This commit consists of three main parts:
1. Code movement. There were X object manager-related statements scattered somewhat throughout the file; these have been consolidated, which resulted in some other statements moving (e.g. iceauth_t).
2. Type changes. Many of the specific event, extension, and property types have been dropped for the time being. The rootwindow_t and remote_xclient_t types have been renamed, and a root_xcolormap_t type has been (re-)added. This is for naming consistency. An "xserver_unprotected" alias has been added for use in labeling clients whose resources should be globally accessible (e.g. xdm_t).
3. Policy changes. These are mostly related to devices, which now have separate x_keyboard and x_pointer classes. The "Hacks" section has been cleaned up, and various other classes have had the default permissions tweaked.
--- policy/modules/services/xserver.te | 283 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
policy/modules/services/xserver.te +157 -126
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ gen_require(` class x_cursor all_x_cursor_perms; class x_client all_x_client_perms; class x_device all_x_device_perms; + class x_pointer all_x_pointer_perms; + class x_keyboard all_x_keyboard_perms; class x_server all_x_server_perms; class x_extension all_x_extension_perms; class x_resource all_x_resource_perms;
@@ -46,70 +48,53 @@ gen_tunable(xdm_sysadm_login, false) ##</desc> gen_tunable(xserver_object_manager, false) -attribute input_xevent_type; -attribute xserver_unconfined_type; attribute x_domain; -attribute x_userdomain; -attribute xproperty_type; -attribute xselection_type; -attribute xextension_type; -attribute xevent_type; -type accelgraphics_xext_t, xextension_type; +# X Events +attribute xevent_type; +attribute input_xevent_type; +type xevent_t, xevent_type; type client_xevent_t, xevent_type; +type input_xevent_t, xevent_type, input_xevent_type; + +# X Extensions +attribute xextension_type; +type xextension_t, xextension_type; +type security_xextension_t, xextension_type; + +# X Properties +attribute xproperty_type; +type xproperty_t, xproperty_type; +type seclabel_xproperty_t, xproperty_type; type clipboard_xproperty_t, xproperty_type; + +# X Selections +attribute xselection_type; +type xselection_t, xselection_type; type clipboard_xselection_t, xselection_type; -type debug_xext_t, xextension_type; -type directhw_xext_t alias disallowed_xext_t, xextension_type; -type focus_xevent_t, xevent_type; +#type settings_xselection_t, xselection_type; +#type dbus_xselection_t, xselection_type; -type iceauth_t; -type iceauth_exec_t; -typealias iceauth_t alias { user_iceauth_t staff_iceauth_t sysadm_iceauth_t }; -typealias iceauth_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_t secadm_iceauth_t }; -application_domain(iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t) -ubac_constrained(iceauth_t) +# X Drawables +attribute xdrawable_type; +attribute xcolormap_type; +type root_xdrawable_t, xdrawable_type; +type root_xcolormap_t, xcolormap_type; -type iceauth_home_t; -typealias iceauth_home_t alias { user_iceauth_home_t staff_iceauth_home_t sysadm_iceauth_home_t }; -typealias iceauth_home_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_home_t secadm_iceauth_home_t }; -files_poly_member(iceauth_home_t) -userdom_user_home_content(iceauth_home_t) +attribute xserver_unconfined_type; +attribute xserver_unprotected_type; + +xserver_object_types_template(root) +#xserver_object_types_template(user) -type info_xproperty_t, xproperty_type; -type input_xevent_t, xevent_type; -type manage_xevent_t, xevent_type; -type output_xext_t, xextension_type; -type property_xevent_t, xevent_type; -type remote_xclient_t; - -type rootwindow_t; -typealias rootwindow_t alias { user_rootwindow_t staff_rootwindow_t sysadm_rootwindow_t }; -typealias rootwindow_t alias { auditadm_rootwindow_t secadm_rootwindow_t }; -ubac_constrained(rootwindow_t) - -type screensaver_xext_t, xextension_type; -type security_xext_t, xextension_type; -type shmem_xext_t, xextension_type; -type std_xext_t, xextension_type; -type video_xext_t, xextension_type; -type unknown_xevent_t, xevent_type; - -xserver_object_types_template(user) -typealias user_xproperty_t alias { staff_xproperty_t sysadm_xproperty_t }; -typealias user_xproperty_t alias { auditadm_xproperty_t secadm_xproperty_t }; -typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { staff_input_xevent_t sysadm_input_xevent_t }; -typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { auditadm_input_xevent_t secadm_input_xevent_t }; -typealias user_property_xevent_t alias { staff_property_xevent_t sysadm_property_xevent_t }; -typealias user_property_xevent_t alias { auditadm_property_xevent_t secadm_property_xevent_t }; -typealias user_focus_xevent_t alias { staff_focus_xevent_t sysadm_focus_xevent_t }; -typealias user_focus_xevent_t alias { auditadm_focus_xevent_t secadm_focus_xevent_t }; -typealias user_manage_xevent_t alias { staff_manage_xevent_t sysadm_manage_xevent_t }; -typealias user_manage_xevent_t alias { auditadm_manage_xevent_t secadm_manage_xevent_t }; -typealias user_default_xevent_t alias { staff_default_xevent_t sysadm_default_xevent_t }; -typealias user_default_xevent_t alias { auditadm_default_xevent_t secadm_default_xevent_t }; -typealias user_client_xevent_t alias { staff_client_xevent_t sysadm_client_xevent_t }; -typealias user_client_xevent_t alias { auditadm_client_xevent_t secadm_client_xevent_t }; +#typealias user_xproperty_t alias { staff_xproperty_t sysadm_xproperty_t }; +#typealias user_xproperty_t alias { auditadm_xproperty_t secadm_xproperty_t }; +#typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { staff_input_xevent_t sysadm_input_xevent_t }; +#typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { auditadm_input_xevent_t secadm_input_xevent_t }; + +type remote_t; +xserver_object_types_template(remote) +xserver_common_x_domain_template(remote,remote_t) type user_fonts_t; typealias user_fonts_t alias { staff_fonts_t sysadm_fonts_t };
@@ -126,10 +111,18 @@ typealias user_fonts_config_t alias { staff_fonts_config_t sysadm_fonts_config_t typealias user_fonts_config_t alias { auditadm_fonts_config_t secadm_fonts_config_t }; userdom_user_home_content(user_fonts_config_t) -type xevent_t alias default_xevent_t, xevent_type; -type xext_t alias unknown_xext_t, xextension_type; -type xproperty_t alias default_xproperty_t, xproperty_type; -type xselection_t alias default_xselection_t, xselection_type; +type iceauth_t; +type iceauth_exec_t; +typealias iceauth_t alias { user_iceauth_t staff_iceauth_t sysadm_iceauth_t }; +typealias iceauth_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_t secadm_iceauth_t }; +application_domain(iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t) +ubac_constrained(iceauth_t) + +type iceauth_home_t; +typealias iceauth_home_t alias { user_iceauth_home_t staff_iceauth_home_t sysadm_iceauth_home_t }; +typealias iceauth_home_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_home_t secadm_iceauth_home_t }; +files_poly_member(iceauth_home_t) +userdom_user_home_content(iceauth_home_t) type xauth_t; type xauth_exec_t;
@@ -161,6 +154,10 @@ type xdm_exec_t; auth_login_pgm_domain(xdm_t) init_domain(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t) init_daemon_domain(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t) +xserver_object_types_template(xdm) +xserver_common_x_domain_template(xdm, xdm_t) +xserver_unconfined(xdm_t) +xserver_unprotected(xdm_t) type xdm_lock_t; files_lock_file(xdm_lock_t)
@@ -190,8 +187,6 @@ type xserver_t; type xserver_exec_t; typealias xserver_t alias { user_xserver_t staff_xserver_t sysadm_xserver_t }; typealias xserver_t alias { auditadm_xserver_t secadm_xserver_t xdm_xserver_t }; -xserver_object_types_template(xdm) -xserver_common_x_domain_template(xdm, xdm_t) init_system_domain(xserver_t, xserver_exec_t) ubac_constrained(xserver_t)
@@ -579,6 +574,14 @@ optional_policy(` # X server local policy # +# X Object Manager rules +type_transition xserver_t xserver_t:x_drawable root_xdrawable_t; +type_transition xserver_t xserver_t:x_colormap root_xcolormap_t; +type_transition root_xdrawable_t input_xevent_t:x_event root_input_xevent_t; + +allow xserver_t { root_xdrawable_t x_domain }:x_drawable send; +allow xserver_t input_xevent_t:x_event send; + # setuid/setgid for the wrapper program to change UID # sys_rawio is for iopl access - should not be needed for frame-buffer # sys_admin, locking shared mem? chowning IPC message queues or semaphores?
@@ -603,20 +606,6 @@ allow xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto } allow xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -# Device rules -allow x_domain xserver_t:x_device { read getattr use setattr setfocus grab bell }; - -allow xserver_t { input_xevent_t input_xevent_type }:x_event send; - -domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t) - -allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; - -# Labeling rules for root windows and colormaps -type_transition xserver_t xserver_t:{ x_drawable x_colormap } rootwindow_t; - -allow xserver_t { rootwindow_t x_domain }:x_drawable send; - manage_dirs_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
@@ -635,6 +624,9 @@ manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib(xserver_t) +domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t) +allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; + # Create files in /var/log with the xserver_log_t type. manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_log_t, xserver_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(xserver_t, xserver_log_t, file)
@@ -752,15 +744,17 @@ tunable_policy(`!xserver_object_manager',` # but typeattribute doesnt work in conditionals allow xserver_t xserver_t:x_server *; - allow xserver_t { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_drawable *; + allow xserver_t { x_domain root_xdrawable_t }:x_drawable *; allow xserver_t xserver_t:x_screen *; allow xserver_t x_domain:x_gc *; - allow xserver_t { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_colormap *; + allow xserver_t { x_domain root_xcolormap_t }:x_colormap *; allow xserver_t xproperty_type:x_property *; allow xserver_t xselection_type:x_selection *; allow xserver_t x_domain:x_cursor *; - allow xserver_t { x_domain remote_xclient_t }:x_client *; + allow xserver_t x_domain:x_client *; allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *; + allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *; + allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *; allow xserver_t xextension_type:x_extension *; allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *; allow xserver_t xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *;
@@ -863,112 +857,149 @@ optional_policy(` # # Hacks -# everyone can get the input focus of everyone else -# this is a fundamental brokenness in the X protocol -allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device getfocus; -# everyone can grab the server -# everyone does it, it is basically a free DOS attack -allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server grab; -# everyone can get the font path, etc. -# this could leak out sensitive information -allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server getattr; # everyone can do override-redirect windows. # this could be used to spoof labels allow x_domain self:x_drawable override; -# everyone can receive management events on the root window -# allows to know when new windows appear, among other things -allow x_domain manage_xevent_t:x_event receive; +# firefox gets nosy with other people's windows +allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable { list_child receive }; # X Server -# can read server-owned resources -allow x_domain xserver_t:x_resource read; +# can get X server attributes +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server getattr; +# can grab the server +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server grab; +# can read and write server-owned generic resources +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_resource { read write }; # can mess with own clients -allow x_domain self:x_client { manage destroy }; +allow x_domain self:x_client { getattr manage destroy }; # X Protocol Extensions -allow x_domain std_xext_t:x_extension { query use }; -allow x_domain shmem_xext_t:x_extension { query use }; -dontaudit x_domain xextension_type:x_extension { query use }; +allow x_domain xextension_t:x_extension { query use }; +allow x_domain security_xextension_t:x_extension { query use }; # X Properties -# can read and write cut buffers -allow x_domain clipboard_xproperty_t:x_property { create read write append }; -# can read info properties -allow x_domain info_xproperty_t:x_property read; # can change properties of root window -allow x_domain rootwindow_t:x_drawable { list_property get_property set_property }; -# can change properties of own windows +allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable { list_property get_property set_property }; +# can change properties of my own windows allow x_domain self:x_drawable { list_property get_property set_property }; +# can read and write cut buffers +allow x_domain clipboard_xproperty_t:x_property { create read write append }; +# can read security labels +allow x_domain seclabel_xproperty_t:x_property { getattr read }; +# can change all other properties +allow x_domain xproperty_t:x_property { getattr create read write append destroy }; # X Windows # operations allowed on root windows -allow x_domain rootwindow_t:x_drawable { getattr list_child add_child remove_child send receive }; +allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable { getattr setattr list_child add_child remove_child send receive hide show }; # operations allowed on my windows allow x_domain self:x_drawable { create destroy getattr setattr read write show hide list_child add_child remove_child manage send receive }; +allow x_domain self:x_drawable { blend }; +# operations allowed on all windows +allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable { getattr get_property set_property remove_child }; # X Colormaps # can use the default colormap -allow x_domain rootwindow_t:x_colormap { read use add_color }; +allow x_domain root_xcolormap_t:x_colormap { read use add_color remove_color install uninstall }; +# can create and use colormaps +allow x_domain self:x_colormap *; + +# X Devices +# operations allowed on my own devices +allow x_domain self:{ x_device x_pointer x_keyboard } *; +# operations allowed on generic devices +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_device { use getattr setattr getfocus setfocus bell grab freeze force_cursor }; +# operations allowed on core keyboard +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_keyboard { use getattr setattr getfocus setfocus bell grab }; +# operations allowed on core pointer +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_pointer { read use getattr setattr getfocus setfocus bell grab freeze force_cursor }; + +# all devices can generate input events +allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable send; +allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable send; +allow x_domain input_xevent_t:x_event send; + +# dontaudit keyloggers repeatedly polling +#dontaudit x_domain xserver_t:x_keyboard read; # X Input -# can receive certain root window events -allow x_domain focus_xevent_t:x_event receive; -allow x_domain property_xevent_t:x_event receive; -allow x_domain client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event receive; -allow x_domain manage_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event receive; +# can receive default events +allow x_domain xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; +# can receive ICCCM events +allow x_domain client_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; # can send ICCCM events to the root window -allow x_domain manage_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send; allow x_domain client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send; +# can receive root window input events +allow x_domain root_input_xevent_t:x_event receive; + # X Selections # can use the clipboard allow x_domain clipboard_xselection_t:x_selection { getattr setattr read }; -# can query all other selections -allow x_domain xselection_t:x_selection { getattr read }; +# can use default selections +allow x_domain xselection_t:x_selection { getattr setattr read }; # Other X Objects # can create and use cursors allow x_domain self:x_cursor *; # can create and use graphics contexts allow x_domain self:x_gc *; -# can create and use colormaps -allow x_domain self:x_colormap *; # can read and write own objects allow x_domain self:x_resource { read write }; +# can mess with the screensaver +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_screen { getattr saver_getattr }; + +######################################## +# +# Rules for unprotected access to a domain +# + +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_drawable *; +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_gc *; +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_colormap *; +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_property *; +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_cursor *; +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_client *; +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_device *; +allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_resource *; + +######################################## +# +# Rules for unconfined access to this module +# tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',` # should be xserver_unconfined(x_domain), # but typeattribute doesnt work in conditionals allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server *; - allow x_domain { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_drawable *; + allow x_domain xdrawable_type:x_drawable *; allow x_domain xserver_t:x_screen *; allow x_domain x_domain:x_gc *; - allow x_domain { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_colormap *; + allow x_domain xcolormap_type:x_colormap *; allow x_domain xproperty_type:x_property *; allow x_domain xselection_type:x_selection *; allow x_domain x_domain:x_cursor *; - allow x_domain { x_domain remote_xclient_t }:x_client *; + allow x_domain x_domain:x_client *; allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *; + allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *; + allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *; allow x_domain xextension_type:x_extension *; allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *; allow x_domain xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *; ') -######################################## -# -# Rules for unconfined access to this module -# - allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_server *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_drawable *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xdrawable_type:x_drawable *; allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_screen *; allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_gc *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_colormap *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xcolormap_type:x_colormap *; allow xserver_unconfined_type xproperty_type:x_property *; allow xserver_unconfined_type xselection_type:x_selection *; allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_cursor *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain remote_xclient_t }:x_client *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_client *; allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *; allow xserver_unconfined_type xextension_type:x_extension *; allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *; allow xserver_unconfined_type xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *;
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
PATCH 5/6 X Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.if.
In reply to Eamon WalshX Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.if.
This commit consists of two parts:
1. Revisions to xserver_object_types_template and xserver_common_x_domain_template. This reflects the dropping of many of the specific event, extension, and property types.
2. New interfaces:
xserver_manage_core_devices: Gives control over core mouse/keyboard.
xserver_unprotected: Allows all clients to access a domain's X objects. Modified interfaces:
xserver_unconfined: Added x_domain typeattribute statement.
--- policy/modules/services/xserver.if | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +63 -42
@@ -324,18 +324,13 @@ interface(`xserver_user_client',` # template(`xserver_common_x_domain_template',` gen_require(` - type $1_xproperty_t, $1_input_xevent_t, $1_property_xevent_t; - type $1_focus_xevent_t, $1_manage_xevent_t, $1_default_xevent_t; - type $1_client_xevent_t; - - type rootwindow_t, xproperty_t; - type input_xevent_t, focus_xevent_t, property_xevent_t, manage_xevent_t; + type root_xdrawable_t; + type xproperty_t, $1_xproperty_t; type xevent_t, client_xevent_t; + type input_xevent_t, $1_input_xevent_t; attribute x_domain; - attribute xproperty_type; - attribute xevent_type; - attribute input_xevent_type; + attribute xdrawable_type, xcolormap_type; class x_drawable all_x_drawable_perms; class x_property all_x_property_perms;
@@ -350,32 +345,28 @@ template(`xserver_common_x_domain_template',` # Type attributes typeattribute $2 x_domain; + typeattribute $2 xdrawable_type, xcolormap_type; # X Properties - # can read and write client properties - allow $2 $1_xproperty_t:x_property { create destroy read write append }; - type_transition $2 xproperty_t:x_property $1_xproperty_t; + # disable property transitions for the time being. +# type_transition $2 xproperty_t:x_property $1_xproperty_t; # X Windows # new windows have the domain type - type_transition $2 rootwindow_t:x_drawable $2; + type_transition $2 root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable $2; # X Input + # distinguish input events + type_transition $2 input_xevent_t:x_event $1_input_xevent_t; + # can send own events + allow $2 $1_input_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } send; # can receive own events allow $2 $1_input_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; - allow $2 $1_property_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; - allow $2 $1_focus_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; - allow $2 $1_manage_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; - allow $2 $1_default_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; - allow $2 $1_client_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; - type_transition $2 input_xevent_t:x_event $1_input_xevent_t; - type_transition $2 property_xevent_t:x_event $1_property_xevent_t; - type_transition $2 focus_xevent_t:x_event $1_focus_xevent_t; - type_transition $2 manage_xevent_t:x_event $1_manage_xevent_t; - type_transition $2 client_xevent_t:x_event $1_client_xevent_t; - type_transition $2 xevent_t:x_event $1_default_xevent_t; - # can send ICCCM events to myself - allow $2 $1_manage_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send; + # can receive default events + allow $2 client_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; + allow $2 xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; + # don't audit send failures + dontaudit $2 input_xevent_type:x_event send; ') #######################################
@@ -401,27 +392,12 @@ template(`xserver_object_types_template',` # # Types for properties - type $1_xproperty_t alias $1_default_xproperty_t, xproperty_type; + type $1_xproperty_t, xproperty_type; ubac_constrained($1_xproperty_t) # Types for events type $1_input_xevent_t, input_xevent_type, xevent_type; ubac_constrained($1_input_xevent_t) - - type $1_property_xevent_t, xevent_type; - ubac_constrained($1_property_xevent_t) - - type $1_focus_xevent_t, xevent_type; - ubac_constrained($1_focus_xevent_t) - - type $1_manage_xevent_t, xevent_type; - ubac_constrained($1_manage_xevent_t) - - type $1_default_xevent_t, xevent_type; - ubac_constrained($1_default_xevent_t) - - type $1_client_xevent_t, xevent_type; - ubac_constrained($1_client_xevent_t) ') #######################################
@@ -1214,6 +1190,49 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',` ######################################## ##<summary> ## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to +## an X client domain. Gives the domain permission to read the +## virtual core keyboard and virtual core pointer devices. +##</summary> +##<param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +##</param> +# +interface(`xserver_manage_core_devices',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_t; + class x_device all_x_device_perms; + class x_pointer all_x_pointer_perms; + class x_keyboard all_x_keyboard_perms; + ') + + allow $1 xserver_t:{ x_device x_pointer x_keyboard } *; +') + +######################################## +##<summary> +## Interface to remove protections on an X client domain. +## Gives other X client domains full permissions over the target +## domain's X objects. +##</summary> +##<param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain to be unprotected. +## </summary> +##</param> +# +interface(`xserver_unprotected',` + gen_require(` + attribute xserver_unprotected_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 xserver_unprotected_type; +') + +######################################## +##<summary> +## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to ## an X client domain. Gives the domain complete control over the ## display. ##</summary>
@@ -1225,8 +1244,10 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',` # interface(`xserver_unconfined',` gen_require(` + attribute x_domain; attribute xserver_unconfined_type; ') + typeattribute $1 x_domain; typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type; ')
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
PATCH 6/6 X Object manager policy revisions to x_contexts.
In reply to Eamon WalshX Object manager policy revisions to x_contexts.
Many of the specific event, extension, and property types have been removed for the time being. Polyinstantiation allows selections and properties to be separated in a different way, and new X server support for labeling individual extension requests (as opposed to entire extensions) should make the extension querying problem easier to solve in the future.
--- config/appconfig-mcs/x_contexts | 109 +++------------------------------ config/appconfig-mls/x_contexts | 109 +++------------------------------ config/appconfig-standard/x_contexts | 109 +++------------------------------ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 297 deletions(-)
config/appconfig-mcs/x_contexts +10 -99
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ # The default client rule defines a context to be used for all clients # connecting to the server from a remote host. # -client * system_u:object_r:remote_xclient_t:s0 +client * system_u:object_r:remote_t:s0 #
@@ -27,25 +27,10 @@ client * system_u:object_r:remote_xclient_t:s0 # rule indicated by an asterisk should follow all other property rules. # # Properties that normal clients may only read -property XFree86_VT system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property XFree86_DDC_EDID1_RAWDATA system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property RESOURCE_MANAGER system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property SCREEN_RESOURCES system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property _MIT_PRIORITY_COLORS system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property AT_SPI_IOR system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property _SELINUX_CLIENT_CONTEXT system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property _NET_WORKAREA system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 -property _XKB_RULES_NAMES system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0 +property _SELINUX_* system_u:object_r:seclabel_xproperty_t:s0 # Clipboard and selection properties -property CUT_BUFFER0 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 -property CUT_BUFFER1 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 -property CUT_BUFFER2 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 -property CUT_BUFFER3 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 -property CUT_BUFFER4 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 -property CUT_BUFFER5 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 -property CUT_BUFFER6 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 -property CUT_BUFFER7 system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 +property CUT_BUFFER? system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0 # Default fallback type property * system_u:object_r:xproperty_t:s0
@@ -61,57 +46,11 @@ property * system_u:object_r:xproperty_t:s0 # Extension rules map an extension name to a context. A default extension # rule indicated by an asterisk should follow all other extension rules. # -# Standard extensions -extension BIG-REQUESTS system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension SHAPE system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension SYNC system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension XC-MISC system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension XFIXES system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension XInputExtension system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension XKEYBOARD system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension DAMAGE system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension RENDER system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 -extension XINERAMA system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0 - -# Direct hardware access extensions -extension XFree86-DGA system_u:object_r:directhw_xext_t:s0 -extension XFree86-VidModeExtension system_u:object_r:directhw_xext_t:s0 - -# Screen management and multihead extensions -extension RANDR system_u:object_r:output_xext_t:s0 -extension Composite system_u:object_r:output_xext_t:s0 - -# Screensaver, power management extensions -extension DPMS system_u:object_r:screensaver_xext_t:s0 -extension MIT-SCREEN-SAVER system_u:object_r:screensaver_xext_t:s0 - -# Shared memory extensions -extension MIT-SHM system_u:object_r:shmem_xext_t:s0 -extension XFree86-Bigfont system_u:object_r:shmem_xext_t:s0 - -# Accelerated graphics, OpenGL, direct rendering extensions -extension GLX system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0 -extension NV-CONTROL system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0 -extension NV-GLX system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0 -extension NVIDIA-GLX system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0 - -# Debugging, testing, and recording extensions -extension RECORD system_u:object_r:debug_xext_t:s0 -extension X-Resource system_u:object_r:debug_xext_t:s0 -extension XTEST system_u:object_r:debug_xext_t:s0 - -# Security-related extensions -extension SECURITY system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0 -extension SELinux system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0 -extension XAccessControlExtension system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0 -extension XC-APPGROUP system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0 - -# Video extensions -extension XVideo system_u:object_r:video_xext_t:s0 -extension XVideo-MotionCompensation system_u:object_r:video_xext_t:s0 +# Restricted extensions +extension SELinux system_u:object_r:security_xextension_t:s0 -# Default fallback type -extension * system_u:object_r:xext_t:s0 +# Standard extensions +extension * system_u:object_r:xextension_t:s0 #
@@ -124,8 +63,6 @@ extension * system_u:object_r:xext_t:s0 # rule indicated by an asterisk should follow all other selection rules. # # Standard selections -selection XA_PRIMARY system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0 -selection XA_SECONDARY system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0 selection PRIMARY system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0 selection CLIPBOARD system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0
@@ -149,7 +86,6 @@ event X11:KeyRelease system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event X11:ButtonPress system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event X11:ButtonRelease system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event X11:MotionNotify system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:SelectionNotify system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event XInputExtension:DeviceKeyPress system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event XInputExtension:DeviceKeyRelease system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event XInputExtension:DeviceButtonPress system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
@@ -159,36 +95,11 @@ event XInputExtension:DeviceValuator system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event XInputExtension:ProximityIn system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 event XInputExtension:ProximityOut system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0 -# Focus events -event X11:FocusIn system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:FocusOut system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:EnterNotify system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:LeaveNotify system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0 - -# Property events -event X11:PropertyNotify system_u:object_r:property_xevent_t:s0 - # Client message events event X11:ClientMessage system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0 - -# Manager events -event X11:ConfigureRequest system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:ResizeRequest system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:MapRequest system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:CirculateRequest system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:CreateNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:DestroyNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:MapNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:UnmapNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:ReparentNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:ConfigureNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:GravityNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:CirculateNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:Expose system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 -event X11:VisibilityNotify system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0 - -# Unknown events (that are not registered in the X server's name database) -event<unknown> system_u:object_r:unknown_xevent_t:s0 +event X11:SelectionNotify system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0 +event X11:UnmapNotify system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0 +event X11:ConfigureNotify system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0 # Default fallback type event * system_u:object_r:xevent_t:s0
config/appconfig-mls/x_contexts +10 -99
150 lines not on this page · raw message
config/appconfig-standard/x_contexts +10 -99
150 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
cover Updated X object manager policy: Intro
In reply to Eamon WalshQuoted 6 lines · Eamon Walsh
This patch series is an updated policy for the X server object manager. This is the policy that I was running in Portland for my various demos.
It includes new x_pointer/x_keyboard classes, unconfined-by-default
user types, and other changes. The only thing missing here is updated mls constraints; I am still working on those.
Quoted 7 lines
I need the first patch in the series (x_pointer/x_keyboard classes) upstream so that I can use these classes in the X server. Please merge this patch expeditiously if possible.
The remaining 5 patches are NOT independent and breakage will probably result if only some of them are applied. I only broke them up in an attempt to make it easier to review the changes.
I tried to build this so I could use sediff to better understand the change, but I get many m4 errors.
Quoted 5 lines
This whole thing is also available in a git tree at
git://anongit.freedesktop.org/~ewalsh/refpolicy(branch "master"), for ease of pulling.
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150