ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries
PATCH v2 1/1 ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries
[BUG]
A corrupt OCFS2 xattr entry can set OCFS2_XATTR_ENTRY_LOCAL while keeping xe_value_size larger than OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. When that entry reaches namevalue_size_xe(), the filesystem hits its BUG_ON:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:namevalue_size_xe fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x2e4/0x330 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1638 Call Trace: ocfs2_xa_wipe_namevalue fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1470 [inline] ocfs2_xa_remove_entry+0xae/0x1d0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1941 ocfs2_xa_remove fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2043 [inline] ocfs2_xa_set+0x11a8/0x30a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2247 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x302/0xc50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2795 __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x7e6/0xdb0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3416 ocfs2_xattr_set+0x1447/0x2610 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3650 ocfs2_xattr_security_set+0x37/0x50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:7241 __vfs_removexattr+0x14d/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:518 cap_inode_killpriv+0x29/0x50 security/commoncap.c:355 security_inode_killpriv+0x105/0x220 security/security.c:2724 setattr_prepare+0x147/0x8a0 fs/attr.c:219 ocfs2_setattr+0x504/0x1fd0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1148 notify_change+0x4b5/0x1030 fs/attr.c:546 do_truncate+0x1d2/0x230 fs/open.c:68 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3596 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3979 [inline] path_openat+0x260f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134 do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161 do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437 ...
[CAUSE]namevalue_size_xe() assumes that local entries contain an inline value no larger than OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. Existing xattr metadata validation only checks whether the value fits the storage region, and cached entries can reach lookup and bucket maintenance paths without a semantic check. A corrupt entry can therefore be passed to namevalue_size_xe().
[FIX]
Validate the local/value-size invariant in the existing flat and bucket metadata validators and before accepting matched entries or traversing bucket entries in paths that call namevalue_size_xe(). Return an OCFS2 corruption error instead of firing the assertion.
---
v2:
- Rebase onto the ACL lock-order fix in linux-next.
- Reuse the existing xattr metadata validators.
- Keep validation in cached lookup and bucket maintenance paths.
--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +46 -7
@@ -237,6 +237,21 @@ static int namevalue_size_xe(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe)return namevalue_size (xe->xe_name_len, value_len); } +static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (struct super_block *sb,u64 blkno, +struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe) +{ +u64 value_len =le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size); + +if (value_len >OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE && +ocfs2_xattr_is_local (xe)) +return ocfs2_error (sb, +"Invalid local xattr in block %llu: value size %llu\n" , + (unsigned long long )blkno, + (unsigned long long )value_len); + +return 0 ; +} + static int ocfs2_xattr_bucket_get_name_value(struct super_block *sb, struct ocfs2_xattr_header *xh,
@@ -992,7 +1007,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,size_t entries_limit = region_size;size_t nv_limit = region_size;size_t max_entries; -int i; +int i, ret;if (region_size <sizeof (*xh)) return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1012,6 +1027,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe = &xh->xh_entries[i];size_t name_offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset);size_t value_offset; +u64 value_len =le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size); + + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (sb, blkno, xe); +if (ret) +return ret;if (name_offset > nv_limit || xe->xe_name_len > nv_limit - name_offset)
@@ -1026,8 +1046,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno, (unsigned long long)blkno, i);if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local (xe)) { -if (le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size) > - nv_limit - value_offset) +if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset) return ocfs2_error(sb, "Invalid xattr in block %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n", (unsigned long long)blkno,
@@ -1112,7 +1131,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket,size_t entries_limit = sb->s_blocksize;size_t nv_limit = sb->s_blocksize;size_t max_entries; -int i; +int i, ret;if (region_size <sizeof (*xh)) return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1140,6 +1159,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket,size_t block_off = name_offset >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;size_t block_offset = name_offset % nv_limit;size_t value_offset; +u64 value_len =le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size); + + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (sb, blkno, xe); +if (ret) +return ret;if (name_offset >= region_size || block_off >= bucket->bu_blocks) return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1158,8 +1182,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket, (unsigned long long)blkno, i);if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local (xe)) { -if (le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size) > - nv_limit - value_offset) +if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset) return ocfs2_error(sb, "Invalid xattr bucket %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n", (unsigned long long)blkno,
@@ -1307,7 +1330,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index, {struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *entry;size_t name_len; -int i, name_offset, cmp =1 ; +int i, name_offset, cmp =1 , ret;if (name ==NULL )return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1330,6 +1353,12 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index,return -EFSCORRUPTED ; } cmp =memcmp (name, (xs->base + name_offset), name_len); +if (!cmp) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, +OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno, entry); +if (ret) +return ret; + } }if (cmp ==0 )break ;
@@ -4041,6 +4070,10 @@ static int ocfs2_find_xe_in_bucket(struct inode *inode, xe_name =bucket_block (bucket, block_off) + new_offset;if (!memcmp (name, xe_name, name_len)) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, +OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno, xe); +if (ret) +break ; *xe_index = i; *found =1 ; ret =0 ;
@@ -4681,6 +4714,9 @@ static int ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode, xe = xh->xh_entries; end =OCFS2_XATTR_BUCKET_SIZE ;for (i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (xh->xh_count); i++, xe++) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, blkno, xe); +if (ret) + goto out; offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset); len =namevalue_size_xe (xe);
@@ -4963,6 +4999,9 @@ static int ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode, name_value_len =0 ;for (i =0 ; i < start; i++) { xe = &xh->xh_entries[i]; + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, blk, xe); +if (ret) + goto out; name_value_len +=namevalue_size_xe (xe);if (le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset) < name_offset) name_offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 40 lines · ZhengYuan Huang
[BUG]
A corrupt OCFS2 xattr entry can setOCFS2_XATTR_ENTRY_LOCALwhile keepingxe_value_sizelarger thanOCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. When that entry reachesnamevalue_size_xe(), the filesystem hits itsBUG_ON:kernel BUG at
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231!Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:namevalue_size_xe fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x2e4/0x330 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1638 Call Trace: ocfs2_xa_wipe_namevalue fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1470 [inline] ocfs2_xa_remove_entry+0xae/0x1d0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1941 ocfs2_xa_remove fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2043 [inline] ocfs2_xa_set+0x11a8/0x30a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2247 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x302/0xc50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2795 __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x7e6/0xdb0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3416 ocfs2_xattr_set+0x1447/0x2610 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3650 ocfs2_xattr_security_set+0x37/0x50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:7241 __vfs_removexattr+0x14d/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:518 cap_inode_killpriv+0x29/0x50 security/commoncap.c:355 security_inode_killpriv+0x105/0x220 security/security.c:2724 setattr_prepare+0x147/0x8a0 fs/attr.c:219 ocfs2_setattr+0x504/0x1fd0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1148 notify_change+0x4b5/0x1030 fs/attr.c:546 do_truncate+0x1d2/0x230 fs/open.c:68 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3596 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3979 [inline] path_openat+0x260f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134 do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161 do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437 ...[CAUSE]
namevalue_size_xe()assumes that local entries contain an inline value no larger thanOCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. Existing xattr metadata validation only checks whether the value fits the storage region, and cached entries can reach lookup and bucket maintenance paths without a semantic check. A corrupt entry can therefore be passed tonamevalue_size_xe().
Quoted 7 lines
[FIX]
Validate the local/value-size invariant in the existing flat and bucket metadata validators and before accepting matched entries or traversing bucket entries in paths that callnamevalue_size_xe(). Return an OCFS2 corruption error instead of firing the assertion.Signed-off-by ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]>
Looks fine.
Quoted 150 lines
---
v2:
- Rebase onto the ACL lock-order fix in linux-next.
- Reuse the existing xattr metadata validators.
- Keep validation in cached lookup and bucket maintenance paths.--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +46
-7@@ -237,6 +237,21 @@ static int namevalue_size_xe(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe)return namevalue_size (xe->xe_name_len, value_len); } +static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (struct super_block *sb,u64 blkno, +struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe) +{ +u64 value_len =le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size); + +if (value_len >OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE && +ocfs2_xattr_is_local (xe)) +return ocfs2_error (sb, +"Invalid local xattr in block %llu: value size %llu\n" , + (unsigned long long )blkno, + (unsigned long long )value_len); + +return 0 ; +} + static int ocfs2_xattr_bucket_get_name_value(struct super_block *sb, struct ocfs2_xattr_header *xh,@@ -992,7 +1007,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,size_t entries_limit = region_size;size_t nv_limit = region_size;size_t max_entries; -int i; +int i, ret;if (region_size <sizeof (*xh)) return ocfs2_error(sb,@@ -1012,6 +1027,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe = &xh->xh_entries[i];size_t name_offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset);size_t value_offset; +u64 value_len =le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size); + + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (sb, blkno, xe); +if (ret) +return ret;if (name_offset > nv_limit || xe->xe_name_len > nv_limit - name_offset)@@ -1026,8 +1046,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno, (unsigned long long)blkno, i);if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local (xe)) { -if (le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size) > - nv_limit - value_offset) +if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset) return ocfs2_error(sb, "Invalid xattr in block %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n", (unsigned long long)blkno,@@ -1112,7 +1131,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket,size_t entries_limit = sb->s_blocksize;size_t nv_limit = sb->s_blocksize;size_t max_entries; -int i; +int i, ret;if (region_size <sizeof (*xh)) return ocfs2_error(sb,@@ -1140,6 +1159,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket,size_t block_off = name_offset >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;size_t block_offset = name_offset % nv_limit;size_t value_offset; +u64 value_len =le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size); + + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (sb, blkno, xe); +if (ret) +return ret;if (name_offset >= region_size || block_off >= bucket->bu_blocks) return ocfs2_error(sb,@@ -1158,8 +1182,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket, (unsigned long long)blkno, i);if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local (xe)) { -if (le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size) > - nv_limit - value_offset) +if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset) return ocfs2_error(sb, "Invalid xattr bucket %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n", (unsigned long long)blkno,@@ -1307,7 +1330,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index, {struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *entry;size_t name_len; -int i, name_offset, cmp =1 ; +int i, name_offset, cmp =1 , ret;if (name ==NULL )return -EINVAL ;@@ -1330,6 +1353,12 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index,return -EFSCORRUPTED ; } cmp =memcmp (name, (xs->base + name_offset), name_len); +if (!cmp) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, +OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno, entry); +if (ret) +return ret; + } }if (cmp ==0 )break ;@@ -4041,6 +4070,10 @@ static int ocfs2_find_xe_in_bucket(struct inode *inode, xe_name =bucket_block (bucket, block_off) + new_offset;if (!memcmp (name, xe_name, name_len)) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, +OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno, xe); +if (ret) +break ; *xe_index = i; *found =1 ; ret =0 ;@@ -4681,6 +4714,9 @@ static int ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode, xe = xh->xh_entries; end =OCFS2_XATTR_BUCKET_SIZE ;for (i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (xh->xh_count); i++, xe++) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, blkno, xe); +if (ret) + goto out; offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset); len =namevalue_size_xe (xe);@@ -4963,6 +4999,9 @@ static int ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode, name_value_len =0 ;for (i =0 ; i < start; i++) { xe = &xh->xh_entries[i]; + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode->i_sb, blk, xe); +if (ret) + goto out; name_value_len +=namevalue_size_xe (xe);if (le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset) < name_offset) name_offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset);
Quoted 5 lines · On Thu, 6 Aug 2026 16:50:12 +0800 ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]> wrote:
[BUG]
A corrupt OCFS2 xattr entry can setOCFS2_XATTR_ENTRY_LOCALwhile keepingxe_value_sizelarger thanOCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. When that entry reachesnamevalue_size_xe(), the filesystem hits itsBUG_ON:
Quoted 7 lines
kernel BUG at
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231!...
[FIX]
...
Thanks. AI review might have found several issues - two are pre-existing and two introduced by this patch:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]