Skip to contentSkip to conversation

Updated X object manager policy: Intro

PATCH New Eamon Walsh 2 participants 10 messages Oct 14, 2009 – Oct 22, 2009

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

cover Updated X object manager policy: Intro

This patch series is an updated policy for the X server object manager. This is the policy that I was running in Portland for my various demos.
It includes new x_pointer/x_keyboard classes, unconfined-by-default
user types, and other changes. The only thing missing here is updated mls constraints; I am still working on those.

I need the first patch in the series (x_pointer/x_keyboard classes) upstream so that I can use these classes in the X server. Please merge this patch expeditiously if possible.

The remaining 5 patches are NOT independent and breakage will probably result if only some of them are applied. I only broke them up in an attempt to make it easier to review the changes.

This whole thing is also available in a git tree at
git://anongit.freedesktop.org/~ewalsh/refpolicy (branch "master"), for ease of pulling.

Signature · 2 lines
Eamon Walsh<[email protected]>
National Security Agency
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/6 Add separate x_pointer and x_keyboard classes inheriting from x_device.

Add separate x_pointer and x_keyboard classes inheriting from x_device.

This is needed to allow more fine-grained control over X devices without using different types. Using different types is problematic because devices act as subjects in the X Flask implementation, and subjects cannot be labeled through a type transition (since the output role is hardcoded to object_r).

---
  policy/flask/access_vectors   |   55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
  policy/flask/security_classes |    4 +++
  2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
policy/flask/access_vectors +34 -21
index 3998b77..6620e4c 100644
@@ -94,6 +94,33 @@ common database
  }
 
  #
+# Define a common prefix for pointer and keyboard access vectors.
+#
+
+common x_device
+{
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	use
+	read
+	write
+	getfocus
+	setfocus
+	bell
+	force_cursor
+	freeze
+	grab
+	manage
+	list_property
+	get_property
+	set_property
+	add
+	remove
+	create
+	destroy
+}
+
+#
  # Define the access vectors.
  #
  # class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
@@ -525,27 +552,7 @@ class x_client
  }
 
  class x_device
-{
-	getattr
-	setattr
-	use
-	read
-	write
-	getfocus
-	setfocus
-	bell
-	force_cursor
-	freeze
-	grab
-	manage
-	list_property
-	get_property
-	set_property
-	add
-	remove
-	create
-	destroy
-}
+inherits x_device
 
  class x_server
  {
@@ -802,3 +809,9 @@ class kernel_service
 
  class tun_socket
  inherits socket
+
+class x_pointer
+inherits x_device
+
+class x_keyboard
+inherits x_device
policy/flask/security_classes +4 -0
index 2bd1bf6..fa65db2 100644
@@ -121,4 +121,8 @@ class kernel_service
 
  class tun_socket
 
+# Still More SE-X Windows stuff
+class x_pointer			# userspace
+class x_keyboard		# userspace
+
  # FLASK
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/6 Add a "prefix" parameter to xserver_role and xserver_restricted_role.

In reply to Eamon Walsh

Add a "prefix" parameter to xserver_role and xserver_restricted_role.

This is required to call xserver_object_types_template and xserver_common_x_domain_template from within these interfaces.

Additionally, add a call to xserver_unconfined from within xserver_restricted_role. This causes the default user types to be unconfined as far as the X object manager is concerned. Only non-default types such as mozilla_t are now confined.

---
  policy/modules/apps/wm.if           |    2 +-
  policy/modules/roles/staff.te       |    2 +-
  policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te      |    2 +-
  policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te  |    2 +-
  policy/modules/services/xserver.if  |  201 ++++++++++++++--------------------
  policy/modules/system/userdomain.if |    2 +-
  6 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
policy/modules/apps/wm.if +1 -1
index 313f247..11d78d0 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ template(`wm_role_template',`
  	')
 
  	optional_policy(`
-		xserver_role($2, $1_wm_t)
+		xserver_role($1_wm, $2, $1_wm_t)
  	')
  ')
 
policy/modules/roles/staff.te +1 -1
index 7433ca0..07af057 100644
@@ -166,5 +166,5 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
-	xserver_role(staff_r, staff_t)
+	xserver_role(staff, staff_r, staff_t)
  ')
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +1 -1
index 2ed3c67..374add6 100644
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
-	xserver_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
+	xserver_role(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +1 -1
index 2183644..4c974d1 100644
@@ -151,5 +151,5 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
-	xserver_role(user_r, user_t)
+	xserver_role(user, user_r, user_t)
  ')
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +83 -118

271 lines not on this page · raw message

policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +1 -1
index f209ccf..b9bea7b 100644
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template',`
  	logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t)
  	selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_t)
 
-	xserver_restricted_role($1_r, $1_t)
+	xserver_restricted_role($1, $1_r, $1_t)
 
  	optional_policy(`
  		alsa_read_rw_config($1_t)
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/6 Make consolekit_t and system_dbusd_t unconfined in X.

In reply to Eamon Walsh

Make consolekit_t and system_dbusd_t unconfined in X.

Both of these types have been observed trying to touch the user's X display, one example being through /usr/libexec/ck-get-x11-server-pid and /usr/libexec/ck-get-x11-display-device.

---
  policy/modules/services/consolekit.te |    1 +
  policy/modules/services/dbus.te       |    2 ++
  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
policy/modules/services/consolekit.te +1 -0
index 1ead55d..4f9b992 100644
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ optional_policy(`
  optional_policy(`
  	xserver_read_xdm_pid(consolekit_t)
  	xserver_read_user_xauth(consolekit_t)
+	xserver_unconfined(consolekit_t)
  	corenet_tcp_connect_xserver_port(consolekit_t)
  ')
 
policy/modules/services/dbus.te +2 -0
index aa857cb..f60e1f1 100644
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ seutil_sigchld_newrole(system_dbusd_t)
  userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(system_dbusd_t)
  userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(system_dbusd_t)
 
+xserver_unconfined(system_dbusd_t)
+
  optional_policy(`
  	bind_domtrans(system_dbusd_t)
  ')
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
#6 lore raw

PATCH 4/6 X Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.te.

In reply to Eamon Walsh

X Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.te.

This commit consists of three main parts:

1. Code movement. There were X object manager-related statements scattered somewhat throughout the file; these have been consolidated, which resulted in some other statements moving (e.g. iceauth_t).

2. Type changes. Many of the specific event, extension, and property types have been dropped for the time being. The rootwindow_t and remote_xclient_t types have been renamed, and a root_xcolormap_t type has been (re-)added. This is for naming consistency. An "xserver_unprotected" alias has been added for use in labeling clients whose resources should be globally accessible (e.g. xdm_t).

3. Policy changes. These are mostly related to devices, which now have separate x_keyboard and x_pointer classes. The "Hacks" section has been cleaned up, and various other classes have had the default permissions tweaked.

---
  policy/modules/services/xserver.te |  283 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
  1 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
policy/modules/services/xserver.te +157 -126
index fc421d5..2f4144d 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ gen_require(`
  	class x_cursor all_x_cursor_perms;
  	class x_client all_x_client_perms;
  	class x_device all_x_device_perms;
+	class x_pointer all_x_pointer_perms;
+	class x_keyboard all_x_keyboard_perms;
  	class x_server all_x_server_perms;
  	class x_extension all_x_extension_perms;
  	class x_resource all_x_resource_perms;
@@ -46,70 +48,53 @@ gen_tunable(xdm_sysadm_login, false)
  ##</desc>
  gen_tunable(xserver_object_manager, false)
 
-attribute input_xevent_type;
-attribute xserver_unconfined_type;
  attribute x_domain;
-attribute x_userdomain;
-attribute xproperty_type;
-attribute xselection_type;
-attribute xextension_type;
-attribute xevent_type;
 
-type accelgraphics_xext_t, xextension_type;
+# X Events
+attribute xevent_type;
+attribute input_xevent_type;
+type xevent_t, xevent_type;
  type client_xevent_t, xevent_type;
+type input_xevent_t, xevent_type, input_xevent_type;
+
+# X Extensions
+attribute xextension_type;
+type xextension_t, xextension_type;
+type security_xextension_t, xextension_type;
+
+# X Properties
+attribute xproperty_type;
+type xproperty_t, xproperty_type;
+type seclabel_xproperty_t, xproperty_type;
  type clipboard_xproperty_t, xproperty_type;
+
+# X Selections
+attribute xselection_type;
+type xselection_t, xselection_type;
  type clipboard_xselection_t, xselection_type;
-type debug_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type directhw_xext_t alias disallowed_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type focus_xevent_t, xevent_type;
+#type settings_xselection_t, xselection_type;
+#type dbus_xselection_t, xselection_type;
 
-type iceauth_t;
-type iceauth_exec_t;
-typealias iceauth_t alias { user_iceauth_t staff_iceauth_t sysadm_iceauth_t };
-typealias iceauth_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_t secadm_iceauth_t };
-application_domain(iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t)
-ubac_constrained(iceauth_t)
+# X Drawables
+attribute xdrawable_type;
+attribute xcolormap_type;
+type root_xdrawable_t, xdrawable_type;
+type root_xcolormap_t, xcolormap_type;
 
-type iceauth_home_t;
-typealias iceauth_home_t alias { user_iceauth_home_t staff_iceauth_home_t sysadm_iceauth_home_t };
-typealias iceauth_home_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_home_t secadm_iceauth_home_t };
-files_poly_member(iceauth_home_t)
-userdom_user_home_content(iceauth_home_t)
+attribute xserver_unconfined_type;
+attribute xserver_unprotected_type;
+
+xserver_object_types_template(root)
+#xserver_object_types_template(user)
 
-type info_xproperty_t, xproperty_type;
-type input_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-type manage_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-type output_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type property_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-type remote_xclient_t;
-
-type rootwindow_t;
-typealias rootwindow_t alias { user_rootwindow_t staff_rootwindow_t sysadm_rootwindow_t };
-typealias rootwindow_t alias { auditadm_rootwindow_t secadm_rootwindow_t };
-ubac_constrained(rootwindow_t)
-
-type screensaver_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type security_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type shmem_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type std_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type video_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type unknown_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-
-xserver_object_types_template(user)
-typealias user_xproperty_t alias { staff_xproperty_t sysadm_xproperty_t };
-typealias user_xproperty_t alias { auditadm_xproperty_t secadm_xproperty_t };
-typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { staff_input_xevent_t sysadm_input_xevent_t };
-typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { auditadm_input_xevent_t secadm_input_xevent_t };
-typealias user_property_xevent_t alias { staff_property_xevent_t sysadm_property_xevent_t };
-typealias user_property_xevent_t alias { auditadm_property_xevent_t secadm_property_xevent_t };
-typealias user_focus_xevent_t alias { staff_focus_xevent_t sysadm_focus_xevent_t };
-typealias user_focus_xevent_t alias { auditadm_focus_xevent_t secadm_focus_xevent_t };
-typealias user_manage_xevent_t alias { staff_manage_xevent_t sysadm_manage_xevent_t };
-typealias user_manage_xevent_t alias { auditadm_manage_xevent_t secadm_manage_xevent_t };
-typealias user_default_xevent_t alias { staff_default_xevent_t sysadm_default_xevent_t };
-typealias user_default_xevent_t alias { auditadm_default_xevent_t secadm_default_xevent_t };
-typealias user_client_xevent_t alias { staff_client_xevent_t sysadm_client_xevent_t };
-typealias user_client_xevent_t alias { auditadm_client_xevent_t secadm_client_xevent_t };
+#typealias user_xproperty_t alias { staff_xproperty_t sysadm_xproperty_t };
+#typealias user_xproperty_t alias { auditadm_xproperty_t secadm_xproperty_t };
+#typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { staff_input_xevent_t sysadm_input_xevent_t };
+#typealias user_input_xevent_t alias { auditadm_input_xevent_t secadm_input_xevent_t };
+
+type remote_t;
+xserver_object_types_template(remote)
+xserver_common_x_domain_template(remote,remote_t)
 
  type user_fonts_t;
  typealias user_fonts_t alias { staff_fonts_t sysadm_fonts_t };
@@ -126,10 +111,18 @@ typealias user_fonts_config_t alias { staff_fonts_config_t sysadm_fonts_config_t
  typealias user_fonts_config_t alias { auditadm_fonts_config_t secadm_fonts_config_t };
  userdom_user_home_content(user_fonts_config_t)
 
-type xevent_t alias default_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-type xext_t alias unknown_xext_t, xextension_type;
-type xproperty_t alias default_xproperty_t, xproperty_type;
-type xselection_t alias default_xselection_t, xselection_type;
+type iceauth_t;
+type iceauth_exec_t;
+typealias iceauth_t alias { user_iceauth_t staff_iceauth_t sysadm_iceauth_t };
+typealias iceauth_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_t secadm_iceauth_t };
+application_domain(iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t)
+ubac_constrained(iceauth_t)
+
+type iceauth_home_t;
+typealias iceauth_home_t alias { user_iceauth_home_t staff_iceauth_home_t sysadm_iceauth_home_t };
+typealias iceauth_home_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_home_t secadm_iceauth_home_t };
+files_poly_member(iceauth_home_t)
+userdom_user_home_content(iceauth_home_t)
 
  type xauth_t;
  type xauth_exec_t;
@@ -161,6 +154,10 @@ type xdm_exec_t;
  auth_login_pgm_domain(xdm_t)
  init_domain(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t)
  init_daemon_domain(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t)
+xserver_object_types_template(xdm)
+xserver_common_x_domain_template(xdm, xdm_t)
+xserver_unconfined(xdm_t)
+xserver_unprotected(xdm_t)
 
  type xdm_lock_t;
  files_lock_file(xdm_lock_t)
@@ -190,8 +187,6 @@ type xserver_t;
  type xserver_exec_t;
  typealias xserver_t alias { user_xserver_t staff_xserver_t sysadm_xserver_t };
  typealias xserver_t alias { auditadm_xserver_t secadm_xserver_t xdm_xserver_t };
-xserver_object_types_template(xdm)
-xserver_common_x_domain_template(xdm, xdm_t)
  init_system_domain(xserver_t, xserver_exec_t)
  ubac_constrained(xserver_t)
 
@@ -579,6 +574,14 @@ optional_policy(`
  # X server local policy
  #
 
+# X Object Manager rules
+type_transition xserver_t xserver_t:x_drawable root_xdrawable_t;
+type_transition xserver_t xserver_t:x_colormap root_xcolormap_t;
+type_transition root_xdrawable_t input_xevent_t:x_event root_input_xevent_t;
+
+allow xserver_t { root_xdrawable_t x_domain }:x_drawable send;
+allow xserver_t input_xevent_t:x_event send;
+
  # setuid/setgid for the wrapper program to change UID
  # sys_rawio is for iopl access - should not be needed for frame-buffer
  # sys_admin, locking shared mem?  chowning IPC message queues or semaphores?
@@ -603,20 +606,6 @@ allow xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }
  allow xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
  allow xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
 
-# Device rules
-allow x_domain xserver_t:x_device { read getattr use setattr setfocus grab bell };
-
-allow xserver_t { input_xevent_t input_xevent_type }:x_event send;
-
-domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t)
-
-allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
-
-# Labeling rules for root windows and colormaps
-type_transition xserver_t xserver_t:{ x_drawable x_colormap } rootwindow_t;
-
-allow xserver_t { rootwindow_t x_domain }:x_drawable send;
-
  manage_dirs_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
  manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
  manage_sock_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
@@ -635,6 +624,9 @@ manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
  manage_lnk_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
  files_search_var_lib(xserver_t)
 
+domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t)
+allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
+
  # Create files in /var/log with the xserver_log_t type.
  manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_log_t, xserver_log_t)
  logging_log_filetrans(xserver_t, xserver_log_t, file)
@@ -752,15 +744,17 @@ tunable_policy(`!xserver_object_manager',`
  	# but typeattribute doesnt work in conditionals
 
  	allow xserver_t xserver_t:x_server *;
-	allow xserver_t { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_drawable *;
+	allow xserver_t { x_domain root_xdrawable_t }:x_drawable *;
  	allow xserver_t xserver_t:x_screen *;
  	allow xserver_t x_domain:x_gc *;
-	allow xserver_t { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_colormap *;
+	allow xserver_t { x_domain root_xcolormap_t }:x_colormap *;
  	allow xserver_t xproperty_type:x_property *;
  	allow xserver_t xselection_type:x_selection *;
  	allow xserver_t x_domain:x_cursor *;
-	allow xserver_t { x_domain remote_xclient_t }:x_client *;
+	allow xserver_t x_domain:x_client *;
  	allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *;
+	allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *;
+	allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *;
  	allow xserver_t xextension_type:x_extension *;
  	allow xserver_t { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *;
  	allow xserver_t xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *;
@@ -863,112 +857,149 @@ optional_policy(`
  #
 
  # Hacks
-# everyone can get the input focus of everyone else
-# this is a fundamental brokenness in the X protocol
-allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device getfocus;
-# everyone can grab the server
-# everyone does it, it is basically a free DOS attack
-allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server grab;
-# everyone can get the font path, etc.
-# this could leak out sensitive information
-allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server getattr;
  # everyone can do override-redirect windows.
  # this could be used to spoof labels
  allow x_domain self:x_drawable override;
-# everyone can receive management events on the root window
-# allows to know when new windows appear, among other things
-allow x_domain manage_xevent_t:x_event receive;
+# firefox gets nosy with other people's windows
+allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable { list_child receive };
 
  # X Server
-# can read server-owned resources
-allow x_domain xserver_t:x_resource read;
+# can get X server attributes
+allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server getattr;
+# can grab the server
+allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server grab;
+# can read and write server-owned generic resources
+allow x_domain xserver_t:x_resource { read write };
  # can mess with own clients
-allow x_domain self:x_client { manage destroy };
+allow x_domain self:x_client { getattr manage destroy };
 
  # X Protocol Extensions
-allow x_domain std_xext_t:x_extension { query use };
-allow x_domain shmem_xext_t:x_extension { query use };
-dontaudit x_domain xextension_type:x_extension { query use };
+allow x_domain xextension_t:x_extension { query use };
+allow x_domain security_xextension_t:x_extension { query use };
 
  # X Properties
-# can read and write cut buffers
-allow x_domain clipboard_xproperty_t:x_property { create read write append };
-# can read info properties
-allow x_domain info_xproperty_t:x_property read;
  # can change properties of root window
-allow x_domain rootwindow_t:x_drawable { list_property get_property set_property };
-# can change properties of own windows
+allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable { list_property get_property set_property };
+# can change properties of my own windows
  allow x_domain self:x_drawable { list_property get_property set_property };
+# can read and write cut buffers
+allow x_domain clipboard_xproperty_t:x_property { create read write append };
+# can read security labels
+allow x_domain seclabel_xproperty_t:x_property { getattr read };
+# can change all other properties
+allow x_domain xproperty_t:x_property { getattr create read write append destroy };
 
  # X Windows
  # operations allowed on root windows
-allow x_domain rootwindow_t:x_drawable { getattr list_child add_child remove_child send receive };
+allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable { getattr setattr list_child add_child remove_child send receive hide show };
  # operations allowed on my windows
  allow x_domain self:x_drawable { create destroy getattr setattr read write show hide list_child add_child remove_child manage send receive };
+allow x_domain self:x_drawable { blend };
+# operations allowed on all windows
+allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable { getattr get_property set_property remove_child };
 
  # X Colormaps
  # can use the default colormap
-allow x_domain rootwindow_t:x_colormap { read use add_color };
+allow x_domain root_xcolormap_t:x_colormap { read use add_color remove_color install uninstall };
+# can create and use colormaps
+allow x_domain self:x_colormap *;
+
+# X Devices
+# operations allowed on my own devices
+allow x_domain self:{ x_device x_pointer x_keyboard } *;
+# operations allowed on generic devices
+allow x_domain xserver_t:x_device { use getattr setattr getfocus setfocus bell grab freeze force_cursor };
+# operations allowed on core keyboard
+allow x_domain xserver_t:x_keyboard { use getattr setattr getfocus setfocus bell grab };
+# operations allowed on core pointer
+allow x_domain xserver_t:x_pointer { read use getattr setattr getfocus setfocus bell grab freeze force_cursor };
+
+# all devices can generate input events
+allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable send;
+allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable send;
+allow x_domain input_xevent_t:x_event send;
+
+# dontaudit keyloggers repeatedly polling
+#dontaudit x_domain xserver_t:x_keyboard read;
 
  # X Input
-# can receive certain root window events
-allow x_domain focus_xevent_t:x_event receive;
-allow x_domain property_xevent_t:x_event receive;
-allow x_domain client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event receive;
-allow x_domain manage_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event receive;
+# can receive default events
+allow x_domain xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
+# can receive ICCCM events
+allow x_domain client_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
  # can send ICCCM events to the root window
-allow x_domain manage_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send;
  allow x_domain client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send;
+# can receive root window input events
+allow x_domain root_input_xevent_t:x_event receive;
+
  # X Selections
  # can use the clipboard
  allow x_domain clipboard_xselection_t:x_selection { getattr setattr read };
-# can query all other selections
-allow x_domain xselection_t:x_selection { getattr read };
+# can use default selections
+allow x_domain xselection_t:x_selection { getattr setattr read };
 
  # Other X Objects
  # can create and use cursors
  allow x_domain self:x_cursor *;
  # can create and use graphics contexts
  allow x_domain self:x_gc *;
-# can create and use colormaps
-allow x_domain self:x_colormap *;
  # can read and write own objects
  allow x_domain self:x_resource { read write };
+# can mess with the screensaver
+allow x_domain xserver_t:x_screen { getattr saver_getattr };
+
+########################################
+#
+# Rules for unprotected access to a domain
+#
+
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_drawable *;
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_gc *;
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_colormap *;
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_property *;
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_cursor *;
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_client *;
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_device *;
+allow x_domain xserver_unprotected_type:x_resource *;
+
+########################################
+#
+# Rules for unconfined access to this module
+#
 
  tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',`
  	# should be xserver_unconfined(x_domain),
  	# but typeattribute doesnt work in conditionals
 
  	allow x_domain xserver_t:x_server *;
-	allow x_domain { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_drawable *;
+	allow x_domain xdrawable_type:x_drawable *;
  	allow x_domain xserver_t:x_screen *;
  	allow x_domain x_domain:x_gc *;
-	allow x_domain { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_colormap *;
+	allow x_domain xcolormap_type:x_colormap *;
  	allow x_domain xproperty_type:x_property *;
  	allow x_domain xselection_type:x_selection *;
  	allow x_domain x_domain:x_cursor *;
-	allow x_domain { x_domain remote_xclient_t }:x_client *;
+	allow x_domain x_domain:x_client *;
  	allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *;
+	allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *;
+	allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *;
  	allow x_domain xextension_type:x_extension *;
  	allow x_domain { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *;
  	allow x_domain xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *;
  ')
 
-########################################
-#
-# Rules for unconfined access to this module
-#
-
  allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_server *;
-allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_drawable *;
+allow xserver_unconfined_type xdrawable_type:x_drawable *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_screen *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_gc *;
-allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain rootwindow_t }:x_colormap *;
+allow xserver_unconfined_type xcolormap_type:x_colormap *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type xproperty_type:x_property *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type xselection_type:x_selection *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_cursor *;
-allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain remote_xclient_t }:x_client *;
+allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_client *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *;
+allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *;
+allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type xextension_type:x_extension *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *;
  allow xserver_unconfined_type xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *;
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
#7 lore raw

PATCH 5/6 X Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.if.

In reply to Eamon Walsh

X Object Manager policy revisions to xserver.if.

This commit consists of two parts:

1. Revisions to xserver_object_types_template and xserver_common_x_domain_template. This reflects the dropping of many of the specific event, extension, and property types.

2. New interfaces:
xserver_manage_core_devices: Gives control over core mouse/keyboard.
xserver_unprotected: Allows all clients to access a domain's X objects. Modified interfaces:
xserver_unconfined: Added x_domain typeattribute statement.

---
  policy/modules/services/xserver.if |  105 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
  1 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +63 -42
index 99bddec..8d1e240 100644
@@ -324,18 +324,13 @@ interface(`xserver_user_client',`
  #
  template(`xserver_common_x_domain_template',`
  	gen_require(`
-		type $1_xproperty_t, $1_input_xevent_t, $1_property_xevent_t;
-		type $1_focus_xevent_t, $1_manage_xevent_t, $1_default_xevent_t;
-		type $1_client_xevent_t;
-
-		type rootwindow_t, xproperty_t;
-		type input_xevent_t, focus_xevent_t, property_xevent_t, manage_xevent_t;
+		type root_xdrawable_t;
+		type xproperty_t, $1_xproperty_t;
  		type xevent_t, client_xevent_t;
+		type input_xevent_t, $1_input_xevent_t;
 
  		attribute x_domain;
-		attribute xproperty_type;
-		attribute xevent_type;
-		attribute input_xevent_type;
+		attribute xdrawable_type, xcolormap_type;
 
  		class x_drawable all_x_drawable_perms;
  		class x_property all_x_property_perms;
@@ -350,32 +345,28 @@ template(`xserver_common_x_domain_template',`
 
  	# Type attributes
  	typeattribute $2 x_domain;
+	typeattribute $2 xdrawable_type, xcolormap_type;
 
  	# X Properties
-	# can read and write client properties
-	allow $2 $1_xproperty_t:x_property { create destroy read write append };
-	type_transition $2 xproperty_t:x_property $1_xproperty_t;
+	# disable property transitions for the time being.
+#	type_transition $2 xproperty_t:x_property $1_xproperty_t;
 
  	# X Windows
  	# new windows have the domain type
-	type_transition $2 rootwindow_t:x_drawable $2;
+	type_transition $2 root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable $2;
 
  	# X Input
+	# distinguish input events
+	type_transition $2 input_xevent_t:x_event $1_input_xevent_t;
+	# can send own events
+	allow $2 $1_input_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } send;
  	# can receive own events
  	allow $2 $1_input_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
-	allow $2 $1_property_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
-	allow $2 $1_focus_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
-	allow $2 $1_manage_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
-	allow $2 $1_default_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
-	allow $2 $1_client_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
-	type_transition $2 input_xevent_t:x_event $1_input_xevent_t;
-	type_transition $2 property_xevent_t:x_event $1_property_xevent_t;
-	type_transition $2 focus_xevent_t:x_event $1_focus_xevent_t;
-	type_transition $2 manage_xevent_t:x_event $1_manage_xevent_t;
-	type_transition $2 client_xevent_t:x_event $1_client_xevent_t;
-	type_transition $2 xevent_t:x_event $1_default_xevent_t;
-	# can send ICCCM events to myself
-	allow $2 $1_manage_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send;
+	# can receive default events
+	allow $2 client_xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
+	allow $2 xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive;
+	# don't audit send failures
+	dontaudit $2 input_xevent_type:x_event send;
  ')
 
  #######################################
@@ -401,27 +392,12 @@ template(`xserver_object_types_template',`
  	#
 
  	# Types for properties
-	type $1_xproperty_t alias $1_default_xproperty_t, xproperty_type;
+	type $1_xproperty_t, xproperty_type;
  	ubac_constrained($1_xproperty_t)
 
  	# Types for events
  	type $1_input_xevent_t, input_xevent_type, xevent_type;
  	ubac_constrained($1_input_xevent_t)
-
-	type $1_property_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-	ubac_constrained($1_property_xevent_t)
-
-	type $1_focus_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-	ubac_constrained($1_focus_xevent_t)
-
-	type $1_manage_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-	ubac_constrained($1_manage_xevent_t)
-
-	type $1_default_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-	ubac_constrained($1_default_xevent_t)
-
-	type $1_client_xevent_t, xevent_type;
-	ubac_constrained($1_client_xevent_t)
  ')
 
  #######################################
@@ -1214,6 +1190,49 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',`
  ########################################
  ##<summary>
  ##	Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to
+##	an X client domain.  Gives the domain permission to read the
+##      virtual core keyboard and virtual core pointer devices.
+##</summary>
+##<param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+##</param>
+#
+interface(`xserver_manage_core_devices',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type xserver_t;
+		class x_device all_x_device_perms;
+		class x_pointer all_x_pointer_perms;
+		class x_keyboard all_x_keyboard_perms;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 xserver_t:{ x_device x_pointer x_keyboard } *;
+')
+
+########################################
+##<summary>
+##	Interface to remove protections on an X client domain.
+##	Gives other X client domains full permissions over the target
+##	domain's X objects.
+##</summary>
+##<param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain to be unprotected.
+##	</summary>
+##</param>
+#
+interface(`xserver_unprotected',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute xserver_unprotected_type;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 xserver_unprotected_type;
+')
+
+########################################
+##<summary>
+##	Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to
  ##	an X client domain.  Gives the domain complete control over the
  ##	display.
  ##</summary>
@@ -1225,8 +1244,10 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',`
  #
  interface(`xserver_unconfined',`
  	gen_require(`
+		attribute x_domain;
  		attribute xserver_unconfined_type;
  	')
 
+	typeattribute $1 x_domain;
  	typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type;
  ')
Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
#8 lore raw

PATCH 6/6 X Object manager policy revisions to x_contexts.

In reply to Eamon Walsh

X Object manager policy revisions to x_contexts.

Many of the specific event, extension, and property types have been removed for the time being. Polyinstantiation allows selections and properties to be separated in a different way, and new X server support for labeling individual extension requests (as opposed to entire extensions) should make the extension querying problem easier to solve in the future.

---
  config/appconfig-mcs/x_contexts      |  109 +++------------------------------
  config/appconfig-mls/x_contexts      |  109 +++------------------------------
  config/appconfig-standard/x_contexts |  109 +++------------------------------
  3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 297 deletions(-)
config/appconfig-mcs/x_contexts +10 -99
index 08da649..0b32044 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  # The default client rule defines a context to be used for all clients
  # connecting to the server from a remote host.
  #
-client	*				system_u:object_r:remote_xclient_t:s0
+client	*				system_u:object_r:remote_t:s0
 
 
  #
@@ -27,25 +27,10 @@ client	*				system_u:object_r:remote_xclient_t:s0
  # rule indicated by an asterisk should follow all other property rules.
  #
  # Properties that normal clients may only read
-property XFree86_VT			system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property XFree86_DDC_EDID1_RAWDATA	system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property RESOURCE_MANAGER		system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property SCREEN_RESOURCES		system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property _MIT_PRIORITY_COLORS		system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property AT_SPI_IOR			system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property _SELINUX_CLIENT_CONTEXT	system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property _NET_WORKAREA			system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
-property _XKB_RULES_NAMES		system_u:object_r:info_xproperty_t:s0
+property _SELINUX_*			system_u:object_r:seclabel_xproperty_t:s0
 
  # Clipboard and selection properties
-property CUT_BUFFER0			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
-property CUT_BUFFER1			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
-property CUT_BUFFER2			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
-property CUT_BUFFER3			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
-property CUT_BUFFER4			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
-property CUT_BUFFER5			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
-property CUT_BUFFER6			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
-property CUT_BUFFER7			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
+property CUT_BUFFER?			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xproperty_t:s0
 
  # Default fallback type
  property *	   			system_u:object_r:xproperty_t:s0
@@ -61,57 +46,11 @@ property *	   			system_u:object_r:xproperty_t:s0
  # Extension rules map an extension name to a context.  A default extension
  # rule indicated by an asterisk should follow all other extension rules.
  #
-# Standard extensions
-extension BIG-REQUESTS			system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension SHAPE				system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension SYNC				system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension XC-MISC			system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension XFIXES			system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension XInputExtension		system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension XKEYBOARD			system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension DAMAGE			system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension RENDER			system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-extension XINERAMA			system_u:object_r:std_xext_t:s0
-
-# Direct hardware access extensions
-extension XFree86-DGA			system_u:object_r:directhw_xext_t:s0
-extension XFree86-VidModeExtension	system_u:object_r:directhw_xext_t:s0
-
-# Screen management and multihead extensions
-extension RANDR				system_u:object_r:output_xext_t:s0
-extension Composite			system_u:object_r:output_xext_t:s0
-
-# Screensaver, power management extensions
-extension DPMS				system_u:object_r:screensaver_xext_t:s0
-extension MIT-SCREEN-SAVER		system_u:object_r:screensaver_xext_t:s0
-
-# Shared memory extensions
-extension MIT-SHM			system_u:object_r:shmem_xext_t:s0
-extension XFree86-Bigfont		system_u:object_r:shmem_xext_t:s0
-
-# Accelerated graphics, OpenGL, direct rendering extensions
-extension GLX				system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0
-extension NV-CONTROL			system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0
-extension NV-GLX			system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0
-extension NVIDIA-GLX			system_u:object_r:accelgraphics_xext_t:s0
-
-# Debugging, testing, and recording extensions
-extension RECORD			system_u:object_r:debug_xext_t:s0
-extension X-Resource			system_u:object_r:debug_xext_t:s0
-extension XTEST				system_u:object_r:debug_xext_t:s0
-
-# Security-related extensions
-extension SECURITY			system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0
-extension SELinux			system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0
-extension XAccessControlExtension	system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0
-extension XC-APPGROUP			system_u:object_r:security_xext_t:s0
-
-# Video extensions
-extension XVideo			system_u:object_r:video_xext_t:s0
-extension XVideo-MotionCompensation	system_u:object_r:video_xext_t:s0
+# Restricted extensions
+extension SELinux			system_u:object_r:security_xextension_t:s0
 
-# Default fallback type
-extension *	   			system_u:object_r:xext_t:s0
+# Standard extensions
+extension *	   			system_u:object_r:xextension_t:s0
 
 
  #
@@ -124,8 +63,6 @@ extension *	   			system_u:object_r:xext_t:s0
  # rule indicated by an asterisk should follow all other selection rules.
  #
  # Standard selections
-selection XA_PRIMARY			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0
-selection XA_SECONDARY			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0
  selection PRIMARY			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0
  selection CLIPBOARD			system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0
 
@@ -149,7 +86,6 @@ event X11:KeyRelease			system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event X11:ButtonPress			system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event X11:ButtonRelease			system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event X11:MotionNotify			system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:SelectionNotify		system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event XInputExtension:DeviceKeyPress	system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event XInputExtension:DeviceKeyRelease	system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event XInputExtension:DeviceButtonPress	system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
@@ -159,36 +95,11 @@ event XInputExtension:DeviceValuator	system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event XInputExtension:ProximityIn	system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
  event XInputExtension:ProximityOut	system_u:object_r:input_xevent_t:s0
 
-# Focus events
-event X11:FocusIn			system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:FocusOut			system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:EnterNotify			system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:LeaveNotify			system_u:object_r:focus_xevent_t:s0
-
-# Property events
-event X11:PropertyNotify		system_u:object_r:property_xevent_t:s0
-
  # Client message events
  event X11:ClientMessage			system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0
-
-# Manager events
-event X11:ConfigureRequest		system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:ResizeRequest			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:MapRequest			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:CirculateRequest		system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:CreateNotify			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:DestroyNotify			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:MapNotify			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:UnmapNotify			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:ReparentNotify		system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:ConfigureNotify		system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:GravityNotify			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:CirculateNotify		system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:Expose			system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-event X11:VisibilityNotify		system_u:object_r:manage_xevent_t:s0
-
-# Unknown events (that are not registered in the X server's name database)
-event<unknown>				system_u:object_r:unknown_xevent_t:s0
+event X11:SelectionNotify		system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0
+event X11:UnmapNotify			system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0
+event X11:ConfigureNotify		system_u:object_r:client_xevent_t:s0
 
  # Default fallback type
  event *					system_u:object_r:xevent_t:s0
config/appconfig-mls/x_contexts +10 -99

150 lines not on this page · raw message

config/appconfig-standard/x_contexts +10 -99

150 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
1.6.5.rc2
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/6 Add separate x_pointer and x_keyboard classes inheriting from x_device.

In reply to Eamon Walsh
Quoted 9 lines · Eamon Walsh

Add separate x_pointer and x_keyboard classes inheriting from x_device.

This is needed to allow more fine-grained control over X devices without
using different types. Using different types is problematic because devices act as subjects in the X Flask implementation, and subjects cannot be labeled through a type transition (since the output role is hardcoded to object_r).

Merged.

Quoted 104 lines
---
  policy/flask/access_vectors   |   55
+++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
  policy/flask/security_classes |    4 +++
  2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
policy/flask/access_vectors +34 -21
index 3998b77..6620e4c 100644
@@ -94,6 +94,33 @@ common database
  }
 
  #
+# Define a common prefix for pointer and keyboard access vectors.
+#
+
+common x_device
+{
+       getattr
+       setattr
+       use
+       read
+       write
+       getfocus
+       setfocus
+       bell
+       force_cursor
+       freeze
+       grab
+       manage
+       list_property
+       get_property
+       set_property
+       add
+       remove
+       create
+       destroy
+}
+
+#
  # Define the access vectors.
  #
  # class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
@@ -525,27 +552,7 @@ class x_client
  }
 
  class x_device
-{
-       getattr
-       setattr
-       use
-       read
-       write
-       getfocus
-       setfocus
-       bell
-       force_cursor
-       freeze
-       grab
-       manage
-       list_property
-       get_property
-       set_property
-       add
-       remove
-       create
-       destroy
-}
+inherits x_device
 
  class x_server
  {
@@ -802,3 +809,9 @@ class kernel_service
 
  class tun_socket
  inherits socket
+
+class x_pointer
+inherits x_device
+
+class x_keyboard
+inherits x_device
policy/flask/security_classes +4 -1
index 2bd1bf6..fa65db2 100644
@@ -121,4 +121,8 @@ class kernel_service
 
  class tun_socket
 
+# Still More SE-X Windows stuff
+class x_pointer                        # userspace
+class x_keyboard               # userspace
+
  # FLASK
--

1.6.5.rc2

Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/6 Add a "prefix" parameter to xserver_role and xserver_restricted_role.

In reply to Eamon Walsh
Quoted 1 line · Eamon Walsh

Add a "prefix" parameter to xserver_role and xserver_restricted_role.

These need to turn into new xserver_role_template and xserver_restricted_role_template templates, and the current versions need to stay, but as deprecated, for compatibility.

Quoted 397 lines

This is required to call xserver_object_types_template and xserver_common_x_domain_template from within these interfaces.

Additionally, add a call to xserver_unconfined from within xserver_restricted_role. This causes the default user types to be unconfined as far as the X object manager is concerned. Only non-default types such as mozilla_t are now confined.

---
  policy/modules/apps/wm.if           |    2 +-
  policy/modules/roles/staff.te       |    2 +-
  policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te      |    2 +-
  policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te  |    2 +-
  policy/modules/services/xserver.if  |  201
++++++++++++++--------------------
  policy/modules/system/userdomain.if |    2 +-
  6 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
policy/modules/apps/wm.if +1 -1
index 313f247..11d78d0 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ template(`wm_role_template',`
        ')
 
        optional_policy(`
-               xserver_role($2, $1_wm_t)
+               xserver_role($1_wm, $2, $1_wm_t)
        ')
  ')
 
policy/modules/roles/staff.te +1 -1
index 7433ca0..07af057 100644
@@ -166,5 +166,5 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
-       xserver_role(staff_r, staff_t)
+       xserver_role(staff, staff_r, staff_t)
  ')
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +1 -1
index 2ed3c67..374add6 100644
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
-       xserver_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
+       xserver_role(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +1 -1
index 2183644..4c974d1 100644
@@ -151,5 +151,5 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
-       xserver_role(user_r, user_t)
+       xserver_role(user, user_r, user_t)
  ')
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +58 -93
index 6a0f5c1..99bddec 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
  ##    Rules required for using the X Windows server
  ##    and environment, for restricted users.
  ##</summary>
+##<param name="prefix">
+##     <summary>
+##     The prefix of the X client domain (e.g., user
+##     is the prefix for user_t).
+##     </summary>
+##</param>
  ##<param name="role">
  ##    <summary>
  ##    Role allowed access.
@@ -22,144 +28,97 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
                type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_config_t;
                type iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t, iceauth_home_t;
                type xauth_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_home_t;
-
-               type info_xproperty_t, rootwindow_t;
-
-               class x_drawable all_x_drawable_perms;
-               class x_screen all_x_screen_perms;
-               class x_gc all_x_gc_perms;
-               class x_font all_x_font_perms;
-               class x_colormap all_x_colormap_perms;
-               class x_property all_x_property_perms;
-               class x_selection all_x_selection_perms;
-               class x_cursor all_x_cursor_perms;
-               class x_client all_x_client_perms;
-               class x_device all_x_device_perms;
-               class x_server all_x_server_perms;
-               class x_extension all_x_extension_perms;
-               class x_resource all_x_resource_perms;
-               class x_event all_x_event_perms;
-               class x_synthetic_event all_x_synthetic_event_perms;
        ')
 
-       role $1 types { xserver_t xauth_t iceauth_t };
+       role $2 types { xserver_t xauth_t iceauth_t };
 
        # Xserver read/write client shm
-       allow xserver_t $2:fd use;
-       allow xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;
+       allow xserver_t $3:fd use;
+       allow xserver_t $3:shm rw_shm_perms;
 
-       domtrans_pattern($2, xserver_exec_t, xserver_t)
-       allow xserver_t $2:process signal;
+       domtrans_pattern($3, xserver_exec_t, xserver_t)
+       allow xserver_t $3:process signal;
 
-       allow xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;
+       allow xserver_t $3:shm rw_shm_perms;
 
-       allow $2 user_fonts_t:dir list_dir_perms;
-       allow $2 user_fonts_t:file read_file_perms;
+       allow $3 user_fonts_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+       allow $3 user_fonts_t:file read_file_perms;
 
-       allow $2 user_fonts_config_t:dir list_dir_perms;
-       allow $2 user_fonts_config_t:file read_file_perms;
+       allow $3 user_fonts_config_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+       allow $3 user_fonts_config_t:file read_file_perms;
 
-       manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
-       manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
+       manage_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
+       manage_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
 
-       stream_connect_pattern($2, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t,
 xserver_t)
-       files_search_tmp($2)
+       stream_connect_pattern($3, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t,
 xserver_t)
+       files_search_tmp($3)
 
        # Communicate via System V shared memory.
-       allow $2 xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
-       allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
+       allow $3 xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
+       allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
 
        # allow ps to show iceauth
-       ps_process_pattern($2, iceauth_t)
+       ps_process_pattern($3, iceauth_t)
 
-       domtrans_pattern($2, iceauth_exec_t, iceauth_t)
+       domtrans_pattern($3, iceauth_exec_t, iceauth_t)
 
-       allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
+       allow $3 iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
 
-       domtrans_pattern($2, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t)
+       domtrans_pattern($3, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t)
 
-       allow $2 xauth_t:process signal;
+       allow $3 xauth_t:process signal;
 
        # allow ps to show xauth
-       ps_process_pattern($2, xauth_t)
-       allow $2 xserver_t:process signal;
+       ps_process_pattern($3, xauth_t)
+       allow $3 xserver_t:process signal;
 
-       allow $2 xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
+       allow $3 xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
 
        # for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system
-       allow $2 xdm_t:fd use;
-       allow $2 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl };
-       allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:dir search;
-       allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
-       dontaudit $2 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write };
+       allow $3 xdm_t:fd use;
+       allow $3 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl };
+       allow $3 xdm_tmp_t:dir search;
+       allow $3 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
+       dontaudit $3 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write };
 
        # Client read xserver shm
-       allow $2 xserver_t:fd use;
-       allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
+       allow $3 xserver_t:fd use;
+       allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
 
        # Read /tmp/.X0-lock
-       allow $2 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read };
+       allow $3 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read };
 
-       dev_rw_xserver_misc($2)
-       dev_rw_power_management($2)
-       dev_read_input($2)
-       dev_read_misc($2)
-       dev_write_misc($2)
+       dev_rw_xserver_misc($3)
+       dev_rw_power_management($3)
+       dev_read_input($3)
+       dev_read_misc($3)
+       dev_write_misc($3)
        # open office is looking for the following
-       dev_getattr_agp_dev($2)
-       dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($2)
+       dev_getattr_agp_dev($3)
+       dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($3)
        # GNOME checks for usb and other devices:
-       dev_rw_usbfs($2)
+       dev_rw_usbfs($3)
 
-       miscfiles_read_fonts($2)
+       miscfiles_read_fonts($3)
 
-       xserver_common_x_domain_template(user, $2)
-       xserver_xsession_entry_type($2)
-       xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2)
-       xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2)
+       xserver_object_types_template($1)
+       xserver_common_x_domain_template($1, $3)
+       xserver_unconfined($3)
+       xserver_xsession_entry_type($3)
+       xserver_dontaudit_write_log($3)
+       xserver_stream_connect_xdm($3)
        # certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
-       xserver_read_xdm_pid($2)
+       xserver_read_xdm_pid($3)
        # gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
-       xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets($2)
+       xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets($3)
        # Needed for escd, remove if we get escd policy
-       xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files($2)
+       xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files($3)
 
        # Client write xserver shm
        tunable_policy(`allow_write_xshm',`
-               allow $2 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
-               allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
+               allow $3 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
+               allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
        ')
-
-       ##############################
-       #
-       # User X object manager local policy
-       #
-
-       # manage: xhost X11:ChangeHosts
-       # freeze: metacity X11:GrabKey
-       # force_cursor: metacity X11:GrabPointer
-       allow $2 xserver_t:x_device { manage freeze force_cursor };
-
-       # gnome-settings-daemon XKEYBOARD:SetControls
-       allow $2 xserver_t:x_server manage;
-
-       # gnome-settings-daemon RANDR:SelectInput
-       allow $2 xserver_t:x_resource write;
-
-       # metacity X11:InstallColormap X11:UninstallColormap
-       allow $2 rootwindow_t:x_colormap { install uninstall };
-
-       # read: gnome-settings-daemon RANDR:GetScreenSizeRange
-       # write: gnome-settings-daemon RANDR:SelectInput
-       # setattr: gnome-settings-daemon X11:GrabKey
-       # manage: metacity X11:ChangeWindowAttributes
-       allow $2 rootwindow_t:x_drawable { read write manage

setattr };

policy/modules/services/xserver.if +0 -3
-
-       # setattr: metacity X11:InstallColormap
-       allow $2 xserver_t:x_screen { saver_getattr saver_setattr

setattr };

policy/modules/services/xserver.if +21 -18
-
-       # xrdb X11:ChangeProperty prop=RESOURCE_MANAGER
-       allow $2 info_xproperty_t:x_property { create append write };
  ')
 
  ########################################
@@ -167,6 +126,12 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
  ##    Rules required for using the X Windows server
  ##    and environment.
  ##</summary>
+##<param name="prefix">
+##     <summary>
+##     The prefix of the X client domain (e.g., user
+##     is the prefix for user_t).
+##     </summary>
+##</param>
  ##<param name="role">
  ##    <summary>
  ##    Role allowed access.
@@ -184,32 +149,32 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
                type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_config_t;
        ')
 
-       xserver_restricted_role($1, $2)
+       xserver_restricted_role($1, $2, $3)
 
        # Communicate via System V shared memory.
-       allow $2 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
-       allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
+       allow $3 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
+       allow $3 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
 
-       allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
-       allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
+       allow $3 iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
+       allow $3 iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
 
-       allow $2 xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
-       allow $2 xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
+       allow $3 xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
+       allow $3 xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
 
-       manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
-       manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
-       relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
-       relabel_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
+       manage_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
+       manage_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
+       relabel_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
+       relabel_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t)
 
-       manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
-       manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
-       relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
-       relabel_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
+       manage_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
+       manage_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
+       relabel_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t,
 user_fonts_cache_t)
+       relabel_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_cache_t,

user_fonts_cache_t)

- manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)
- manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)
- relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)
- relabel_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)
+ manage_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)
+ relabel_dirs_pattern($3, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)
+ relabel_files_pattern($3, user_fonts_config_t,
user_fonts_config_t)

')

policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +0 -0
index f209ccf..b9bea7b 100644
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@

template(userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template',

        logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t)
        selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_t)
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +1 -2
-       xserver_restricted_role($1_r, $1_t)
+       xserver_restricted_role($1, $1_r, $1_t)
 
        optional_policy(`
                alsa_read_rw_config($1_t)
--

1.6.5.rc2

Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150
#9 lore raw

cover Updated X object manager policy: Intro

In reply to Eamon Walsh
Quoted 6 lines · Eamon Walsh

This patch series is an updated policy for the X server object manager. This is the policy that I was running in Portland for my various demos.
It includes new x_pointer/x_keyboard classes, unconfined-by-default
user types, and other changes. The only thing missing here is updated mls constraints; I am still working on those.

Quoted 7 lines

I need the first patch in the series (x_pointer/x_keyboard classes) upstream so that I can use these classes in the X server. Please merge this patch expeditiously if possible.

The remaining 5 patches are NOT independent and breakage will probably result if only some of them are applied. I only broke them up in an attempt to make it easier to review the changes.

I tried to build this so I could use sediff to better understand the change, but I get many m4 errors.

Quoted 5 lines

This whole thing is also available in a git tree at
git://anongit.freedesktop.org/~ewalsh/refpolicy (branch "master"), for ease of pulling.

Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150