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Basic guest memory introspection support

RFC PATCH Superseded Razvan Cojocaru 1 participant 1 message Aug 4, 2014

v4 of 11 Superseded Latest is v11 →

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v4 cover Basic guest memory introspection support

Hello,

The issues discussed (thanks!) for the V3 series have been addressed in V4.

As stated originally, we had to modify Xen in order to be able to detect rootkits in HVM guests, in a way that allows an application that runs in dom0 (or a similarly privileged domain) to control what the guest is allowed to do once a threat is detected. This has been done over the mem_event mechanism.

To this end, we needed to:

1. Be able to execute the current instruction without allowing it to write to memory. This is done based on new mem_event response fields sent from the controlling application.

2. Have the guest as responsive as possible amid all the processing. So we had to cache some information with each mem_event sent.

3. Not allow the hypervisor to disable sending information about interesting MSR events.

4. Add an additional mem_event type, namely a VMCALL event - in order to do its work, our application occasionally triggers VMCALLs in the guest (not included in the current series, but included in the initial RFC series).

5. Add an additional libxc function that allows triggering page faults in the guest.

Changes since V3:
- Addressed discussed issues (please see individual patches for details).

Patches:

xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events
xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state
xen: Emulate with no writes

Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru