Add Guest API & Guest Kernel support for SEV live migration.
Subsystems (8)
v3 cover Add Guest API & Guest Kernel support for SEV live migration.
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
The series adds guest api and guest kernel support for SEV live migration.
The patch series introduces a new hypercall. The guest OS can use this hypercall to notify the page encryption status. If the page is encrypted with guest specific-key then we use SEV command during the migration. If page is not encrypted then fallback to default.
This section descibes how the SEV live migration feature is negotiated between the host and guest, the host indicates this feature support via KVM_FEATURE_CPUID. The guest firmware (OVMF) detects this feature and sets a UEFI enviroment variable indicating OVMF support for live migration, the guest kernel also detects the host support for this feature via cpuid and in case of an EFI boot verifies if OVMF also supports this feature by getting the UEFI enviroment variable and if it set then enables live migration feature on host by writing to a custom MSR, if not booted under EFI, then it simply enables the feature by again writing to the custom MSR.
Changes since v2:
- Add guest api patch to this patchset.
- Replace KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall with the more generic KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall.
- Add WARN_ONCE() messages if address lookup fails during kernel page table walk while issuing KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall.
Changes since v1:
- Avoid having an SEV specific variant of kvm_hypercall3() and instead invert the default to VMMCALL.
Ashish Kalra (4):
KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall
KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL
EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID. x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live
Migration feature.
Brijesh Singh (1):
mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 19 +++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 7 ++ Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst | 21 +++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 13 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 6 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 13 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 46 +++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 75 +++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 7 ++ include/linux/efi.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 1 + 19 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v3 1/5 KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
This hypercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a change in the page encryption status to the hypervisor. The hypercall should be invoked only when the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice versa. By default all guest pages are considered encrypted.
The hypercall exits to userspace to manage the guest shared regions and integrate with the userspace VMM's migration code.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 19 +++++++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 7 ++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst | 21 ++++++++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 13 ++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 13 ++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 123 insertions(+)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +19 -0
@@ -6891,3 +6891,22 @@ This capability is always enabled. This capability indicates that the KVM virtual PTP service is supported in the host. A VMM can check whether the service is available to the guest on migration. + +8.33 KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL +--------------------------- + +:Capability: KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL +:Architectures: x86 +:Type: vm + +This capability, if enabled, will cause KVM to exit to userspace +with KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL exit reason to process some hypercalls. + +Calling KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION for this capability will return a bitmask +of hypercalls that can be configured to exit to userspace. +Right now, the only such hypercall is KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE. + +The argument to KVM_ENABLE_CAP is also a bitmask, and must be a subset +of the result of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION. KVM will forward to userspace +the hypercalls whose corresponding bit is in the argument, and return +ENOSYS for the others.
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +7 -0
@@ -96,6 +96,13 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit before using extended destination ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. +KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 16 guest checks this feature bit before + using the map gpa range hypercall + to notify the page state change + +KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL 17 guest checks this feature bit before + using MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL + KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side per-cpu warps are expected in kvmclock
Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst +21 -0
@@ -169,3 +169,24 @@ a0: destination APIC ID :Usage example: When sending a call-function IPI-many to vCPUs, yield if any of the IPI target vCPUs was preempted. + +8. KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE +------------------------- +:Architecture: x86 +:Status: active +:Purpose: Request KVM to map a GPA range with the specified attributes. + +a0: the guest physical address of the start page +a1: the number of (4kb) pages (must be contiguous in GPA space) +a2: attributes + + Where 'attributes' : + * bits 3:0 - preferred page size encoding 0 = 4kb, 1 = 2mb, 2 = 1gb, etc... + * bit 4 - plaintext = 0, encrypted = 1 + * bits 63:5 - reserved (must be zero) + +**Implementation note**: this hypercall is implemented in userspace via +the KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL capability. Userspace must enable that capability +before advertising KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE in the guest CPUID. In +addition, if the guest supports KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL, userspace +must also set up an MSR filter to process writes to MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL.
Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst +13 -0
@@ -376,3 +376,16 @@ data: write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. + +MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL: + 0x4b564d08 + +data: + This MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL is present in + CPUID. Bit 0 represents whether live migration of the guest is allowed. + + When a guest is started, bit 0 will be 0 if the guest has encrypted + memory and 1 if the guest does not have encrypted memory. If the + guest is communicating page encryption status to the host using the + ``KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE`` hypercall, it can set bit 0 in this MSR to + allow live migration of the guest.
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
@@ -1067,6 +1067,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {u32 user_space_msr_mask;struct kvm_x86_msr_filter __rcu *msr_filter; +u32 hypercall_exit_enabled; +/* Guest can access the SGX PROVISIONKEY. */ bool sgx_provisioning_allowed;
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +13 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13#define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14#define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 +#define KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 16 +#define KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL 17#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0
@@ -54,6 +56,7 @@#define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05#define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06#define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 +#define MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL 0x4b564d08struct kvm_steal_time {__u64 steal;
@@ -90,6 +93,16 @@ struct kvm_clock_pairing {/* MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT */ #define KVM_ASYNC_PF_VEC_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) +/* MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL */ +#define KVM_MIGRATION_READY (1 << 0) + +/* KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE */ +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K 0 +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_2M (1 << 0) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_1G (1 << 1) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT (n) (n << 4) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENCRYPTED KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT(1) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_DECRYPTED KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT(0)/* Operations for KVM_HC_MMU_OP */ #define KVM_MMU_OP_WRITE_PTE 1
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +46 -0
76 lines not on this page · raw message
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -1082,6 +1082,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 196#define KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM 197#define KVM_CAP_PTP_KVM 198 +#define KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL 199#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#define KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING 9#define KVM_HC_SEND_IPI 10#define KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD 11 +#define KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 12/* * hypercalls use architecture specific
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall
Quoted 288 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
This hypercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a change in the page encryption status to the hypervisor. The hypercall should be invoked only when the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice versa. By default all guest pages are considered encrypted.
The hypercall exits to userspace to manage the guest shared regions and integrate with the userspace VMM's migration code.
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steve Rutherford <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>--- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 19 +++++++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 7 ++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst | 21 ++++++++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 13 ++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 13 ++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 123 insertions(+)Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +19
-0@@ -6891,3 +6891,22 @@ This capability is always enabled. This capability indicates that the KVM virtual PTP service is supported in the host. A VMM can check whether the service is available to the guest on migration. + +8.33 KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL +--------------------------- + +:Capability: KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL +:Architectures: x86 +:Type: vm + +This capability, if enabled, will cause KVM to exit to userspace +with KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL exit reason to process some hypercalls. + +Calling KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION for this capability will return a bitmask +of hypercalls that can be configured to exit to userspace. +Right now, the only such hypercall is KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE. + +The argument to KVM_ENABLE_CAP is also a bitmask, and must be a subset +of the result of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION. KVM will forward to userspace +the hypercalls whose corresponding bit is in the argument, and return +ENOSYS for the others.Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +7
-0@@ -96,6 +96,13 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit before using extended destination ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. +KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 16 guest checks this feature bit before + using the map gpa range hypercall + to notify the page state change + +KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL 17 guest checks this feature bit before + using MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL + KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side per-cpu warps are expected in kvmclockDocumentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst +21
-0@@ -169,3 +169,24 @@ a0: destination APIC ID :Usage example: When sending a call-function IPI-many to vCPUs, yield if any of the IPI target vCPUs was preempted. + +8. KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE +------------------------- +:Architecture: x86 +:Status: active +:Purpose: Request KVM to map a GPA range with the specified attributes. + +a0: the guest physical address of the start page +a1: the number of (4kb) pages (must be contiguous in GPA space) +a2: attributes + + Where 'attributes' : + * bits 3:0 - preferred page size encoding 0 = 4kb, 1 = 2mb, 2 = 1gb, etc... + * bit 4 - plaintext = 0, encrypted = 1 + * bits 63:5 - reserved (must be zero) + +**Implementation note**: this hypercall is implemented in userspace via +the KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL capability. Userspace must enable that capability +before advertising KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE in the guest CPUID. In +addition, if the guest supports KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL, userspace +must also set up an MSR filter to process writes to MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL.Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst +13
-0@@ -376,3 +376,16 @@ data: write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. + +MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL: + 0x4b564d08 + +data: + This MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL is present in + CPUID. Bit 0 represents whether live migration of the guest is allowed. + + When a guest is started, bit 0 will be 0 if the guest has encrypted + memory and 1 if the guest does not have encrypted memory. If the + guest is communicating page encryption status to the host using the + ``KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE`` hypercall, it can set bit 0 in this MSR to + allow live migration of the guest.arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2
-0@@ -1067,6 +1067,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {u32 user_space_msr_mask;struct kvm_x86_msr_filter __rcu *msr_filter; +u32 hypercall_exit_enabled; +/* Guest can access the SGX PROVISIONKEY. */ bool sgx_provisioning_allowed;arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +13
-0@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13#define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14#define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 +#define KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 16 +#define KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL 17#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0@@ -54,6 +56,7 @@#define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05#define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06#define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 +#define MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL 0x4b564d08struct kvm_steal_time {__u64 steal;@@ -90,6 +93,16 @@ struct kvm_clock_pairing {/* MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT */ #define KVM_ASYNC_PF_VEC_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) +/* MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL */ +#define KVM_MIGRATION_READY (1 << 0) + +/* KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE */ +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K 0 +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_2M (1 << 0) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_1G (1 << 1) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT (n) (n << 4) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENCRYPTED KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT(1) +#define KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_DECRYPTED KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT(0)/* Operations for KVM_HC_MMU_OP */ #define KVM_MMU_OP_WRITE_PTE 1arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +46
-0@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ static u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)EFER_SCE);static u64 __read_mostly cr4_reserved_bits =CR4_RESERVED_BITS ; +#define KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE) +#define KVM_X2APIC_API_VALID_FLAGS (KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS | \ KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK)@@ -3894,6 +3896,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)case KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM : r =1 ;break ; +case KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL : + r =KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK ; +break ;case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 :return KVM_GUESTDBG_VALID_MASK ;#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN @@ -5499,6 +5504,14 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,if (kvm_x86_ops.vm_copy_enc_context_from) r = kvm_x86_ops.vm_copy_enc_context_from (kvm, cap->args[0 ]);return r; +case KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL : +if (cap->args[0 ] & ~KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK ) { + r = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + kvm->arch.hypercall_exit_enabled = cap->args[0 ]; + r =0 ; +break ;default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;@@ -8384,6 +8397,17 @@ static void kvm_sched_yield(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long dest_id)return ; } +static int complete_hypercall_exit (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +u64 ret = vcpu->run->hypercall.ret; + +if (!is_64_bit_mode (vcpu)) + ret = (u32 )ret; +kvm_rax_write (vcpu, ret); + ++vcpu->stat.hypercalls; +return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction (vcpu); +} +int kvm_emulate_hypercall (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;@@ -8449,6 +8473,28 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kvm_sched_yield (vcpu, a0); ret =0 ;break ; +case KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE : { +u64 gpa = a0, npages = a1, attrs = a2; + + ret = -KVM_ENOSYS ; +if (!(vcpu->kvm->arch.hypercall_exit_enabled & (1 <<KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE ))) +break ; + +if (!PAGE_ALIGNED (gpa) || !npages || +gpa_to_gfn (gpa) + npages <=gpa_to_gfn (gpa)) { + ret = -KVM_EINVAL ; +break ; + } + + vcpu->run->exit_reason =KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL ; + vcpu->run->hypercall.nr =KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE ; + vcpu->run->hypercall.args[0 ] = gpa; + vcpu->run->hypercall.args[1 ] = npages; + vcpu->run->hypercall.args[2 ] = attrs; + vcpu->run->hypercall.longmode = op_64_bit; + vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_hypercall_exit; +return 0 ; + }default : ret = -KVM_ENOSYS ;break ;include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1
-0@@ -1082,6 +1082,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 196#define KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM 197#define KVM_CAP_PTP_KVM 198 +#define KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL 199#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h +0
-0
include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h line 35
Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h +1
-0@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#define KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING 9#define KVM_HC_SEND_IPI 10#define KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD 11 +#define KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 12/* * hypercalls use architecture specific
Queued this one for 5.14, thanks!
Paolo
PATCH v3 2/5 KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL
In reply to Ashish KalraFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
KVM hypercall framework relies on alternative framework to patch the VMCALL -> VMMCALL on AMD platform. If a hypercall is made before apply_alternative() is called then it defaults to VMCALL. The approach works fine on non SEV guest. A VMCALL would causes #UD, and hypervisor will be able to decode the instruction and do the right things. But when SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest key and hypervisor will not be able to decode the instruction bytes.
So invert KVM_HYPERCALL and X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL to default to VMMCALL and opt into VMCALL.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +1 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #define KVM_HYPERCALL \ - ALTERNATIVE("vmcall", "vmmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL) + ALTERNATIVE("vmmcall", "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMCALL)/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall * instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL
Preferred shortlog prefix for KVM guest changes is "x86/kvm". "KVM: x86" is for host changes.
Quoted 10 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
KVM hypercall framework relies on alternative framework to patch the VMCALL -> VMMCALL on AMD platform. If a hypercall is made before
apply_alternative()is called then it defaults to VMCALL. The approach works fine on non SEV guest. A VMCALL would causes #UD, and hypervisor will be able to decode the instruction and do the right things. But when SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest key and hypervisor will not be able to decode the instruction bytes.
Quoted 2 lines
So invert
KVM_HYPERCALLandX86_FEATURE_VMMCALLto default to VMMCALL and opt into VMCALL.
The changelog needs to explain why SEV hypercalls need to be made before apply_alternative(), why it's ok to make Intel CPUs take #UDs on the unknown VMMCALL, and why this is not creating the same conundrum for TDX.
Actually, I don't think making Intel CPUs take #UDs is acceptable. This patch breaks Linux on upstream KVM on Intel due a bug in upstream KVM. KVM attempts to patch the "wrong" hypercall to the "right" hypercall, but stupidly does so via an emulated write. I.e. KVM honors the guest page table permissions and injects a !WRITABLE #PF on the VMMCALL RIP if the kernel code is mapped RX.
In other words, trusting the VMM to not screw up the #UD is a bad idea. This also makes documenting the "why does SEV need super early hypercalls" extra important.
This patch doesn't work because X86_FEATURE_VMCALL is a synthetic flag and is only set by VMware paravirt code, which is why the patching doesn't happen as would be expected. The obvious solution would be to manually set X86_FEATURE_VMCALL where appropriate, but given that defaulting to VMCALL has worked for years, defaulting to VMMCALL makes me nervous, e.g. even if we splatter X86_FEATURE_VMCALL into Intel, Centaur, and Zhaoxin, there's a possibility we'll break existing VMs that run on hypervisors that do something weird with the vendor string.
Rather than look for X86_FEATURE_VMCALL, I think it makes sense to have this be a "pure" inversion, i.e. patch in VMCALL if VMMCALL is not supported, as opposed to patching in VMCALL if VMCALL is supproted.
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +1 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #define KVM_HYPERCALL \ - ALTERNATIVE("vmcall", "vmmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL) + ALTERNATIVE("vmmcall", "vmcall", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL))/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall * instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the
Quoted 10 lines
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Is Brijesh the author? Co-developed-by for a one-line change would be odd...
Quoted 21 lines
Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +1
-1@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #define KVM_HYPERCALL \ - ALTERNATIVE("vmcall", "vmmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL) + ALTERNATIVE("vmmcall", "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMCALL)/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall * instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL
Hello Sean,
Quoted 16 lines · Sean Christopherson
Preferred shortlog prefix for KVM guest changes is "x86/kvm". "KVM: x86" is for host changes.
Quoted 11 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
KVM hypercall framework relies on alternative framework to patch the VMCALL -> VMMCALL on AMD platform. If a hypercall is made before
apply_alternative()is called then it defaults to VMCALL. The approach works fine on non SEV guest. A VMCALL would causes #UD, and hypervisor will be able to decode the instruction and do the right things. But when SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest key and hypervisor will not be able to decode the instruction bytes.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So invert
KVM_HYPERCALLandX86_FEATURE_VMMCALLto default to VMMCALL and opt into VMCALL.The changelog needs to explain why SEV hypercalls need to be made before
apply_alternative(), why it's ok to make Intel CPUs take #UDs on the unknown VMMCALL, and why this is not creating the same conundrum for TDX.
I think it makes more sense to stick to the original approach/patch, i.e., introducing a new private hypercall interface like kvm_sev_hypercall3() and let early paravirtualized kernel code invoke this private hypercall interface wherever required.
This helps avoiding Intel CPUs taking unnecessary #UDs and also avoid using hacks as below.
TDX code can introduce similar private hypercall interface for their early para virtualized kernel code if required.
Quoted 10 lines
Actually, I don't think making Intel CPUs take #UDs is acceptable. This patch breaks Linux on upstream KVM on Intel due a bug in upstream KVM. KVM attempts to patch the "wrong" hypercall to the "right" hypercall, but stupidly does so via an emulated write. I.e. KVM honors the guest page table permissions and injects a !WRITABLE #PF on the VMMCALL RIP if the kernel code is mapped RX.
In other words, trusting the VMM to not screw up the #UD is a bad idea. This also makes documenting the "why does SEV need super early hypercalls" extra important.
Makes sense.
Thanks,
Ashish
Quoted 64 lines
This patch doesn't work because
X86_FEATURE_VMCALLis a synthetic flag and is only set by VMware paravirt code, which is why the patching doesn't happen as would be expected. The obvious solution would be to manually setX86_FEATURE_VMCALLwhere appropriate, but given that defaulting to VMCALL has worked for years, defaulting to VMMCALL makes me nervous, e.g. even if we splatterX86_FEATURE_VMCALLinto Intel, Centaur, and Zhaoxin, there's a possibility we'll break existing VMs that run on hypervisors that do something weird with the vendor string.Rather than look for
X86_FEATURE_VMCALL, I think it makes sense to have this be a "pure" inversion, i.e. patch in VMCALL if VMMCALL is not supported, as opposed to patching in VMCALL if VMCALL is supproted.arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +1
-1@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #define KVM_HYPERCALL \ - ALTERNATIVE("vmcall", "vmmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL) + ALTERNATIVE("vmmcall", "vmcall", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL))/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall * instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the Quoted 11 lines
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Is Brijesh the author? Co-developed-by for a one-line change would be odd...
Quoted 21 lines
Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h| 2 +-1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +1
-1@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #define KVM_HYPERCALL \ - ALTERNATIVE("vmcall", "vmmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL) + ALTERNATIVE("vmmcall", "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMCALL)/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall * instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL
Quoted 29 lines · Ashish
Hello Sean,
Quoted 16 lines · Sean Christopherson
Preferred shortlog prefix for KVM guest changes is "x86/kvm". "KVM: x86" is for host changes.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
KVM hypercall framework relies on alternative framework to patch the VMCALL -> VMMCALL on AMD platform. If a hypercall is made before
apply_alternative()is called then it defaults to VMCALL. The approach works fine on non SEV guest. A VMCALL would causes #UD, and hypervisor will be able to decode the instruction and do the right things. But when SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest key and hypervisor will not be able to decode the instruction bytes.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So invert
KVM_HYPERCALLandX86_FEATURE_VMMCALLto default to VMMCALL and opt into VMCALL.The changelog needs to explain why SEV hypercalls need to be made before
apply_alternative(), why it's ok to make Intel CPUs take #UDs on the unknown VMMCALL, and why this is not creating the same conundrum for TDX.
Quoted 5 lines
I think it makes more sense to stick to the original approach/patch, i.e., introducing a new private hypercall interface like
kvm_sev_hypercall3()and let early paravirtualized kernel code invoke this private hypercall interface wherever required.This helps avoiding Intel CPUs taking unnecessary #UDs and also avoid using hacks as below.
TDX code can introduce similar private hypercall interface for their early para virtualized kernel code if required.
Actually, if we are using this kvm_sev_hypercall3() and not modifying KVM_HYPERCALL() then Intel CPUs avoid unnecessary #UDs and TDX code does not need any new interface. Only early AMD/SEV specific code will use this kvm_sev_hypercall3() interface. TDX code will always work with KVM_HYPERCALL().
Thanks,
Ashish
Quoted 81 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Actually, I don't think making Intel CPUs take #UDs is acceptable. This patch breaks Linux on upstream KVM on Intel due a bug in upstream KVM. KVM attempts to patch the "wrong" hypercall to the "right" hypercall, but stupidly does so via an emulated write. I.e. KVM honors the guest page table permissions and injects a !WRITABLE #PF on the VMMCALL RIP if the kernel code is mapped RX.
In other words, trusting the VMM to not screw up the #UD is a bad idea. This also makes documenting the "why does SEV need super early hypercalls" extra important.
Makes sense.
Thanks,
AshishQuoted 64 lines
This patch doesn't work because
X86_FEATURE_VMCALLis a synthetic flag and is only set by VMware paravirt code, which is why the patching doesn't happen as would be expected. The obvious solution would be to manually setX86_FEATURE_VMCALLwhere appropriate, but given that defaulting to VMCALL has worked for years, defaulting to VMMCALL makes me nervous, e.g. even if we splatterX86_FEATURE_VMCALLinto Intel, Centaur, and Zhaoxin, there's a possibility we'll break existing VMs that run on hypervisors that do something weird with the vendor string.Rather than look for
X86_FEATURE_VMCALL, I think it makes sense to have this be a "pure" inversion, i.e. patch in VMCALL if VMMCALL is not supported, as opposed to patching in VMCALL if VMCALL is supproted.arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +1
-1@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #define KVM_HYPERCALL \ - ALTERNATIVE("vmcall", "vmmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL) + ALTERNATIVE("vmmcall", "vmcall", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL))/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall * instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the Quoted 11 lines
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Is Brijesh the author? Co-developed-by for a one-line change would be odd...
Quoted 21 lines
Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h| 2 +-1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +1
-1@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #define KVM_HYPERCALL \ - ALTERNATIVE("vmcall", "vmmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL) + ALTERNATIVE("vmmcall", "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_VMCALL)/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall * instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL
Quoted 6 lines · Ashish
Quoted 6 lines · Ashish
I think it makes more sense to stick to the original approach/patch, i.e., introducing a new private hypercall interface like
kvm_sev_hypercall3()and let early paravirtualized kernel code invoke this private hypercall interface wherever required.
I don't like the idea of duplicating code just because the problem is tricky to solve. Right now it's just one function, but it could balloon to multiple in the future. Plus there's always the possibility of a new, pre-alternatives kvm_hypercall() being added in generic code, at which point using an SEV-specific variant gets even uglier.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 5 lines
This helps avoiding Intel CPUs taking unnecessary #UDs and also avoid using hacks as below.
TDX code can introduce similar private hypercall interface for their early para virtualized kernel code if required.
Actually, if we are using this
kvm_sev_hypercall3()and not modifyingKVM_HYPERCALL()then Intel CPUs avoid unnecessary #UDs and TDX code does not need any new interface. Only early AMD/SEV specific code will use thiskvm_sev_hypercall3()interface. TDX code will always work withKVM_HYPERCALL().
Even if VMCALL is the default, i.e. not patched in, VMCALL it will #VE on TDX. In other words, VMCALL isn't really any better than VMMCALL, TDX will need to do something clever either way.
Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL
Quoted 8 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Ashish
Quoted 6 lines · Ashish
I think it makes more sense to stick to the original approach/patch, i.e., introducing a new private hypercall interface like
kvm_sev_hypercall3()and let early paravirtualized kernel code invoke this private hypercall interface wherever required.
Quoted 6 lines
I don't like the idea of duplicating code just because the problem is tricky to solve. Right now it's just one function, but it could balloon to multiple in the future. Plus there's always the possibility of a new, pre-alternatives
kvm_hypercall()being added in generic code, at which point using an SEV-specific variant gets even uglier.
Also to highlight the need to support this interface, capturing the flow of apply_alternatives() as part of this thread:
setup_arch() call init_hypervisor_platform() which detects the hypervisor platform the kernel is running under and then the hypervisor specific initialization code can make early hypercalls. For example, KVM specific initialization in case of SEV will try to mark the "__bss_decrypted" section's encryption state via early page encryption status hypercalls.
Now, apply_alternatives() is called much later when setup_arch() calls check_bugs(), so we do need some kind of an early, pre-alternatives hypercall interface.
Other cases of pre-alternatives hypercalls include marking per-cpu GHCB pages as decrypted on SEV-ES and per-cpu apf_reason, steal_time and kvm_apic_eoi as decrypted for SEV generally.
Actually using this kvm_sev_hypercall3() function may be abstracted quite nicely. All these early hypercalls are made through early_set_memory_XX() interfaces, which in turn invoke pv_ops.
Now, pv_ops can have this SEV/TDX specific abstractions.
Currently, pv_ops.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed() callback is setup to kvm_sev_hypercall3() in case of SEV.
Similarly, in case of TDX, pv_ops.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed() can be setup to a TDX specific callback.
Therefore, this early_set_memory_XX() -> pv_ops.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed() is a generic interface and can easily have SEV, TDX and any other future platform specific abstractions added to it.
Thanks,
Ashish
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 5 lines
This helps avoiding Intel CPUs taking unnecessary #UDs and also avoid using hacks as below.
TDX code can introduce similar private hypercall interface for their early para virtualized kernel code if required.
Actually, if we are using this
kvm_sev_hypercall3()and not modifyingKVM_HYPERCALL()then Intel CPUs avoid unnecessary #UDs and TDX code does not need any new interface. Only early AMD/SEV specific code will use thiskvm_sev_hypercall3()interface. TDX code will always work withKVM_HYPERCALL().Even if VMCALL is the default, i.e. not patched in, VMCALL it will #VE on TDX. In other words, VMCALL isn't really any better than VMMCALL, TDX will need to do something clever either way.
PATCH v3 3/5 mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
In reply to Ashish KalraFrom: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Invoke a hypercall when a memory region is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice versa. Hypervisor needs to know the page encryption status during the guest migration.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 1 + arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 7 +++ 6 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +6 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ static inline void paravirt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)PVOP_VCALL1 (mmu.exit_mmap, mm); } +static inline void notify_page_enc_status_changed (unsigned long pfn, +int npages,bool enc) +{ +PVOP_VCALL3 (mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed, pfn, npages, enc); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL static inline void load_sp0 (unsigned long sp0) {
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +1 -0
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ struct pv_mmu_ops {/* Hook for intercepting the destruction of an mm_struct. */ void (*exit_mmap)(struct mm_struct *mm); +void (*notify_page_enc_status_changed)(unsigned long pfn,int npages,bool enc);#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL struct paravirt_callee_save read_cr2;
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +1 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages);int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page);int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page); +void notify_range_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c +1 -0
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ struct paravirt_patch_template pv_ops = { (void (*)(struct mmu_gather *, void *))tlb_remove_page, .mmu.exit_mmap = paravirt_nop, + .mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed = paravirt_nop, #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL .mmu.read_cr2 = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(native_read_cr2),
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +60 -9
107 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +7 -0
@@ -2020,6 +2020,13 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)*/ cpa_flush (&cpa,0 ); +/* +* Notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped encrypted +* or decrypted. The hypervisor will use this information during the +* VM migration. +*/ +notify_range_enc_status_changed (addr, numpages, enc); +return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c void __init sev_setup_arch(void) · line 261
Quoted 2 lines · Ashish Kalra
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +2
-0+void notify_range_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int npages, +bool enc)
You don't need to break this line.
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +2
-1@@ -285,12 +333,13 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size,bool enc) { -unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next; +unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next, start;unsigned long psize, pmask;int split_page_size_mask;int level, ret;pte_t *kpte; + start = vaddr; vaddr_next = vaddr; vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr, · line 398
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +2
-0@@ -345,6 +394,8 @@ static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr, ret =0 ; +notify_range_enc_status_changed (start,PAGE_ALIGN (size) >>PAGE_SHIFT , + enc);
Ditto.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +0
-0out:__flush_tlb_all ();return ret;arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +0
-0
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 2027
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +5
-0@@ -2020,6 +2020,13 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)*/ cpa_flush (&cpa,0 ); +/* +* Notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped encrypted +* or decrypted. The hypervisor will use this information during the +* VM migration. +*/
Simplify that comment:
/*
* Notify the hypervisor about the encryption status change of the memory
* range. It will use this information during the VM migration. */
With those nitpicks fixed:
Paulo, if you want me to take this, lemme know, but I think it'll conflict with patch 5 so perhaps it all should go together through the kvm tree...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v3 3/5] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
Hello Boris, Paolo,
Quoted 55 lines · Borislav Petkov
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c void __init sev_setup_arch(void) · line 261
Quoted 2 lines · Ashish Kalra
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +2
-0+void notify_range_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int npages, +bool enc)You don't need to break this line.
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +2
-1@@ -285,12 +333,13 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size,bool enc) { -unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next; +unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next, start;unsigned long psize, pmask;int split_page_size_mask;int level, ret;pte_t *kpte; + start = vaddr; vaddr_next = vaddr; vaddr_end = vaddr + size;arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr, · line 398
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +2
-0@@ -345,6 +394,8 @@ static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr, ret =0 ; +notify_range_enc_status_changed (start,PAGE_ALIGN (size) >>PAGE_SHIFT , + enc);Ditto.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +0
-0out:__flush_tlb_all ();return ret;arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +0
-0arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 2027
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +5
-0@@ -2020,6 +2020,13 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)*/ cpa_flush (&cpa,0 ); +/* +* Notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped encrypted +* or decrypted. The hypervisor will use this information during the +* VM migration. +*/ Simplify that comment:
/*
* Notify the hypervisor about the encryption status change of the memory
* range. It will use this information during the VM migration. */
Quoted 8 lines
With those nitpicks fixed:
Reviewed-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Paulo, if you want me to take this, lemme know, but I think it'll conflict with patch 5 so perhaps it all should go together through the kvm tree...
Will these patches be merged into 5.14 ?
I have posted another version (v5) for patch 5 after more review comments from Boris, so please pull in all these patches together.
Thanks,
Ashish
Quoted 7 lines
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpeople.kernel.org%2Ftglx%2Fnotes-about-netiquette&data=04%7C01%7CAshish.Kalra%40amd.com%7C142a30170b8145b44a2f08d92c3de599%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637589466634224968%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=nCXHGP8%2F9on0DurrLLbBT0MivMWXfNqwS73rKkqclUM%3D&reserved=0
PATCH v3 4/5 EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID.
In reply to Ashish KalraFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Introduce a new AMD Memory Encryption GUID which is currently used for defining a new UEFI environment variable which indicates UEFI/OVMF support for the SEV live migration feature. This variable is setup when UEFI/OVMF detects host/hypervisor support for SEV live migration and later this variable is read by the kernel using EFI runtime services to verify if OVMF supports the live migration feature.
--- include/linux/efi.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/efi.h +1 -0
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);/* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) +#define AMD_SEV_MEM_ENCRYPT_GUID EFI_GUID(0x0cf29b71, 0x9e51, 0x433a, 0xa3, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xab, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x75) typedef struct { efi_guid_t guid;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID.
Quoted 11 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Introduce a new AMD Memory Encryption GUID which is currently used for defining a new UEFI environment variable which indicates UEFI/OVMF support for the SEV live migration feature. This variable is setup when UEFI/OVMF detects host/hypervisor support for SEV live migration and later this variable is read by the kernel using EFI runtime services to verify if OVMF supports the live migration feature.
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Quoted 19 lines
--- include/linux/efi.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)include/linux/efi.h +1
-1@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);/* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) +#define AMD_SEV_MEM_ENCRYPT_GUID EFI_GUID(0x0cf29b71, 0x9e51, 0x433a, 0xa3, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xab, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x75) typedef struct { efi_guid_t guid; --2.17.1
PATCH v3 5/5 x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.
In reply to Ashish KalraFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
The guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live migration feature uses the following logic :
- kvm_init_plaform() checks if its booted under the EFI
- If not EFI,
i) if kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), issue a wrmsrl() to enable the SEV live migration support
- If EFI,
i) If kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), read the UEFI variable which indicates OVMF support for live migration
ii) the variable indicates live migration is supported, issue a wrmsrl() to
enable the SEV live migration support
The EFI live migration check is done using a late_initcall() callback.
Also, ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the shared pages list.
Also adds kexec support for SEV Live Migration.
Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel specific page encryption status settings before we load a new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete shared pages list here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.
The host's shared pages list is maintained for the guest to keep track of all unencrypted guest memory regions, therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 6 ++ 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +4 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);int __init early_set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size);int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size); +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages, +bool enc);void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void );
@@ -83,6 +85,8 @@ static inline int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }static inline int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size) {return 0 ; } +static inline void __init +early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {}static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void ) { }
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +107 -0
139 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +6 -0
@@ -411,6 +411,12 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)return early_set_memory_enc_dec (vaddr, size, true); } +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages, +bool enc) +{ +notify_range_enc_status_changed (vaddr, npages, enc); +} +/* * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 5/5] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) · line 415
Quoted 10 lines · Ashish Kalra
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +2
-0@@ -411,6 +411,12 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)return early_set_memory_enc_dec (vaddr, size, true); } +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages, +bool enc)
You don't have to break this line either.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette