random,x86,kvm: Rework arch RNG seeds and get some from kvm
Subsystems (6)
v4 cover random,x86,kvm: Rework arch RNG seeds and get some from kvm
This introduces and uses a very simple synchronous mechanism to get /dev/urandom-style bits appropriate for initial KVM PV guest RNG seeding.
It also re-works the way that architectural random data is fed into random.c's pools. I added a new arch hook called arch_get_rng_seed. The default implementation uses arch_get_random_seed_long and arch_get_random_long, but not quite the same way as before.
x86 gets a custom arch_get_rng_seed, which is significantly enhanced over the generic implementation. It uses RDSEED less aggressively (the old implementation requested 4x or 8x as many bits as would fit in the pool, depending on kernel bitness), but, if using RDRAND, it requests enough bits to comply with Intel's recommendations.
x86's arch_get_rng_seed will also use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED if available. If more paravirt seed sources show up, it will be a natural place to add them.
I sent the corresponding kvm-unit-tests and qemu changes separately.
Changes from v3:
- Other than KASLR, the guest pieces are completely rewritten. Patches 2-4 have essentially nothing in common with v2.
Changes from v2:
- Bisection fix (patch 2 had a misplaced brace). The final states is identical to that of v2.
- Improve the 0/5 description a little bit.
Changes from v1:
- Split patches 2 and 3
- Log all arch sources in init_std_data
- Fix the 32-bit kaslr build
Andy Lutomirski (5):
x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit
random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
x86,random: Add an x86 implementation of arch_get_rng_seed x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available
Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt | 3 ++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 27 ++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h | 9 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++ drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++-- include/linux/random.h | 40 +++++++++++++++ 14 files changed, 237 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
PATCH v4 1/5 x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit
This adds a simple interface to allow a guest to request 64 bits of host nonblocking entropy. This is independent of virtio-rng for a couple of reasons:
- It's intended to be usable during early boot, when a trivial synchronous interface is needed.
- virtio-rng gives blocking entropy, and making guest boot wait for the host's /dev/random will cause problems.
MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is intended to provide 64 bits of best-effort cryptographically secure data for use as a seed. It provides no guarantee that the result contains any actual entropy.
--- Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt +3 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT || 7 || guest checks this feature bit || || before enabling paravirtualized || || spinlock support. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED || 8 || host provides rng seed data via + || || MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT || 24 || host will warn if no guest-side || || per-cpu warps are expected in || || kvmclock.
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME 5#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI 6#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT 7 +#define KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED 8/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored.
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN 0x4b564d02#define MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME 0x4b564d03#define MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN 0x4b564d04 +#define MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED 0x4b564d05struct kvm_steal_time {__u64 steal;
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -1
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +4 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@#include <linux/pci.h> #include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h> #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <trace/events/kvm.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -2480,6 +2481,9 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN : data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;break ; +case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED : +get_random_bytes (&data,sizeof (data)); +break ;case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR :case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP :
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
PATCH v4 2/5 random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
In reply to Andy LutomirskiCurrently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch random sources. This logic is a bit strange: it reads one long of arch random data per byte of internal state.
This replaces that logic with a generic function arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and arch_get_random_long individually, requesting one bit per bit of internal state being seeded.
Assuming the arch sources are perfect, this is the right thing to do. They're not, though, so the followup patch attempts to implement the correct logic on x86.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++++++--- include/linux/random.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +11 -3
@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch); +static void seed_entropy_store (void *ctx,u32 data) +{ +mix_pool_bytes ((struct entropy_store *)ctx, &data,sizeof (data),NULL ); +}/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
@@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)int i;ktime_t now =ktime_get_real ();unsigned long rv; +char log_prefix[128 ]; r->last_pulled = jiffies;mix_pool_bytes (r, &now,sizeof (now),NULL );for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) { -if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) - rv =random_get_entropy (); + rv =random_get_entropy ();mix_pool_bytes (r, &rv,sizeof (rv),NULL ); } + +sprintf (log_prefix,"random: seeded %s pool" , r->name); +arch_get_rng_seed (r, seed_entropy_store,8 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes, + log_prefix); +mix_pool_bytes (r,utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ())),NULL ); }
include/linux/random.h +40 -0
@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void) }#endif +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED + +/** +* arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data +* @ctx: context for the seed function +* @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained +* @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use +* @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL) +* +* Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort +* random seed data. An arch-specific implementation should be no worse +* than this generic implementation. If the arch code does something +* interesting, it may log something of the form "log_prefix with +* 8 bits of stuff". +* +* No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic +* implementation. +*/ +static inline void arch_get_rng_seed (void *ctx, +void (*seed)(void *ctx,u32 data), +int bits_per_source, +const char *log_prefix) +{ +int i, longs = (bits_per_source +BITS_PER_LONG -1 ) /BITS_PER_LONG ; + +for (i =0 ; i < longs; i++) { +unsigned long rv; + +if (arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) || +arch_get_random_long (&rv)) { +seed (ctx, (u32 )rv); +#if BITS_PER_LONG >32 +seed (ctx, (u32)(rv >>32 )); +#endif + } + } +} + +#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */ +/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */ static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32 (u32 seed) {
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Currently,
init_std_datacontains its own logic for using arch random sources. This logic is a bit strange: it reads one long of arch random data per byte of internal state.
This isn't true. Check out the init_std_data() a bit more closely.
unsigned long rv;
...
for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
...In particular, note the "i -= sizeof(rv)". We are reading one bit per bit of internal state beeing seeded.
Quoted 3 lines
Assuming the arch sources are perfect, this is the right thing to do. They're not, though, so the followup patch attempts to implement the correct logic on x86.
... and that's not a problem because we aren't giving any entropy credit --- and this is deliberate, because we don't want to trust un-auditable hardware. We are deliberately trying to be conservative here.
So I don't think either this patch or the next one is needed. It adds far more complexity than is warranted.
Regards,
- Ted
Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 14 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Currently,
init_std_datacontains its own logic for using arch random sources. This logic is a bit strange: it reads one long of arch random data per byte of internal state.This isn't true. Check out the
init_std_data()a bit more closely.unsigned long rv; ... for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { ...
Quoted 2 lines
In particular, note the "i -= sizeof(rv)". We are reading one bit per bit of internal state beeing seeded.
Whoops, my bad.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Assuming the arch sources are perfect, this is the right thing to do. They're not, though, so the followup patch attempts to implement the correct logic on x86.
... and that's not a problem because we aren't giving any entropy credit --- and this is deliberate, because we don't want to trust un-auditable hardware. We are deliberately trying to be conservative here.
True.
But, if you Intel's hardware does, in fact, work as documented, then the current code will collect very little entropy on RDSEED-less hardware. I see no great reason that we should do something weaker than following Intel's explicit recommendation for how to seed a PRNG from RDRAND.
Quoted 3 lines
So I don't think either this patch or the next one is needed. It adds far more complexity than is warranted.
The real reason I did this is because I didn't want to pollute the kernel with yet more arch_get_random_xyz functions. In the previous iteration of this patchset, init_std_data had to deal with no less than three arch random sources. If Xen adds something (which, IMO, they should), then either it'll be up to four, or one of them will have to multiplex.
Another benefit of this split is that it will potentially allow arch_get_rng_seed to be made to work before alternatives are run. There's no fundamental reason that it couldn't work *extremely* early in boot. (The KASLR code is an example of how this might work.) On the other hand, making arch_get_random_long work very early in boot would either slow down all the other callers or add a considerable amount of extra complexity.
So I think that this patch is a slight improvement in RNG initialization and will actually result in simpler code. (And yes, if I submit a new version of it, I'll fix the changelog.)
--Andy
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerRe: [PATCH v4 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
But, if you Intel's hardware does, in fact, work as documented, then the current code will collect very little entropy on RDSEED-less hardware. I see no great reason that we should do something weaker than following Intel's explicit recommendation for how to seed a PRNG from RDRAND.
Very little entropy in the architectural worst case. However, since we are running single-threaded at this point, actual hardware performs orders of magnitude better. Since we run the mixing function (for no particularly good reason -- it is a linear function and doesn't add security) there will be enough delay that RDRAND will in practice catch up and the output will be quite high quality. Since the pool is quite large, the likely outcome is that there will be enough randomness that in practice we would probably be okay if *no* further entropy was ever collected.
Quoted 11 lines
Another benefit of this split is that it will potentially allow
arch_get_rng_seedto be made to work before alternatives are run. There's no fundamental reason that it couldn't work *extremely* early in boot. (The KASLR code is an example of how this might work.) On the other hand, makingarch_get_random_longwork very early in boot would either slow down all the other callers or add a considerable amount of extra complexity.So I think that this patch is a slight improvement in RNG initialization and will actually result in simpler code. (And yes, if I submit a new version of it, I'll fix the changelog.)
There really isn't any significant reason why we could not permit randomness initialization very early in the boot, indeed. It has largely been useless in the past because until the I/O system gets initialized there is no randomness of any kind available on traditional hardware.
-hpa
Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 9 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
But, if you Intel's hardware does, in fact, work as documented, then the current code will collect very little entropy on RDSEED-less hardware. I see no great reason that we should do something weaker than following Intel's explicit recommendation for how to seed a PRNG from RDRAND.
Quoted 9 lines
Very little entropy in the architectural worst case. However, since we are running single-threaded at this point, actual hardware performs orders of magnitude better. Since we run the mixing function (for no particularly good reason -- it is a linear function and doesn't add security) there will be enough delay that RDRAND will in practice catch up and the output will be quite high quality. Since the pool is quite large, the likely outcome is that there will be enough randomness that in practice we would probably be okay if *no* further entropy was ever collected.
Just to check: do you mean the RDRAND is very likely to work (i.e. arch_get_random_long will return true) or that RDRAND will actually reseed several times during initialization?
I have no RDRAND-capable hardware, so I can't benchmark it, but I imagine that we're talking about adding 1-2 ms per boot to ensure that the pool is filled to capacity with *NRBG* data according to the the architectural specification.
Anyway, the current code is IMO very much encoding some form of knowledge of how arch_get_random_* work into init_std_data, and I don't think that's the place for it.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Another benefit of this split is that it will potentially allow
arch_get_rng_seedto be made to work before alternatives are run. There's no fundamental reason that it couldn't work *extremely* early in boot. (The KASLR code is an example of how this might work.) On the other hand, makingarch_get_random_longwork very early in boot would either slow down all the other callers or add a considerable amount of extra complexity.Quoted 3 lines
So I think that this patch is a slight improvement in RNG initialization and will actually result in simpler code. (And yes, if I submit a new version of it, I'll fix the changelog.)
Quoted 5 lines
There really isn't any significant reason why we could not permit randomness initialization very early in the boot, indeed. It has largely been useless in the past because until the I/O system gets initialized there is no randomness of any kind available on traditional hardware.
To me, the question is whether this is a sufficient reason to add arch_get_rng_data. If it is, then great. If not, then I'd like to know what other way of doing this would be acceptable. You disliked arch_get_slow_rng_u64 or whatever I called it, and I agree -- I think it sucked.
--Andy
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerRe: [PATCH v4 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 5 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Just to check: do you mean the RDRAND is very likely to work (i.e.
arch_get_random_longwill return true) or that RDRAND will actually reseed several times during initialization?
I mean that RDRAND will actually reseed several times during initialization. The documented architectural limit is actually extremely conservative.
Either way, it isn't really different from seeding from a VM hosts /dev/urandom...
-hpa
Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 7 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 5 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Just to check: do you mean the RDRAND is very likely to work (i.e.
arch_get_random_longwill return true) or that RDRAND will actually reseed several times during initialization?
Quoted 7 lines
I mean that RDRAND will actually reseed several times during initialization. The documented architectural limit is actually extremely conservative.
Either way, it isn't really different from seeding from a VM hosts
/dev/urandom...
Sure it is. The VM host's /dev/urandom makes no guarantee (or AFAIK even any particular effort) to reseed such that the output has some minimum entropy per bit, so there would be no point to reading extra data from it.
Anyway, I'd be willing to drop the conservative RDRAND logic, but I *still* think that arch_get_rng_seed is a much better interface than arch_get_slow_rng_u64.
--Andy
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerRe: [PATCH v4 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 12 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 11 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 5 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Just to check: do you mean the RDRAND is very likely to work (i.e.
arch_get_random_longwill return true) or that RDRAND will actually reseed several times during initialization?I mean that RDRAND will actually reseed several times during initialization. The documented architectural limit is actually extremely conservative.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Either way, it isn't really different from seeding from a VM hosts
/dev/urandom...Sure it is. The VM host's
/dev/urandommakes no guarantee (or AFAIK even any particular effort) to reseed such that the output has some minimum entropy per bit, so there would be no point to reading extra data from it.
Depends on what you define as "extra data". If the data pulled is less than the size of the output pool, it *may* be fully entropic.
(Fun fact: it may even have been fully entropic at the time you pull it, but then turn out not to be later because *another* process consumed data from /dev/urandom without adequate reseeding.)
Quoted 3 lines
Anyway, I'd be willing to drop the conservative RDRAND logic, but I *still* think that
arch_get_rng_seedis a much better interface thanarch_get_slow_rng_u64.
That I will leave up to you and Ted.
-hpa
PATCH v4 3/5 x86,random: Add an x86 implementation of arch_get_rng_seed
In reply to Andy LutomirskiThis is closer to Intel's recommended logic for using RDRAND and RDSEED. It will attempt to seed the entire internal state of the RNG pool using RDSEED (with one bit of RDSEED output per bit of state). For any bits that can't be obtained using RDSEED (e.g. if RDSEED is unavailable), it calculates the number of RDRAND reseeds needed to obtain the missing bits from the internal NRBG and then requests enough bits from RDRAND to obtain the full output from at least that many reseeds.
Arguably, arch_get_random_seed could be removed now: I'm having some trouble imagining a sensible non-architecture-specific use of it that wouldn't be better served by arch_get_rng_seed.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +6 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ GET_SEED(arch_get_random_seed_int, unsigned int, RDSEED_INT, ASM_NOP4);#define arch_has_random () static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)#define arch_has_random_seed () static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) +#define __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED +extern void arch_get_rng_seed (void *ctx, +void (*seed)(void *ctx,u32 data), +int bits_per_source, +const char *log_prefix); +#else static inline int rdrand_long (unsigned long *v)
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT) += paravirt.o paravirt_patch_$(BITS).o obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS)+= paravirt-spinlocks.o obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK) += pvclock.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += archrandom.o + obj-$(CONFIG_PCSPKR_PLATFORM) += pcspeaker.o obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CHECK_BIOS_CORRUPTION) += check.o
arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c new file +79 -0
79 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
PATCH v4 4/5 x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed
In reply to Andy LutomirskiThis is a straightforward implementation: for each bit of internal RNG state, request one bit from KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. This is done even if RDSEED/RDRAND worked, since KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is likely to provide cryptographically secure output even if the CPU's RNG is weak or compromised.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ config KVM_GUEST bool "KVM Guest support (including kvmclock)" depends on PARAVIRT select PARAVIRT_CLOCK + select ARCH_RANDOM default y ---help--- This option enables various optimizations for running under the KVM
@@ -1507,6 +1508,9 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure hardware random number generator. + This also enables paravirt RNGs such as KVM's if the relevant + PV guest support is enabled. + config X86_SMAP def_bool y prompt "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h +9 -0
@@ -3,4 +3,13 @@int kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo (void ); +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST ) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM ) +extern bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *rv); +#else +static inline bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *rv) +{ +return false; +} +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_GUEST_H */
arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c +21 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@*/ #include <asm/archrandom.h> +#include <asm/kvm_guest.h> void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx, void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx, const char *log_prefix) {int i, longs = (bits_per_source +BITS_PER_LONG -1 ) /BITS_PER_LONG ; -int rdseed_bits =0 , rdrand_bits =0 ; +int rdseed_bits =0 , rdrand_bits =0 , kvm_bits =0 ;int rdrand_longs_wanted =0 ;char buf[128 ] ="" ;char *msgptr = buf;
@@ -74,6 +75,25 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,if (rdrand_bits) msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from RDRAND" , rdrand_bits); +/* +* Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED regardless of whether the CPU RNG worked, +* since it incorporates entropy unavailable to the CPU. We +* request enough bits for the entire internal RNG state, because +* there's no good reason not to. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < (bits_per_source +63 ) /64 ; i++) { +u64 rv; + +if (kvm_get_rng_seed (&rv)) { +seed (ctx, (u32 )rv); +seed (ctx, (u32)(rv >>32 )); + kvm_bits +=8 *sizeof (rv); + } + } +if (kvm_bits) + msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from KVM_GET_RNG_BITS" , + kvm_bits); +if (buf[0 ])pr_info ("%s with %s\n" , log_prefix, buf +2 ); }
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +10 -0
@@ -416,6 +416,16 @@ void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)wrmsr (MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME ,0 ,0 ); } +bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *v) +{ +/* +* Allow migration from a hypervisor with the GET_RNG_SEED +* feature to a hypervisor without it. +*/ +return (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED ) && +rdmsrl_safe (MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED , v) ==0 ); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu (void ) {
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
PATCH v4 5/5 x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available
In reply to Andy LutomirskiIt's considerably better than any of the alternatives on KVM.
Rather than reinventing all of the cpu feature query code, this fixes native_cpuid to work in PIC objects.
I haven't combined it with boot/cpuflags.c's cpuid implementation:
including asm/processor.h from boot/cpuflags.c results in a flood of unrelated errors, and fixing it might be messy.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c +27 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@#include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/e820.h> +#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h> +#include <generated/compile.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/uts.h>
@@ -15,6 +17,22 @@static const char build_str[] =UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@" LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION ; +static bool kvm_para_has_feature (unsigned int feature) +{ +u32 kvm_base; +u32 features; + +if (!has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR )) +return false; + + kvm_base =hypervisor_cpuid_base ("KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0" ,KVM_CPUID_FEATURES ); +if (!kvm_base) +return false; + + features =cpuid_eax (kvm_base |KVM_CPUID_FEATURES ); +return features & (1UL << feature); +} +#define I8254_PORT_CONTROL 0x43#define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0 0x40#define I8254_CMD_READBACK 0xC0
@@ -81,6 +99,15 @@ static unsigned long get_random_long(void) } } +if (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED )) { +u64 seed; + +debug_putstr (" MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED" ); +rdmsrl (MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED , seed); + random ^= (unsigned long )seed; + use_i8254 = false; + } +if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_TSC )) {debug_putstr (" RDTSC" );rdtscll (raw);
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +18 -3
@@ -189,10 +189,25 @@ static inline int have_cpuid_p(void)static inline void native_cpuid (unsigned int *eax,unsigned int *ebx,unsigned int *ecx,unsigned int *edx) { -/* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */ - asmvolatile ("cpuid" +/* +* This function can be used from the boot code, so it needs +* to avoid using EBX in constraints in PIC mode. +* +* ecx is often an input as well as an output. +*/ + asmvolatile (".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1 \n\t" +"movl %%ebx,%1 \n\t" +".endif ; .endif \n\t" +"cpuid \n\t" +".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1 \n\t" +"xchgl %%ebx,%1 \n\t" +".endif ; .endif" : "=a" (*eax), -"=b" (*ebx), +#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__PIC__) + "=r" (*ebx), /* gcc won't let us use ebx */ +#else + "=b" (*ebx), /* ebx is okay */ +#endif "=c" (*ecx), "=d" (*edx) : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx)
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Re: [PATCH v4 5/5] x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available
Quoted 10 lines · Andy Lutomirski
It's considerably better than any of the alternatives on KVM.
Rather than reinventing all of the cpu feature query code, this fixes
native_cpuidto work in PIC objects.I haven't combined it with boot/cpuflags.c's cpuid implementation:
includingasm/processor.hfromboot/cpuflags.cresults in a flood of unrelated errors, and fixing it might be messy.Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
This will be very nice to have under kvm!
Thanks,
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security