net: sctp: remove unused multiple cookie keys
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 net: sctp: remove unused multiple cookie keys
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
--- include/net/sctp/constants.h | 2 +- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 5 +---- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 9 ++------- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 31 +++++++------------------------ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/net/sctp/constants.h +1 -1
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ enum { SCTP_MAX_GABS = 16 };* to which we will raise the P-MTU. */ #define SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT 512/* MTU size ... if no mtu disc */ -#define SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS 2/* How many secrets I keep */ +#define SCTP_SECRET_SIZE 32/* Number of octets in a 256 bits. */ #define SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20/* size of a SLA-1 signature */
include/net/sctp/structs.h +1 -4
@@ -1236,10 +1236,7 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {* Discussion in [RFC1750] can be helpful in * selection of the key. */ -__u8 secret_key[SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS ][SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ]; -int current_key; -int last_key; -int key_changed_at; +__u8 secret_key[SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ];/* digest: This is a digest of the sctp cookie. This field is * only used on the receive path when we try to validate
net/sctp/endpointola.c +2 -7
@@ -151,9 +151,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy;/* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */ -get_random_bytes (&ep->secret_key[0 ],SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ); - ep->last_key = ep->current_key =0 ; - ep->key_changed_at = jiffies; +get_random_bytes (ep->secret_key,sizeof (ep->secret_key));/* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/ INIT_LIST_HEAD (&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
@@ -249,8 +247,6 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)/* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy (struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { -int i; -SCTP_ASSERT (ep->base.dead,"Endpoint is not dead" , return);/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -273,8 +269,7 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)sctp_inq_free (&ep->base.inqueue);sctp_bind_addr_free (&ep->base.bind_addr); -for (i =0 ; i <SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS ; ++i) -memset (&ep->secret_key[i],0 ,SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ); +memset (ep->secret_key,0 ,sizeof (ep->secret_key));/* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +7 -24
@@ -1589,8 +1589,6 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie;struct scatterlist sg;int headersize, bodysize; -unsigned int keylen; -char *key;/* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including * any padding.
@@ -1650,12 +1648,11 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,/* Sign the message. */ sg_init_one (&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize); - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ; - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; desc.tfm =sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags =0 ; -if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, key, keylen) || +if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, ep->secret_key, +sizeof (ep->secret_key)) ||crypto_hash_digest (&desc, &sg, bodysize, cookie->signature)) goto free_cookie; }
@@ -1682,8 +1679,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(int headersize, bodysize, fixed_size;__u8 *digest = ep->digest;struct scatterlist sg; -unsigned int keylen, len; -char *key; +unsigned int len;sctp_scope_t scope;struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;struct timeval tv;
@@ -1718,34 +1714,21 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( goto no_hmac;/* Check the signature. */ - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ;sg_init_one (&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize); - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; desc.tfm =sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags =0 ;memset (digest,0x00 ,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE ); -if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, key, keylen) || +if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, ep->secret_key, +sizeof (ep->secret_key)) ||crypto_hash_digest (&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) { *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM ; goto fail; }if (memcmp (digest, cookie->signature,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { -/* Try the previous key. */ - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->last_key]; -memset (digest,0x00 ,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE ); -if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, key, keylen) || -crypto_hash_digest (&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) { - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM ; - goto fail; - } - -if (memcmp (digest, cookie->signature,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { -/* Yikes! Still bad signature! */ - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG ; - goto fail; - } + *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG ; + goto fail; } no_hmac:
Signature · 1 line
1.7.11.7
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
Cc Neil Horman <[email protected]>Cc Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
Cc Neil Horman <[email protected]>Cc Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Thanks
-vlad
Quoted 149 lines
Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>--- include/net/sctp/constants.h | 2 +- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 5 +---- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 9 ++------- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 31 +++++++------------------------ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)include/net/sctp/constants.h +1
-1@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ enum { SCTP_MAX_GABS = 16 };* to which we will raise the P-MTU. */ #define SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT 512/* MTU size ... if no mtu disc */ -#define SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS 2/* How many secrets I keep */ +#define SCTP_SECRET_SIZE 32/* Number of octets in a 256 bits. */ #define SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20/* size of a SLA-1 signature */ include/net/sctp/structs.h +1
-4@@ -1236,10 +1236,7 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {* Discussion in [RFC1750] can be helpful in * selection of the key. */ -__u8 secret_key[SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS ][SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ]; -int current_key; -int last_key; -int key_changed_at; +__u8 secret_key[SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ];/* digest: This is a digest of the sctp cookie. This field is * only used on the receive path when we try to validate net/sctp/endpointola.c +2
-7@@ -151,9 +151,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy;/* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */ -get_random_bytes (&ep->secret_key[0 ],SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ); - ep->last_key = ep->current_key =0 ; - ep->key_changed_at = jiffies; +get_random_bytes (ep->secret_key,sizeof (ep->secret_key));/* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/ INIT_LIST_HEAD (&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);@@ -249,8 +247,6 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)/* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy (struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { -int i; -SCTP_ASSERT (ep->base.dead,"Endpoint is not dead" , return);/* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -273,8 +269,7 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)sctp_inq_free (&ep->base.inqueue);sctp_bind_addr_free (&ep->base.bind_addr); -for (i =0 ; i <SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS ; ++i) -memset (&ep->secret_key[i],0 ,SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ); +memset (ep->secret_key,0 ,sizeof (ep->secret_key));/* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +7
-24@@ -1589,8 +1589,6 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie;struct scatterlist sg;int headersize, bodysize; -unsigned int keylen; -char *key;/* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including * any padding. @@ -1650,12 +1648,11 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,/* Sign the message. */ sg_init_one (&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize); - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ; - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; desc.tfm =sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags =0 ; -if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, key, keylen) || +if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, ep->secret_key, +sizeof (ep->secret_key)) ||crypto_hash_digest (&desc, &sg, bodysize, cookie->signature)) goto free_cookie; }@@ -1682,8 +1679,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(int headersize, bodysize, fixed_size;__u8 *digest = ep->digest;struct scatterlist sg; -unsigned int keylen, len; -char *key; +unsigned int len;sctp_scope_t scope;struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;struct timeval tv;@@ -1718,34 +1714,21 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( goto no_hmac;/* Check the signature. */ - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ;sg_init_one (&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize); - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; desc.tfm =sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags =0 ;memset (digest,0x00 ,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE ); -if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, key, keylen) || +if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, ep->secret_key, +sizeof (ep->secret_key)) ||crypto_hash_digest (&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) { *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM ; goto fail; }if (memcmp (digest, cookie->signature,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { -/* Try the previous key. */ - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->last_key]; -memset (digest,0x00 ,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE ); -if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, key, keylen) || -crypto_hash_digest (&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) { - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM ; - goto fail; - } - -if (memcmp (digest, cookie->signature,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { -/* Yikes! Still bad signature! */ - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG ; - goto fail; - } + *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG ; + goto fail; } no_hmac:
From: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 10:43:22 -0500
Quoted 11 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Quoted 8 lines
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
Cc Neil Horman <[email protected]>Cc Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>Acked-by Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks everyone.