crypto: use timing-safe digest comparison
Subsystems (2)
cover crypto: use timing-safe digest comparison
Timing attacks in DPDK crypto were fixed earlier but several drivers did not use the new timing safe comparison operation.
First patch drops the experimental flag off rte_memeq_timingsafe(). The function is a static inline with no exported symbol, no ABI change. This avoids having to turn on experimental flag in other drivers.
The rest convert the digest verify comparisons in the uadk, ccp, armv8 and cnxk PMDs.
This problem was reported for several drivers and for those the Reported-by was added.
Stephen Hemminger (5):
eal: take experimental flag off of rte_memeq_timingsafe crypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparison crypto/ccp: use timing-safe digest comparison crypto/armv8: use timing-safe digest comparison crypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparison
doc/guides/rel_notes/release_26_07.rst | 4 ++++ drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp_crypto.c | 8 ++++---- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h | 2 +- drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c | 4 ++-- lib/eal/include/rte_memory.h | 4 ---- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH 1/5 eal: take experimental flag off of rte_memeq_timingsafe
This function is needed in other places, and don't want to have to propagate allow_experimental_api into those drivers. It is stable enough and inline so no ABI exposure.
--- doc/guides/rel_notes/release_26_07.rst | 4 ++++ lib/eal/include/rte_memory.h | 4 ---- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
doc/guides/rel_notes/release_26_07.rst +4 -0
@@ -218,6 +218,10 @@ API Changes - ``rte_pmd_mlx5_enable_steering`` - ``rte_pmd_mlx5_disable_steering`` +* **eal: promoted timing-safe memory comparison from experimental to stable.** + + The inline function ``rte_memeq_timingsafe()`` is no longer marked experimental. + ABI Changes -----------
lib/eal/include/rte_memory.h +0 -4
@@ -747,9 +747,6 @@ void rte_memzero_explicit(void *dst, size_t sz);/** -* @warning -* @b EXPERIMENTAL: this API may change without prior notice. -* * Timing-safe memory equality comparison. * * This function compares two memory regions in constant time,
@@ -770,7 +767,6 @@ rte_memzero_explicit(void *dst, size_t sz);* @return * true if the memory regions are identical, false if they differ. */ -__rte_experimental static inline bool rte_memeq_timingsafe (const void *a,const void *b,size_t n) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH 2/5 crypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen HemmingerDigest verification used memcmp() to compare the computed and expected MAC. memcmp() returns as soon as the first differing byte is found, so its run time depends on how many leading bytes match. An attacker submitting forged digests can use that timing signal to recover the correct value one byte at a time.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe(), whose run time depends only on the length, for the verify comparison.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c +2 -2
@@ -1111,8 +1111,8 @@ uadk_crypto_dequeue_burst(void *queue_pair, struct rte_crypto_op **ops,if (sess->auth.operation ==RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) {uint8_t *dst = qp->temp_digest[i %BURST_MAX ]; -if (memcmp (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, - sess->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, + sess->auth.digest_length)) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH 3/5 crypto/ccp: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen HemmingerBoth the CPU HMAC verify path and the offload digest verify path compared the computed and expected MAC with memcmp(), which short circuits on the first mismatching byte and leaks the number of matching leading bytes through timing.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe() for both verify comparisons.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp_crypto.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp_crypto.c +4 -4
@@ -1490,8 +1490,8 @@ static int cpu_crypto_auth(struct ccp_qp *qp, }if (sess->auth.op ==CCP_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) { -if (memcmp (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, - sess->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) { +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, + sess->auth.digest_length)) { op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; }else { op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;
@@ -2801,8 +2801,8 @@ static inline void ccp_auth_dq_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *op) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;if (session->auth.op ==CCP_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) { -if (memcmp (addr + offset, digest_data, - session->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (addr + offset, digest_data, + session->auth.digest_length)) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH 4/5 crypto/armv8: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen HemmingerThe chained-op verify path compared the computed and expected MAC with memcmp(), whose run time depends on the number of matching leading bytes and can leak the digest to an attacker submitting forged values.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe() for the verify comparison.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c +2 -2
@@ -631,8 +631,8 @@ process_armv8_chained_op(struct armv8_crypto_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op, op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;if (sess->auth.operation ==RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) { -if (memcmp (adst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, - sess->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) { +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (adst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, + sess->auth.digest_length)) { op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH 4/5] crypto/armv8: use timing-safe digest comparison
Quoted 32 lines · Stephen Hemminger
The chained-op verify path compared the computed and expected MAC with
memcmp(), whose run time depends on the number of matching leading bytes and can leak the digest to an attacker submitting forged values.Use
rte_memeq_timingsafe()for the verify comparison.Bugzilla ID: 1773
Fixes 169ca3db550c ("crypto/armv8: add PMD optimized for ARMv8 processors")Reported-by Siraj Luthfi Ananda <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>--- drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c +2
-2@@ -631,8 +631,8 @@ process_armv8_chained_op(struct armv8_crypto_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op, op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;if (sess->auth.operation ==RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) { -if (memcmp (adst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, - sess->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) { +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (adst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, + sess->auth.digest_length)) { op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; } }
PATCH 5/5 crypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen Hemmingercompl_auth_verify() compared the generated and received MAC with memcmp(), which returns early on the first differing byte and leaks the number of matching leading bytes through timing.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe() for the verify comparison.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h +1 -1
@@ -3282,7 +3282,7 @@ compl_auth_verify(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *gen_mac, uint64_t mac_len)return ; } -if (memcmp (mac, gen_mac, mac_len)) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (mac, gen_mac, mac_len)) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ;else op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
RE: [EXTERNAL] [PATCH 5/5] crypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparison
Quoted 39 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, June 25, 2026 9:27 PM
To: [email protected]
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [PATCH 5/5]crypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparison
compl_auth_verify()compared the generated and received MAC withmemcmp(), which returns early on the first differing byte and leaks the number of matching leading bytes through timing.Use
rte_memeq_timingsafe()for the verify comparison.Bugzilla ID: 1773
Fixes 786963fdcf3e ("crypto/cnxk: add digest support")Signed-off-by Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>--- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h +1
-1@@ -3282,7 +3282,7 @@ compl_auth_verify(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *gen_mac, uint64_t mac_len) return; } -if (memcmp (mac, gen_mac, mac_len)) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (mac, gen_mac, mac_len)) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ;else
op->status=RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
--
2.53.0
Quoted 21 lines
Timing attacks in DPDK crypto were fixed earlier but several drivers did not use the new timing safe comparison operation.
First patch drops the experimental flag off
rte_memeq_timingsafe(). The function is a static inline with no exported symbol, no ABI change. This avoids having to turn on experimental flag in other drivers.The rest convert the digest verify comparisons in the uadk, ccp, armv8 and cnxk PMDs.
This problem was reported for several drivers and for those the Reported-by was added.
Stephen Hemminger (5):
eal: take experimental flag off ofrte_memeq_timingsafecrypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparisoncrypto/ccp: use timing-safe digest comparisoncrypto/armv8: use timing-safe digest comparisoncrypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparison
Quoted 8 lines
doc/guides/rel_notes/release_26_07.rst | 4 ++++ drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp_crypto.c | 8 ++++---- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h | 2 +- drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c | 4 ++-- lib/eal/include/rte_memory.h | 4 ---- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
A couple of more instances which can be fixed for asym crypto.drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c:742: if (memcmp(rsa->sign.data, rsa->message.data,drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_ae.h:1924: if (memcmp(rptr + 2, rsa->message.data, rsa->message.length))
v2 cover crypto: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen HemmingerTiming attacks in DPDK crypto were fixed earlier but several drivers did not use the new timing safe comparison operation.
First patch drops the experimental flag off rte_memeq_timingsafe(). The function is a static inline with no exported symbol, no ABI change. This avoids having to turn on experimental flag in other drivers.
The rest convert the digest verify comparisons in the uadk, ccp, armv8 and cnxk PMDs.
This problem was reported for several drivers and for those the Reported-by was added.
v2 - pick up a couple of other memcmp() locations
Stephen Hemminger (6):
eal: take experimental flag off of rte_memeq_timingsafe crypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparison crypto/ccp: use timing-safe digest comparison crypto/armv8: use timing-safe digest comparison crypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparison crypto/octeontx: use timing-safe RSA signature verification
doc/guides/rel_notes/release_26_07.rst | 4 ++++ drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp_crypto.c | 8 ++++---- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_ae.h | 4 +++- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h | 2 +- drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c | 3 ++- drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c | 4 ++-- lib/eal/include/rte_memory.h | 4 ---- 8 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 1/6 eal: take experimental flag off of rte_memeq_timingsafe
This function is needed in other places, and don't want to have to propagate allow_experimental_api into those drivers. It is stable enough and inline so no ABI exposure.
--- doc/guides/rel_notes/release_26_07.rst | 4 ++++ lib/eal/include/rte_memory.h | 4 ---- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
doc/guides/rel_notes/release_26_07.rst +4 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,10 @@ API Changes - ``rte_pmd_mlx5_enable_steering`` - ``rte_pmd_mlx5_disable_steering`` +* **eal: promoted timing-safe memory comparison from experimental to stable.** + + The inline function ``rte_memeq_timingsafe()`` is no longer marked experimental. + ABI Changes -----------
lib/eal/include/rte_memory.h +0 -4
@@ -747,9 +747,6 @@ void rte_memzero_explicit(void *dst, size_t sz);/** -* @warning -* @b EXPERIMENTAL: this API may change without prior notice. -* * Timing-safe memory equality comparison. * * This function compares two memory regions in constant time,
@@ -770,7 +767,6 @@ rte_memzero_explicit(void *dst, size_t sz);* @return * true if the memory regions are identical, false if they differ. */ -__rte_experimental static inline bool rte_memeq_timingsafe (const void *a,const void *b,size_t n) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 2/6 crypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen HemmingerDigest verification used memcmp() to compare the computed and expected MAC. memcmp() returns as soon as the first differing byte is found, so its run time depends on how many leading bytes match. An attacker submitting forged digests can use that timing signal to recover the correct value one byte at a time.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe(), whose run time depends only on the length, for the verify comparison.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c +2 -2
@@ -1111,8 +1111,8 @@ uadk_crypto_dequeue_burst(void *queue_pair, struct rte_crypto_op **ops,if (sess->auth.operation ==RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) {uint8_t *dst = qp->temp_digest[i %BURST_MAX ]; -if (memcmp (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, - sess->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, + sess->auth.digest_length)) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 3/6 crypto/ccp: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen HemmingerBoth the CPU HMAC verify path and the offload digest verify path compared the computed and expected MAC with memcmp(), which short circuits on the first mismatching byte and leaks the number of matching leading bytes through timing.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe() for both verify comparisons.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp_crypto.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp_crypto.c +4 -4
@@ -1490,8 +1490,8 @@ static int cpu_crypto_auth(struct ccp_qp *qp, }if (sess->auth.op ==CCP_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) { -if (memcmp (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, - sess->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) { +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, + sess->auth.digest_length)) { op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; }else { op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;
@@ -2801,8 +2801,8 @@ static inline void ccp_auth_dq_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *op) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;if (session->auth.op ==CCP_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) { -if (memcmp (addr + offset, digest_data, - session->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (addr + offset, digest_data, + session->auth.digest_length)) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 4/6 crypto/armv8: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen HemmingerThe chained-op verify path compared the computed and expected MAC with memcmp(), whose run time depends on the number of matching leading bytes and can leak the digest to an attacker submitting forged values.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe() for the verify comparison.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c +2 -2
@@ -631,8 +631,8 @@ process_armv8_chained_op(struct armv8_crypto_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op, op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;if (sess->auth.operation ==RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY ) { -if (memcmp (adst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, - sess->auth.digest_length) !=0 ) { +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (adst, op->sym->auth.digest.data, + sess->auth.digest_length)) { op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 5/6 crypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparison
In reply to Stephen Hemmingercompl_auth_verify() compared the generated and received MAC with memcmp(), which returns early on the first differing byte and leaks the number of matching leading bytes through timing.
Use rte_memeq_timingsafe() for the verify comparison.
Bugzilla ID: 1773
--- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_ae.h | 4 +++- drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_ae.h +3 -1
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <rte_common.h> #include <rte_crypto_asym.h> #include <rte_malloc.h> +#include <rte_memory.h> #include "roc_ae.h" #include "roc_re.h"
@@ -1921,7 +1922,8 @@ cnxk_ae_dequeue_rsa_op(struct rte_crypto_op *cop, uint8_t *rptr,* Offset output data pointer by length field * (2 bytes) and compare signed data. */ -if (memcmp (rptr +2 , rsa->message.data, rsa->message.length)) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (rptr +2 , + rsa->message.data, rsa->message.length)) cop->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR ; }break ;
drivers/crypto/cnxk/cnxk_se.h +1 -1
@@ -3362,7 +3362,7 @@ compl_auth_verify(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *gen_mac, uint64_t mac_len)return ; } -if (memcmp (mac, gen_mac, mac_len)) +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (mac, gen_mac, mac_len)) op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED ;else op->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 6/6 crypto/octeontx: use timing-safe RSA signature verification
In reply to Stephen HemmingerReplace memcmp() with rte_memeq_timingsafe() when verifying RSA signatures to prevent timing-based side-channel attacks.
The comparison at drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c:742 is used to verify RSA signed data against expected message content. Using regular memcmp() for cryptographic verification can leak information about the compared data through timing differences.
--- drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c +2 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <rte_errno.h> #include <rte_malloc.h> #include <rte_mempool.h> +#include <rte_memory.h> #include "otx_cryptodev.h" #include "otx_cryptodev_capabilities.h"
@@ -739,7 +740,7 @@ otx_cpt_asym_rsa_op(struct rte_crypto_op *cop, struct cpt_request_info *req, }memcpy (rsa->sign.data, req->rptr, rsa->sign.length); -if (memcmp (rsa->sign.data, rsa->message.data, +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (rsa->sign.data, rsa->message.data, rsa->message.length)) {CPT_LOG_DP_ERR ("RSA verification failed" ); cop->status =RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
RE: [EXTERNAL] [PATCH v2 6/6] crypto/octeontx: use timing-safe RSA signature verification
Quoted 47 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2026 12:29 AM
To: [email protected]
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>; Anoob Joseph <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [PATCH v2 6/6]crypto/octeontx: use timing-safe RSA signature verificationReplace
memcmp()withrte_memeq_timingsafe()when verifying RSA signatures to prevent timing-based side-channel attacks.The comparison at
drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c:742is used to verify RSA signed data against expected message content. Using regularmemcmp()for cryptographic verification can leak information about the compared data through timing differences.Signed-off-by Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>--- drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/crypto/octeontx/otx_cryptodev_ops.c +2
-1@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <rte_errno.h> #include <rte_malloc.h> #include <rte_mempool.h> +#include <rte_memory.h> #include "otx_cryptodev.h" #include "otx_cryptodev_capabilities.h" @@ -739,7 +740,7 @@ otx_cpt_asym_rsa_op(struct rte_crypto_op *cop, struct cpt_request_info *req, }memcpy (rsa->sign.data, req->rptr, rsa->sign.length); -if (memcmp (rsa->sign.data, rsa->message.data, +if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe (rsa->sign.data, rsa->message.data, rsa->message.length)) {CPT_LOG_DP_ERR ("RSA verification failed" );
cop->status=RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
--
2.53.0
Thomas Monjalon
AppliedQuoted 7 lines
Stephen Hemminger (6):
eal: take experimental flag off ofrte_memeq_timingsafecrypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparisoncrypto/ccp: use timing-safe digest comparisoncrypto/armv8: use timing-safe digest comparisoncrypto/cnxk: use timing-safe digest comparisoncrypto/octeontx: use timing-safe RSA signature verification
Applied, thanks.