powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace
Subsystems (8)
v3 cover powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace
In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV systems, secure boot requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform. These are stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, called OPAL secure variables. In order to enable users to manage the keys, the secure variables need to be exposed to userspace.
OPAL provides the runtime services for the kernel to be able to access the secure variables[1]. This patchset defines the kernel interface for the OPAL APIs. These APIs are used by the hooks, which load these variables to the keyring and expose them to the userspace for reading/writing.
The previous version[2] of the patchset added support only for the sysfs interface. This patch adds two more patches that involves loading of the firmware trusted keys to the kernel keyring. This patchset is dependent on the base CONFIG PPC_SECURE_BOOT added by ima arch specific patches for POWER[3]
Overall, this patchset adds the following support:
* expose secure variables to the kernel via OPAL Runtime API interface
* expose secure variables to the userspace via kernel sysfs interface
* load kernel verification and revocation keys to .platform and .blacklist keyring respectively.
The secure variables can be read/written using simple linux utilities cat/hexdump.
For example:
Path to the secure variables is:/sys/firmware/secvar/vars
Each secure variable is listed as directory.
$ ls -l total 0 drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 db drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 KEK drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 PK
The attributes of each of the secure variables are(for example: PK):
[PK]$ ls -l
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 32000 Aug 21 08:28 data -r--r--r--. 1 root root 65536 Aug 21 08:28 size --w-------. 1 root root 32000 Aug 21 08:28 update
The "data" is used to read the existing variable value using hexdump. The data is stored in ESL format.
The "update" is used to write a new value using cat. The update is to be submitted as AUTH file.
[1] Depends on skiboot OPAL API changes which removes metadata from the API. The new version with the changes are going to be posted soon.
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/13/1644
[3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/19/402
Changelog:
v3:
* includes Greg's feedbacks:
* fixes in Patch 2/4
* updates the Documentation.
* fixes code feedbacks
* adds SYSFS Kconfig dependency for SECVAR_SYSFS
* fixes mixed tabs and spaces
* removes "name" attribute for each of the variable name based directories
* fixes using __ATTR_RO() and __BIN_ATTR_RO() and statics and const
* fixes the racing issue by using kobj_type default groups. Also, fixes the kobject leakage.
* removes extra print messages
* updates patch description for Patch 3/4
* removes file name from Patch 4/4 file header comment and removed def_bool y from the LOAD_PPC_KEYS Kconfig
* includes Oliver's feedbacks:
* fixes Patch 1/2
* moves OPAL API wrappers after opal_nx_proc_init(), fixed the naming, types and removed extern.
* fixes spaces
* renames get_variable() to get(), get_next_variable() to get_next() and set_variable() to set()
* removed get_secvar_ops() and defined secvar_ops as global
* fixes consts and statics
* removes generic secvar_init() and defined platform specific opal_secar_init()
* updates opal_secvar_supported() to check for secvar support even before checking the OPAL APIs support and also fixed the error codes.
* addes function that converts OPAL return codes to linux errno
* moves secvar check support in the opal_secvar_init() and defined its prototype in opal.h
* fixes Patch 2/2
* fixes static/const
* defines macro for max name size
* replaces OPAL error codes with linux errno and also updated error handling
* moves secvar support check before creating sysfs kobjects in secvar_sysfs_init()
* fixes spaces
v2:
* removes complete efi-sms from the sysfs implementation and is simplified
* includes Greg's and Oliver's feedbacks:
* adds sysfs documentation
* moves sysfs code to arch/powerpc
* other code related feedbacks.
* adds two new patches to load keys to .platform and .blacklist keyring. These patches are added to this series as they are also dependent on OPAL APIs.
Nayna Jain (4):
powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 37 ++++ arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 10 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h | 5 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 7 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h | 35 +++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c | 19 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c | 200 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 6 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c | 3 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 138 ++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c | 5 + security/integrity/Kconfig | 8 + security/integrity/Makefile | 6 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 +++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 88 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +----- 20 files changed, 682 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v3 1/4 powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by OPAL.
This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure variables based on the unique key.
This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h | 5 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 7 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h | 35 +++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c | 19 +++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 6 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c | 3 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c | 5 + 11 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +4 -1
@@ -208,7 +208,10 @@#define OPAL_HANDLE_HMI2 166#define OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT 167#define OPAL_XIVE_GET_VP_STATE 170 -#define OPAL_LAST 170 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 173 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT 174 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE 175 +#define OPAL_LAST 175#define QUIESCE_HOLD 1/* Spin all calls at entry */ #define QUIESCE_REJECT 2/* Fail all calls with OPAL_BUSY */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +6 -1
@@ -296,7 +296,11 @@ int opal_set_power_shift_ratio(u32 handle, int token, u32 psr);int opal_sensor_group_clear (u32 group_hndl,int token);int opal_sensor_group_enable (u32 group_hndl,int token,bool enable);int opal_nx_coproc_init (uint32_t chip_id,uint32_t ct); - +int opal_secvar_get (const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t *data_size); +int opal_secvar_get_next (const char *key,uint64_t *key_len,uint64_t key_size); +int opal_secvar_enqueue_update (const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t data_size);s64 opal_signal_system_reset (s32 cpu);s64 opal_quiesce (u64 shutdown_type,s32 cpu);
@@ -387,6 +391,7 @@ void opal_wake_poller(void);void opal_powercap_init (void );void opal_psr_init (void );void opal_sensor_groups_init (void ); +void opal_secvar_init (void );#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h +2 -0
@@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ extern void powernv_set_nmmu_ptcr(unsigned long ptcr);void pnv_program_cpu_hotplug_lpcr (unsigned int cpu,u64 lpcr_val);void pnv_tm_init (void ); +#else static inline void powernv_set_nmmu_ptcr (unsigned long ptcr) { }static inline void pnv_tm_init (void ) { } +#endif #endif /* _ASM_POWERNV_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation +* Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +* +* PowerPC secure variable operations. +*/ +#ifndef SECVAR_OPS_H +#define SECVAR_OPS_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> + +extern const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +struct secvar_operations { +int (*get)(const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t *data_size); +int (*get_next)(const char *key,uint64_t *key_len, +uint64_t keysize); +int (*set)(const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t data_size); +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT + +extern void set_secvar_ops (const struct secvar_operations *ops); + +#else + +static inline void set_secvar_ops (const struct secvar_operations *ops) { } + +#endif + +#endif
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) += kvm.o kvm_emul.o -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file +19 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* +* Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation +* Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +* +* This file initializes secvar operations for PowerPC Secureboot +*/ + +#include <stddef.h> +#include <asm/secvar.h> + +const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +void set_secvar_ops (const struct secvar_operations *ops) +{ +if (!ops) + secvar_ops =NULL ; + secvar_ops = ops; +}
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -47,3 +47,9 @@ config PPC_VAS VAS adapters are found in POWER9 based systems. If unsure, say N. + +config OPAL_SECVAR + bool "OPAL Secure Variables" + depends on PPC_POWERNV + help + This enables the kernel to access OPAL secure variables.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += opal-imc.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE) += memtrace.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS) += vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE) += ocxl.o +obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c +3 -0
@@ -287,3 +287,6 @@ OPAL_CALL(opal_pci_set_pbcq_tunnel_bar, OPAL_PCI_SET_PBCQ_TUNNEL_BAR);OPAL_CALL (opal_sensor_read_u64,OPAL_SENSOR_READ_U64 );OPAL_CALL (opal_sensor_group_enable,OPAL_SENSOR_GROUP_ENABLE );OPAL_CALL (opal_nx_coproc_init,OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT ); +OPAL_CALL (opal_secvar_get,OPAL_SECVAR_GET ); +OPAL_CALL (opal_secvar_get_next,OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT ); +OPAL_CALL (opal_secvar_enqueue_update,OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE );
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +138 -0
138 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +5 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@#include <asm/mce.h> #include <asm/imc-pmu.h> #include <asm/bug.h> +#include <asm/secvar.h> +#include <asm/secboot.h> #include "powernv.h"
@@ -988,6 +990,9 @@ static int __init opal_init(void)/* Initialise OPAL Power control interface */ opal_power_control_init (); +/* Initialize OPAL secure variables */ +opal_secvar_init (); +return 0 ; }machine_subsys_initcall (powernv, opal_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v3 2/4 powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
In reply to Nayna JainPowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.
This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating the keys stored in the secure variables.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 37 +++++ arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 10 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c | 200 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 248 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +What: /sys/firmware/secvar +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: This directory is created if the POWER firmware supports OS + secureboot, thereby secure variables. It exposes interface + for reading/writing the secure variables + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: This directory lists all the secure variables that are supported + by the firmware. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name> +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as + <variable_name>. The variable name is unique and is in ASCII + representation. The data and size can be determined by reading + their respective attribute files. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/size +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: An integer representation of the size of the content of the + variable. In other words, it represents the size of the data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/data +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: A read-only file containing the value of the variable + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/update +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: A write-only file that is used to submit the new value for the + variable.
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +10 -0
@@ -925,6 +925,16 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that have firmware secure boot support. +config SECVAR_SYSFS + tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables" + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + depends on SYSFS + help + POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware. + These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable + read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have + secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace. + endmenu config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) += kvm.o kvm_emul.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECVAR_SYSFS) += secvar-sysfs.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +200 -0
200 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 95
Quoted 5 lines · Nayna Jain
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +5
-0+static struct bin_attribute update_attr = { + .attr = {.name ="update" , .mode =0200 }, + .size =VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE , + .write = update_write, +};
Ah, do we need a __BIN_ATTR_WO() macro for you? That would make this more obvious, right?
Other than that minor thing (not a complaint at all) looks much better to me, nice work:
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 95
Quoted 5 lines · Nayna Jain
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +5
-0+static struct bin_attribute update_attr = { + .attr = {.name ="update" , .mode =0200 }, + .size =VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE , + .write = update_write, +};Ah, do we need a
__BIN_ATTR_WO()macro for you? That would make this more obvious, right?
Thanks Greg. Yes, I agree it will be good to have that.
Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/1 sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro
This variant was missing from sysfs.h, I guess no one noticed it before.
Turns out the powerpc secure variable code can use it, so add it to the tree for it, and potentially others to take advantage of, instead of open-coding it.
---
I'll queue this up to my tree for 5.4-rc1, but if you want to take this in your tree earlier, feel free to do so.
include/linux/sysfs.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
include/linux/sysfs.h +9 -0
@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ + .attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ + .store = _name##_store, \ + .size = _size, \ +} +#define __BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ __BIN_ATTR(_name, 0644, _name##_read, _name##_write, _size)
@@ -208,6 +214,9 @@ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \#define BIN_ATTR_RO (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) \ +struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_WO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RW(_name, _size)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Michael Ellerman
reviewerRe: [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This variant was missing from
sysfs.h, I guess no one noticed it before.Turns out the powerpc secure variable code can use it, so add it to the tree for it, and potentially others to take advantage of, instead of open-coding it.
Quoted 6 lines
Reported-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>---
I'll queue this up to my tree for 5.4-rc1, but if you want to take this in your tree earlier, feel free to do so.
OK. This series is blocked on the firmware support going in, so at the moment it might miss v5.4 anyway. So this going via your tree is no problem.
If it does make it into v5.4 we can do a fixup patch to use the new macro once everything's in Linus' tree.
cheers
Quoted 29 lines
include/linux/sysfs.h +9
-0@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ + .attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ + .store = _name##_store, \ + .size = _size, \ +} +#define __BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ __BIN_ATTR(_name, 0644, _name##_read, _name##_write, _size)@@ -208,6 +214,9 @@ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \#define BIN_ATTR_RO (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) \ +struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_WO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RW(_name, _size)Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro
Quoted 11 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This variant was missing from
sysfs.h, I guess no one noticed it before.Turns out the powerpc secure variable code can use it, so add it to the tree for it, and potentially others to take advantage of, instead of open-coding it.
Reported-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>---
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'll queue this up to my tree for 5.4-rc1, but if you want to take this in your tree earlier, feel free to do so.
OK. This series is blocked on the firmware support going in, so at the moment it might miss v5.4 anyway. So this going via your tree is no problem.
Ok, will queue it up now, thanks!
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanHi Greg,
Quoted 34 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This variant was missing from
sysfs.h, I guess no one noticed it before.Turns out the powerpc secure variable code can use it, so add it to the tree for it, and potentially others to take advantage of, instead of open-coding it.
Reported-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>---
I'll queue this up to my tree for 5.4-rc1, but if you want to take this in your tree earlier, feel free to do so.
include/linux/sysfs.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)include/linux/sysfs.h +6
-0@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ + .attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ + .store = _name##_store, \ + .size = _size, \ +} +#define __BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ __BIN_ATTR(_name, 0644, _name##_read, _name##_write, _size)
include/linux/sysfs.h struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \ · line 222
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/sysfs.h +3
-0@@ -208,6 +214,9 @@ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \#define BIN_ATTR_RO (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) \ +struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_WO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RW(_name, _size)
I am sorry. I didn't notice it via inspection but there is a bug in this macro. When I actually try using it, compilation fails. Here's a likely patch:
include/linux/sysfs.h +2 -2
@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } -#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) { \ .attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ - .store = _name##_store, \ + .write = _name##_write, \ .size = _size, \ }
Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro
Quoted 53 lines · Nayna
Hi Greg,
Quoted 32 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This variant was missing from
sysfs.h, I guess no one noticed it before.Turns out the powerpc secure variable code can use it, so add it to the tree for it, and potentially others to take advantage of, instead of open-coding it.
Reported-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>---
I'll queue this up to my tree for 5.4-rc1, but if you want to take this in your tree earlier, feel free to do so.
include/linux/sysfs.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)include/linux/sysfs.h +6
-0@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ + .attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ + .store = _name##_store, \ + .size = _size, \ +} +#define __BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ __BIN_ATTR(_name, 0644, _name##_read, _name##_write, _size)include/linux/sysfs.h struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \ · line 220
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/sysfs.h +3
-0@@ -208,6 +214,9 @@ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \#define BIN_ATTR_RO (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) \ +struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_WO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RW(_name, _size)I am sorry. I didn't notice it via inspection but there is a bug in this macro. When I actually try using it, compilation fails. Here's a likely patch:
include/linux/sysfs.h +0
-0
include/linux/sysfs.h struct bin_attribute { · line 203
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/sysfs.h +2
-2@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } -#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) { \ .attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ - .store = _name##_store, \ + .write = _name##_write, \ .size = _size, \ }
Heh, good catch. Can you send a real patch for this that I can apply to give you the proper credit for finding and fixing this?
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro
Quoted 57 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 56 lines · Nayna
Hi Greg,
Quoted 32 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This variant was missing from
sysfs.h, I guess no one noticed it before.Turns out the powerpc secure variable code can use it, so add it to the tree for it, and potentially others to take advantage of, instead of open-coding it.
Reported-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>---
I'll queue this up to my tree for 5.4-rc1, but if you want to take this in your tree earlier, feel free to do so.
include/linux/sysfs.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)include/linux/sysfs.h +6
-0@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ + .attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ + .store = _name##_store, \ + .size = _size, \ +} +#define __BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ __BIN_ATTR(_name, 0644, _name##_read, _name##_write, _size)include/linux/sysfs.h struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \ · line 220
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/sysfs.h +3
-0@@ -208,6 +214,9 @@ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR(_name, _mode, _read, \#define BIN_ATTR_RO (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) \ +struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_WO(_name, _size) +#define BIN_ATTR_RW (_name, _size) \ struct bin_attribute bin_attr_##_name = __BIN_ATTR_RW(_name, _size)I am sorry. I didn't notice it via inspection but there is a bug in this macro. When I actually try using it, compilation fails. Here's a likely patch:
include/linux/sysfs.h +1
-1@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ struct bin_attribute { .size = _size, \ } -#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name) { \ +#define __BIN_ATTR_WO (_name, _size) { \
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/sysfs.h struct bin_attribute { · line 204
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/sysfs.h +1
-1.attr = { .name = __stringify(_name), .mode = 0200 }, \ - .store = _name##_store, \ + .write = _name##_write, \ .size = _size, \ }Heh, good catch. Can you send a real patch for this that I can apply to give you the proper credit for finding and fixing this?
Sure.. Thanks Greg !!
Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
In reply to Nayna JainQuoted 1 line · Nayna Jain
+static struct
kobj_attributesize_attr=__ATTR_RO(size);
Wait, why not just normal ATTR_RO()?
Quoted 1 line
+static struct
bin_attributedata_attr=__BIN_ATTR_RO(data, VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE);
And BIN_ATTR_RO() here?
Do those not work for you somehow?
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
Quoted 3 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 1 line · Nayna Jain
+static struct
kobj_attributesize_attr=__ATTR_RO(size);Wait, why not just normal
ATTR_RO()?
Oh!! Sorry. I am not seeing this macro in sysfs.h. am I missing something ?
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+static struct
bin_attributedata_attr=__BIN_ATTR_RO(data, VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE);And
BIN_ATTR_RO()here?
This would have worked. I think I just thought to use the same way as __ATTR_RO(). I will change this to __BIN_ATTR_RO and use __BIN_ATTR_WO from your patch.
Thanks for the patch.
Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
Quoted 8 lines · Nayna
Quoted 3 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 1 line · Nayna Jain
+static struct
kobj_attributesize_attr=__ATTR_RO(size);Wait, why not just normal
ATTR_RO()?Oh!! Sorry. I am not seeing this macro in
sysfs.h. am I missing something ?
Ugh, no, you are right, I thought it was there as the BIN_ATTR_RO() one was there :)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line
+static struct
bin_attributedata_attr=__BIN_ATTR_RO(data, VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE);And
BIN_ATTR_RO()here?This would have worked. I think I just thought to use the same way as
__ATTR_RO().
Yes, that's fine to use, sorry for the noise.
greg k-h
PATCH v3 3/4 x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
In reply to Nayna JainThe handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c
--- security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +--------------- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
security/integrity/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ - platform_certs/load_uefi.o + platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c new file +80 -0
80 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h new file +32 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H +#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H + +#include <linux/efi.h> + +void blacklist_hash (const char *source,const void *data, +size_t len,const char *type, +size_t type_len); + +/* +* Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. +*/ +void blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); + +/* +* Blacklist the hash of an executable. +*/ +void blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); + +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +#endif
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1 -66
79 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Michael Ellerman
reviewerRe: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from
load_uefi.ctokeyring_handler.cSigned-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
--- security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +--------------- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
This has no acks from security folks, though I'm not really clear on who maintains those files.
Do I take it because it's mostly just code movement people are OK with it going in via the powerpc tree?
cheers
Quoted 225 lines
security/integrity/Makefile +2
-1@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ - platform_certs/load_uefi.o + platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wcharsecurity/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c new file +80
-0@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> +#include "../integrity.h" + +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid__initdata =EFI_CERT_X509_GUID ; +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid__initdata = +EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ; +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid__initdata =EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID ; + +/* +* Blacklist a hash. +*/ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash (const char *source,const void *data, +size_t len,const char *type, +size_t type_len) +{ +char *hash, *p; + + hash =kmalloc (type_len + len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!hash) +return ; + p =memcpy (hash, type, type_len); + p += type_len; +bin2hex (p, data, len); + p += len *2 ; + *p =0 ; + +mark_hash_blacklisted (hash); +kfree (hash); +} + +/* +* Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. +*/ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source, +const void *data,size_t len) +{ +uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); +} + +/* +* Blacklist the hash of an executable. +*/ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source, +const void *data,size_t len) +{ +uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); +} + +/* +* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in +* the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. +*/ +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_platform_keyring; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in +* the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. +*/ +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) ==0 ) +return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) ==0 ) +return uefi_blacklist_binary; +return 0 ; +}security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h new file +32
-0@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H +#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H + +#include <linux/efi.h> + +void blacklist_hash (const char *source,const void *data, +size_t len,const char *type, +size_t type_len); + +/* +* Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. +*/ +void blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); + +/* +* Blacklist the hash of an executable. +*/ +void blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); + +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +#endif security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-66@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "../integrity.h" +#include "keyring_handler.h" static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid__initdata =EFI_CERT_X509_GUID ; static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =@@ -67,72 +68,6 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,return db; } -/* -* Blacklist a hash. -*/ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash (const char *source,const void *data, -size_t len,const char *type, -size_t type_len) -{ -char *hash, *p; - - hash =kmalloc (type_len + len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!hash) -return ; - p =memcpy (hash, type, type_len); - p += type_len; -bin2hex (p, data, len); - p += len *2 ; - *p =0 ; - -mark_hash_blacklisted (hash); -kfree (hash); -} - -/* -* Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. -*/ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source, -const void *data,size_t len) -{ -uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); -} - -/* -* Blacklist the hash of an executable. -*/ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source, -const void *data,size_t len) -{ -uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); -} - -/* -* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in -* the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. -*/ -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db (const efi_guid_t * - sig_type) -{ -if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) -return add_to_platform_keyring; -return 0 ; -} - -/* -* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in -* the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. -*/ -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx (const efi_guid_t * - sig_type) -{ -if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) ==0 ) -return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; -if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) ==0 ) -return uefi_blacklist_binary; -return 0 ; -} -/* * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
(Cc'ing Josh Boyer, David Howells)
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from
load_uefi.ctokeyring_handler.cSigned-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
--- security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +--------------- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.hThis has no acks from security folks, though I'm not really clear on who maintains those files.
I upstreamed David's, Josh's, and Nayna's patches, so that's probably me.
Quoted 2 lines
Do I take it because it's mostly just code movement people are OK with it going in via the powerpc tree?
Yes, the only reason for splitting load_uefi.c is for powerpc. These patches should be upstreamed together.
Mimi
Michael Ellerman
reviewerRe: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
Quoted 27 lines · Mimi Zohar
(Cc'ing Josh Boyer, David Howells)
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from
load_uefi.ctokeyring_handler.cSigned-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Acked-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
--- security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +--------------- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.hThis has no acks from security folks, though I'm not really clear on who maintains those files.
Quoted 8 lines
I upstreamed David's, Josh's, and Nayna's patches, so that's probably me.
Quoted 2 lines
Do I take it because it's mostly just code movement people are OK with it going in via the powerpc tree?
Yes, the only reason for splitting
load_uefi.cis for powerpc. These patches should be upstreamed together.
Thanks.
cheers
PATCH v3 4/4 powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
In reply to Nayna JainThe keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware.
--- security/integrity/Kconfig | 8 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 3 + .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 99 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
security/integrity/Kconfig +8 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,14 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS depends on S390 def_bool y +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS + bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER" + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + help + Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted + hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms. + config INTEGRITY_AUDIT bool "Enables integrity auditing support " depends on AUDIT
security/integrity/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o +integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ + platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +88 -0
88 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Feel free to add my tag after addressing the formatting issues.
Quoted 66 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +60
-0@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* +* Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation +* Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +* +* - loads keys and hashes stored and controlled by the firmware. +*/ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <asm/secboot.h> +#include <asm/secvar.h> +#include "keyring_handler.h" + +/* +* Get a certificate list blob from the named secure variable. +*/ +static __init void *get_cert_list (u8 *key,unsigned long keylen,uint64_t *size) +{ +int rc; +void *db; + + rc = secvar_ops->get (key, keylen,NULL , size); +if (rc) { +pr_err ("Couldn't get size: %d\n" , rc); +return NULL ; + } + + db =kmalloc (*size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!db) +return NULL ; + + rc = secvar_ops->get (key, keylen, db, size); +if (rc) { +kfree (db); +pr_err ("Error reading db var: %d\n" , rc); +return NULL ; + } + +return db; +} + +/* +* Load the certs contained in the keys databases into the platform trusted +* keyring and the blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist +* keyring. +*/ +static int __init load_powerpc_certs (void ) +{ +void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL ; +uint64_t dbsize =0 , dbxsize =0 ; +int rc =0 ; + +if (!secvar_ops) +return -ENODEV ; + +/* Get db, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't +* an error if we can't get them.
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c line 70
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +10
-0+*/ + db =get_cert_list ("db" ,3 , &dbsize); +if (!db) { +pr_err ("Couldn't get db list from firmware\n" ); + }else { + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:db" , + db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n" , + rc);
There's no need to split this line.
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c line 80
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +10
-0+kfree (db); + } + + dbx =get_cert_list ("dbx" ,3 , &dbxsize); +if (!dbx) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get dbx list from firmware\n" ); + }else { + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:dbx" , + dbx, dbxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx);
Formatting of this line is off.
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +8
-0+if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (dbx); + } + +return rc; +} +late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);