Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Subsystems (13)
v4 cover Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open for a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the process effective set [2].
This patch set introduces CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations in security sensitive, restricted, production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments) where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system because of security considerations.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes [2].
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [2] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the introduced CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip perf/core
sha1: ceb9e77324fa661b1001a0ae66f061b5fcb4e4e6
---
Changes in v4:
- converted perfmon_capable() into an inline function
- made perf_events kprobes, uprobes, hw breakpoints and namespaces data available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- applied perfmon_capable() to drivers/perf and drivers/oprofile
- extended __cmd_ftrace() with support of CAP_SYS_PERFMON
Changes in v3:
- implemented perfmon_capable() macros aggregating required capabilities checks Changes in v2:
- made perf_events trace points available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- made perf_event_paranoid_check() treat CAP_SYS_PERFMON equally to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- applied CAP_SYS_PERFMON to i915_perf, bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system performance monitoring and observability related subsystems
---
Alexey Budankov (9):
capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process parisc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++------- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 16 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
---
Testing and validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.4.0-rc8+, x86_64):
libcap library [3], [4] and Perf tool can be used to apply CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the scope permitted by the system wide perf_event_paranoid kernel setting [5] and below are the steps for evaluation:
- patch, build and boot the kernel
- patch, build Perf tool e.g. to /home/user/perf
...
# git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap
# pushd libcap
# patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1]
# make
# pushd progs
# ./setcap "cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
# ./setcap -v "cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf: OK
# ./getcap /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_sys_perfmon+ep
# echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
2
...
$ /home/user/perf top
... works as expected ...
$ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status
Name: perf
Umask: 0002
State: S (sleeping)
Tgid: 2958
Ngid: 0
Pid: 2958
PPid: 9847
TracerPid: 0
Uid: 500 500 500 500
Gid: 500 500 500 500
FDSize: 256
...
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000004400080000
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog
CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff
CapAmb: 0000000000000000
NoNewPrivs: 0
Seccomp: 0
Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable
Cpus_allowed: ff
Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7
...Usage of cap_sys_perfmon effectively avoids unused credentials excess:
- with cap_sys_admin:
CapEff: 0000007fffffffff => 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111
- with cap_sys_perfmon:
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
38 34 19
sys_perfmon syslog sys_ptrace---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[4] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[5] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html
[6] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v4 1/9 capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf and other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
--- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +4 -0
@@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const structextern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid (const struct inode *inode,int cap);extern bool file_ns_capable (const struct file *file,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ptracer_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns); +static inline bool perfmon_capable (void ) +{ +return capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +}/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk (const struct dentry *dentry,struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
include/uapi/linux/capability.h +7 -1
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* +* Allow system performance and observability privileged operations +* using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems +*/ + +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2 -2
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_SYS_PERFMON #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Quoted 16 lines · Alexey Budankov
Introduce
CAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role forperf_events,i915_perfand other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available toCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to take overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials in accordance with the recommendations provided in the man page forCAP_SYS_ADMIN[1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
Quoted 3 lines
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Note for selinux developers: we will need to update the selinux-testsuite tests for perf_event when/if this change lands upstream.
Quoted 58 lines
--- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/capability.h +4
-0@@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const structextern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid (const struct inode *inode,int cap);extern bool file_ns_capable (const struct file *file,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ptracer_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns); +static inline bool perfmon_capable (void ) +{ +return capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +}/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk (const struct dentry *dentry,struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);include/uapi/linux/capability.h +7
-1@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* +* Allow system performance and observability privileged operations +* using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems +*/ + +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2
-2@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_SYS_PERFMON #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
In reply to Alexey BudankovQuoted 16 lines · Alexey Budankov
Introduce
CAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role forperf_events,i915_perfand other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available toCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to take overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials in accordance with the recommendations provided in the man page forCAP_SYS_ADMIN[1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
Quoted 3 lines
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
In reply to Alexey BudankovQuoted 20 lines · Alexey Budankov
Introduce
CAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role forperf_events,i915_perfand other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available toCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to take overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials in accordance with the recommendations provided in the man page forCAP_SYS_ADMIN[1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
PATCH v4 2/9 perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/perf_event.h +3 -3
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );
kernel/events/core.c +3 -3
@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
@@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
@@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (attr.namespaces) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 36 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
perf_eventsmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access toperf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );
include/linux/perf_event.h static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) · line 1307
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );
These are OK I suppose.
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9122
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
Idem, I presume.
kernel/events/core.c SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, · line 11162
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (attr.namespaces) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ; }
And given we basically make the entire kernel observable with this CAP, busting namespaces shoulnd't be a problem either.
So yeah, I suppose that works.
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 56 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 36 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
perf_eventsmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access toperf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );include/linux/perf_event.h static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) · line 1307
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );These are OK I suppose.
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/events/core.c +0
-0@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ;
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1-if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
This unblocks creation of local trace kprobes and uprobes by CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process, exactly the same as for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process.
Quoted 27 lines
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9122
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Idem, I presume.
kernel/events/core.c SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, · line 11162
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (attr.namespaces) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ; }And given we basically make the entire kernel observable with this CAP, busting namespaces shoulnd't be a problem either.
So yeah, I suppose that works.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 15 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 14 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 12 lines · Alexey Budankov
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 1 line
kernel/events/core.c +0
-0/* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
This unblocks creation of local trace kprobes and uprobes by
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged process, exactly the same as forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process.
I've no idea what you just said; it's just words.
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes, it does not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think CAP_SYS_PERFMON should be allowed to create kprobes.
As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
Masami Hiramatsu
maintainerRe: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 26 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 15 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 14 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 12 lines · Alexey Budankov
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 1 line
kernel/events/core.c +0
-0/* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
This unblocks creation of local trace kprobes and uprobes by
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged process, exactly the same as forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process.I've no idea what you just said; it's just words.
Quoted 8 lines
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes, it does not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace interface to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as completely same as tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new probe event via perf_event interface. Above one is that interface. IOW, it creates new kprobe.
Thank you,
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 5 lines
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes, it does not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace interface to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as completely same as tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new probe event via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, it creates new kprobe.
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the perf_event_open() interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?
- Arnaldo
Masami Hiramatsu
maintainerRe: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 11 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 9 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 8 lines
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes, it does not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace interface to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as completely same as tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new probe event via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, it creates new kprobe.Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?
Would you mean perf probe to switch to perf_event_open()?
No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think we can add an option to use perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from perf_event_open() is separated from ftrace by design.
I think the reason why ebpf uses perf_event_open() interface is to avoid conflict with ftrace users. Those probes are temporally used by ebpf, but if it is appeared on ftrace, it is easy to be used by ftrace. In that case, it can not be removed when the ebpf exits.
Thank you,
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 23 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 16 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 14 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 8 lines
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes, it does not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace interface to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as completely same as tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new probe event via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, it creates new kprobe.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()?
No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think we can add an option to useperf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation fromperf_event_open()is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...
We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
Thanks,
Song
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
<[email protected]>,Jann Horn <[email protected]>,Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>,Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>,Lionel Landwerlin <[email protected]>,linux-kernel <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Quoted 43 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
Quoted 6 lines
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Regards,
- Arnaldo
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Song
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 51 lines · On 11.01.2020 3:35, [email protected] wrote:
<[email protected]>,Jann Horn <[email protected]>,Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>,Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>,Lionel Landwerlin <[email protected]>,linux-kernel <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>Quoted 46 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Arnaldo, Masami, Song,
What do you think about making this also open to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes? Could you please also review and comment on patch 5/9 for bpf_trace.c?
Thanks,
Alexey
Quoted 9 lines
Regards,
- Arnaldo
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Song
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 59 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 53 lines · On 11.01.2020 3:35, [email protected] wrote:
<[email protected]>,Jann Horn <[email protected]>,Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>,Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>,Lionel Landwerlin <[email protected]>,linux-kernel <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>Quoted 48 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...We can just do
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Arnaldo, Masami, Song,
What do you think about making this also open to
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes?
I think we should at least allow CAP_SYS_PERFMON to create some kprobes. Maybe we can limited that to per-task kprobes, and the task should be owned by the user?
Thanks,
Song
Masami Hiramatsu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovQuoted 57 lines · On Sat, 11 Jan 2020 12:57:18 +0300 Alexey Budankov…
Quoted 54 lines · On 11.01.2020 3:35, [email protected] wrote:
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Quoted 49 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Arnaldo, Masami, Song,
What do you think about making this also open to
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes? Could you please also review and comment on patch 5/9 forbpf_trace.c?
As we talked at RFC series of CAP_SYS_TRACING last year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.
If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.
Thank you,
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 71 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 57 lines · On Sat, 11 Jan 2020 12:57:18 +0300 Alexey Budankov…
Quoted 54 lines · On 11.01.2020 3:35, [email protected] wrote:
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Quoted 49 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Arnaldo, Masami, Song,
What do you think about making this also open to
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes? Could you please also review and comment on patch 5/9 forbpf_trace.c?As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.
Quoted 7 lines
If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partial CAP_SYS_PERFMON would be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breaking sys_perf_even_open() access into two CAPs.
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 80 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 71 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 57 lines · On Sat, 11 Jan 2020 12:57:18 +0300 Alexey Budankov…
Quoted 54 lines · On 11.01.2020 3:35, [email protected] wrote:
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Quoted 49 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Arnaldo, Masami, Song,
What do you think about making this also open to
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes? Could you please also review and comment on patch 5/9 forbpf_trace.c?As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.Quoted 7 lines
If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.
Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.
Alexei, Masami,
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thru CAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
Thanks,
Alexey
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 22 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.
Quoted 8 lines
Alexei, Masami,
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_open is always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw. imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all of sys_perf_event_open syscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.
Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.
Well, as this patch set already covers complete perf_event_open functionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?
Thanks,
Alexey
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 47 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.
Quoted 3 lines
Well, as this patch set already covers complete
perf_event_openfunctionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?
yes. the current patches 2 and 5 look good to me.
I would only change patch 1 to what Andy was proposing earlier:
static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
{
if (capable_noaudit(CAP_PERFMON))
return capable(CAP_PERFMON);
if (capable_noaudit(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
return capable(CAP_PERFMON);
}
I think Andy was trying to preserve the order of audit events.
I'm also suggesting to drop SYS from the cap name. It doesn't add any value to the name.
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 49 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 47 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Well, as this patch set already covers complete
perf_event_openfunctionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?yes. the current patches 2 and 5 look good to me.
Thanks. I appreciate your cooperation.
Quoted 1 line
I would only change patch 1 to what Andy was proposing earlier:
Could you please share the link to the proposal to get more details? In this patch set discussion there was only this [1] on more generic naming of PERFMON cap from Andi Kleen.
Quoted 10 lines
static inline bool
perfmon_capable(void)
{
if (capable_noaudit(CAP_PERFMON))
returncapable(CAP_PERFMON);
if (capable_noaudit(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
returncapable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);return
capable(CAP_PERFMON);
}
Yes, this makes sense and adds up.
Quoted 4 lines
I think Andy was trying to preserve the order of audit events.
I'm also suggesting to drop SYS from the cap name. It doesn't add any value to the name.
Agreed, CAP_PERFMON sounds more generic, as it actually is.
Gratefully,
Alexey
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexei StarovoitovHi Alexei,
Quoted 49 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 47 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Well, as this patch set already covers complete
perf_event_openfunctionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?yes. the current patches 2 and 5 look good to me.
Could this have you explicit Reviewed-by or Acked-by tag so
the changes could be driven into the kernel?
Latest v7 is here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Alexey
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 56 lines · Alexey Budankov
Hi Alexei,
Quoted 53 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 50 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.Well, as this patch set already covers complete
perf_event_openfunctionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
yes. the current patches 2 and 5 look good to me.
Could this have you explicit Reviewed-by or Acked-by tag so
the changes could be driven into the kernel?
Latest v7 is here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Posted v8 with all acquired tags so far:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Alexey
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovQuoted 56 lines · Alexey Budankov
Hi Alexei,
Quoted 53 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 50 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.Well, as this patch set already covers complete
perf_event_openfunctionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
yes. the current patches 2 and 5 look good to me.
Could this have you explicit Reviewed-by or Acked-by tag so
the changes could be driven into the kernel?
Latest v7 is here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Posted v8 with all acquired tags so far:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Alexey
Masami Hiramatsu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovQuoted 28 lines · On Tue, 14 Jan 2020 21:50:33 +0300 Alexey Budankov…
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.
OK, anyway, for higher security, admin may not give CAP_SYS_PERFMON to unpriviledged users, since it might allows users to analyze kernel, which can lead security concerns.
Quoted 2 lines
Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Agreed, bugs must be fixed anyway.
Thank you,
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.Well, as this patch set already covers complete
perf_event_openfunctionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?Thanks,
Alexey
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 38 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 35 lines · On Tue, 14 Jan 2020 21:50:33 +0300 Alexey Budankov…
Quoted 33 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 30 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.Quoted 9 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation.
If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway. I think such partialCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.Alexei, Masami,
Thanks for your meaningful input.
If we know in advance that it still can crash the system in some cases and on some archs, even though root fully controls delegation thruCAP_SYS_PERFMON, such delegation looks premature until the crashes are avoided. So it looks like access to eBPF forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes is the subject for a separate patch set.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line
perf_event_openis always dangerous. sw cannot guarantee non-bugginess of hw.OK, anyway, for higher security, admin may not give
CAP_SYS_PERFMONto unpriviledged users, since it might allows users to analyze kernel, which can lead security concerns.
FWIW,
Discovered security related hardware issues could be mitigated in software and here [1] is the official procedure documented on how to follow up, so this could be a draft plan to approach eBPF perf_events related hardware issues, if required.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Sure, software cannot guarantee, but known software bugs could still be fixed, that's what I meant.
Agreed, bugs must be fixed anyway.
Thank you,
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 5 lines
imo adding a cap just for pmc is pointless.
if you add a new cap it should cover all ofsys_perf_event_opensyscall. subdividing it into sw vs hw counters, kprobe create vs enable, etc will be the source of ongoing confusion. nack to such cap.Well, as this patch set already covers complete
perf_event_openfunctionality, and also eBPF related parts too, could you please review and comment on it? Does the patches 2/9 and 5/9 already bring all required extentions?Thanks,
Alexey
Masami Hiramatsu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexei StarovoitovQuoted 80 lines · On Mon, 13 Jan 2020 21:17:49 -0800 Alexei Starovoitov…
Quoted 71 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 57 lines · On Sat, 11 Jan 2020 12:57:18 +0300 Alexey Budankov…
Quoted 54 lines · On 11.01.2020 3:35, [email protected] wrote:
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Quoted 49 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Arnaldo, Masami, Song,
What do you think about making this also open to
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes? Could you please also review and comment on patch 5/9 forbpf_trace.c?As we talked at RFC series of
CAP_SYS_TRACINGlast year, I just expected to open it for enabling/disabling kprobes, not for creation.Quoted 7 lines
If we can accept user who has no admin priviledge but the
CAP_SYS_PERFMON, to shoot their foot by their own risk, I'm OK to allow it. (Even though, it should check the max number of probes to be created by something like ulimit)
I think nowadays we have fixed all such kernel crash problems on x86, but not sure for other archs, especially on the devices I can not reach. I need more help to stabilize it.
Quoted 2 lines
I don't see how enable/disable is any safer than creation. If there are kernel bugs in kprobes the kernel will crash anyway.
Why? admin can test the probes before using it via bpf.
My point was only admin can make a dicision to allow (or delegate) the priviledge to a user, and if it is OK, I don't mind it. (Maybe it is better to give a knob to allow this CAP only for admin.)
Quoted 6 lines
I think such partial
CAP_SYS_PERFMONwould be very confusing to the users. CAP_* is about delegation of root privileges to non-root. Delegating some of it is ok, but disallowing creation makes it useless for bpf tracing, so we would need to add another CAP later. Hence I suggest to do it right away instead of breakingsys_perf_even_open()access into two CAPs.
I understand that the single strong CAP will useful anyway (even if it is CAP_SYS_ADMIN). I just concern that causes any issue and when someone wants to mitigate it, it is sad if there is only way to disable all tracing facilities.
What about providing a sysctl to control the power of the CAP? maybe it is also good from the viewpoint of system security.
Thank you,
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Masami Hiramatsu
maintainerRe: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 1 line · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 21:35:12 -0300 [email protected] wrote:
<[email protected]>,Jann Horn <[email protected]>,Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>,Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>,Lionel Landwerlin <[email protected]>,linux-kernel <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <[email protected]>,"[email protected]" <oprofile-list@list
s.sf.net>
Quoted 50 lines
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>Quoted 46 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 3 lines
On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:47 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 13:45:31 -0300 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>…
Em Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:52:13AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu escreveu:
Quoted 1 line
On Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:02:34 +0100 Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes,
it does
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
not allow creating kprobes, right?
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
There are 2 ABIs nowadays, ftrace and ebpf. perf-probe uses ftrace
interface to
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
completely same as
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
tracepoint events. On the other hand, ebpf tries to define new
probe event
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
via
perf_eventinterface. Above one is that interface. IOW, itcreates new kprobe.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Masami, any plans to make 'perf probe' use the
perf_event_open()interface for creating kprobes/uprobes?Would you mean perf probe to switch to
perf_event_open()? No, perf probe is for setting up the ftrace probe events. I think wecan add an
Quoted 1 line
option to use
perf_event_open(). But current kprobe creation from
perf_event_open()Quoted 1 line
is separated from ftrace by design.
I guess we can extend event parser to understand kprobe directly. Instead of
perf probe
kernel_func
perf stat/record -e probe:kernel_func ...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We can just do
perf stat/record -e kprobe:kernel_func ...
You took the words from my mouth, exactly, that is a perfect use case, an alternative to the 'perf probe' one of making a disabled event that then gets activated via record/stat/trace, in many cases it's better, removes the explicit probe setup case.
Ah, I got it. If the perf event parser just kicks perf's kprobe creation interface, it will be easy. In that case, there should be following differences.
- perf * -e "kprobe":kernel_func will put a local (hidden) kprobe events. So ftrace user can not access it.
- perf * -e "kprobe":kernel_func may not support inline/function-body nor trace local variables etc.
Hm, if we support inline function via -e "kprobe" interface, we have to expand perf_event_open() to support multi-probe event.
Thanks,
Quoted 9 lines
Regards,
- Arnaldo
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Song
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 21 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 20 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 18 lines · Peter Zijlstra
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 13 lines · Alexey Budankov
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This unblocks creation of local trace kprobes and uprobes by
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged process, exactly the same as forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process.I've no idea what you just said; it's just words.
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes, it does not allow creating kprobes, right?
Not really, this allows creating a kprobe using perf_event_open syscall that associates file descriptor with the kprobe [1].
Lifetime of that kprobe is equal to the lifetime of the file descriptor and the kprobe is not visible in tracefs: /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
Quoted 6 lines
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
~Alexey
---
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 21 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 20 lines · Alexey Budankov
Quoted 18 lines · Peter Zijlstra
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 13 lines · Alexey Budankov
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This unblocks creation of local trace kprobes and uprobes by
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged process, exactly the same as forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process.I've no idea what you just said; it's just words.
Again, this only allows attaching to previously created kprobes, it does not allow creating kprobes, right?
Not really, this allows creating a kprobe using perf_event_open syscall that associates file descriptor with the kprobe [1].
Lifetime of that kprobe is equal to the lifetime of the file descriptor and the kprobe is not visible in tracefs: /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
Quoted 7 lines
That is; I don't think
CAP_SYS_PERFMONshould be allowed to create kprobes.As might be clear; I don't actually know what the user-ABI is for creating kprobes.
~Alexey
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Peter ZijlstraHi Peter,
Quoted 89 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 36 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
perf_eventsmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access toperf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );include/linux/perf_event.h static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) · line 1307
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );These are OK I suppose.
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9122
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Idem, I presume.
kernel/events/core.c SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, · line 11162
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (attr.namespaces) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ; }And given we basically make the entire kernel observable with this CAP, busting namespaces shoulnd't be a problem either.
Quoted 1 line
So yeah, I suppose that works.
Could this have you explicit Reviewed-by or Acked-by tag so the changes could be driven into the kernel? Latest v7 is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Alexey
Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 92 lines · Alexey Budankov
Hi Peter,
Quoted 89 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 36 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
perf_eventsmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access toperf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );include/linux/perf_event.h static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) · line 1307
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );These are OK I suppose.
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9062
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes.
kernel/events/core.c static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 9122
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Idem, I presume.
kernel/events/core.c SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, · line 11162
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (attr.namespaces) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ; }And given we basically make the entire kernel observable with this CAP, busting namespaces shoulnd't be a problem either.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
So yeah, I suppose that works.
Could this have you explicit Reviewed-by or Acked-by tag so the changes could be driven into the kernel? Latest v7 is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Posted v8 with all acquired tags so far:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Alexey
PATCH v4 3/9 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support
In reply to Alexey BudankovExtend error messages to mention CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability as an option to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c +3 -2
@@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) .events = POLLIN, }; - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" + "users with the CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" #else "root" #endif
tools/perf/design.txt +2 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for their own tasks. A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_PERFMON or +CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
tools/perf/util/cap.h +4 -0
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)#define CAP_SYSLOG 34#endif +#ifndef CAP_SYS_PERFMON +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 +#endif +#endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +5 -5
@@ -2468,14 +2468,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,"You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" -"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" +"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" "The current value is %d:\n\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" -">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" +">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
tools/perf/util/util.c +1 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)bool perf_event_paranoid_check (int max_level) {return perf_cap__capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +perf_cap__capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||perf_event_paranoid () <= max_level; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v4 4/9 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_perf subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure i915_perf monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c +6 -7
@@ -2748,10 +2748,10 @@ i915_perf_open_ioctl_locked(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv,/* Similar to perf's kernel.perf_paranoid_cpu sysctl option * we check a dev.i915.perf_stream_paranoid sysctl option * to determine if it's ok to access system wide OA counters -* without CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. +* without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ if (privileged_op && - i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { + i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to open system-wide i915 perf stream\n" ); ret = -EACCES ; goto err_ctx;
@@ -2939,9 +2939,8 @@ static int read_properties_unlocked(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv, }else oa_freq_hz =0 ; -if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && - !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { -DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without root privileges\n" , +if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && !perfmon_capable ()) { +DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges\n" , i915_oa_max_sample_rate);return -EACCES ; }
@@ -3328,7 +3327,7 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -EINVAL ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to add i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
@@ -3474,7 +3473,7 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -ENOTSUPP ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to remove i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v4 4/9] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 7 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
i915_perfmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access toi915_perfsubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for securei915_perfmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Quoted 51 lines
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c +6
-7@@ -2748,10 +2748,10 @@ i915_perf_open_ioctl_locked(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv,/* Similar to perf's kernel.perf_paranoid_cpu sysctl option * we check a dev.i915.perf_stream_paranoid sysctl option * to determine if it's ok to access system wide OA counters -* without CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. +* without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ if (privileged_op && - i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { + i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to open system-wide i915 perf stream\n" ); ret = -EACCES ; goto err_ctx;@@ -2939,9 +2939,8 @@ static int read_properties_unlocked(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv, }else oa_freq_hz =0 ; -if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && - !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { -DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without root privileges\n" , +if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && !perfmon_capable ()) { +DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges\n" , i915_oa_max_sample_rate);return -EACCES ; }@@ -3328,7 +3327,7 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -EINVAL ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to add i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }@@ -3474,7 +3473,7 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -ENOTSUPP ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to remove i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
PATCH v4 5/9 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +1 -1
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;int ret; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (event->attr.type !=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT )return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 5/9] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 12 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
bpf_tracemonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access tobpf_tracemonitoring remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for securebpf_tracemonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines
---
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c| 2 +-1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +0
-0
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) · line 1278
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +1
-1@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;int ret; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (event->attr.type !=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT )return -EINVAL ;
I guess we need to fix this check for kprobe/uprobe created with perf_event_open()...
Thanks,
Song
PATCH v4 6/9 powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Sampling not supported */
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Return if this is a couting event */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v4 7/9 parisc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +1 -1
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,else return -EFAULT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;if (count !=sizeof (uint32_t ))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v4 7/9] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 7 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring for
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Quoted 18 lines
--- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +1
-1@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,else return -EFAULT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;if (count !=sizeof (uint32_t ))
PATCH v4 8/9 drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&perfmon_capable ()) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT );return reg;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; reg =arm_spe_event_to_pmscr (event); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && +if (!perfmon_capable () && (reg & (BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT ))))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 25 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring for
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +1
-1@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&perfmon_capable ()) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT );return reg;
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 706
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +1
-1@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; reg =arm_spe_event_to_pmscr (event); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && +if (!perfmon_capable () && (reg & (BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT ))))
Worth noting that this allows profiling of *physical* addresses used by memory access instructions and so probably has some security implications beyond the usual "but perf is buggy" line of reasoning.
Will
Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 37 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 25 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring for
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +1
-1@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&perfmon_capable ()) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT );return reg;drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 706
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +1
-1@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; reg =arm_spe_event_to_pmscr (event); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && +if (!perfmon_capable () && (reg & (BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT ))))Acked-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
Worth noting that this allows profiling of *physical* addresses used by memory access instructions and so probably has some security implications beyond the usual "but perf is buggy" line of reasoning.
Good to know. Thank you!
The data on physical addresses used by memory access instructions can already be provided under CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges [1] thus, I suppose, any implications you have mentioned are already in place. I believe providing the data under CAP_PERFMON alone without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials decreases chances to misuse the data for harm and makes the monitoring more secure.
~Alexey
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
Quoted 3 lines
Will
Re: [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Will DeaconQuoted 37 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 25 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring for
CAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +1
-1@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&perfmon_capable ()) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT );return reg;drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 706
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +1
-1@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; reg =arm_spe_event_to_pmscr (event); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && +if (!perfmon_capable () && (reg & (BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT ))))Acked-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
Worth noting that this allows profiling of *physical* addresses used by memory access instructions and so probably has some security implications beyond the usual "but perf is buggy" line of reasoning.
Good to know. Thank you!
The data on physical addresses used by memory access instructions can already be provided under CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges [1] thus, I suppose, any implications you have mentioned are already in place. I believe providing the data under CAP_PERFMON alone without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials decreases chances to misuse the data for harm and makes the monitoring more secure.
~Alexey
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
Quoted 3 lines
Will
PATCH v4 9/9 drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c +1 -1
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int event_buffer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) {int err = -EPERM ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (test_and_set_bit_lock (0 , &buffer_opened))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Patchwork
CI[Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev3)
In reply to Alexey Budankov== Series Details ==
== Series Details ==
Series: Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev3)
URL : https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/70961/
State : failure
== Summary ==
Applying: capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Applying: perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Applying: perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support
Applying: drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Using index info to reconstruct a base tree...
M drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
Falling back to patching base and 3-way merge...
Auto-merging drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
error: Failed to merge in the changes.
hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch' to see the failed patch
Patch failed at 0004 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx