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RFC Basic guest memory introspection support

Razvan Cojocaru xen-devel 20 versions – In review

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  1. v10 posting 3/34 patches 5 repliesIn review
  2. v9 posting 2/24 patches 2 repliesSuperseded
  3. v8 posting 2/24 patches 4 repliesSuperseded
Earlier versions · 17
VersionPostedPatchesRepliesStatus
v7 posting 2/24 patches7 repliesSuperseded
v6 posting 2/25 patches15 repliesSuperseded
v55 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v4 posting 3/35 patches7 repliesSuperseded
v2 posting 2/20 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v11 RFC Latest0 of 5 patches3 repliesIn review
v10 RFC posting 2/30 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v10 RFC posting 1/30 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v9 RFC posting 1/20 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v8 RFC posting 1/20 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v7 RFC posting 1/20 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v6 RFC posting 1/20 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v4 RFC posting 2/30 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v4 RFC posting 1/30 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v3 RFC0 of 5 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v2 RFC posting 1/20 of 6 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v1 RFC0 of 9 patches4 repliesSuperseded

Changes since V9 from the cover letter

- The "xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc" has been reworked to extend HVMOP_inject_trap instead of a new libxc hypercall.

Patches in v11 No applies recorded yet

None of the 5 patches the cover letter announces are in this archive.

Reviews trailers per patch

No Reviewed-by, Acked-by or Tested-by trailers for v11 yet.

Read the v11 thread

Cover letter [PATCH RFC V11 0/5] Basic guest memory introspection support

I apologize, I've sent this as a duplicate V10.
Here it is, resent (correctly) as V11. Sorry.

As stated originally, we had to modify Xen in order to be able to detect rootkits in HVM guests, in a way that allows an application that runs in dom0 (or a similarly privileged domain) to control what the guest is allowed to do once a threat is detected. This has been done over the mem_event mechanism.

To this end, we needed to:

1. Be able to execute the current instruction without allowing it to write to memory. This is done based on new mem_event response fields sent from the controlling application.

2. Have the guest as responsive as possible amid all the processing. So we had to cache some information with each mem_event sent.

3. Not allow the hypervisor to disable sending information about interesting MSR events.

4. Add an additional mem_event type, namely a VMCALL event - in order to do its work, our application occasionally triggers VMCALLs in the guest (not included in the current series, but included in the initial RFC series).

5. Add an additional libxc function that allows triggering page faults in the guest.

Changes since V9:
- The "xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc" has been reworked to extend HVMOP_inject_trap instead of a new libxc hypercall.

Patches:

xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
xen, libxc: Force-enable relevant MSR events
xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state
xen: Emulate with no writes

Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru

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