arm64: return address signing
Subsystems (6)
v5 cover arm64: return address signing
Hi,
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
This series is based on Linux version v5.6-rc2.
Changes since v4 [1]:
- Rebased the patch series to v5.6-rc2.
- Patch "arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability" updated as per Suzuki's review comments.
This series do not implement few things:
- kdump tools may need some rework to work with ptrauth. The kdump tools may need the ptrauth information to strip PAC bits. This will be sent in a separate patch.
- Few more ptrauth generic lkdtm tests as requested by Kees Cook.
- Generate compile time warnings if requested Kconfig feature not supported by compilers.
Feedback welcome!
Thanks,
Amit Daniel
[1]: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-January/707567.html
Amit Daniel Kachhap (8):
arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check
arm64: create macro to park cpu in an infinite loop
arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task
arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
Kristina Martsenko (7):
arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities
arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
Mark Rutland (1):
arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
Vincenzo Frascino (1):
kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 27 +++++++++++- arch/arm64/Makefile | 11 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 20 +++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 33 ++++++++++++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 54 ++++++++++++------------ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 10 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 5 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 16 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 27 ++++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 7 +--- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 5 ++- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 +++---- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 8 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 10 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + include/linux/stackprotector.h | 2 +- scripts/Kconfig.include | 4 ++ 26 files changed, 411 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 1/17 arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check
Some existing/future meta cpucaps match need the presence of individual cpucaps. Currently the individual cpucaps checks it via an array based flag and this introduces dependency on the array entry order. This limitation exists only for system scope cpufeature.
This patch introduces an internal helper function (__system_matches_cap) to invoke the matching handler for system scope. This helper has to be used during a narrow window when,
- The system wide safe registers are set with all the SMP CPUs and,
- The SYSTEM_FEATURE cpu_hwcaps may not have been set.
Normal users should use the existing cpus_have_{const_}cap() global function.
---
Changes since v4:
* Made the helper function static and updated the commit message as suggested by Suzuki [1].
[1]: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-January/707722.html
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +14 -1
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)static void cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap); +static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n); +/* * NOTE: Any changes to the visibility of features should be kept in * sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
@@ -2146,6 +2148,17 @@ bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int n)return false; } +static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n) +{ +if (n <ARM64_NCAPS ) { +const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap = cpu_hwcaps_ptrs[n]; + +if (cap) +return cap->matches (cap,SCOPE_SYSTEM ); + } +return false; +} +void cpu_set_feature (unsigned int num) {WARN_ON (num >=MAX_CPU_FEATURES );
@@ -2218,7 +2231,7 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)static bool __maybe_unused cpufeature_pan_not_uao (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); +return (__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); }static void __maybe_unused cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 2/17 arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
To enable pointer auth for the kernel, we're going to need to check for the presence of address auth and generic auth using alternative_if. We currently have two cpucaps for each, but alternative_if needs to check a single cpucap. So define meta-capabilities that are present when either of the current two capabilities is present.
Leave the existing four cpucaps in place, as they are still needed to check for mismatched systems where one CPU has the architected algorithm but another has the IMP DEF algorithm.
Note, the meta-capabilities were present before but were removed in commit a56005d32105 ("arm64: cpufeature: Reduce number of pointer auth CPU caps from 6 to 4") and commit 1e013d06120c ("arm64: cpufeature: Rework ptr auth hwcaps using multi_entry_cap_matches"), as they were not needed then. Note, unlike before, the current patch checks the cpucap values directly, instead of reading the CPU ID register value.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 4 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +3 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT_NVHE 48#define ARM64_HAS_E0PD 49#define ARM64_HAS_RNG 50 +#define ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH 51 +#define ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH 52 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 51 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 53#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +2 -4
@@ -590,15 +590,13 @@ static inline bool system_supports_cnp(void)static inline bool system_supports_address_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_supports_generic_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_uses_irq_prio_masking (void )
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +24 -1
@@ -1323,6 +1323,20 @@ static void cpu_enable_address_auth(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 , SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB); } + +static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +} + +static bool has_generic_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +}#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD
@@ -1600,7 +1614,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)",
@@ -1611,6 +1624,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_address_auth, .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, {
@@ -1633,6 +1651,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_generic_auth, + },#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI {
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 3/17 arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
We currently enable ptrauth for userspace, but do not use it within the kernel. We're going to enable it for the kernel, and will need to manage a separate set of ptrauth keys for the kernel.
We currently keep all 5 keys in struct ptrauth_keys. However, as the kernel will only need to use 1 key, it is a bit wasteful to allocate a whole ptrauth_keys struct for every thread.
Therefore, a subsequent patch will define a separate struct, with only 1 key, for the kernel. In preparation for that, rename the existing struct (and associated macros and functions) to reflect that they are specific to userspace.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 12 ++++++------ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 8 ++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +6 -6
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct ptrauth_key {* We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*(). */ -struct ptrauth_keys { +struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apia;struct ptrauth_key apib;struct ptrauth_key apda;
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia));
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia);
@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ do { \ struct task_struct *__ptiu_tsk = (tsk); \ - ptrauth_keys_init(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ + ptrauth_keys_init_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ + ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ } while (0)#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct thread_struct {unsigned long fault_code;/* ESR_EL1 value */ struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -struct ptrauth_keys keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user;#endif };
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +4 -4
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg) { -struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user;unsigned long addr_key_mask =PR_PAC_APIAKEY |PR_PAC_APIBKEY |PR_PAC_APDAKEY |PR_PAC_APDBKEY ;unsigned long key_mask = addr_key_mask |PR_PAC_APGAKEY ;
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)return -EINVAL ;if (!arg) { -ptrauth_keys_init (keys); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys); +ptrauth_keys_init_user (keys); +ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (arg &PR_PAC_APGAKEY )get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys); +ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +8 -8
@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ static struct ptrauth_key pac_key_from_user(__uint128_t ukey) }static void pac_address_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apiakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apia); ukeys->apibkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apib);
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ static void pac_address_keys_to_user(struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, ukeys->apdbkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apdb); } -static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys) { keys->apia =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apiakey);
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_address_auth ())
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;int ret;
@@ -1056,12 +1056,12 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, }static void pac_generic_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apgakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apga); } -static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys) { keys->apga =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apgakey);
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_generic_auth ())
@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;int ret;
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 4/17 arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
As we're going to enable pointer auth within the kernel and use a different APIAKey for the kernel itself, so move the user APIAKey switch to EL0 exception return.
The other 4 keys could remain switched during task switch, but are also moved to keep things consistent.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 23 +-------------- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 11 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 3 -- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 1 - 6 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +49 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H +#define __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H + +#include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +/* + * thread.keys_user.ap* as offset exceeds the #imm offset range + * so use the base value of ldp as thread.keys_user and offset as + * keys_user.ap*. + */ + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_USER + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + b .Laddr_auth_skip_\@ +alternative_else_nop_endif + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB] + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA] + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB] + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 +.Laddr_auth_skip_\@: +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA] + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + +#endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +1 -22
@@ -50,19 +50,6 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) -{ -if (system_supports_address_auth ()) { -__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia); -__ptrauth_key_install (APIB , keys->apib); -__ptrauth_key_install (APDA , keys->apda); -__ptrauth_key_install (APDB , keys->apdb); - } - -if (system_supports_generic_auth ()) -__ptrauth_key_install (APGA , keys->apga); -} -extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -78,20 +65,12 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ -do { \ - struct task_struct *__ptiu_tsk = (tsk); \ - ptrauth_keys_init_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ - ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ -} while (0) - -#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) -#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +11 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ int main(void)#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); +#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0])); DEFINE(S_X2, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[2]));
@@ -128,5 +131,13 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , interrupted_regs));DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , priority));#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apia)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apib)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga)); +BLANK (); +#endif return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/esr.h>
@@ -341,6 +342,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr cntkctl_el1, x1 4: #endif + ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2 + apply_ssbd 0, x0, x1 .endif
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +0 -3
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (!arg) {ptrauth_keys_init_user (keys); -ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }
@@ -41,7 +40,5 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (arg &PR_PAC_APGAKEY )get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); -ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys); -return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +0 -1
@@ -512,7 +512,6 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,contextidr_thread_switch (next);entry_task_switch (next);uao_thread_switch (next); -ptrauth_thread_switch (next);ssbs_thread_switch (next);/*
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 5/17 arm64: create macro to park cpu in an infinite loop
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapA macro early_park_cpu is added to park the faulted cpu in an infinite loop. Currently, this macro is substituted in two instances and may be reused in future.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +13 -12
@@ -761,6 +761,17 @@ ENDPROC(__secondary_too_slow) .endm /* + * Macro to park the cpu in an infinite loop. + */ + .macro early_park_cpu status + update_early_cpu_boot_status \status | CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL, x1, x2 +.Lepc_\@: + wfe + wfi + b .Lepc_\@ + .endm + +/* * Enable the MMU. * * x0 = SCTLR_EL1 value for turning on the MMU.
@@ -808,24 +819,14 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) and x0, x0, #(0xf << ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT) cbnz x0, 2f - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA, x0, x1 -1: wfe - wfi - b 1b - + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA #endif 2: ret ENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) __no_granule_support: /* Indicate that this CPU can't boot and is stuck in the kernel */ - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN, x1, x2 -1: - wfe - wfi - b 1b + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN ENDPROC(__no_granule_support) #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 6/17 arm64: add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch allows __cpu_setup to be invoked with one of these flags, ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY, ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY or ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. This is required as some cpufeatures need different handling during different scenarios.
The input parameter in x0 is preserved till the end to be used inside this function.
There should be no functional change with this patch and is useful for the subsequent ptrauth patch which utilizes it. Some upcoming arm cpufeatures can also utilize these flags.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +5 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA (UL(1) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN (UL(2) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT) +/* Options for __cpu_setup */ +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY (1) +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY (2) +#define ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME (3) +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__#include <asm/percpu.h>
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +2 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ ENTRY(stext) * On return, the CPU will be ready for the MMU to be turned on and * the TCR will have been set. */ + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor b __primary_switch ENDPROC(stext)
@@ -712,6 +713,7 @@ secondary_startup: * Common entry point for secondary CPUs. */ bl __cpu_secondary_check52bitva + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir bl __enable_mmu
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +2 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> .text /*
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ ENDPROC(__cpu_suspend_enter) .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" ENTRY(cpu_resume) bl el2_setup // if in EL2 drop to EL1 cleanly + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME bl __cpu_setup /* enable the MMU early - so we can access sleep_save_stash by va */ adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +15 -11
@@ -408,31 +408,31 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings) /* * __cpu_setup * - * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. Return in x0 the - * value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. + * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. + * + * Input: + * x0 with a flag ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY/ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY/ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. + * Output: + * Return in x0 the value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. */ .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) tlbi vmalle1 // Invalidate local TLB dsb nsh - mov x0, #3 << 20 - msr cpacr_el1, x0 // Enable FP/ASIMD - mov x0, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable - msr mdscr_el1, x0 // access to the DCC from EL0 + mov x1, #3 << 20 + msr cpacr_el1, x1 // Enable FP/ASIMD + mov x1, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable + msr mdscr_el1, x1 // access to the DCC from EL0 isb // Unmask debug exceptions now, enable_dbg // since this is per-cpu - reset_pmuserenr_el0 x0 // Disable PMU access from EL0 + reset_pmuserenr_el0 x1 // Disable PMU access from EL0 /* * Memory region attributes */ mov_q x5, MAIR_EL1_SET msr mair_el1, x5 /* - * Prepare SCTLR - */ - mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET - /* * Set/prepare TCR and TTBR. We use 512GB (39-bit) address range for * both user and kernel. */
@@ -468,5 +468,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) 1: #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM */ msr tcr_el1, x10 + /* + * Prepare SCTLR + */ + mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET ret // return to head.S SYM_FUNC_END(__cpu_setup)
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 7/17 arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Each system capability can be of either boot, local, or system scope, depending on when the state of the capability is finalized. When we detect a conflict on a late CPU, we either offline the CPU or panic the system. We currently always panic if the conflict is caused by a boot scope capability, and offline the CPU if the conflict is caused by a local or system scope capability.
We're going to want to add a new capability (for pointer authentication) which needs to be boot scope but doesn't need to panic the system when a conflict is detected. So add a new flag to specify whether the capability requires the system to panic or not. Current boot scope capabilities are updated to set the flag, so there should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 23 +++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +16 -2
@@ -208,6 +208,10 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;* In some non-typical cases either both (a) and (b), or neither, * should be permitted. This can be described by including neither * or both flags in the capability's type field. +* +* In case of a conflict, the CPU is prevented from booting. If the +* ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT flag is specified for the capability, +* then a kernel panic is triggered. */
@@ -240,6 +244,8 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;#define ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ((u16)BIT(4))/* Is it safe for a late CPU to miss this capability when system has it */ #define ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ((u16)BIT(5)) +/* Panic when a conflict is detected */ +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ((u16)BIT(6))/* * CPU errata workarounds that need to be enabled at boot time if one or
@@ -279,9 +285,11 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;/* * CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. All secondary -* CPUs must match the state of the capability as detected by the boot CPU. +* CPUs must match the state of the capability as detected by the boot CPU. In +* case of a conflict, a kernel panic is triggered. */ -#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \ + (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT)struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {const char *desc;
@@ -352,6 +360,12 @@ cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); } +static inline bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ); +} +/* * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit.
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +9 -14
@@ -2005,10 +2005,8 @@ static void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask)* Run through the list of capabilities to check for conflicts. * If the system has already detected a capability, take necessary * action on this CPU. -* -* Returns "false" on conflicts. */ -static bool verify_local_cpu_caps (u16 scope_mask) +static void verify_local_cpu_caps (u16 scope_mask) {int i;bool cpu_has_cap, system_has_cap;
@@ -2053,10 +2051,12 @@ static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask)pr_crit ("CPU%d: Detected conflict for capability %d (%s), System: %d, CPU: %d\n" ,smp_processor_id (), caps->capability, caps->desc, system_has_cap, cpu_has_cap); -return false; - } -return true; +if (cpucap_panic_on_conflict (caps)) +cpu_panic_kernel (); +else +cpu_die_early (); + } }/*
@@ -2066,12 +2066,8 @@ static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask)static void check_early_cpu_features (void ) {verify_cpu_asid_bits (); -/* -* Early features are used by the kernel already. If there -* is a conflict, we cannot proceed further. -*/ -if (!verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_BOOT_CPU )) -cpu_panic_kernel (); + +verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_BOOT_CPU ); } static void
@@ -2119,8 +2115,7 @@ static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void)* check_early_cpu_features(), as they need to be verified * on all secondary CPUs. */ -if (!verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU )) -cpu_die_early (); +verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU );verify_local_elf_hwcaps (arm64_elf_hwcaps);
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 07/17] arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) · line 367
Quoted 13 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5
-0@@ -352,6 +360,12 @@ cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); } +static inline bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ); +}
Does this need to be in the header file? If not, please move it to cpufeature.c (and drop 'inline' if moved).
Signature · 6 lines
Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 07/17] arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
Quoted 9 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 8 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +0
-0@@ -352,6 +360,12 @@ cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); }
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) · line 367
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5
-0+static inline bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ); +}Does this need to be in the header file? If not, please move it to
cpufeature.c(and drop 'inline' if moved).
Actually there are similar functions in cpufeature.h such as cpucap_late_cpu_permitted, cpucap_late_cpu_optional etc in the file cpufeature.h so done this way.
But yes all these functions are consumed only in cpufeature.c so can be moved there. I can send as a cleanup patch.
Quoted 1 line
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 8/17 arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
When the kernel is compiled with pointer auth instructions, the boot CPU needs to start using address auth very early, so change the cpucap to account for this.
Pointer auth must be enabled before we call C functions, because it is not possible to enter a function with pointer auth disabled and exit it with pointer auth enabled. Note, mismatches between architected and IMPDEF algorithms will still be caught by the cpufeature framework (the separate *_ARCH and *_IMP_DEF cpucaps).
Note the change in behavior: if the boot CPU has address auth and a late CPU does not, then the late CPU is parked by the cpufeature framework. Also, if the boot CPU does not have address auth and the late CPU has then the late cpu will still boot but with ptrauth feature disabled.
Leave generic authentication as a "system scope" cpucap for now, since initially the kernel will only use address authentication.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +++---------- arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -1515,6 +1515,12 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature. + If the feature is present on the boot CPU but not on a late CPU, then + the late CPU will be parked. Also, if the boot CPU does not have + address auth and the late CPU has then the late CPU will still boot + but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should + not be selected. + endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features"
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +9 -0
@@ -291,6 +291,15 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \ (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT) +/* +* CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. It is safe for a +* late CPU to have this feature even though the boot CPU hasn't enabled it, +* although the feature will not be used by Linux in this case. If the boot CPU +* has enabled this feature already, then every late CPU must have it. +*/ +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \ + (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU) +struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {const char *desc;u16 capability;
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA (UL(1) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN (UL(2) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT) +#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH (UL(4) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)/* Options for __cpu_setup */ #define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY (1)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -10
@@ -1318,12 +1318,6 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -static void cpu_enable_address_auth (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) -{ -sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 , SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | - SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB); -} -static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) {
@@ -1608,7 +1602,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "Address authentication (architected algorithm)", .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT,
@@ -1618,7 +1612,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)", .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT,
@@ -1627,9 +1621,8 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { }, { .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, .matches = has_address_auth, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, { .desc = "Generic authentication (architected algorithm)",
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +2 -0
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support 52-bit VAs\n" , cpu);if (status &CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN )pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support %luK granule \n" , cpu,PAGE_SIZE /SZ_1K ); +if (status &CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH ) +pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support pointer authentication\n" , cpu); cpus_stuck_in_kernel++;break ;case CPU_PANIC_KERNEL :
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +31 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES #define TCR_TG_FLAGS TCR_TG0_64K | TCR_TG1_64K
@@ -468,9 +469,39 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) 1: #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM */ msr tcr_el1, x10 + mov x1, x0 /* * Prepare SCTLR */ mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + /* No ptrauth setup for run time cpus */ + cmp x1, #ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME + b.eq 3f + + /* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ + mrs x2, id_aa64isar1_el1 + ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 + cbz x2, 3f + + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, xzr + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, xzr + + /* Just enable ptrauth for primary cpu */ + cmp x1, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY + b.eq 2f + + /* if !system_supports_address_auth() then skip enable */ +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + b 3f +alternative_else_nop_endif + +2: /* Enable ptrauth instructions */ + ldr x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \ + SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB + orr x0, x0, x2 +3: +#endif ret // return to head.S SYM_FUNC_END(__cpu_setup)
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 9/17 arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from EL0.
The keys for idle threads need to be set before calling any C functions, because it is not possible to enter and exit a function with different keys.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 12 ++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +14 -0
@@ -39,11 +39,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +13 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel { +struct ptrauth_key apia; +}; +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {
@@ -50,6 +54,12 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel (struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +{ +if (system_supports_address_auth ()) +get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia)); +} +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -66,11 +76,14 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct thread_struct {struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel keys_kernel;#endif };
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +4 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/threads.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY (int, cpu_number);
@@ -93,6 +94,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void);struct secondary_data {void *stack;struct task_struct *task; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel ptrauth_key; +#endif long status; };
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +5 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); + DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0]));
@@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ int main(void)BLANK ();DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_STACK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , stack));DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_TASK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , task)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY , offsetof(struct secondary_data , ptrauth_key)); +#endif BLANK ();#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_ARM_HOST DEFINE(VCPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt));
@@ -137,6 +141,7 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel , apia));BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ alternative_cb_end apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23 .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE get_current_task tsk
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr cntkctl_el1, x1 4: #endif + /* No kernel C function calls after this as user keys are set. */ ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2 apply_ssbd 0, x0, x1
@@ -898,6 +900,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_switch_to) ldr lr, [x8] mov sp, x9 msr sp_el0, x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 ret ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +2 -0
@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,*/ fpsimd_flush_task_state (p); +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (p); +if (likely (!(p->flags &PF_KTHREAD ))) { *childregs = *current_pt_regs (); childregs->regs[0 ] =0 ;
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +8 -0
@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)*/ secondary_data.task = idle; secondary_data.stack =task_stack_page (idle) +THREAD_SIZE ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.lo; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.hi; +#endif update_cpu_boot_status (CPU_MMU_OFF );__flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data));
@@ -138,6 +142,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) secondary_data.task =NULL ; secondary_data.stack =NULL ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo =0 ; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi =0 ; +#endif __flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data)); status =READ_ONCE (secondary_data.status);if (ret && status) {
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +12 -0
@@ -485,6 +485,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbz x2, 3f + /* + * The primary cpu keys are reset here and can be + * re-initialised with some proper values later. + */ msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, xzr msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, xzr
@@ -497,6 +501,14 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH b 3f alternative_else_nop_endif + /* Install ptrauth key for secondary cpus */ + adr_l x2, secondary_data + ldr x3, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_TASK] // get secondary_data.task + cbz x3, 2f // check for slow booting cpus + ldp x3, x4, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, x3 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, x4 + 2: /* Enable ptrauth instructions */ ldr x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \ SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 10/17 arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch uses the existing boot_init_stack_canary arch function to initialize the ptrauth keys for the booting task in the primary core. The requirement here is that it should be always inline and the caller must never return.
As pointer authentication too detects a subset of stack corruption so it makes sense to place this code here.
Both pointer authentication and stack canary codes are protected by their respective config option.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 11 ++++++++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/stackprotector.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +10 -1
@@ -54,12 +54,18 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ }while (0 ) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel (struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ())get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia)); } +static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +{ +if (system_supports_address_auth ()) +__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia); +} +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -78,12 +84,15 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel) +#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk)#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) +#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h +5 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/version.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;*/ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) { +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR )unsigned long canary;/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
@@ -36,6 +38,9 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) current->stack_canary = canary;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK )) __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; +#endif +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (current); + ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel(current); }#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
include/linux/stackprotector.h +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/random.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR ) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )# include <asm/stackprotector.h> #else static inline void boot_init_stack_canary (void )
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 11/17 arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis redefines __builtin_return_address to mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As __builtin_return_address is used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.
This patch adds a new file (asm/compiler.h) and is transitively included (via include/compiler_types.h) on the compiler command line so it is guaranteed to be loaded and the users of this macro will not find a wrong version.
A helper macro ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask is created for this purpose and added in this file. A similar macro ptrauth_user_pac_mask exists in pointer_auth.h and is now moved here for the sake of consistency.
This change fixes the utilities like cat /proc/vmallocinfo to show correct symbol names.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 13 +++++-------- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +20 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_COMPILER_H + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + +/* +* The EL0/EL1 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. +* This is dependent on TBI0/TBI1 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. +*/ +#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(54, vabits_actual) +#define ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(63, vabits_actual) + +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask()) + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + +#endif /* __ASM_COMPILER_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +5 -8
@@ -68,16 +68,13 @@ static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerneextern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg); -/* -* The EL0 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. -* This is dependent on TBI0 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. -*/ -#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK(54, vabits_actual) - -/* Only valid for EL0 TTBR0 instruction pointers */ +/* Valid for EL0 TTBR0 and EL1 TTBR1 instruction pointers */ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (unsigned long ptr) { -return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); +if (ptr &BIT_ULL (55 )) +return ptr |ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask (); +else +return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 12/17 arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.
Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
@@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame) }#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ + frame->pc =ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (frame->pc); +/* * Frames created upon entry from EL0 have NULL FP and PC values, so * don't bother reporting these. Frames created by __noreturn functions
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 13/17 arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
In reply to Amit Daniel Kachhaplr is printed with %pS which will try to find an entry in kallsyms. After enabling pointer authentication, this match will fail due to PAC present in the lr.
Strip PAC from the lr to display the correct symbol name.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)if (!user_mode (regs)) {printk ("pc : %pS\n" , (void *)regs->pc); -printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)lr); +printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr)); }else {printk ("pc : %016llx\n" , regs->pc);printk ("lr : %016llx\n" , lr);
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 14/17 arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch restores the kernel keys from current task during cpu resume after the mmu is turned on and ptrauth is enabled.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +6 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/smp.h>
@@ -134,6 +135,11 @@ ENTRY(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + get_current_task x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x2, x3, x4 +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 14/17] arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
Quoted 21 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch restores the kernel keys from current task during cpu resume after the mmu is turned on and ptrauth is enabled.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-0@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/smp.h>
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S ENTRY(_cpu_resume) · line 141
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +4
-0@@ -134,6 +135,11 @@ ENTRY(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + get_current_task x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x2, x3, x4 +#endif
Could we move this to cpu_do_resume? Most of the sysreg initialisation during resume is done there.
Signature · 6 lines
Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 14/17] arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
Quoted 25 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 24 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch restores the kernel keys from current task during cpu resume after the mmu is turned on and ptrauth is enabled.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-0@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/smp.h>@@ -134,6 +135,11 @@ ENTRY(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S ENTRY(_cpu_resume) · line 141
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + get_current_task x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x2, x3, x4 +#endifCould we move this to
cpu_do_resume? Most of the sysreg initialisation during resume is done there.
Yes it makes sense. I will implement in my v6 series.
Quoted 1 line
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 15/17 kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Currently kconfig does not have a feature that allows to detect if the used assembler supports a specific compilation option.
Introduce 'as-option' to serve this purpose in the context of Kconfig:
config X
def_bool $(as-option,...)--- scripts/Kconfig.include | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
scripts/Kconfig.include +4 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) # Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -) +# $(as-option,<flag>) +# Return y if the assembler supports <flag>, n otherwise +as-option = $(success, $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/zero) + # check if $(CC) and $(LD) exist $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(CC)),compiler '$(CC)' not found) $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(LD)),linker '$(LD)' not found)
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Re: [PATCH v5 15/17] kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
Hi.
Quoted 25 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Currently kconfig does not have a feature that allows to detect if the used assembler supports a specific compilation option.
Introduce 'as-option' to serve this purpose in the context of
Kconfig:config X def_bool $(as-option,...)Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Acked-by Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- scripts/Kconfig.include | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)scripts/Kconfig.include +0
-0
scripts/Kconfig.include ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) · line 41
Quoted 7 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include +4
-0@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) # Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -) +# $(as-option,<flag>) +# Return y if the assembler supports <flag>, n otherwise +as-option =$(success, $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/zero) +
I am still not convinced with using /dev/zero here.
Does this work?
as-option = $(success, cat /dev/null | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -)
[1] Could you insert as-option between ld-option and as-instr ?
[2] Could you add some comments to explain why
/dev/null -o /dev/null does not work?
Quoted 6 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include +0
-1# check if $(CC) and $(LD) exist $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(CC)),compiler '$(CC)' not found) $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(LD)),linker '$(LD)' not found) --2.7.4
Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards Masahiro Yamada
Re: [PATCH v5 15/17] kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
Hi,
Quoted 32 lines · Masahiro Yamada
Hi.
Quoted 28 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Currently kconfig does not have a feature that allows to detect if the used assembler supports a specific compilation option.
Introduce 'as-option' to serve this purpose in the context of
Kconfig:config X def_bool $(as-option,...)Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Acked-by Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- scripts/Kconfig.include | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)scripts/Kconfig.include +0
-0@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) # Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -)
Quoted 8 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) · line 41
Quoted 4 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include +4
-0+# $(as-option,<flag>) +# Return y if the assembler supports <flag>, n otherwise +as-option =$(success, $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/zero) +I am still not convinced with using
/dev/zerohere.
Could you please elaborate a bit more?
Quoted 6 lines
Does this work?
as-option = $(success, cat
/dev/null| $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler -o/dev/null-)
I will try and get back to you.
Quoted 3 lines
[1] Could you insert as-option between ld-option and as-instr ?
Sure, I will do it in the next version.
Quoted 4 lines
[2] Could you add some comments to explain why
/dev/null-o/dev/nulldoes not work?
Comments are always a good think :) I will do in the next version.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include +0
-1# check if $(CC) and $(LD) exist $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(CC)),compiler '$(CC)' not found) $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(LD)),linker '$(LD)' not found) --2.7.4
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Vincenzo
Re: [PATCH v5 15/17] kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
Hi,
Quoted 45 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Hi,
Quoted 32 lines · Masahiro Yamada
Hi.
Quoted 28 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Currently kconfig does not have a feature that allows to detect if the used assembler supports a specific compilation option.
Introduce 'as-option' to serve this purpose in the context of
Kconfig:config X def_bool $(as-option,...)Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Acked-by Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- scripts/Kconfig.include | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)scripts/Kconfig.include +0
-0@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) # Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -)Quoted 8 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) · line 41
Quoted 4 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include +4
-0+# $(as-option,<flag>) +# Return y if the assembler supports <flag>, n otherwise +as-option =$(success, $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/zero) +I am still not convinced with using
/dev/zerohere.
Quoted 1 line
Could you please elaborate a bit more?
I am just not familiar with this usage of /dev/zero.
The behavior of /dev/null is clear.
The read/write to /dev/null is described in the standard:
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/basedefs/xbd_chap10.html
I just do not know whether the write to /dev/zero is the defined-behavior or not.
Masahiro Yamada
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Does this work?
as-option = $(success, cat
/dev/null| $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler -o/dev/null-)I will try and get back to you.
Masahiro Yamada
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 4 lines
[1] Could you insert as-option between ld-option and as-instr ?
Sure, I will do it in the next version.
Quoted 4 lines
[2] Could you add some comments to explain why
/dev/null-o/dev/nulldoes not work?Comments are always a good think :) I will do in the next version.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include +0
-1# check if $(CC) and $(LD) exist $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(CC)),compiler '$(CC)' not found) $(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(LD)),linker '$(LD)' not found) --2.7.4
Quoted 3 lines
--
Regards,
Vincenzo
--
Best Regards
Masahiro Yamada
Re: [PATCH v5 15/17] kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
Hi Masahiro,
Quoted 2 lines · Masahiro Yamada
Hi,
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Could you please elaborate a bit more?
Quoted 9 lines
I am just not familiar with this usage of
/dev/zero.Quoted 1 line
The behavior of
/dev/nullis clear.The read/write to
/dev/nullis described in the standard:
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/basedefs/xbd_chap10.htmlI just do not know whether the write to
/dev/zerois the defined-behavior or not.
Even if /dev/null is more common for this use, in linux /dev/zero has the same behavior for what concerns the write operation. In particular all write operations to /dev/zero succeed with no other effects.
You do not find it at the link you provided because existence of /dev/zero is not required by POSIX as far as I know, but the behavior is standardized by Linux ABI hence I do not think it is going to change.
Please have a look at drivers/char/mem.c +818 where the operation is defined.
Based on this I propose to put a comment on why we are not using /dev/null in this case accordingly with what you stated in your previous email, but to leave the rule as is.
Quoted 12 lines
Masahiro Yamada
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Does this work?
as-option = $(success, cat
/dev/null| $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler -o/dev/null-)
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Vincenzo
PATCH v5 16/17 arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Compile all functions with two ptrauth instructions: PACIASP in the prologue to sign the return address, and AUTIASP in the epilogue to authenticate the return address (from the stack). If authentication fails, the return will cause an instruction abort to be taken, followed by an oops and killing the task.
This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming. As ptrauth protects the return address, it can also serve as a replacement for CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR, although note that it does not protect other parts of the stack.
The new instructions are in the HINT encoding space, so on a system without ptrauth they execute as NOPs.
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH now not only enables ptrauth for userspace and KVM guests, but also automatically builds the kernel with ptrauth instructions if the compiler supports it. If there is no compiler support, we do not warn that the kernel was built without ptrauth instructions.
GCC 7 and 8 support the -msign-return-address option, while GCC 9 deprecates that option and replaces it with -mbranch-protection. Support both options.
Clang uses an external assembler hence this patch makes sure that the correct parameters (-march=armv8.3-a) are passed down to help it recognize the ptrauth instructions. This option is not used for GNU toolchain.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +19 -1
@@ -1499,6 +1499,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE + depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC help Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
@@ -1506,11 +1507,17 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH and other attacks. This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace). - Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. + If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or + -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option + will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address + protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to + support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be + disabled with minimal loss of protection. + The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
@@ -1522,6 +1529,17 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should not be selected. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET + # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf) + +config CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS + # GCC 7, 8 + def_bool $(cc-option,-msign-return-address=all) + +config AS_HAS_PAC + def_bool $(as-option,-Wa$(comma)-march=armv8.3-a) + endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features"
arch/arm64/Makefile +11 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,17 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +# -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the compiler +# to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract we pass it +# only to the assembler when clang is selected as a compiler. For the GNU toolchain +# this option is not used. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endif + ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 16/17] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 77
Quoted 10 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Makefile +10
-0+ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +# -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the compiler +# to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract we pass it +# only to the assembler when clang is selected as a compiler. For the GNU toolchain +# this option is not used. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endif
Does this work with the clang integrated assembler? AFAIK it ignores the -Wa, though it may be fine with the instructions generated by the compiler. (while we don't officially support it, we merged patches to facilitate it).
Also, the above comment says that the -Wa option is used only when building with clang. I don't see this being the case in the patch above.
Signature · 6 lines
Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 16/17] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
Quoted 17 lines · Catalin Marinas
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 77
Quoted 10 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Makefile +10
-0+ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +# -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the compiler +# to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract we pass it +# only to the assembler when clang is selected as a compiler. For the GNU toolchain +# this option is not used. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endifDoes this work with the clang integrated assembler? AFAIK it ignores the -Wa, though it may be fine with the instructions generated by the compiler. (while we don't officially support it, we merged patches to facilitate it).
Quoted 2 lines
Also, the above comment says that the -Wa option is used only when building with clang. I don't see this being the case in the patch above.
I will check on this and get back.
Quoted 1 line
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 16/17] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
In reply to Catalin MarinasQuoted 12 lines · Catalin Marinas
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 77
Quoted 5 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Makefile +5
-0+# only to the assembler when clang is selected as a compiler. For the GNU toolchain +# this option is not used. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endifDoes this work with the clang integrated assembler? AFAIK it ignores the -Wa, though it may be fine with the instructions generated by the compiler. (while we don't officially support it, we merged patches to facilitate it).
If the assembler integrated into the compiler doesn't cope with instructions emitted by the compiler that seems like something we should push to get fixed on the compiler side.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 16/17] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
Hi Mark,
Quoted 14 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 12 lines · Catalin Marinas
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 77
Quoted 5 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Makefile +5
-0+# only to the assembler when clang is selected as a compiler. For the GNU toolchain +# this option is not used. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endifDoes this work with the clang integrated assembler? AFAIK it ignores the -Wa, though it may be fine with the instructions generated by the compiler. (while we don't officially support it, we merged patches to facilitate it).
Quoted 4 lines
If the assembler integrated into the compiler doesn't cope with instructions emitted by the compiler that seems like something we should push to get fixed on the compiler side.
This option should be required only in the "hybrid" scenario of building the kernel with clang+binutils.
The llvm assembler relies on "--target" and "-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf" so I do not think we should report or fix anything in this case.
This series is already passing the correct parameters to clang hence seems safe to assume that it will continue doing so once the assembler will be switched to the native version.
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 16/17] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
In reply to Catalin MarinasQuoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 77
Quoted 10 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Makefile +10
-0+ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +# -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the compiler +# to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract we pass it +# only to the assembler when clang is selected as a compiler. For the GNU toolchain +# this option is not used. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endifDoes this work with the clang integrated assembler? AFAIK it ignores the -Wa, though it may be fine with the instructions generated by the compiler. (while we don't officially support it, we merged patches to facilitate it).
Clang integrated assembler compiles some initial c files into object files and those contains the ptrauth instructions.
As you said it ignores the -Wa flag.
Quoted 3 lines
Also, the above comment says that the -Wa option is used only when building with clang. I don't see this being the case in the patch above.
I will update the comments.
Quoted 1 line
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 16/17] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
In reply to Catalin MarinasHi Catalin,
Quoted 17 lines · Catalin Marinas
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 77
Quoted 10 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Makefile +10
-0+ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +# -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the compiler +# to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract we pass it +# only to the assembler when clang is selected as a compiler. For the GNU toolchain +# this option is not used. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endifDoes this work with the clang integrated assembler? AFAIK it ignores the -Wa, though it may be fine with the instructions generated by the compiler. (while we don't officially support it, we merged patches to facilitate it).
The kernel is currently built with "-no-integrated-as" (Makefile +538) when clang is selected. This means that the only assembler supported is the one provide by binutils in this scenario.
The only patch series that I am aware of that is trying to do something with the integrated as is [1] that uses it for inline assembly when LTO is enabled (mainly for Android kernels at the moment). And this series is still being reviewed.
Curiosity, which one is the series you are referring to? And how do I enable the clang assembler for building the kernel?
[1] https://github.com/samitolvanen/linux/commits/clang-cfi
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 17/17 lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis test is specific for arm64. When in-kernel Pointer Authentication config is enabled, the return address stored in the stack is signed. This feature helps in ROP kind of attack. If any parameters used to generate the pac (<key, sp, lr>) is modified then this will fail in the authentication stage and will lead to abort.
This test changes the input parameter APIA kernel keys to cause abort. The pac computed from the new key can be same as last due to hash collision so this is retried for few times as there is no reliable way to compare the pacs. Even though this test may fail even after retries but this may cause authentication failure at a later stage in earlier function returns.
This test can be invoked as,
echo CORRUPT_PAC > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
or as below if inserted as a module,
insmod lkdtm.ko cpoint_name=DIRECT cpoint_type=CORRUPT_PAC cpoint_count=1
[ 13.118166] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_PAC [ 13.118298] lkdtm: Clearing PAC from the return address [ 13.118466] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfff8000108648ec [ 13.118626] Mem abort info: [ 13.118666] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 13.118866] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 13.118966] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 13.119117] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
--- drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +36 -0
@@ -378,3 +378,39 @@ void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT(void)pr_err ("XFAIL: this test is ia32-only\n" );#endif } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +static noinline void change_pac_parameters(void) +{ +/* Reset the keys of current task */ +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (current); +ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (current); +} + +#define CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE 10 +noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void) +{ +int i; + +if (!system_supports_address_auth ()) { +pr_err ("FAIL: arm64 pointer authentication feature not present\n" ); +return ; + } + +pr_info ("Change the PAC parameters to force function return failure\n" ); +/* +* Pac is a hash value computed from input keys, return address and +* stack pointer. As pac has fewer bits so there is a chance of +* collision, so iterate few times to reduce the collision probability. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i <CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE ; i++) +change_pac_parameters (); + +pr_err ("FAIL: %s test failed. Kernel may be unstable from here\n" , __func__); +} +#else /* !CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ +noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void) +{ +pr_err ("FAIL: arm64 pointer authentication config disabled\n" ); +} +#endif
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c +1 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING ),CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING ),CRASHTYPE (UNSET_SMEP ), +CRASHTYPE (CORRUPT_PAC ),CRASHTYPE (UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE ),CRASHTYPE (OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION ), CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void);#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT (void );#endif +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void );/* lkdtm_heap.c */ void __init lkdtm_heap_init (void );
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel