KVM TDX basic feature support
Subsystems (17)
v8 cover KVM TDX basic feature support
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
KVM TDX basic feature support
Hello. This is v8 the patch series vof KVM TDX support.
This is based on v5.19-rc8 + kvm/queue branch + TDX HOST patch series. The tree can be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream
How to run/test: It's describe at https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM
Major changes from v7:
- Use xarray to track whether GFN is private or shared. Drop SPTE_SHARED_MASK. The complex state machine with SPTE_SHARED_MASK was ditched.
- Large page support is implemented. But will be posted as independent RFC patch.
- fd-based private page v7 is integrated. This is mostly same to Chao's patches. It's in github.
Thanks,
Isaku Yamahata
Changes from v6:
- rebased to v5.19
Changes from v5:
- export __seamcall and use it
- move mutex lock from callee function of smp_call_on_cpu to the caller.
- rename mmu_prezap => flush_shadow_all_private() and tdx_mmu_release_hkid
- updated comment
- drop the use of tdh_mng_key.reclaimid(): as the function is for backward compatibility to only return success
- struct kvm_tdx_cmd: metadata => flags, added __u64 error.
- make this ioctl systemwide ioctl
- ABI change to struct kvm_init_vm
- guest_tsc_khz: use kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz
- rename BUILD_BUG_ON_MEMCPY to MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE
- drop exporting kvm_set_tsc_khz().
- fix kvm_tdp_page_fault() for mtrr emulation
- rename it to kvm_gfn_shared_mask(), dropped kvm_gpa_shared_mask()
- drop kvm_is_private_gfn(), kept kvm_is_private_gpa()
keep kvm_{gfn, gpa}_private(), kvm_gpa_private()
- update commit message
- rename shadow_init_value => shadow_nonprsent_value
- added ept_violation_ve_test mode
- shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in tdp_mmu.c
- legacy MMU case
=> - mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(), kvm_mmu_create()
- FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
- #VE warning:
- rename: REMOVED_SPTE => __REMOVED_SPTE, SHADOW_REMOVED_SPTE => REMOVED_SPTE
- merge into Like we discussed, this patch should be merged with patch "KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE".
- fix pointed by Sagi. check !is_private check => (kvm_gfn_shared_mask && !is_private)
- introduce kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, gfn)
- add only_shared argument to kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn()
- use kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported()
- rename SPTE_PRIVATE_PROHIBIT to SPTE_SHARED_MASK.
- rename: is_private_prohibit_spte() => spte_shared_mask()
- fix: shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in comment
- dropped this patch as the change was merged into kvm/queue
- update vt_apicv_post_state_restore()
- use is_64_bit_hypercall()
- comment: expand MSMI -> Machine Check System Management Interrupt
- fixed TDX_SEPT_PFERR
- tdvmcall_p[1234]_{write, read}() => tdvmcall_a[0123]_{read,write}()
- rename tdmvcall_exit_readon() => tdvmcall_leaf()
- remove optional zero check of argument.
- do a check for static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE) in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi and __apic_accept_irq.
- WARN_ON_ONCE in tdx_smi_allowed and tdx_enable_smi_window.
- introduce vcpu_deliver_init to x86_ops
- sprinkeled KVM_BUG_ON()
Changes from v4:
- rebased to TDX host kernel patch series.
- include all the patches to make this patch series working.
- add [MARKER] patches to mark the patch layer clear.
---
* What's TDX?
TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions, which extends Intel Virtual Machines Extensions (VMX) to introduce a kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust Domain (TD) for confidential computing.
A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself.
We have more detailed explanations below (***). We have the high-level design of TDX KVM below (****).
In this patch series, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the current "VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.
* The organization of this patch series
This patch series is on top of the patches series "TDX host kernel support":
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
this patch series is available at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/releases/tag/kvm-upstream
The corresponding patches to qemu are available at
https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx/commits/tdx-upstream
The relations of the layers are depicted as follows.
The arrows below show the order of patch reviews we would like to have.
The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD VM, create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and handle vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully.
TDX vcpu
interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\
^ |
| |
TD finalization |
^ |
| |
TDX EPT violation<------------\ |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu enter/exit | |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu creation/destruction | \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
^ | ^
| | |
TD VM creation/destruction \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks ^ ^
| |
TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
^ ^
| |
TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
coexistence support
The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy commit that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify where each layer starts.
TDX host kernel support:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functions this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module.
TDX, VMX coexistence:
Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the initialization of the TDX module.
This layer starts with
"KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX"
TDX architectural definitions:
Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions".
TD VM creation/destruction:
Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction".
TD vcpu creation/destruction:
guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction"
TDX EPT violation:
Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs. This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation"
TD vcpu enter/exit:
Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state before entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit"
TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:
Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected so that TD vcpu can continue running.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls"
KVM MMU GPA shared bit:
Introduce framework to handle shared bit repurposed bit of GPA TDX repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shared, it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access shared guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the guest page is encrypted.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits"
KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:
TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences. This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX"
KVM TDP MMU hooks:
Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct EPT access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Unlike conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Instead, use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks"
KVM TDP MMU MapGPA:
Introduce framework to handle switching guest pages from private/shared to shared/private. For a given GPA, a guest page can be assigned to a private GPA or a shared GPA exclusively. With TDX MapGPA hypercall, guest TD converts GPA assignments from private (or shared) to shared (or private).
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA "
KVM guest private memory: (not shown in the above diagram)
[PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private
memory: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395
Guest private memory requires different memory management in KVM. The patch proposes a way for it. Integration with TDX KVM.
(***)
* TDX module
A CPU-attested software module called the "TDX module" is designed to implement the TDX architecture, and it is loaded by the UEFI firmware today. It can be loaded by the kernel or driver at runtime, but in this patch series we assume that the TDX module is already loaded and initialized.
The TDX module provides two main new logical modes of operation built upon the new SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) root and non-root CPU modes added to the VMX architecture. TDX root mode is mostly identical to the VMX root operation mode, and the TDX functions (described later) are triggered by the new SEAMCALL instruction with the desired interface function selected by an input operand (leaf number, in RAX). TDX non-root mode is used for TD guest operation. TDX non-root operation (i.e. "guest TD" mode) is similar to the VMX non-root operation (i.e. guest VM), with changes and restrictions to better assure that no other software or hardware has direct visibility of the TD memory and state.
TDX transitions between TDX root operation and TDX non-root operation include TD Entries, from TDX root to TDX non-root mode, and TD Exits from TDX non-root to TDX root mode. A TD Exit might be asynchronous, triggered by some external event (e.g., external interrupt or SMI) or an exception, or it might be synchronous, triggered by a TDCALL (TDG.VP.VMCALL) function.
TD VCPUs can be entered using SEAMCALL(TDH.VP.ENTER) by KVM. TDH.VP.ENTER is one of the TDX interface functions as mentioned above, and "TDH" stands for Trust Domain Host. Those host-side TDX interface functions are categorized into various areas just for better organization, such as SYS (TDX module management), MNG (TD management), VP (VCPU), PHYSMEM (physical memory), MEM (private memory), etc. For example, SEAMCALL(TDH.SYS.INFO) returns the TDX module information.
TDCS (Trust Domain Control Structure) is the main control structure of a guest TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole, execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc that KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the same value for all VCPUs of the same TD.
Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures, such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc.
Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These control structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS.
The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for TDs,
2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs to define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3) Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();".
*TD Private Memory
TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the encryption keys.
In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.
During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT (Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in host VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exchange needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT functionality even for TDs.
* Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code
The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (why "subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer time than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to minor the Secure EPT for the TD.
This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface functions.
* VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. For example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot copy the initial image to private memory.
* TSC Virtualization
The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values (e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is determined by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The current KVM owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs.
* MCE support for TDs
The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed for TD to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM. MSRs related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by paravirtualizing MSR access.
[1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are available.
* Restrictions or future work
Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are addressed as future independent patch series.
- large page (2M, 1G)
- qemu gdb stub
- guest PMU
- and more
* Prerequisites
It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the scope of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=y, the TDX module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX guest life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use.
Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, global configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are done. The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine
** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID (HKID) assigned to guest TD.
The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
- int seamrr_enabled()
Check if required cpu feature (SEAM mode) is available. This only check CPU feature availability. At this point, the TDX module may not be ready for KVM to use.
- int init_tdx(void);
Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
- const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX isn't initialized.
- u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void);
Return global key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
- int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
Allocate HKID for guest TD.
- void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
Free HKID for guest TD.
(****)
* TDX KVM high-level design
- Host key ID management
Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryption. It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions, u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and,
void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid).
- Data structures and VM type
Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. To identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) or TDX, is used.
- VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operations. New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM/VCPU parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement.
The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to the conventional VM creation.
- Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported
- VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM)
- New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY.
- New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
- VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU)
- New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU.
- New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement with the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
- New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial TDX VM contents.
- VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN)
- Protected guest state
Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM VMM can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested via KVM API ioctls.
VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations. Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redirect operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()".
Operations on the CPU state
silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write to CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0.
. ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones.
. TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because the KVM
implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to back out those changes. Instead, skip the logic.
. dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported.
. exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore
Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guests.
- KVM MMU integration
One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indicate if the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the bit is set). The bits are called stolen bits.
- Stolen bits framework
systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, is used.
- Shared EPT and secure EPT
There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA. Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at the cost of extra memory.
The following depicts the relationship.
KVM | TDX module
| | |
-------------+---------- | |
| | | |
V V | |
shared GPA private GPA | |
CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
| | | |
| | | |
V V | V
shared EPT private EPT--------mirror----->Secure EPT
| | | |
| \--------------------+------\ |
| | | |
V | V V
shared guest page | private guest page
|
|
non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
| - Operating on Secure EPT
Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and wiring it to TDX backend.
* References
[1] TDX specification
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
[2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
[4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf
[5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
[6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf
[8] intel public github
kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx
[9] TDVF
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
This was merged into EDK2 main branch. https://github.com/tianocore/edk2
Chao Gao (3):
KVM: x86: Move check_processor_compatibility from init ops to runtime
ops
Partially revert "KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional
arch funcs"
KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o
wrmsr
Isaku Yamahata (74):
KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about
TDX module
KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel
module
KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural
definitions
KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id
KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
creation/destruction
KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits
KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of
GPA
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for
TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at
allocation
KVM: x86/mmu: Require TDP MMU for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow dirty logging for x86 TDX
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs
KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD
KVM: x86/VMX: introduce vmx tlb_remote_flush and
tlb_remote_flush_with_range
KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
KVM: Add functions to track whether GFN is private or shared
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization
KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory
KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit
KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu
KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path
KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)
KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
exits/interrupts/hypercalls
KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit
KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit
KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor
KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched
behavior
KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c
KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection
KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit
KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls
(TDG.VP.VMCALL)
KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall
KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV map_gpa hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall
KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request
KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU
Sean Christopherson (23):
KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
KVM: Enable hardware before doing arch VM initialization
KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from
confidential VMs
KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases
KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function
KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code
KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX
KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC
KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced
KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function
argument
KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper
KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state
Xiaoyao Li (2):
KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters
KVM: x86/mmu: Let vcpu re-try when faulting page type conflict
Yuan Yao (1):
KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 30 +- Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 2 + .../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 33 + Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 345 +++ Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 417 +++ arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kvm/mips.c | 18 +- arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 2 +- arch/riscv/kvm/main.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 83 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 72 + arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 14 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 95 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 5 +- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 5 + arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c | 5 +- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 37 +- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 41 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 278 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 121 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 50 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 38 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 14 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 468 +++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 10 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 22 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 174 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1090 ++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 39 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 43 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 13 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 2424 +++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 274 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 157 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 37 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 22 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 212 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 146 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 793 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 40 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 240 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 149 +- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 2 + arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 49 +- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 52 - include/linux/kvm_host.h | 20 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 + tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 95 + tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + virt/kvm/Kconfig | 3 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 128 +- 61 files changed, 7641 insertions(+), 827 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 1/103 KVM: x86: Move check_processor_compatibility from init ops to runtime ops
From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
so that KVM can do compatibility checks on hotplugged CPUs. Drop __init from check_processor_compatibility() and its callees.
use a static_call() to invoke .check_processor_compatibility.
Opportunistically rename {svm,vmx}_check_processor_compat to conform to the naming convention of fields of kvm_x86_ops.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 14 +++++++------- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +-- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed) KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); +KVM_X86_OP(check_processor_compatibility) #undef KVM_X86_OP #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -1447,6 +1447,7 @@ static inline u16 kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(bool dest_mode_logical)struct kvm_x86_ops {const char *name; +int (*check_processor_compatibility)(void );int (*hardware_enable)(void );void (*hardware_disable)(void );void (*hardware_unsetup)(void );
@@ -1657,7 +1658,6 @@ struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {struct kvm_x86_init_ops {int (*cpu_has_kvm_support)(void );int (*disabled_by_bios)(void ); -int (*check_processor_compatibility)(void );int (*hardware_setup)(void );unsigned int (*handle_intel_pt_intr)(void );
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2 -2
@@ -4134,7 +4134,7 @@ svm_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall) hypercall[2 ] =0xd9 ; } -static int __init svm_check_processor_compat (void ) +static int svm_check_processor_compatibility (void ) {return 0 ; }
@@ -4740,6 +4740,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .name = "kvm_amd", .hardware_unsetup = svm_hardware_unsetup, + .check_processor_compatibility = svm_check_processor_compatibility, .hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable, .hardware_disable = svm_hardware_disable, .has_emulated_msr = svm_has_emulated_msr,
@@ -5119,7 +5120,6 @@ static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = { .cpu_has_kvm_support = has_svm, .disabled_by_bios = is_disabled, .hardware_setup = svm_hardware_setup, - .check_processor_compatibility = svm_check_processor_compat, .runtime_ops = &svm_x86_ops, .pmu_ops = &amd_pmu_ops,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7 -7
@@ -2520,8 +2520,8 @@ static bool cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug(void) } -static __init int adjust_vmx_controls (u32 ctl_min,u32 ctl_opt, -u32 msr,u32 *result) +static int adjust_vmx_controls (u32 ctl_min,u32 ctl_opt, +u32 msr,u32 *result) {u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;u32 ctl = ctl_min | ctl_opt;
@@ -2539,7 +2539,7 @@ static __init int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt,return 0 ; } -static __init u64 adjust_vmx_controls64 (u64 ctl_opt,u32 msr) +static u64 adjust_vmx_controls64 (u64 ctl_opt,u32 msr) {u64 allowed;
@@ -2548,8 +2548,8 @@ static __init u64 adjust_vmx_controls64(u64 ctl_opt, u32 msr)return ctl_opt & allowed; } -static __init int setup_vmcs_config (struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, -struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap) +static int setup_vmcs_config (struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, +struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap) {u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;u32 _pin_based_exec_control =0 ;
@@ -7388,7 +7388,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)return 0 ; } -static int __init vmx_check_processor_compat (void ) +static int vmx_check_processor_compatibility (void ) {struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
@@ -7986,6 +7986,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup, + .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility, .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable, .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable, .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
@@ -8377,7 +8378,6 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)static struct kvm_x86_init_ops vmx_init_ops__initdata = { .cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support, .disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios, - .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat, .hardware_setup = hardware_setup, .handle_intel_pt_intr =NULL ,
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -2
@@ -11993,7 +11993,6 @@ void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void)int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) {struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data (smp_processor_id ()); -struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops = opaque;WARN_ON (!irqs_disabled ());
@@ -12001,7 +12000,7 @@ int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat(void *opaque) __cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, &boot_cpu_data)) return -EIO; -return ops->check_processor_compatibility (); +return static_call (kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility)(); }bool kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 2/103 Partially revert "KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs"
In reply to [email protected]From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
This partially reverts commit b99040853738 ("KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs") remove opaque from kvm_arch_check_processor_compat because no one uses this opaque now. Address conflicts for ARM (due to file movement) and manually handle RISC-V which comes after the commit. The change about kvm_arch_hardware_setup() in original commit are still needed so they are not reverted.
The current implementation enables hardware (e.g. enable VMX on all CPUs), arch-specific initialization for VM creation, and disables hardware (in x86, disable VMX on all CPUs) for last VM destruction.
TDX requires its initialization on loading KVM module with VMX enabled on all available CPUs. It needs to enable/disable hardware on module initialization. To reuse the same logic, one way is to pass around the unused opaque argument, another way is to remove the unused opaque argument. This patch is a preparation for the latter by removing the argument.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kvm/mips.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 2 +- arch/riscv/kvm/main.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 16 +++------------- 8 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +1 -1
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }
arch/mips/kvm/mips.c +1 -1
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +1 -1
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return kvmppc_core_check_processor_compat (); }
arch/riscv/kvm/main.c +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,return -EINVAL ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }
arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +1 -1
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -1
@@ -11990,7 +11990,7 @@ void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void)static_call (kvm_x86_hardware_unsetup)(); } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data (smp_processor_id ());
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void);void kvm_arch_hardware_disable (void );int kvm_arch_hardware_setup (void *opaque);void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup (void ); -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque); +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void );int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);bool kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +3 -13
@@ -5793,22 +5793,14 @@ void kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks(void) }#endif -struct kvm_cpu_compat_check { -void *opaque; -int *ret; -}; - -static void check_processor_compat (void *data) +static void check_processor_compat (void *rtn) { -struct kvm_cpu_compat_check *c = data; - - *c->ret =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (c->opaque); + *(int *)rtn =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (); }int kvm_init (void *opaque,unsigned vcpu_size,unsigned vcpu_align,struct module *module) { -struct kvm_cpu_compat_check c;int r;int cpu;
@@ -5836,10 +5828,8 @@ int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,if (r <0 ) goto out_free_1; - c.ret = &r; - c.opaque = opaque;for_each_online_cpu (cpu) { -smp_call_function_single (cpu, check_processor_compat, &c,1 ); +smp_call_function_single (cpu, check_processor_compat, &r,1 );if (r <0 ) goto out_free_2; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 002/103] Partially revert "KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs"
Quoted 9 lines · On Sun, 2022-08-07 at 15:00 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
This partially reverts commit
b99040853738("KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs") remove opaque fromkvm_arch_check_processor_compatbecause no one uses this opaque now. Address conflicts for ARM (due to file movement) and manually handle RISC-V which comes after the commit. The change aboutkvm_arch_hardware_setup()in original commit are still needed so they are not reverted.
Quoted 3 lines
The current implementation enables hardware (e.g. enable VMX on all CPUs), arch-specific initialization for VM creation,
I guess you need to point out _first_ VM?
Quoted 6 lines
and disables hardware (in
x86, disable VMX on all CPUs) for last VM destruction.TDX requires its initialization on loading KVM module with VMX enabled on all available CPUs. It needs to enable/disable hardware on module initialization. To reuse the same logic, one way is to pass around the
To reuse the same logic for what? I think you need to be specific (and focus) on why we need this patch: we will opportunistically move CPU compatibility check to hardware_enable_nolock(), which doesn't take any argument, and this patch is a preparation to do that.
Quoted 3 lines
unused opaque argument, another way is to remove the unused opaque argument. This patch is a preparation for the latter by removing the argument
So how about replacing the last two paragraphs with:
"
Initializing TDX will be done during module loading time, and in order to do that hardware_enable_all() will be done during module loading time too, as initializing TDX requires all cpus being in VMX operation. As a result, CPU compatibility check will be opportunistically moved to hardware_enable_nolock(), which doesn't take any argument. Instead of passing 'opaque' around to hardware_enable_nolock() and hardware_enable_all(), just remove the unused 'opaque' argument from kvm_arch_check_processor_compat().
"
Or even simpler:
"
To support TDX, hardware_enable_all() will be done during module loading time. As a result, CPU compatibility check will be opportunistically moved to hardware_enable_nolock(), which doesn't take any argument. Instead of passing 'opaque' around to hardware_enable_nolock() and hardware_enable_all(), just remove the unused 'opaque' argument from kvm_arch_check_processor_compat(). "
With changelog updated:
Quoted 151 lines
Signed-off-by Chao Gao <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Acked-by Anup Patel <[email protected]>Acked-by Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kvm/mips.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 2 +- arch/riscv/kvm/main.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 16 +++------------- 8 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +1
-1@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }arch/mips/kvm/mips.c +1
-1@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +1
-1@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return kvmppc_core_check_processor_compat (); }arch/riscv/kvm/main.c +1
-1@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,return -EINVAL ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +1
-1@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)return 0 ; } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {return 0 ; }arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-1@@ -11990,7 +11990,7 @@ void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void)static_call (kvm_x86_hardware_unsetup)(); } -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque) +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void ) {struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data (smp_processor_id ());include/linux/kvm_host.h +1
-1@@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void);void kvm_arch_hardware_disable (void );int kvm_arch_hardware_setup (void *opaque);void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup (void ); -int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void *opaque); +int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void );int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);bool kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +3
-13@@ -5793,22 +5793,14 @@ void kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks(void) }#endif -struct kvm_cpu_compat_check { -void *opaque; -int *ret; -}; - -static void check_processor_compat (void *data) +static void check_processor_compat (void *rtn) { -struct kvm_cpu_compat_check *c = data; - - *c->ret =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (c->opaque); + *(int *)rtn =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (); }int kvm_init (void *opaque,unsigned vcpu_size,unsigned vcpu_align,struct module *module) { -struct kvm_cpu_compat_check c;int r;int cpu;@@ -5836,10 +5828,8 @@ int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,if (r <0 ) goto out_free_1; - c.ret = &r; - c.opaque = opaque;for_each_online_cpu (cpu) { -smp_call_function_single (cpu, check_processor_compat, &c,1 ); +smp_call_function_single (cpu, check_processor_compat, &r,1 );if (r <0 ) goto out_free_2; }
Re: [PATCH v8 002/103] Partially revert "KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs"
Quoted 10 lines · Kai
Quoted 9 lines · On Sun, 2022-08-07 at 15:00 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
This partially reverts commit
b99040853738("KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs") remove opaque fromkvm_arch_check_processor_compatbecause no one uses this opaque now. Address conflicts for ARM (due to file movement) and manually handle RISC-V which comes after the commit. The change aboutkvm_arch_hardware_setup()in original commit are still needed so they are not reverted.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
The current implementation enables hardware (e.g. enable VMX on all CPUs), arch-specific initialization for VM creation,
I guess you need to point out _first_ VM?
Yes. I'll add "first".
Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 7 lines
and disables hardware (in
x86, disable VMX on all CPUs) for last VM destruction.TDX requires its initialization on loading KVM module with VMX enabled on all available CPUs. It needs to enable/disable hardware on module initialization. To reuse the same logic, one way is to pass around the
To reuse the same logic for what? I think you need to be specific (and focus) on why we need this patch: we will opportunistically move CPU compatibility check to
hardware_enable_nolock(), which doesn't take any argument, and this patch is a preparation to do that.Quoted 3 lines
unused opaque argument, another way is to remove the unused opaque argument. This patch is a preparation for the latter by removing the argument
So how about replacing the last two paragraphs with:
"
Initializing TDX will be done during module loading time, and in order to do thathardware_enable_all()will be done during module loading time too, as initializing TDX requires all cpus being in VMX operation. As a result, CPU compatibility check will be opportunistically moved tohardware_enable_nolock(), which doesn't take any argument. Instead of passing 'opaque' around tohardware_enable_nolock()andhardware_enable_all(), just remove the unused 'opaque' argument fromkvm_arch_check_processor_compat().
"Or even simpler:
"
To support TDX,hardware_enable_all()will be done during module loading time. As a result, CPU compatibility check will be opportunistically moved tohardware_enable_nolock(), which doesn't take any argument. Instead of passing 'opaque' around tohardware_enable_nolock()andhardware_enable_all(), just remove the unused 'opaque' argument fromkvm_arch_check_processor_compat(). "
Quoted 1 line
With changelog updated:
Thanks, I'll adapt the simpler one.
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
PATCH v8 3/103 KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX module requires its initialization. It requires VMX to be enabled. Although there are several options of when to initialize it, the choice is the initialization time of the KVM kernel module. There is no usable arch-specific hook for the TDX module to utilize during the KVM kernel module initialization. The code doesn't enable/disable hardware (VMX in TDX case) during the kernel module initialization. Add a hook for enabling hardware, arch-specific initialization, and disabling hardware during KVM kernel module initialization to make a room for TDX module initialization. The current KVM enables hardware when the first VM is created and disables hardware when the last VM is destroyed. When no VM is running, hardware is disabled. To follow these semantics, the kernel module initialization needs to disable hardware. Opportunistically refactor the code to enable/disable hardware.
Add hadware_enable_all() and hardware_disable_all() to kvm_init() and introduce a new arch-specific callback function, kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup, for arch to do arch-specific initialization that requires hardware_enable_all(). Opportunistically, move kvm_arch_check_processor_compat() to to hardware_enabled_nolock(). TDX module initialization code will go into kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup().
This patch reorders some function calls as below from (*) (**) (A) and (B) to (A) (B) and (*). Here (A) and (B) depends on (*), but not (**). By code inspection, only mips and VMX has the code of (*). No other arch has empty (*). So refactor mips and VMX and eliminate the necessity hook for (*) instead of adding an unused hook.
Before this patch:
- Arch module initialization
- kvm_init()
- kvm_arch_init()
- kvm_arch_check_processor_compat() on each CPUs
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (*): (A) and (B) depends on this
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (**): no dependency to (A) and (B)
- When creating/deleting the first/last VM
- kvm_arch_hardware_enable() on each CPUs -- (A)
- kvm_arch_hardware_disable() on each CPUs -- (B)
After this patch:
- Arch module initialization
- kvm_init()
- kvm_arch_init()
- arch-specific initialization -- (*)
- kvm_arch_check_processor_compat() on each CPUs
- kvm_arch_hardware_enable() on each CPUs -- (A)
- kvm_arch_hardware_disable() on each CPUs -- (B)
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (**)
- When creating/deleting the first/last VM (no logic change)
- kvm_arch_hardware_enable() on each CPUs -- (A)
- kvm_arch_hardware_disable() on each CPUs -- (B)
Code inspection result:
As long as I inspected, I found only mips and VMX have non-empty (*) or non-empty (A) or (B).
x86: tested on a real machine
mips: compile test only
powerpc, s390, arm, riscv: code inspection only
- arch/mips/kvm/mips.c
module init function, kvm_mips_init(), does some initialization after kvm_init(). Compile test only.
- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
- uses vm_list which is statically initialized.
- static_call(kvm_x86_hardware_enable)();
- SVM: (*) and (**) are empty.
- VMX: initialize percpu variable loaded_vmcss_on_cpu that VMXON uses.
- arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
kvm_arch_hardware_enable/disable() are nop
- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
kvm_arch_hardware_enable/disable() are nop
- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
module init function, arm_init(), calls only kvm_init(). (*) and (**) are empty
- arch/riscv/kvm/main.c
module init function, riscv_kvm_init(), calls only kvm_init(). (*) and (**) are empty
--- arch/mips/kvm/mips.c | 16 +++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/mips/kvm/mips.c +11 -5
@@ -1642,12 +1642,11 @@ static int __init kvm_mips_init(void)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +/* +* kvm_init() calls kvm_arch_hardware_enable/disable(). The early +* initialization is needed before calling kvm_init(). +*/ ret =kvm_mips_entry_setup (); -if (ret) -return ret; - - ret =kvm_init (NULL ,sizeof (struct kvm_vcpu ),0 ,THIS_MODULE ); -if (ret)return ret;
@@ -1656,6 +1655,13 @@ static int __init kvm_mips_init(void)register_die_notifier (&kvm_mips_csr_die_notifier); + ret =kvm_init (NULL ,sizeof (struct kvm_vcpu ),0 ,THIS_MODULE ); + +if (ret) { +unregister_die_notifier (&kvm_mips_csr_die_notifier); +return ret; + } +return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +19 -4
@@ -8433,6 +8433,23 @@ static void vmx_exit(void) }module_exit (vmx_exit); +/* +* Early initialization before kvm_init() so that vmx_hardware_enable/disable() +* can work. +*/ +static void __init vmx_init_early (void ) +{ +int cpu; + +/* +* vmx_hardware_disable() accesses loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list. +* Initialize the variable before kvm_init() that calls +* vmx_hardware_enable/disable(). +*/ +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&per_cpu (loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); +} +static int __init vmx_init (void ) {int r, cpu;
@@ -8470,6 +8487,7 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void) }#endif +vmx_init_early (); r =kvm_init (&vmx_init_ops,sizeof (struct vcpu_vmx ), __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx ),THIS_MODULE );if (r)
@@ -8490,11 +8508,8 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl (); -for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&per_cpu (loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); - +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)pi_init_cpu (cpu); - }#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1437,6 +1437,7 @@ static inline void kvm_create_vcpu_debugfs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}int kvm_arch_hardware_enable (void );void kvm_arch_hardware_disable (void );int kvm_arch_hardware_setup (void *opaque); +int kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (void *opaque);void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup (void );int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void );int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +24 -7
@@ -4995,8 +4995,13 @@ static void hardware_enable_nolock(void *junk)cpumask_set_cpu (cpu, cpus_hardware_enabled); + r =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (); +if (r) + goto out; + r =kvm_arch_hardware_enable (); +out:if (r) {cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu, cpus_hardware_enabled);atomic_inc (&hardware_enable_failed);
@@ -5793,9 +5798,9 @@ void kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks(void) }#endif -static void check_processor_compat (void *rtn) +__weak int kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (void *opaque) { - *(int *)rtn =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (); +return 0 ; } int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,
@@ -5828,11 +5833,23 @@ int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,if (r <0 ) goto out_free_1; -for_each_online_cpu (cpu) { -smp_call_function_single (cpu, check_processor_compat, &r,1 ); -if (r <0 ) - goto out_free_2; - } +/* hardware_enable_nolock() checks CPU compatibility on each CPUs. */ + r =hardware_enable_all (); +if (r) + goto out_free_2; +/* +* Arch specific initialization that requires to enable virtualization +* feature. e.g. TDX module initialization requires VMXON on all +* present CPUs. +*/ +kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (opaque); +/* +* Make hardware disabled after the KVM module initialization. KVM +* enables hardware when the first KVM VM is created and disables +* hardware when the last KVM VM is destroyed. When no KVM VM is +* running, hardware is disabled. Keep that semantics. +*/ +hardware_disable_all (); r =cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls (CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTING ,"kvm/cpu:starting" , kvm_starting_cpu, kvm_dying_cpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
Quoted 24 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:00, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX module requires its initialization. It requires VMX to be enabled. Although there are several options of when to initialize it, the choice is the initialization time of the KVM kernel module. There is no usable arch-specific hook for the TDX module to utilize during the KVM kernel module initialization. The code doesn't enable/disable hardware (VMX in TDX case) during the kernel module initialization. Add a hook for enabling hardware, arch-specific initialization, and disabling hardware during KVM kernel module initialization to make a room for TDX module initialization. The current KVM enables hardware when the first VM is created and disables hardware when the last VM is destroyed. When no VM is running, hardware is disabled. To follow these semantics, the kernel module initialization needs to disable hardware. Opportunistically refactor the code to enable/disable hardware.
Add
hadware_enable_all()andhardware_disable_all()tokvm_init()and introduce a new arch-specific callback function,kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup, for arch to do arch-specific initialization that requireshardware_enable_all(). Opportunistically, movekvm_arch_check_processor_compat()to tohardware_enabled_nolock(). TDX module initialization code will go intokvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup().
Quoted 3 lines
This patch reorders some function calls as below from (*) (**) (A) and (B) to (A) (B) and (*). Here (A) and (B) depends on (*), but not (**). By code inspection, only mips and VMX has the code of (*). No other
No other or other?
Quoted 15 lines
arch has empty (*). So refactor mips and VMX and eliminate the necessity hook for (*) instead of adding an unused hook.
Before this patch:
- Arch module initialization
-kvm_init()
-kvm_arch_init()
-kvm_arch_check_processor_compat()on each CPUs
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (*): (A) and (B) depends on this
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (**): no dependency to (A) and (B)- When creating/deleting the first/last VM
-kvm_arch_hardware_enable()on each CPUs -- (A)
-kvm_arch_hardware_disable()on each CPUs -- (B)
Quoted 7 lines
After this patch:
- Arch module initialization
-kvm_init()
-kvm_arch_init()
- arch-specific initialization -- (*)
-kvm_arch_check_processor_compat()on each CPUs
-kvm_arch_hardware_enable()on each CPUs -- (A)
Maybe also put the new added kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup here? After all, this is the purpose of this patch.
Quoted 7 lines
-
kvm_arch_hardware_disable()on each CPUs -- (B)
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (**)- When creating/deleting the first/last VM (no logic change)
-kvm_arch_hardware_enable()on each CPUs -- (A)
-kvm_arch_hardware_disable()on each CPUs -- (B)
Re: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
In reply to [email protected]First of all, I think the patch title can be improved. "refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization" isn't the purpose of this patch. It is just a bonus. The title should reflect the main purpose (or behaviour) of this patch:
KVM: Temporarily enable hardware on all cpus during module loading time
Quoted 11 lines · On Sun, 2022-08-07 at 15:00 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX module requires its initialization. It requires VMX to be enabled. Although there are several options of when to initialize it, the choice is the initialization time of the KVM kernel module. There is no usable arch-specific hook for the TDX module to utilize during the KVM kernel module initialization. The code doesn't enable/disable hardware (VMX in TDX case) during the kernel module initialization. Add a hook for enabling hardware, arch-specific initialization, and disabling hardware during KVM kernel module initialization to make a room for TDX module initialization.
The hook is only for arch-specific initialization. It doesn't do hardware_enable_all() and hardware_disable_all().
Quoted 7 lines
The
current KVM enables hardware when the first VM is created and disables hardware when the last VM is destroyed. When no VM is running, hardware is disabled. To follow these semantics, the kernel module initialization needs to disable hardware. Opportunistically refactor the code to enable/disable hardware.
Quoted 7 lines
Add
hadware_enable_all()andhardware_disable_all()tokvm_init()and introduce a new arch-specific callback function,kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup, for arch to do arch-specific initialization that requireshardware_enable_all(). Opportunistically, movekvm_arch_check_processor_compat()to tohardware_enabled_nolock(). TDX module initialization code will go intokvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup().
The remaining paragraphs are very hard to follow. IMHO they are too details and are not changelog material. If you can obtain Reviewed-by from reviewer/maintainer for specific arch, then it implies the code is fine to that arch, and you don't need those details below in changelog.
So perhaps just say something like:
With doing hardware_enable_all() and hardware_disable_all() in kvm_init(), some arch-specific code which must be done before them must also be moved before kvm_init(). Only VMX and MIPS have such code:
- For VMX, per-cpu variable loaded_vmcss_on_cpu must be initialized before hardware_disable_all(). Introduce vmx_early_init() to do it and call vmx_eraly_init() before kvm_init() in vmx_init().
- For MIPS, move kvm_init() to the end of kvm_mips_init() (or whatever you like...).
Quoted 79 lines
This patch reorders some function calls as below from (*) (**) (A) and (B) to (A) (B) and (*). Here (A) and (B) depends on (*), but not (**). By code inspection, only mips and VMX has the code of (*). No other arch has empty (*). So refactor mips and VMX and eliminate the necessity hook for (*) instead of adding an unused hook.
Before this patch:
- Arch module initialization
-kvm_init()
-kvm_arch_init()
-kvm_arch_check_processor_compat()on each CPUs
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (*): (A) and (B) depends on this
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (**): no dependency to (A) and (B)- When creating/deleting the first/last VM
-kvm_arch_hardware_enable()on each CPUs -- (A)
-kvm_arch_hardware_disable()on each CPUs -- (B)After this patch:
- Arch module initialization
-kvm_init()
-kvm_arch_init()
- arch-specific initialization -- (*)
-kvm_arch_check_processor_compat()on each CPUs
-kvm_arch_hardware_enable()on each CPUs -- (A)
-kvm_arch_hardware_disable()on each CPUs -- (B)
- post-arch-specific initialization -- (**)- When creating/deleting the first/last VM (no logic change)
-kvm_arch_hardware_enable()on each CPUs -- (A)
-kvm_arch_hardware_disable()on each CPUs -- (B)Code inspection result:
As long as I inspected, I found only mips and VMX have non-empty (*) or non-empty (A) or (B).
x86: tested on a real machine
mips: compile test only
powerpc, s390, arm, riscv: code inspection only-
arch/mips/kvm/mips.c
module init function,kvm_mips_init(), does some initialization afterkvm_init(). Compile test only.-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
- usesvm_listwhich is statically initialized.
- static_call(kvm_x86_hardware_enable)();
- SVM: (*) and (**) are empty.
- VMX: initialize percpu variableloaded_vmcss_on_cputhat VMXON uses.-
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
kvm_arch_hardware_enable/disable() are nop-
arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
kvm_arch_hardware_enable/disable() are nop-
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
module init function,arm_init(), calls onlykvm_init(). (*) and (**) are empty-
arch/riscv/kvm/main.c
module init function,riscv_kvm_init(), calls onlykvm_init(). (*) and (**) are emptyCo-developed-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/mips/kvm/mips.c | 16 +++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)arch/mips/kvm/mips.c +0
-0
arch/mips/kvm/mips.c static int __init kvm_mips_init(void) · line 1648
Quoted 7 lines
arch/mips/kvm/mips.c +4
-0@@ -1642,12 +1642,11 @@ static int __init kvm_mips_init(void)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +/* +* kvm_init() calls kvm_arch_hardware_enable/disable(). The early +* initialization is needed before calling kvm_init(). +*/
Sorry I take this back. It's upto MIPS reviewer/maintainer to decide whether we need a comment here.
Quoted 129 lines
arch/mips/kvm/mips.c +7
-5ret =kvm_mips_entry_setup (); -if (ret) -return ret; - - ret =kvm_init (NULL ,sizeof (struct kvm_vcpu ),0 ,THIS_MODULE ); -if (ret)return ret;@@ -1656,6 +1655,13 @@ static int __init kvm_mips_init(void)register_die_notifier (&kvm_mips_csr_die_notifier); + ret =kvm_init (NULL ,sizeof (struct kvm_vcpu ),0 ,THIS_MODULE ); + +if (ret) { +unregister_die_notifier (&kvm_mips_csr_die_notifier); +return ret; + } +return 0 ; }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +19
-4@@ -8433,6 +8433,23 @@ static void vmx_exit(void) }module_exit (vmx_exit); +/* +* Early initialization before kvm_init() so that vmx_hardware_enable/disable() +* can work. +*/ +static void __init vmx_init_early (void ) +{ +int cpu; + +/* +* vmx_hardware_disable() accesses loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list. +* Initialize the variable before kvm_init() that calls +* vmx_hardware_enable/disable(). +*/ +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&per_cpu (loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); +} +static int __init vmx_init (void ) {int r, cpu;@@ -8470,6 +8487,7 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void) }#endif +vmx_init_early (); r =kvm_init (&vmx_init_ops,sizeof (struct vcpu_vmx ), __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx ),THIS_MODULE );if (r)@@ -8490,11 +8508,8 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl (); -for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&per_cpu (loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); - +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)pi_init_cpu (cpu); - }#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,include/linux/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1437,6 +1437,7 @@ static inline void kvm_create_vcpu_debugfs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}int kvm_arch_hardware_enable (void );void kvm_arch_hardware_disable (void );int kvm_arch_hardware_setup (void *opaque); +int kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (void *opaque);void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup (void );int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (void );int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +13
-7@@ -4995,8 +4995,13 @@ static void hardware_enable_nolock(void *junk)cpumask_set_cpu (cpu, cpus_hardware_enabled); + r =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (); +if (r) + goto out; + r =kvm_arch_hardware_enable (); +out:if (r) {cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu, cpus_hardware_enabled);atomic_inc (&hardware_enable_failed);@@ -5793,9 +5798,9 @@ void kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks(void) }#endif -static void check_processor_compat (void *rtn) +__weak int kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (void *opaque) { - *(int *)rtn =kvm_arch_check_processor_compat (); +return 0 ; } int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,@@ -5828,11 +5833,23 @@ int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,if (r <0 ) goto out_free_1; -for_each_online_cpu (cpu) { -smp_call_function_single (cpu, check_processor_compat, &r,1 ); -if (r <0 ) - goto out_free_2; - } +/* hardware_enable_nolock() checks CPU compatibility on each CPUs. */ + r =hardware_enable_all (); +if (r) + goto out_free_2; +/* +* Arch specific initialization that requires to enable virtualization
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, · line 5851
Quoted 10 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +10
-0+* feature. e.g. TDX module initialization requires VMXON on all +* present CPUs. +*/ +kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (opaque); +/* +* Make hardware disabled after the KVM module initialization. KVM +* enables hardware when the first KVM VM is created and disables +* hardware when the last KVM VM is destroyed. When no KVM VM is +* running, hardware is disabled. Keep that semantics. +*/
Except the first sentence, the remaining sentences are more like changelog material. Perhaps just say something below to be more specific on the purpose:
/*
* Disable hardware on all cpus so that out-of-tree drivers which
* also use hardware-assisted virtualization (such as virtualbox
* kernel module) can still be loaded when KVM is loaded. */
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, · line 5855
Quoted 4 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1
-0+hardware_disable_all (); r =cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls (CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTING ,"kvm/cpu:starting" , kvm_starting_cpu, kvm_dying_cpu);
Anyway (although I still think it's better to introduce the __weak kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup() in later patch together with the VMX version to support TDX), with above comments addressed:
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, -Kai
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
+Will (for arm crud)
Quoted 6 lines · Kai
First of all, I think the patch title can be improved. "refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization" isn't the purpose of this patch. It is just a bonus. The title should reflect the main purpose (or behaviour) of this patch:
KVM: Temporarily enable hardware on all cpus during module loading time
...
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 6 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +6
-0+/* hardware_enable_nolock() checks CPU compatibility on each CPUs. */ + r =hardware_enable_all (); +if (r) + goto out_free_2; +/* +* Arch specific initialization that requires to enable virtualization virt/kvm/kvm_main.c int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, · line 5851
Quoted 10 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +10
-0+* feature. e.g. TDX module initialization requires VMXON on all +* present CPUs. +*/ +kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (opaque); +/* +* Make hardware disabled after the KVM module initialization. KVM +* enables hardware when the first KVM VM is created and disables +* hardware when the last KVM VM is destroyed. When no KVM VM is +* running, hardware is disabled. Keep that semantics. +*/ Except the first sentence, the remaining sentences are more like changelog material. Perhaps just say something below to be more specific on the purpose:
/*
* Disable hardware on all cpus so that out-of-tree drivers which
* also use hardware-assisted virtualization (such as virtualbox
* kernel module) can still be loaded when KVM is loaded. */
Quoted 4 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, · line 5855
Quoted 4 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1
-0+hardware_disable_all (); r =cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls (CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTING ,"kvm/cpu:starting" , kvm_starting_cpu, kvm_dying_cpu);
I've been poking at the "hardware enable" code this week for other reasons, and have come to the conclusion that the current implementation is a mess.
x86 overloads "hardware enable" to do three different things:
1. actually enable hardware
2. snapshot per-CPU MSR value for user-return MSRs
3. handle unstable TSC _for existing VMs_ on suspend+resume and/or CPU hotplug
#2 and #3 have nothing to do with enabling hardware, kvm_arch_hardware_enable() just so happens to be called in a superset of what is needed for dealing with unstable TSCs, and AFAICT the user-return MSRs is simply a historical wart. The user-return MSRs code is subtly very, very nasty, as it means that KVM snaphots MSRs from IRQ context, e.g. if an out-of-tree module is running VMs, the IRQ can interrupt the _guest_ and cause KVM to snapshot guest registers. VMX and SVM kinda sorta guard against this by refusing to load if VMX/SVM are already enabled, but it's not foolproof.
Eww, and #3 is broken. If CPU (un)hotplug collides with kvm_destroy_vm() or kvm_create_vm(), kvm_arch_hardware_enable() could explode due to vm_list being modified while it's being walked.
Of course, that path is broken for other reasons too, e.g. needs to prevent CPUs from going on/off-line when KVM is enabling hardware.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
arm64 is also quite evil and circumvents KVM's hardware enabling logic to some extent. kvm_arch_init() => init_subsystems() unconditionally enables hardware, and for pKVM _leaves_ hardware enabled. And then hyp_init_cpu_pm_notifier() disables/enables hardware across lower power enter+exit, except if pKVM is enabled. The icing on the cake is "disabling" hardware doesn't even do anything (AFAICT) if the kernel is running at EL2 (which I think is nVHE + not-pKVM?).
PPC apparently didn't want to be left out of the party, and despite having a nop for kvm_arch_hardware_disable(), it does its own "is KVM enabled" tracking (see kvm_hv_vm_(de)activated()). At least PPC gets the cpus_read_(un)lock() stuff right...
MIPS doesn't appear to have any shenanigans, but kvm_vz_hardware_enable() appears to be a "heavy" operation, i.e. ideally not something that should be done spuriously.
s390 and PPC are the only sane architectures and don't require explicit enabling of virtualization.
At a glance, arm64 won't explode, but enabling hardware _twice_ during kvm_init() is all kinds of gross.
Another wart that we can clean up is the cpus_hardware_enabled mask. I don't see any reason KVM needs to use a global mask, a per-cpu variable a la kvm_arm_hardware_enabled would do just fine.
OMG, and there's another bug lurking (I need to stop looking at this code). Commit 5f6de5cbebee ("KVM: Prevent module exit until all VMs are freed") added an error path that can cause VM creation to fail _after_ it has been added to the list, but doesn't unwind _any_ of the stuff done by kvm_arch_post_init_vm() and beyond.
Rather than trying to rework common KVM to fit all the architectures random needs, I think we should instead overhaul the entire mess. And we should do that ASAP ahead of TDX, though obviously with an eye toward not sucking for TDX.
Not 100% thought out at this point, but I think we can do:
1. Have x86 snapshot per-CPU user-return MRS on first use (trivial to do by adding a flag to struct kvm_user_return_msrs, as user_return_msrs is already per-CPU).
2. Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock and
cpu_read_lock().
3. Provide arch hooks that are invoked for "power management" operations (including CPU hotplug and host reboot, hence the quotes). Note, there's both a platform- wide PM notifier and a per-CPU notifier...
4. Rename kvm_arch_post_init_vm() to e.g. kvm_arch_add_vm(), call it under kvm_lock, and pass in kvm_usage_count.
5a. Drop cpus_hardware_enabled and drop the common hardware enable/disable code.
or
5b. Expose kvm_hardware_enable_all() and/or kvm_hardware_enable() so that archs
don't need to implement their own error handling and per-CPU flags.
I.e. give each architecture hooks to handle possible transition points, but otherwise let arch code decide when and how to do hardware enabling/disabling.
I'm very tempted to vote for (5a); x86 is the only architecture has an error path in kvm_arch_hardware_enable(), and trying to get common code to play nice with arm's kvm_arm_hardware_enabled logic is probably going to be weird.
E.g. if we can get the back half kvm_create_vm() to look like the below, then arch code can enable hardware during kvm_arch_add_vm() if the existing count is zero without generic KVM needing to worry about when hardware needs to be enabled and disabled.
r = kvm_arch_init_vm(kvm, type);
if (r)
goto out_err_no_arch_destroy_vm;
r = kvm_init_mmu_notifier(kvm);
if (r)
goto out_err_no_mmu_notifier;
/*
* When the fd passed to this ioctl() is opened it pins the module,
* but try_module_get() also prevents getting a reference if the module
* is in MODULE_STATE_GOING (e.g. if someone ran "rmmod --wait").
*/
if (!try_module_get(kvm_chardev_ops.owner)) {
r = -ENODEV;
goto out_err;
}
mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
cpus_read_lock();
r = kvm_arch_add_vm(kvm, kvm_usage_count);
if (r)
goto out_final;
kvm_usage_count++;
list_add(&kvm->vm_list, &vm_list);
cpus_read_unlock();
mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
if (r)
goto out_put_module;
preempt_notifier_inc();
kvm_init_pm_notifier(kvm);
return kvm;out_final:
cpus_read_unlock(); mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock); module_put(kvm_chardev_ops.owner); out_err_no_put_module: #if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) && defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER) if (kvm->mmu_notifier.ops) mmu_notifier_unregister(&kvm->mmu_notifier, current->mm); #endif out_err_no_mmu_notifier: kvm_arch_destroy_vm(kvm);
Re: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
Quoted 38 lines · Sean Christopherson
+Will (for arm crud)
Quoted 6 lines · Kai
First of all, I think the patch title can be improved. "refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization" isn't the purpose of this patch. It is just a bonus. The title should reflect the main purpose (or behaviour) of this patch:
KVM: Temporarily enable hardware on all cpus during module loading time
...
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 6 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +6
-0+/* hardware_enable_nolock() checks CPU compatibility on each CPUs. */ + r =hardware_enable_all (); +if (r) + goto out_free_2; +/* +* Arch specific initialization that requires to enable virtualization virt/kvm/kvm_main.c int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, · line 5851
Quoted 10 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +10
-0+* feature. e.g. TDX module initialization requires VMXON on all +* present CPUs. +*/ +kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (opaque); +/* +* Make hardware disabled after the KVM module initialization. KVM +* enables hardware when the first KVM VM is created and disables +* hardware when the last KVM VM is destroyed. When no KVM VM is +* running, hardware is disabled. Keep that semantics. +*/ Except the first sentence, the remaining sentences are more like changelog material. Perhaps just say something below to be more specific on the purpose:
/*
* Disable hardware on all cpus so that out-of-tree drivers which
* also use hardware-assisted virtualization (such as virtualbox
* kernel module) can still be loaded when KVM is loaded. */
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, · line 5855
Quoted 4 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1
-0+hardware_disable_all (); r =cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls (CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTING ,"kvm/cpu:starting" , kvm_starting_cpu, kvm_dying_cpu);I've been poking at the "hardware enable" code this week for other reasons, and have come to the conclusion that the current implementation is a mess.
Thanks for the lengthy reply :)
First of all, to clarify, I guess by "current implementation" you mean the current upstream KVM code, but not this particular patch? :)
Quoted 15 lines
x86 overloads "hardware enable" to do three different things:
1. actually enable hardware
2. snapshot per-CPU MSR value for user-return MSRs
3. handle unstable TSC_forexistingVMs_on suspend+resume and/or CPU hotplug#2 and #3 have nothing to do with enabling hardware,
kvm_arch_hardware_enable()just so happens to be called in a superset of what is needed for dealing with unstable TSCs, and AFAICT the user-return MSRs is simply a historical wart. The user-return MSRs code is subtly very, very nasty, as it means that KVM snaphots MSRs from IRQ context, e.g. if an out-of-tree module is running VMs, the IRQ can interrupt the _guest_ and cause KVM to snapshot guest registers. VMX and SVM kinda sorta guard against this by refusing to load if VMX/SVM are already enabled, but it's not foolproof.
Quoted 3 lines
Eww, and #3 is broken. If CPU (un)hotplug collides with
kvm_destroy_vm()orkvm_create_vm(),kvm_arch_hardware_enable()could explode due tovm_listbeing modified while it's being walked.
Agreed.
Quoted 4 lines
Of course, that path is broken for other reasons too, e.g. needs to prevent CPUs from going on/off-line when KVM is enabling hardware.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
If I read correctly, the problem described in above link seems only to be true after we move CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTING from STARTING section to ONLINE section, but this hasn't been done yet in the current upstream KVM. Currently, CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTING is still in STARTING section so it is guaranteed it has been executed before start_secondary sets itself to online cpu mask.
Btw I saw v4 of Chao's patchset was sent Feb this year. It seems that series indeed improved CPU compatibility check and hotplug handling. Any reason that series wasn't merged?
Quoted 34 lines
arm64 is also quite evil and circumvents KVM's hardware enabling logic to some extent.
kvm_arch_init()=>init_subsystems()unconditionally enables hardware, and for pKVM _leaves_ hardware enabled. And thenhyp_init_cpu_pm_notifier()disables/enables hardware across lower power enter+exit, except if pKVM is enabled. The icing on the cake is "disabling" hardware doesn't even do anything (AFAICT) if the kernel is running at EL2 (which I think is nVHE + not-pKVM?).PPC apparently didn't want to be left out of the party, and despite having a nop for
kvm_arch_hardware_disable(), it does its own "is KVM enabled" tracking (see kvm_hv_vm_(de)activated()). At least PPC gets the cpus_read_(un)lock() stuff right...MIPS doesn't appear to have any shenanigans, but
kvm_vz_hardware_enable()appears to be a "heavy" operation, i.e. ideally not something that should be done spuriously.s390 and PPC are the only sane architectures and don't require explicit enabling of virtualization.
At a glance, arm64 won't explode, but enabling hardware _twice_ during
kvm_init()is all kinds of gross.Another wart that we can clean up is the
cpus_hardware_enabledmask. I don't see any reason KVM needs to use a global mask, a per-cpu variable a lakvm_arm_hardware_enabledwould do just fine.OMG, and there's another bug lurking (I need to stop looking at this code). Commit
5f6de5cbebee("KVM: Prevent module exit until all VMs are freed") added an error path that can cause VM creation to fail _after_ it has been added to the list, but doesn't unwind _any_ of the stuff done bykvm_arch_post_init_vm()and beyond.Rather than trying to rework common KVM to fit all the architectures random needs, I think we should instead overhaul the entire mess. And we should do that ASAP ahead of TDX, though obviously with an eye toward not sucking for TDX.
Quoted 7 lines
Not 100% thought out at this point, but I think we can do:
1. Have x86 snapshot per-CPU user-return MRS on first use (trivial to do by adding a flag to struct
kvm_user_return_msrs, asuser_return_msrsis already per-CPU).2. Drop
kvm_count_lockand instead protectkvm_usage_countwithkvm_lockandcpu_read_lock().
Agreed spinlock should/can be removed/replaced. It seems there's no need to use spinlock.
Also agreed that kvm_lock should be used. But I am not sure whether cpus_read_lock() is needed (whether CPU hotplug should be prevented). In current KVM, we don't do CPU compatibility check for hotplug CPU anyway, so when KVM does CPU compatibility check using for_each_online_cpu(), if CPU hotplug (hot-removal) happens, the worst case is we lose compatibility check on that CPU.
Or perhaps I am missing something?
Quoted 40 lines
3. Provide arch hooks that are invoked for "power management" operations (including CPU hotplug and host reboot, hence the quotes). Note, there's both a platform- wide PM notifier and a per-CPU notifier...
4. Rename
kvm_arch_post_init_vm()to e.g.kvm_arch_add_vm(), call it underkvm_lock, and pass inkvm_usage_count.5a. Drop
cpus_hardware_enabledand drop the common hardware enable/disable code.or
5b. Expose
kvm_hardware_enable_all()and/orkvm_hardware_enable()so that archs
don't need to implement their own error handling and per-CPU flags.I.e. give each architecture hooks to handle possible transition points, but otherwise let arch code decide when and how to do hardware enabling/disabling.
I'm very tempted to vote for (5a); x86 is the only architecture has an error path in
kvm_arch_hardware_enable(), and trying to get common code to play nice with arm'skvm_arm_hardware_enabledlogic is probably going to be weird.E.g. if we can get the back half
kvm_create_vm()to look like the below, then arch code can enable hardware duringkvm_arch_add_vm()if the existing count is zero without generic KVM needing to worry about when hardware needs to be enabled and disabled.r = kvm_arch_init_vm(kvm, type); if (r) goto out_err_no_arch_destroy_vm; r = kvm_init_mmu_notifier(kvm); if (r) goto out_err_no_mmu_notifier; /* * When the fd passed to this ioctl() is opened it pins the module, * but try_module_get() also prevents getting a reference if the module * is in MODULE_STATE_GOING (e.g. if someone ran "rmmod --wait"). */
Quoted 8 lines
if (!try_module_get(kvm_chardev_ops.owner)) {
r = -ENODEV;
goto out_err;
}
mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
cpus_read_lock();
r = kvm_arch_add_vm(kvm, kvm_usage_count);Holding cpus_read_lock() here implies CPU hotplug cannot happen during kvm_arch_add_vm(). This needs a justification/comment to explain why.
Also, assuming we have a justification, since (based on your description above) arch _may_ choose to enable hardware within it, but it is not a _must_. So maybe remove cpus_read_lock() here and let kvm_arch_add_vm() to decide whether to use it?
Quoted 26 lines
if (r) goto out_final; kvm_usage_count++; list_add(&kvm->vm_list, &vm_list); cpus_read_unlock(); mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock); if (r) goto out_put_module; preempt_notifier_inc(); kvm_init_pm_notifier(kvm); return kvm;
out_final:cpus_read_unlock(); mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock); module_put(kvm_chardev_ops.owner); out_err_no_put_module: #if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) && defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER) if (kvm->mmu_notifier.ops) mmu_notifier_unregister(&kvm->mmu_notifier, current->mm); #endif out_err_no_mmu_notifier: kvm_arch_destroy_vm(kvm);
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
Quoted 8 lines · Kai
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
I've been poking at the "hardware enable" code this week for other reasons, and have come to the conclusion that the current implementation is a mess.
Thanks for the lengthy reply :)
First of all, to clarify, I guess by "current implementation" you mean the current upstream KVM code, but not this particular patch? :)
Yeah, upstream code.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Of course, that path is broken for other reasons too, e.g. needs to prevent CPUs from going on/off-line when KVM is enabling hardware.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]If I read correctly, the problem described in above link seems only to be true after we move
CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTINGfrom STARTING section to ONLINE section, but this hasn't been done yet in the current upstream KVM. Currently,CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTINGis still in STARTING section so it is guaranteed it has been executed beforestart_secondarysets itself to online cpu mask.
The lurking issue is that for_each_online_cpu() can against hotplug, i.e. every instance of for_each_online_cpu() in KVM is buggy (at least on the x86 side, I can't tell at a glance whether or not arm pKVM's usage is safe).
https://lore.kernel.org/all/87bl20aa72.ffs@tglx
Quoted 3 lines
Btw I saw v4 of Chao's patchset was sent Feb this year. It seems that series indeed improved CPU compatibility check and hotplug handling. Any reason that series wasn't merged?
AFAIK it was just a lack of reviews/acks for the non-KVM patches.
Quoted 8 lines
Also agreed that
kvm_lockshould be used. But I am not sure whethercpus_read_lock()is needed (whether CPU hotplug should be prevented). In current KVM, we don't do CPU compatibility check for hotplug CPU anyway, so when KVM does CPU compatibility check usingfor_each_online_cpu(), if CPU hotplug (hot-removal) happens, the worst case is we lose compatibility check on that CPU.Or perhaps I am missing something?
On a hot-add of an incompatible CPU, KVM would potentially skip the compatibility check and try to enable hardware on an incompatible/broken CPU.
Another possible bug is the checking of hv_get_vp_assist_page(); hot-adding a CPU that failed to allocate the VP assist page while vmx_init() is checking online CPUs could result in a NULL pointer deref due to KVM not rejecting the CPU as it should.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
mutex_lock(&kvm_lock); cpus_read_lock(); r = kvm_arch_add_vm(kvm, kvm_usage_count);Holding
cpus_read_lock()here implies CPU hotplug cannot happen duringkvm_arch_add_vm(). This needs a justification/comment to explain why.
Oh, for sure, the above was only intended to be a rough sketch, definitely not a formal patch.
Quoted 4 lines
Also, assuming we have a justification, since (based on your description above) arch _may_ choose to enable hardware within it, but it is not a _must_. So maybe remove
cpus_read_lock()here and letkvm_arch_add_vm()to decide whether to use it?
My thought is that it makes sense to provide a CPU hotplug friendly arch hook since
(a) all architectures except s390 (and maybe PPC) need such a hook (or more likely, multiple hooks) and (b) cpus_read_lock() will almost never be contended.
In other words, address the problem that's easy to solve (but also easy to forget) in generic code, but let architectures deal with the hardware enabling problem, which is a mess to solve in generic code (unless I'm missing something).
All that said, I haven't tried compiling yet, let alone actually running anything, so it's entirely possible my idea won't pan out.
Re: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
Quoted 22 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 8 lines · Kai
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
I've been poking at the "hardware enable" code this week for other reasons, and have come to the conclusion that the current implementation is a mess.
Thanks for the lengthy reply :)
First of all, to clarify, I guess by "current implementation" you mean the current upstream KVM code, but not this particular patch? :)
Yeah, upstream code.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Of course, that path is broken for other reasons too, e.g. needs to prevent CPUs from going on/off-line when KVM is enabling hardware.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]If I read correctly, the problem described in above link seems only to be true after we move
CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTINGfrom STARTING section to ONLINE section, but this hasn't been done yet in the current upstream KVM. Currently,CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTINGis still in STARTING section so it is guaranteed it has been executed beforestart_secondarysets itself to online cpu mask.
Quoted 5 lines
The lurking issue is that
for_each_online_cpu()can against hotplug, i.e. every instance offor_each_online_cpu()in KVM is buggy (at least on the x86 side, I can't tell at a glance whether or not arm pKVM's usage is safe).
Yes agreed. for_each_online_cpu() can race with CPU hotplug.
But the fact is looks there are many places using for_each_online_cpus() w/o holding cpus_read_lock(). :)
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Btw I saw v4 of Chao's patchset was sent Feb this year. It seems that series indeed improved CPU compatibility check and hotplug handling. Any reason that series wasn't merged?
AFAIK it was just a lack of reviews/acks for the non-KVM patches.
Quoted 7 lines
Also agreed that
kvm_lockshould be used. But I am not sure whethercpus_read_lock()is needed (whether CPU hotplug should be prevented). In current KVM, we don't do CPU compatibility check for hotplug CPU anyway, so when KVM does CPU compatibility check usingfor_each_online_cpu(), if CPU hotplug (hot-removal) happens, the worst case is we lose compatibility check on that CPU.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Or perhaps I am missing something?
On a hot-add of an incompatible CPU, KVM would potentially skip the compatibility check and try to enable hardware on an incompatible/broken CPU.
To resolve this, we need to do compatibility check before actually enabling hardware on each cpu, as Chao's series did. I don't see using cpus_read_lock() alone can actually fix anything.
Quoted 6 lines
Another possible bug is the checking of
hv_get_vp_assist_page(); hot-adding a CPU that failed to allocate the VP assist page whilevmx_init()is checking online CPUs could result in a NULL pointer deref due to KVM not rejecting the CPU as it should.
So we need Chao's series to fix those problems: 1) Do compatibility check before actually enable the hardware for each cpu; 2) allow CPU hotplug to fail; 3) Hold cpus_read_lock() when needed.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, -Kai
Re: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 14 lines · Kai
Quoted 14 lines
3. Provide arch hooks that are invoked for "power management" operations (including CPU hotplug and host reboot, hence the quotes). Note, there's both a platform- wide PM notifier and a per-CPU notifier...
4. Rename
kvm_arch_post_init_vm()to e.g.kvm_arch_add_vm(), call it underkvm_lock, and pass inkvm_usage_count.5a. Drop
cpus_hardware_enabledand drop the common hardware enable/disable code.or
5b. Expose
kvm_hardware_enable_all()and/orkvm_hardware_enable()so that archs
don't need to implement their own error handling and per-CPU flags.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
I.e. give each architecture hooks to handle possible transition points, but otherwise let arch code decide when and how to do hardware enabling/disabling.
I'm very tempted to vote for (5a); x86 is the only architecture has an error path in
kvm_arch_hardware_enable(), and trying to get common code to play nice with arm'skvm_arm_hardware_enabledlogic is probably going to be weird.
I ended up with (5a) with the following RFC patches.
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/T/#m0239e7800b66174b49c5b1049462aad50293a994
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 18 lines
E.g. if we can get the back half
kvm_create_vm()to look like the below, then arch code can enable hardware duringkvm_arch_add_vm()if the existing count is zero without generic KVM needing to worry about when hardware needs to be enabled and disabled.r = kvm_arch_init_vm(kvm, type); if (r) goto out_err_no_arch_destroy_vm; r = kvm_init_mmu_notifier(kvm); if (r) goto out_err_no_mmu_notifier; /* * When the fd passed to this ioctl() is opened it pins the module, * but try_module_get() also prevents getting a reference if the module * is in MODULE_STATE_GOING (e.g. if someone ran "rmmod --wait"). */Quoted 8 lines
if (!try_module_get(kvm_chardev_ops.owner)) { r = -ENODEV; goto out_err; } mutex_lock(&kvm_lock); cpus_read_lock(); r = kvm_arch_add_vm(kvm, kvm_usage_count);
Quoted 7 lines
Holding
cpus_read_lock()here implies CPU hotplug cannot happen duringkvm_arch_add_vm(). This needs a justification/comment to explain why.Also, assuming we have a justification, since (based on your description above) arch _may_ choose to enable hardware within it, but it is not a _must_. So maybe remove
cpus_read_lock()here and letkvm_arch_add_vm()to decide whether to use it?
For now, I put locking outside of kvm_arch_{add, del}_vm(). But I haven't looked at non-x86 arch. Probably arm code has its preference for its implementation.
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Marc Zyngier
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
In reply to Sean ChristophersonSean,
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
+Will (for arm crud)
When it comes to KVM/arm64, I'd appreciate if you could Cc me.
Quoted 8 lines
arm64 is also quite evil and circumvents KVM's hardware enabling logic to some extent.
kvm_arch_init()=>init_subsystems()unconditionally enables hardware, and for pKVM _leaves_ hardware enabled. And thenhyp_init_cpu_pm_notifier()disables/enables hardware across lower power enter+exit, except if pKVM is enabled. The icing on the cake is "disabling" hardware doesn't even do anything (AFAICT) if the kernel is running at EL2 (which I think is nVHE + not-pKVM?).
In the cases where disabling doesn't do anything (which are the exact opposite of the cases you describe), that's because there is absolutely *nothing* to do:
- If VHE, the kernel is the bloody hypervisor: disable virtualisation, kill the kernel.
- if pKVM, the kernel is basically a guest, and has no business touching anything at all.
So much the 'evil' behaviour.
M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization
Quoted 8 lines · Marc Zyngier
Sean,
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
+Will (for arm crud)
When it comes to KVM/arm64, I'd appreciate if you could Cc me.
Sorry, will do.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arm64 is also quite evil and circumvents KVM's hardware enabling logic to some extent.
kvm_arch_init()=>init_subsystems()unconditionally enables hardware, and for pKVM _leaves_ hardware enabled. And thenhyp_init_cpu_pm_notifier()disables/enables hardware across lower power enter+exit, except if pKVM is enabled. The icing on the cake is "disabling" hardware doesn't even do anything (AFAICT) if the kernel is running at EL2 (which I think is nVHE + not-pKVM?).
Quoted 3 lines
In the cases where disabling doesn't do anything (which are the exact opposite of the cases you describe), that's because there is absolutely *nothing* to do:
Yes, I know.
Quoted 7 lines
- If VHE, the kernel is the bloody hypervisor: disable virtualisation, kill the kernel.
- if pKVM, the kernel is basically a guest, and has no business touching anything at all.
So much the 'evil' behaviour.
The colorful language is tongue-in-cheek.
I get the impression that you feel I am attacking ARM. That is very much not what I intended. If anything, I'm attacking x86 for forcing its quirks on everyone else.
What am trying to point out here is that ARM and other architectures are not well-served by KVM's current hardware enabling/disabling infrastructure. I am not saying that ARM is broken and needs to be fixed, I am saying that KVM is broken and needs to be fixed, and that ARM is a victim of KVM's x86-centric origins.
PATCH v8 4/103 KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM accesses Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) with VMX instructions to operate on VM. TDX defines its data structure and TDX SEAMCALL APIs for VMM to operate on Trust Domain (TD) instead.
Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR ,..). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures, such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc. TDVPS is composed of Trust Domain Virtual Processor Root (TDVPR) which is the root page of TDVPS and Trust Domain Virtual Processor eXtension (TDVPX) pages which extend TDVPR to help provide enough physical space for the logical TDVPS structure.
Also, we have a new structure, Trust Domain Control Structure (TDCS) is the main control structure of a guest TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole, execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc. KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the same value for all VCPUs of the same TD. TDCS is a multi-page logical structure composed of multiple Trust Domain Control Extension (TDCX) physical pages. Trust Domain Root (TDR) is the root control structure of a guest TD and is encrypted using the TDX global private key. It holds a minimal set of state variables that enable guest TD control even during times when the TD's private key is not known, or when the TD's key management state does not permit access to memory encrypted using the TD's private key.
The following shows the relationship between those structures.
TDR--> TDCS per-TD
| \--> TDCX
\
\--> TDVPS per-TD VCPU
\--> TDVPR and TDVPXThe existing global struct kvm_x86_ops already defines an interface which fits with TDX. But kvm_x86_ops is system-wide, not per-VM structure. To allow VMX to coexist with TDs, the kvm_x86_ops callbacks will have wrappers "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()" to switch VMX or TDX at run time.
To split the runtime switch, the VMX implementation, and the TDX implementation, add main.c, and move out the vmx_x86_ops hooks in preparation for adding TDX, which can coexist with VMX, i.e. KVM can run both VMs and TDs. Use 'vt' for the naming scheme as a nod to VT-x and as a concatenation of VmxTdx.
The current code looks as follows.
In vmx.c
static vmx_op() { ... }
static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = {
.op = vmx_op,initialization code
The eventually converted code will look like In vmx.c, keep the VMX operations.
vmx_op() { ... }
VMX initialization
In tdx.c, define the TDX operations.
tdx_op() { ... }
TDX initialization
In x86_ops.h, declare the VMX and TDX operations.
vmx_op();
tdx_op();
In main.c, define common wrappers for VMX and VMX.
static vt_ops() { if (tdx) tdx_ops() else vmx_ops() }
static struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops = {
.op = vt_op,initialization to call VMX and TDX initialization
Opportunistically, fix the name inconsistency from vmx_create_vcpu() and vmx_free_vcpu() to vmx_vcpu_create() and vxm_vcpu_free().
--- arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 363 +++++++++++-------------------------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 125 +++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 259 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += mmu/tdp_iter.o mmu/tdp_mmu.o kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ - vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o + vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c new file +155 -0
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arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +105 -258
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arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h new file +125 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 004/103] KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
Quoted 65 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:00, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM accesses Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) with VMX instructions to operate on VM. TDX defines its data structure and TDX SEAMCALL APIs for VMM to operate on Trust Domain (TD) instead.
Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR ,..). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures, such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc. TDVPS is composed of Trust Domain Virtual Processor Root (TDVPR) which is the root page of TDVPS and Trust Domain Virtual Processor eXtension (TDVPX) pages which extend TDVPR to help provide enough physical space for the logical TDVPS structure.
Also, we have a new structure, Trust Domain Control Structure (TDCS) is the main control structure of a guest TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole, execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc. KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the same value for all VCPUs of the same TD. TDCS is a multi-page logical structure composed of multiple Trust Domain Control Extension (TDCX) physical pages. Trust Domain Root (TDR) is the root control structure of a guest TD and is encrypted using the TDX global private key. It holds a minimal set of state variables that enable guest TD control even during times when the TD's private key is not known, or when the TD's key management state does not permit access to memory encrypted using the TD's private key.
The following shows the relationship between those structures.
TDR--> TDCS per-TD | \--> TDCX \ \--> TDVPS per-TD VCPU \--> TDVPR and TDVPXThe existing global struct
kvm_x86_opsalready defines an interface which fits with TDX. Butkvm_x86_opsis system-wide, not per-VM structure. To allow VMX to coexist with TDs, thekvm_x86_opscallbacks will have wrappers "if (tdx)tdx_op()elsevmx_op()" to switch VMX or TDX at run time.To split the runtime switch, the VMX implementation, and the TDX implementation, add
main.c, and move out thevmx_x86_opshooks in preparation for adding TDX, which can coexist with VMX, i.e. KVM can run both VMs and TDs. Use 'vt' for the naming scheme as a nod to VT-x and as a concatenation of VmxTdx.The current code looks as follows.
Invmx.c
staticvmx_op(){ ... }static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = { .op = vmx_op,initialization code
The eventually converted code will look like
Invmx.c, keep the VMX operations.
vmx_op(){ ... }
VMX initialization
Intdx.c, define the TDX operations.
tdx_op(){ ... }
TDX initialization
Inx86_ops.h, declare the VMX and TDX operations.
Quoted 3 lines
vmx_op(); tdx_op();In
main.c, define common wrappers for VMX and VMX.
LGTM.
One typo here, VMX and TDX.
Quoted 13 lines
static vt_ops() { if (tdx) tdx_ops() else vmx_ops() } static struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops = { .op = vt_op, initialization to call VMX and TDX initializationOpportunistically, fix the name inconsistency from
vmx_create_vcpu()andvmx_free_vcpu()tovmx_vcpu_create()andvxm_vcpu_free().Co-developed-by Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v8 004/103] KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 4 lines · On Sun, 2022-08-07 at 15:00 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM accesses Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) with VMX instructions to operate on VM. TDX defines its data structure and TDX SEAMCALL APIs for
its own data structures
Quoted 1 line
VMM to operate on Trust Domain (TD) instead.
And sorry I don't see how below paragraphs from here ...
Quoted 26 lines
Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR ,..). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures, such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc. TDVPS is composed of Trust Domain Virtual Processor Root (TDVPR) which is the root page of TDVPS and Trust Domain Virtual Processor eXtension (TDVPX) pages which extend TDVPR to help provide enough physical space for the logical TDVPS structure.
Also, we have a new structure, Trust Domain Control Structure (TDCS) is the main control structure of a guest TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole, execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc. KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the same value for all VCPUs of the same TD. TDCS is a multi-page logical structure composed of multiple Trust Domain Control Extension (TDCX) physical pages. Trust Domain Root (TDR) is the root control structure of a guest TD and is encrypted using the TDX global private key. It holds a minimal set of state variables that enable guest TD control even during times when the TD's private key is not known, or when the TD's key management state does not permit access to memory encrypted using the TD's private key.
Quoted 8 lines
The following shows the relationship between those structures.
TDR--> TDCS per-TD | \--> TDCX \ \--> TDVPS per-TD VCPU \--> TDVPR and TDVPX
... to here are directly related to this patch. They belong to the patch(es) which actually implements them.
For instance, I don't think details like "MSR bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the same value for all VCPUs of the same TD" are related to this patch.
What we need to justify the change here is simple:
TDX doesn't allow VMM to operate VMCS directly. Instead, TDX has its own data structures, and uses SEAMCALLs to operate those data structures. This means we must have a TDX version of kvm_x86_ops.
I think your first paragraph kinda already does this.
Then you can balabala below ...
Quoted 50 lines
The existing global struct
kvm_x86_opsalready defines an interface which fits with TDX. Butkvm_x86_opsis system-wide, not per-VM structure. To allow VMX to coexist with TDs, thekvm_x86_opscallbacks will have wrappers "if (tdx)tdx_op()elsevmx_op()" to switch VMX or TDX at run time.To split the runtime switch, the VMX implementation, and the TDX implementation, add
main.c, and move out thevmx_x86_opshooks in preparation for adding TDX, which can coexist with VMX, i.e. KVM can run both VMs and TDs. Use 'vt' for the naming scheme as a nod to VT-x and as a concatenation of VmxTdx.The current code looks as follows.
Invmx.c
staticvmx_op(){ ... }static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = { .op = vmx_op,initialization code
The eventually converted code will look like In
vmx.c, keep the VMX operations.
vmx_op(){ ... }
VMX initialization
Intdx.c, define the TDX operations.
tdx_op(){ ... }
TDX initialization
Inx86_ops.h, declare the VMX and TDX operations.
vmx_op();
tdx_op();
Inmain.c, define common wrappers for VMX and VMX.
staticvt_ops(){ if (tdx)tdx_ops()elsevmx_ops()}static struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops = { .op = vt_op,initialization to call VMX and TDX initialization
Opportunistically, fix the name inconsistency from
vmx_create_vcpu()andvmx_free_vcpu()tovmx_vcpu_create()andvxm_vcpu_free().Co-developed-by Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 363 +++++++++++-------------------------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 125 +++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 259 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
PATCH v8 5/103 KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Currently, KVM VMX module initialization/exit functions are a single function each. Refactor KVM VMX module initialization functions into KVM common part and VMX part so that TDX specific part can be added cleanly. Opportunistically refactor module exit function as well.
The current module initialization flow is, 1.) calculate the sizes of VMX kvm structure and VMX vcpu structure, 2.) hyper-v specific initialization 3.) report those sizes to the KVM common layer and KVM common initialization, and 4.) VMX specific system-wide initialization.
Refactor the KVM VMX module initialization function into functions with a wrapper function to separate VMX logic in vmx.c from a file, main.c, common among VMX and TDX. We have a wrapper function, "vt_init() {vmx kvm/vcpu size calculation; hv_vp_assist_page_init(); kvm_init(); vmx_init(); }" in main.c, and hv_vp_assist_page_init() and vmx_init() in vmx.c. hv_vp_assist_page_init() initializes hyper-v specific assist pages, kvm_init() does system-wide initialization of the KVM common layer, and vmx_init() does system-wide VMX initialization.
The KVM architecture common layer allocates struct kvm with reported size for architecture-specific code. The KVM VMX module defines its structure as struct vmx_kvm { struct kvm; VMX specific members;} and uses it as struct vmx kvm. Similar for vcpu structure. TDX KVM patches will define TDX specific kvm and vcpu structures, add tdx_pre_kvm_init() to report the sizes of them to the KVM common layer.
The current module exit function is also a single function, a combination of VMX specific logic and common KVM logic. Refactor it into VMX specific logic and KVM common logic. This is just refactoring to keep the VMX specific logic in vmx.c from main.c.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 38 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 +++ 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +38 -0
@@ -153,3 +153,41 @@ struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = { .runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops, .pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops, }; + +static int __init vt_init (void ) +{ +unsigned int vcpu_size, vcpu_align; +int r; + + vt_x86_ops.vm_size =sizeof (struct kvm_vmx ); + vcpu_size =sizeof (struct vcpu_vmx ); + vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx ); + +hv_vp_assist_page_init (); +vmx_init_early (); + + r =kvm_init (&vt_init_ops, vcpu_size, vcpu_align,THIS_MODULE ); +if (r) + goto err_vmx_post_exit; + + r =vmx_init (); +if (r) + goto err_kvm_exit; + +return 0 ; + +err_kvm_exit: +kvm_exit (); +err_vmx_post_exit: +hv_vp_assist_page_exit (); +return r; +} +module_init (vt_init); + +static void vt_exit (void ) +{ +vmx_exit (); +kvm_exit (); +hv_vp_assist_page_exit (); +} +module_exit (vt_exit);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +51 -55
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arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +6 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@#include "x86.h" +void __init hv_vp_assist_page_init (void ); +void hv_vp_assist_page_exit (void ); +void __init vmx_init_early (void ); +int __init vmx_init (void ); +void vmx_exit (void ); +__init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support (void );__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios (void );__init int vmx_hardware_setup (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 6/103 KVM: Enable hardware before doing arch VM initialization
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Swap the order of hardware_enable_all() and kvm_arch_init_vm() to accommodate Intel's TDX, which needs VMX to be enabled during VM init in order to make SEAMCALLs.
This also provides consistent ordering between kvm_create_vm() and kvm_destroy_vm() with respect to calling kvm_arch_destroy_vm() and hardware_disable_all().
--- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +7 -7
@@ -1182,19 +1182,19 @@ static struct kvm *kvm_create_vm(unsigned long type)rcu_assign_pointer (kvm->buses[i],kzalloc (sizeof (struct kvm_io_bus ),GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ));if (!kvm->buses[i]) - goto out_err_no_arch_destroy_vm; + goto out_err_no_disable; } kvm->max_halt_poll_ns = halt_poll_ns; - r =kvm_arch_init_vm (kvm, type); -if (r) - goto out_err_no_arch_destroy_vm; - r =hardware_enable_all ();if (r) goto out_err_no_disable; + r =kvm_arch_init_vm (kvm, type); +if (r) + goto out_err_no_arch_destroy_vm; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQFD INIT_HLIST_HEAD (&kvm->irq_ack_notifier_list);#endif
@@ -1232,10 +1232,10 @@ static struct kvm *kvm_create_vm(unsigned long type)mmu_notifier_unregister (&kvm->mmu_notifier, current->mm);#endif out_err_no_mmu_notifier: -hardware_disable_all (); -out_err_no_disable:kvm_arch_destroy_vm (kvm); out_err_no_arch_destroy_vm: +hardware_disable_all (); +out_err_no_disable:WARN_ON_ONCE (!refcount_dec_and_test (&kvm->users_count));for (i =0 ; i <KVM_NR_BUSES ; i++)kfree (kvm_get_bus (kvm, i));
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 7/103 KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Add placeholders TDX VM/vcpu structure that overlays with VMX VM/vcpu structures. Initialize VM structure size and vcpu size/align so that x86 KVM common code knows those size irrespective of VMX or TDX. Those structures will be populated as guest creation logic develops.
Add helper functions to check if the VM is guest TD and add conversion functions between KVM VM/VCPU and TDX VM/VCPU.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 8 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +5 -3
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@#include "vmx.h" #include "nested.h" #include "pmu.h" +#include "tdx.h" struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,
@@ -159,9 +160,10 @@ static int __init vt_init(void)unsigned int vcpu_size, vcpu_align;int r; - vt_x86_ops.vm_size =sizeof (struct kvm_vmx ); - vcpu_size =sizeof (struct vcpu_vmx ); - vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx ); + vt_x86_ops.vm_size =max (sizeof (struct kvm_vmx ),sizeof (struct kvm_tdx )); + vcpu_size =max (sizeof (struct vcpu_vmx ),sizeof (struct vcpu_tdx )); + vcpu_align =max (__alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx ), + __alignof__(struct vcpu_tdx ));hv_vp_assist_page_init ();vmx_init_early ();
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h new file +54 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 8/103 x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about TDX module
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX KVM needs system-wide information about the TDX module, struct tdsysinfo_struct. Add a helper function tdx_get_sysinfo() to return it instead of KVM getting it with various error checks. Move out the struct definition about it to common place arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 20 +++++++++++--- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 52 ----------------------------------- 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +55 -0
@@ -89,11 +89,66 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +struct tdx_cpuid_config { +u32 leaf; +u32 sub_leaf; +u32 eax; +u32 ebx; +u32 ecx; +u32 edx; +} __packed; + +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE 1024 +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT 1024 + +struct tdsysinfo_struct { +/* TDX-SEAM Module Info */ +u32 attributes; +u32 vendor_id; +u32 build_date; +u16 build_num; +u16 minor_version; +u16 major_version; +u8 reserved0[14 ]; +/* Memory Info */ +u16 max_tdmrs; +u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr; +u16 pamt_entry_size; +u8 reserved1[10 ]; +/* Control Struct Info */ +u16 tdcs_base_size; +u8 reserved2[2 ]; +u16 tdvps_base_size; +u8 tdvps_xfam_dependent_size; +u8 reserved3[9 ]; +/* TD Capabilities */ +u64 attributes_fixed0; +u64 attributes_fixed1; +u64 xfam_fixed0; +u64 xfam_fixed1; +u8 reserved4[32 ]; +u32 num_cpuid_config; +/* +* The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above +* 'num_cpuid_config'. The size of 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' +* is 1024B defined by TDX architecture. Use a union with +* specific padding to make 'sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct)' +* equal to 1024. +*/ +union { +struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0 ]; +u8 reserved5[892 ]; + }; +} __packed__aligned(TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT) ; +bool platform_tdx_enabled (void );int tdx_init (void ); +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void );#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled (void ) {return false; }static inline int tdx_init (void ) {return -ENODEV ; } +struct tdsysinfo_struct ; +static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +16 -4
@@ -354,9 +354,9 @@ static int check_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int *actual_cmr_num)return 0 ; } -static int tdx_get_sysinfo (struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo, -struct cmr_info *cmr_array, -int *actual_cmr_num) +static int __tdx_get_sysinfo (struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo, +struct cmr_info *cmr_array, +int *actual_cmr_num) {struct tdx_module_output out;u64 ret;
@@ -383,6 +383,18 @@ static int tdx_get_sysinfo(struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo,return check_cmrs (cmr_array, actual_cmr_num); } +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) +{ +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *r =NULL ; + +mutex_lock (&tdx_module_lock); +if (tdx_module_status ==TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED ) + r = &tdx_sysinfo; +mutex_unlock (&tdx_module_lock); +return r; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_get_sysinfo); +/* * Skip the memory region below 1MB. Return true if the entire * region is skipped. Otherwise, the updated range is returned.
@@ -1106,7 +1118,7 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void)if (ret) goto out; - ret =tdx_get_sysinfo (&tdx_sysinfo, tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_cmr_num); + ret =__tdx_get_sysinfo (&tdx_sysinfo, tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_cmr_num);if (ret) goto out;
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h +0 -52
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 008/103] x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about TDX module
Quoted 6 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:00:53PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX KVM needs system-wide information about the TDX module, struct
tdsysinfo_struct. Add a helper functiontdx_get_sysinfo()to return it instead of KVM getting it with various error checks. Move out the struct definition about it to common placearch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h.
Will this be one of TDX's host patch set? The changes for arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h looks like exposing some struct definitaion as part of API to user of TDX (now it's KVM).
Quoted 190 lines
Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 20 +++++++++++--- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 52 ----------------------------------- 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +55
-0@@ -89,11 +89,66 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +struct tdx_cpuid_config { +u32 leaf; +u32 sub_leaf; +u32 eax; +u32 ebx; +u32 ecx; +u32 edx; +} __packed; + +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE 1024 +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT 1024 + +struct tdsysinfo_struct { +/* TDX-SEAM Module Info */ +u32 attributes; +u32 vendor_id; +u32 build_date; +u16 build_num; +u16 minor_version; +u16 major_version; +u8 reserved0[14 ]; +/* Memory Info */ +u16 max_tdmrs; +u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr; +u16 pamt_entry_size; +u8 reserved1[10 ]; +/* Control Struct Info */ +u16 tdcs_base_size; +u8 reserved2[2 ]; +u16 tdvps_base_size; +u8 tdvps_xfam_dependent_size; +u8 reserved3[9 ]; +/* TD Capabilities */ +u64 attributes_fixed0; +u64 attributes_fixed1; +u64 xfam_fixed0; +u64 xfam_fixed1; +u8 reserved4[32 ]; +u32 num_cpuid_config; +/* +* The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above +* 'num_cpuid_config'. The size of 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' +* is 1024B defined by TDX architecture. Use a union with +* specific padding to make 'sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct)' +* equal to 1024. +*/ +union { +struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0 ]; +u8 reserved5[892 ]; + }; +} __packed__aligned(TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT) ; +bool platform_tdx_enabled (void );int tdx_init (void ); +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void );#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled (void ) {return false; }static inline int tdx_init (void ) {return -ENODEV ; } +struct tdsysinfo_struct ; +static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +16
-4@@ -354,9 +354,9 @@ static int check_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int *actual_cmr_num)return 0 ; } -static int tdx_get_sysinfo (struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo, -struct cmr_info *cmr_array, -int *actual_cmr_num) +static int __tdx_get_sysinfo (struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo, +struct cmr_info *cmr_array, +int *actual_cmr_num) {struct tdx_module_output out;u64 ret;@@ -383,6 +383,18 @@ static int tdx_get_sysinfo(struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo,return check_cmrs (cmr_array, actual_cmr_num); } +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) +{ +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *r =NULL ; + +mutex_lock (&tdx_module_lock); +if (tdx_module_status ==TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED ) + r = &tdx_sysinfo; +mutex_unlock (&tdx_module_lock); +return r; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_get_sysinfo); +/* * Skip the memory region below 1MB. Return true if the entire * region is skipped. Otherwise, the updated range is returned. @@ -1106,7 +1118,7 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void)if (ret) goto out; - ret =tdx_get_sysinfo (&tdx_sysinfo, tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_cmr_num); + ret =__tdx_get_sysinfo (&tdx_sysinfo, tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_cmr_num);if (ret) goto out;arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h +0
-53@@ -65,58 +65,6 @@ struct cmr_info {#define MAX_CMRS 32#define CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT 512 -struct cpuid_config { -u32 leaf; -u32 sub_leaf; -u32 eax; -u32 ebx; -u32 ecx; -u32 edx; -} __packed; - -#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE 1024 -#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT 1024 - -struct tdsysinfo_struct { -/* TDX-SEAM Module Info */ -u32 attributes; -u32 vendor_id; -u32 build_date; -u16 build_num; -u16 minor_version; -u16 major_version; -u8 reserved0[14 ]; -/* Memory Info */ -u16 max_tdmrs; -u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr; -u16 pamt_entry_size; -u8 reserved1[10 ]; -/* Control Struct Info */ -u16 tdcs_base_size; -u8 reserved2[2 ]; -u16 tdvps_base_size; -u8 tdvps_xfam_dependent_size; -u8 reserved3[9 ]; -/* TD Capabilities */ -u64 attributes_fixed0; -u64 attributes_fixed1; -u64 xfam_fixed0; -u64 xfam_fixed1; -u8 reserved4[32 ]; -u32 num_cpuid_config; -/* -* The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above -* 'num_cpuid_config'. The size of 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' -* is 1024B defined by TDX architecture. Use a union with -* specific padding to make 'sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct)' -* equal to 1024. -*/ -union { -struct cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0 ]; -u8 reserved5[892 ]; - }; -} __packed__aligned(TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT) ; -struct tdmr_reserved_area {u64 offset;u64 size; --2.25.1
PATCH v8 9/103 KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX requires several initialization steps for KVM to create guest TDs. Detect CPU feature, enable VMX (TDX is based on VMX), detect the TDX module availability, and initialize it. This patch implements those steps.
There are several options on when to initialize the TDX module. A.) kernel module loading time, B.) the first guest TD creation time. A.) was chosen. With B.), a user may hit an error of the TDX initialization when trying to create the first guest TD. The machine that fails to initialize the TDX module can't boot any guest TD further. Such failure is undesirable and a surprise because the user expects that the machine can accommodate guest TD, but actually not. So A.) is better than B.).
Introduce a module parameter, enable_tdx, to explicitly enable TDX KVM support. It's off by default to keep same behavior for those who don't use TDX. Implement hardware_setup method to detect TDX feature of CPU. Because TDX requires all present CPUs to enable VMX (VMXON). The x86 specific kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup overrides the existing weak symbol of kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup which is called at the KVM module initialization.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 29 ++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 1 + 8 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1659,6 +1659,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_init_ops {int (*cpu_has_kvm_support)(void );int (*disabled_by_bios)(void );int (*hardware_setup)(void ); +int (*post_hardware_enable_setup)(void );unsigned int (*handle_intel_pt_intr)(void );struct kvm_x86_ops *runtime_ops;
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o +kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +28 -1
@@ -7,6 +7,32 @@#include "pmu.h" #include "tdx.h" +static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST ); +module_param_named (tdx, enable_tdx, bool,0444 ); + +static __init int vt_hardware_setup (void ) +{ +int ret; + + ret =vmx_hardware_setup (); +if (ret) +return ret; + + enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup (&vt_x86_ops); + +return 0 ; +} + +static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup (void ) +{ + enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_module_setup (); +/* +* Even if it failed to initialize TDX module, conventional VMX is +* available. Keep VMX usable. +*/ +return 0 ; +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,
@@ -148,7 +174,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = { .cpu_has_kvm_support = vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support, .disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios, - .hardware_setup = vmx_hardware_setup, + .hardware_setup = vt_hardware_setup, + .post_hardware_enable_setup = vt_post_hardware_enable_setup, .handle_intel_pt_intr =NULL , .runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +89 -0
89 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +4 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@#define __KVM_X86_TDX_H #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +int tdx_module_setup(void); + struct kvm_tdx { struct kvm kvm; /* TDX specific members follow. */
@@ -37,6 +39,8 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); }#else +static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }; +struct kvm_tdx {struct kvm kvm; };
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +6 -0
@@ -128,4 +128,10 @@ void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#endif void vmx_setup_mce (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops); +#else +static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; } +#endif +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8 -0
@@ -11983,6 +11983,14 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } +int kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (void *opaque) +{ +struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops = opaque; +if (ops->post_hardware_enable_setup) +return ops->post_hardware_enable_setup (); +return 0 ; +} +void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup (void ) {kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks ();
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +1 -0
@@ -1283,6 +1283,7 @@ bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) {return tdx_keyid_num >=2 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (platform_tdx_enabled);/** * tdx_init - Initialize the TDX module
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 009/103] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module
Quoted 176 lines · On Sun, 2022-08-07 at 15:00 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX requires several initialization steps for KVM to create guest TDs. Detect CPU feature, enable VMX (TDX is based on VMX), detect the TDX module availability, and initialize it. This patch implements those steps.
There are several options on when to initialize the TDX module. A.) kernel module loading time, B.) the first guest TD creation time. A.) was chosen. With B.), a user may hit an error of the TDX initialization when trying to create the first guest TD. The machine that fails to initialize the TDX module can't boot any guest TD further. Such failure is undesirable and a surprise because the user expects that the machine can accommodate guest TD, but actually not. So A.) is better than B.).
Introduce a module parameter,
enable_tdx, to explicitly enable TDX KVM support. It's off by default to keep same behavior for those who don't use TDX. Implementhardware_setupmethod to detect TDX feature of CPU. Because TDX requires all present CPUs to enable VMX (VMXON). The x86 specifickvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setupoverrides the existing weak symbol ofkvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setupwhich is called at the KVM module initialization.Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 29 ++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 1 + 8 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.carch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1659,6 +1659,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_init_ops {int (*cpu_has_kvm_support)(void );int (*disabled_by_bios)(void );int (*hardware_setup)(void ); +int (*post_hardware_enable_setup)(void );unsigned int (*handle_intel_pt_intr)(void );struct kvm_x86_ops *runtime_ops;arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o +kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.oarch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +28
-1@@ -7,6 +7,32 @@#include "pmu.h" #include "tdx.h" +static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST ); +module_param_named (tdx, enable_tdx, bool,0444 ); + +static __init int vt_hardware_setup (void ) +{ +int ret; + + ret =vmx_hardware_setup (); +if (ret) +return ret; + + enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup (&vt_x86_ops); + +return 0 ; +} + +static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup (void ) +{ + enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_module_setup (); +/* +* Even if it failed to initialize TDX module, conventional VMX is +* available. Keep VMX usable. +*/ +return 0 ; +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -148,7 +174,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = { .cpu_has_kvm_support = vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support, .disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios, - .hardware_setup = vmx_hardware_setup, + .hardware_setup = vt_hardware_setup, + .post_hardware_enable_setup = vt_post_hardware_enable_setup, .handle_intel_pt_intr =NULL , .runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +63
-0@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/cpu.h> + +#include <asm/tdx.h> + +#include "capabilities.h" +#include "x86_ops.h" +#include "tdx.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "tdx: " fmt + +#define TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS \ + ((sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) - \ + offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs)) \ + / sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)) + +struct tdx_capabilities { +u8 tdcs_nr_pages; +u8 tdvpx_nr_pages; + +u64 attrs_fixed0; +u64 attrs_fixed1; +u64 xfam_fixed0; +u64 xfam_fixed1; + +u32 nr_cpuid_configs; +struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS ]; +}; + +/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */ +static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps; + +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) +{ +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo; +int ret =0 ; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (*tdsysinfo) !=1024 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS !=37 ); + + ret =tdx_init (); +if (ret) { +pr_info ("Failed to initialize TDX module.\n" ); +return ret; + } + + tdsysinfo =tdx_get_sysinfo (); +if (tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config >TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS ) +return -EIO ; + + tdx_caps = (struct tdx_capabilities ) { + .tdcs_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size /PAGE_SIZE , +/* +* TDVPS = TDVPR(4K page) + TDVPX(multiple 4K pages). +* -1 for TDVPR. +*/ + .tdvpx_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdvps_base_size /PAGE_SIZE -1 , + .attrs_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed0, + .attrs_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed1, + .xfam_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed0, + .xfam_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed1, + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c line 73
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +10
-0+ }; +if (!memcpy (tdx_caps.cpuid_configs, tdsysinfo->cpuid_configs, + tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config * +sizeof (struct tdx_cpuid_config ))) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; +} + +int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
Function argument isn't used.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c line 83
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +10
-0+{ +if (!enable_ept) { +pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (!platform_tdx_enabled ()) { +pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX on TDX disabled platform\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + }
I am not sure whether this is necessary, as tdx_init() will call it internally anyway.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c line 86
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +3
-0+ +pr_info ("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n" , + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
Is it a little early to say "TDX is supported" before tdx_init() is called?
I don't think the whole tdx_hardware_setup() is even necessary? Looks nothing is serious here anyway, and all staff can be done in tdx_module_setup().
Quoted 71 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +3
-0+ +return 0 ; +}arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +4
-0@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@#define __KVM_X86_TDX_H #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +int tdx_module_setup(void); + struct kvm_tdx { struct kvm kvm; /* TDX specific members follow. */@@ -37,6 +39,8 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); }#else +static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }; +struct kvm_tdx {struct kvm kvm; };arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +6
-0@@ -128,4 +128,10 @@ void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#endif void vmx_setup_mce (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops); +#else +static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; } +#endif +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8
-0@@ -11983,6 +11983,14 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } +int kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (void *opaque) +{ +struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops = opaque; +if (ops->post_hardware_enable_setup) +return ops->post_hardware_enable_setup (); +return 0 ; +} +void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup (void ) {kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks ();arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +1
-0@@ -1283,6 +1283,7 @@ bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) {return tdx_keyid_num >=2 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (platform_tdx_enabled);/** * tdx_init - Initialize the TDX module
Re: [PATCH v8 009/103] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module
Quoted 57 lines · Kai
Quoted 30 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +30
-0+int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) +{ +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo; +int ret =0 ; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (*tdsysinfo) !=1024 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS !=37 ); + + ret =tdx_init (); +if (ret) { +pr_info ("Failed to initialize TDX module.\n" ); +return ret; + } + + tdsysinfo =tdx_get_sysinfo (); +if (tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config >TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS ) +return -EIO ; + + tdx_caps = (struct tdx_capabilities ) { + .tdcs_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size /PAGE_SIZE , +/* +* TDVPS = TDVPR(4K page) + TDVPX(multiple 4K pages). +* -1 for TDVPR. +*/ + .tdvpx_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdvps_base_size /PAGE_SIZE -1 , + .attrs_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed0, + .attrs_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed1, + .xfam_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed0, + .xfam_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed1, + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c line 73
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +10
-0+ }; +if (!memcpy (tdx_caps.cpuid_configs, tdsysinfo->cpuid_configs, + tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config * +sizeof (struct tdx_cpuid_config ))) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; +} + +int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)Function argument isn't used.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c line 83
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +10
-0+{ +if (!enable_ept) { +pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (!platform_tdx_enabled ()) { +pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX on TDX disabled platform\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + }I am not sure whether this is necessary, as
tdx_init()will call it internally anyway.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c line 86
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +3
-0+ +pr_info ("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n" , + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);Is it a little early to say "TDX is supported" before
tdx_init()is called?I don't think the whole
tdx_hardware_setup()is even necessary? Looks nothing is serious here anyway, and all staff can be done intdx_module_setup().
With the reorganize of kvm initialization[1], we have only one callback (kvm_arch_hardware_setup()). And yes, the message should be output after tdx_init().
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v8 009/103] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 65 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:00, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX requires several initialization steps for KVM to create guest TDs. Detect CPU feature, enable VMX (TDX is based on VMX), detect the TDX module availability, and initialize it. This patch implements those steps.
There are several options on when to initialize the TDX module. A.) kernel module loading time, B.) the first guest TD creation time. A.) was chosen. With B.), a user may hit an error of the TDX initialization when trying to create the first guest TD. The machine that fails to initialize the TDX module can't boot any guest TD further. Such failure is undesirable and a surprise because the user expects that the machine can accommodate guest TD, but actually not. So A.) is better than B.).
Introduce a module parameter,
enable_tdx, to explicitly enable TDX KVM support. It's off by default to keep same behavior for those who don't use TDX. Implementhardware_setupmethod to detect TDX feature of CPU. Because TDX requires all present CPUs to enable VMX (VMXON). The x86 specifickvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setupoverrides the existing weak symbol ofkvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setupwhich is called at the KVM module initialization.Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 29 ++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 1 + 8 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)create mode 100644
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.carch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1659,6 +1659,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_init_ops {int (*cpu_has_kvm_support)(void );int (*disabled_by_bios)(void );int (*hardware_setup)(void ); +int (*post_hardware_enable_setup)(void );unsigned int (*handle_intel_pt_intr)(void );struct kvm_x86_ops *runtime_ops;arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o +kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.oarch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c line 10
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +1
-0@@ -7,6 +7,32 @@#include "pmu.h" #include "tdx.h" +static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST );
So, if CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST is opt-in in kconfig, the code will try to enable TDX.
The behavior seems a bit different from what you mentioned in the commit message about the option to "explicitly enable TDX KVM support".
Quoted 201 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +27
-1+module_param_named (tdx, enable_tdx, bool,0444 ); + +static __init int vt_hardware_setup (void ) +{ +int ret; + + ret =vmx_hardware_setup (); +if (ret) +return ret; + + enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup (&vt_x86_ops); + +return 0 ; +} + +static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup (void ) +{ + enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_module_setup (); +/* +* Even if it failed to initialize TDX module, conventional VMX is +* available. Keep VMX usable. +*/ +return 0 ; +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -148,7 +174,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = { .cpu_has_kvm_support = vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support, .disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios, - .hardware_setup = vmx_hardware_setup, + .hardware_setup = vt_hardware_setup, + .post_hardware_enable_setup = vt_post_hardware_enable_setup, .handle_intel_pt_intr =NULL , .runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +89
-0@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/cpu.h> + +#include <asm/tdx.h> + +#include "capabilities.h" +#include "x86_ops.h" +#include "tdx.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "tdx: " fmt + +#define TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS \ + ((sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) - \ + offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs)) \ + / sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)) + +struct tdx_capabilities { +u8 tdcs_nr_pages; +u8 tdvpx_nr_pages; + +u64 attrs_fixed0; +u64 attrs_fixed1; +u64 xfam_fixed0; +u64 xfam_fixed1; + +u32 nr_cpuid_configs; +struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS ]; +}; + +/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */ +static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps; + +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) +{ +const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo; +int ret =0 ; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (*tdsysinfo) !=1024 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS !=37 ); + + ret =tdx_init (); +if (ret) { +pr_info ("Failed to initialize TDX module.\n" ); +return ret; + } + + tdsysinfo =tdx_get_sysinfo (); +if (tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config >TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS ) +return -EIO ; + + tdx_caps = (struct tdx_capabilities ) { + .tdcs_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size /PAGE_SIZE , +/* +* TDVPS = TDVPR(4K page) + TDVPX(multiple 4K pages). +* -1 for TDVPR. +*/ + .tdvpx_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdvps_base_size /PAGE_SIZE -1 , + .attrs_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed0, + .attrs_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed1, + .xfam_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed0, + .xfam_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed1, + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config, + }; +if (!memcpy (tdx_caps.cpuid_configs, tdsysinfo->cpuid_configs, + tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config * +sizeof (struct tdx_cpuid_config ))) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; +} + +int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) +{ +if (!enable_ept) { +pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (!platform_tdx_enabled ()) { +pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX on TDX disabled platform\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + } + +pr_info ("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n" , + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); + +return 0 ; +}arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +4
-0@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@#define __KVM_X86_TDX_H #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +int tdx_module_setup(void); + struct kvm_tdx { struct kvm kvm; /* TDX specific members follow. */@@ -37,6 +39,8 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); }#else +static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }; +struct kvm_tdx {struct kvm kvm; };arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +6
-0@@ -128,4 +128,10 @@ void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#endif void vmx_setup_mce (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops); +#else +static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; } +#endif +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8
-0@@ -11983,6 +11983,14 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)return 0 ; } +int kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup (void *opaque) +{ +struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops = opaque; +if (ops->post_hardware_enable_setup) +return ops->post_hardware_enable_setup (); +return 0 ; +} +void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup (void ) {kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks ();arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +1
-0@@ -1283,6 +1283,7 @@ bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) {return tdx_keyid_num >=2 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (platform_tdx_enabled);/** * tdx_init - Initialize the TDX module
Re: [PATCH v8 009/103] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module
Quoted 71 lines · Binbin Wu
Quoted 62 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:00, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX requires several initialization steps for KVM to create guest TDs. Detect CPU feature, enable VMX (TDX is based on VMX), detect the TDX module availability, and initialize it. This patch implements those steps.
There are several options on when to initialize the TDX module. A.) kernel module loading time, B.) the first guest TD creation time. A.) was chosen. With B.), a user may hit an error of the TDX initialization when trying to create the first guest TD. The machine that fails to initialize the TDX module can't boot any guest TD further. Such failure is undesirable and a surprise because the user expects that the machine can accommodate guest TD, but actually not. So A.) is better than B.).
Introduce a module parameter,
enable_tdx, to explicitly enable TDX KVM support. It's off by default to keep same behavior for those who don't use TDX. Implementhardware_setupmethod to detect TDX feature of CPU. Because TDX requires all present CPUs to enable VMX (VMXON). The x86 specifickvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setupoverrides the existing weak symbol ofkvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setupwhich is called at the KVM module initialization.Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 29 ++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 1 + 8 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)create mode 100644
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.carch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1659,6 +1659,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_init_ops {int (*cpu_has_kvm_support)(void );int (*disabled_by_bios)(void );int (*hardware_setup)(void ); +int (*post_hardware_enable_setup)(void );unsigned int (*handle_intel_pt_intr)(void );struct kvm_x86_ops *runtime_ops;arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o +kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.oarch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +0
-0arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c line 9
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +1
-0@@ -7,6 +7,32 @@#include "pmu.h" #include "tdx.h" +static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST );So, if
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOSTis opt-in in kconfig, the code will try to enable TDX.
Quoted 3 lines
The behavior seems a bit different from what you mentioned in the commit message about the option to "explicitly enable TDX KVM support".
Oops. For least surpise, I'll fix it as follows.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +1 -1
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@#include "pmu.h" #include "tdx.h" -static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST ); +static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx;module_param_named (tdx, enable_tdx, bool,0444 );static __init int vt_hardware_setup (void )
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
PATCH v8 10/103 KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from confidential VMs
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Unlike default VMs, confidential VMs (Intel TDX and AMD SEV-ES) don't allow some operations (e.g., memory read/write, register state access, etc).
Introduce vm_type to track the type of the VM to x86 KVM. Other arch KVMs already use vm_type, KVM_INIT_VM accepts vm_type, and x86 KVM callback vm_init accepts vm_type. So follow them. Further, a different policy can be made based on vm_type. Define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM for default VM as default and define KVM_X86_TDX_VM for Intel TDX VM. The wrapper function will be defined as "bool is_td(kvm) { return vm_type == VM_TYPE_TDX; }"
Add a capability KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES to effectively allow device model, e.g. qemu, to query what VM types are supported by KVM. This (introduce a new capability and add vm_type) is chosen to align with other arch KVMs that have VM types already. Other arch KVMs uses different name to query supported vm types and there is no common name for it, so new name was chosen.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 6 +----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++++++++- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 3 +++ tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 13 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +21 -0
@@ -147,10 +147,31 @@ described as 'basic' will be available. The new VM has no virtual cpus and no memory. You probably want to use 0 as machine type. +X86: +^^^^ + +Supported vm type can be queried from KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES, which returns the +bitmap of supported vm types. The 1-setting of bit @n means vm type with +value @n is supported. + +S390: +^^^^^ + In order to create user controlled virtual machines on S390, check KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL and use the flag KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL as privileged user (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). +MIPS: +^^^^^ + +To use hardware assisted virtualization on MIPS (VZ ASE) rather than +the default trap & emulate implementation (which changes the virtual +memory layout to fit in user mode), check KVM_CAP_MIPS_VZ and use the +flag KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ. + +ARM64: +^^^^^^ + On arm64, the physical address size for a VM (IPA Size limit) is limited to 40bits by default. The limit can be configured if the host supports the extension KVM_CAP_ARM_VM_IPA_SIZE. When supported, use
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(hardware_disable) KVM_X86_OP(hardware_unsetup) KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid) +KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported) KVM_X86_OP(vm_init) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ enum kvm_apicv_inhibit { };struct kvm_arch { +unsigned long vm_type;unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;
@@ -1454,6 +1455,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {bool (*has_emulated_msr)(struct kvm *kvm,u32 index);void (*vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);unsigned int vm_size;int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +3 -0
@@ -532,4 +532,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL 0/* control group for the timestamp counter (TSC) */ #define KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET 0/* attribute for the TSC offset */ +#define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM 0 +#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM 1 +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +6 -0
@@ -4722,6 +4722,11 @@ static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)sev_vm_destroy (kvm); } +static bool svm_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) +{ +return type ==KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM ; +} +static int svm_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh)
@@ -4749,6 +4754,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .vcpu_free = svm_vcpu_free, .vcpu_reset = svm_vcpu_reset, + .is_vm_type_supported = svm_is_vm_type_supported, .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_svm), .vm_init = svm_vm_init, .vm_destroy = svm_vm_destroy,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +1 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable, .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr, + .is_vm_type_supported = vmx_is_vm_type_supported, .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_init = vmx_vm_init, .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +1 -5
@@ -17,11 +17,7 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {static inline bool is_td (struct kvm *kvm) { -/* -* TDX VM type isn't defined yet. -* return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM; -*/ -return false; +return kvm->arch.vm_type ==KVM_X86_TDX_VM ; }static inline bool is_td_vcpu (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5 -0
@@ -7351,6 +7351,11 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)return err; } +bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) +{ +return type ==KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM ; +} +#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);int vmx_check_processor_compatibility (void );int vmx_hardware_enable (void );void vmx_hardware_disable (void ); +bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type);int vmx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm);void vmx_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm);int vmx_vcpu_precreate (struct kvm *kvm);
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8 -1
@@ -4485,6 +4485,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)case KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT : r = kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit;break ; +case KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES : + r =BIT (KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM ); +if (static_call (kvm_x86_is_vm_type_supported)(KVM_X86_TDX_VM )) + r |=BIT (KVM_X86_TDX_VM ); +break ;default :break ; }
@@ -12049,9 +12054,11 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)int ret;unsigned long flags; -if (type) +if (!static_call (kvm_x86_is_vm_type_supported)(type))return -EINVAL ; + kvm->arch.vm_type = type; + ret =kvm_page_track_init (kvm);if (ret) goto out;
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -1169,6 +1169,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES 220#define KVM_CAP_S390_ZPCI_OP 221#define KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY 222 +#define KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES 223#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +3 -0
@@ -526,4 +526,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL 0/* control group for the timestamp counter (TSC) */ #define KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET 0/* attribute for the TSC offset */ +#define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM 0 +#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM 1 +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -1157,6 +1157,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_VM_TSC_CONTROL 214#define KVM_CAP_SYSTEM_EVENT_DATA 215#define KVM_CAP_ARM_SYSTEM_SUSPEND 216 +#define KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES 223#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 11/103 KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
NOTE: This patch is in position of the patch series for developers to be able to test codes during the middle of the patch series although this patch series doesn't provide functional features until the all the patches of this patch series. When merging this patch series, this patch can be moved to the end.
As first step TDX VM support, return that TDX VM type supported to device model, e.g. qemu. The callback to create guest TD is vm_init callback for KVM_CREATE_VM.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 ----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +16 -2
@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST );module_param_named (tdx, enable_tdx, bool,0444 ); +static bool vt_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) +{ +return type ==KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || + (enable_tdx &&tdx_is_vm_type_supported (type)); +} +static __init int vt_hardware_setup (void ) {int ret;
@@ -33,6 +39,14 @@ static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup(void)return 0 ; } +static int vt_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */ + +return vmx_vm_init (kvm); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,
@@ -43,9 +57,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable, .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr, - .is_vm_type_supported = vmx_is_vm_type_supported, + .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported, .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), - .vm_init = vmx_vm_init, + .vm_init = vt_vm_init, .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ int __init tdx_module_setup(void)return 0 ; } +bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) +{ +/* enable_tdx check is done by the caller. */ +return type ==KVM_X86_TDX_VM ; +} +int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {if (!enable_ept) {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0 -5
@@ -7351,11 +7351,6 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)return err; } -bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) -{ -return type ==KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM ; -} -#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -1
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);int vmx_check_processor_compatibility (void );int vmx_hardware_enable (void );void vmx_hardware_disable (void ); -bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type);int vmx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm);void vmx_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm);int vmx_vcpu_precreate (struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -131,8 +130,10 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops); +bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; } +static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; }#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 12/103 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TDX architectural definitions.
--- .../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=================================== +Intel Trust Dodmain Extensions(TDX) +=================================== + +Layer status +============ +What qemu can do +---------------- +- TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu. +- Qemu can try to create VM of TDX VM type and then fails. + +Patch Layer status +------------------ + Patch layer Status +* TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied +* TDX architectural definitions: Applying +* TD VM creation/destruction: Not yet +* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Not yet +* TDX EPT violation: Not yet +* TD finalization: Not yet +* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet +* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet + +* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Not yet +* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Not yet +* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet +* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 13/103 KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Define architectural definitions for KVM to issue the TDX SEAMCALLs.
Structures and values that are architecturally defined in the TDX module specifications the chapter of ABI Reference.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 157 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 157 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h new file +157 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* architectural constants/data definitions for TDX SEAMCALLs */ + +#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H +#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* +* TDX SEAMCALL API function leaves +*/ +#define TDH_VP_ENTER 0 +#define TDH_MNG_ADDCX 1 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD 2 +#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD 3 +#define TDH_VP_ADDCX 4 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE 5 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG 6 +#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK 7 +#define TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG 8 +#define TDH_MNG_CREATE 9 +#define TDH_VP_CREATE 10 +#define TDH_MNG_RD 11 +#define TDH_MR_EXTEND 16 +#define TDH_MR_FINALIZE 17 +#define TDH_VP_FLUSH 18 +#define TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE 19 +#define TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID 20 +#define TDH_MNG_INIT 21 +#define TDH_VP_INIT 22 +#define TDH_VP_RD 26 +#define TDH_MNG_KEY_RECLAIMID 27 +#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM 28 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE 29 +#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE 30 +#define TDH_MEM_TRACK 38 +#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK 39 +#define TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB 40 +#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD 41 +#define TDH_VP_WR 43 +#define TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN 44 + +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO 0x10000 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR 0x10003 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT 0x10004 + +/* TDX control structure (TDR/TDCS/TDVPS) field access codes */ +#define TDX_NON_ARCH BIT_ULL(63) +#define TDX_CLASS_SHIFT 56 +#define TDX_FIELD_MASK GENMASK_ULL(31, 0) + +#define __BUILD_TDX_FIELD (non_arch, class, field) \ + (((non_arch) ? TDX_NON_ARCH : 0) | \ + ((u64)(class) << TDX_CLASS_SHIFT) | \ + ((u64)(field) & TDX_FIELD_MASK)) + +#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD (class, field) \ + __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(false, (class), (field)) + +#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH (class, field) \ + __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(true, (class), (field)) + + +/* @field is the VMCS field encoding */ +#define TDVPS_VMCS (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(0, (field)) + +enum tdx_guest_other_state { +TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_NON_ARCH =0x100 , +}; + +union tdx_vcpu_state_details { +struct { +u64 vmxip :1 ; +u64 reserved :63 ; + }; +u64 full; +}; + +/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_other_state */ +#define TDVPS_STATE (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(17, (field)) +#define TDVPS_STATE_NON_ARCH (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(17, (field)) + +/* Management class fields */ +enum tdx_guest_management { +TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI =11 , +}; + +/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_management */ +#define TDVPS_MANAGEMENT (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(32, (field)) + +enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control { +TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET =10 , +}; + +/* @field is any of enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control */ +#define TDCS_EXEC (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(17, (field)) + +#define TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE 256 + +struct tdx_cpuid_value { +u32 eax; +u32 ebx; +u32 ecx; +u32 edx; +} __packed; + +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG BIT_ULL(0) +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PKS BIT_ULL(30) +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_KL BIT_ULL(31) +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON BIT_ULL(63) + +/* +* TD_PARAMS is provided as an input to TDH_MNG_INIT, the size of which is 1024B. +*/ +struct td_params { +u64 attributes; +u64 xfam; +u32 max_vcpus; +u32 reserved0; + +u64 eptp_controls; +u64 exec_controls; +u16 tsc_frequency; +u8 reserved1[38 ]; + +u64 mrconfigid[6 ]; +u64 mrowner[6 ]; +u64 mrownerconfig[6 ]; +u64 reserved2[4 ]; + +union { +struct tdx_cpuid_value cpuid_values[0 ]; +u8 reserved3[768 ]; + }; +} __packed__aligned(1024) ; + +/* +* Guest uses MAX_PA for GPAW when set. +* 0: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[47] +* 1: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[51] +*/ +#define TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW BIT_ULL(0) + +/* +* TDX requires the frequency to be defined in units of 25MHz, which is the +* frequency of the core crystal clock on TDX-capable platforms, i.e. the TDX +* module can only program frequencies that are multiples of 25MHz. The +* frequency must be between 100mhz and 10ghz (inclusive). +*/ +#define TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ (tsc_in_khz) ((tsc_in_khz) / (25 * 1000)) +#define TDX_TSC_25MHZ_TO_KHZ (tsc_in_25mhz) ((tsc_in_25mhz) * (25 * 1000)) +#define TDX_MIN_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (100 * 1000) +#define TDX_MAX_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (10 * 1000 * 1000) + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 013/103] KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
Quoted 98 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:00, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Define architectural definitions for KVM to issue the TDX SEAMCALLs.
Structures and values that are architecturally defined in the TDX module specifications the chapter of ABI Reference.
Co-developed-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 157 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 157 insertions(+)create mode 100644
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.harch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h new file +76
-0@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* architectural constants/data definitions for TDX SEAMCALLs */ + +#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H +#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* + * TDX SEAMCALL API function leaves + */ +#define TDH_VP_ENTER 0 +#define TDH_MNG_ADDCX 1 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD 2 +#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD 3 +#define TDH_VP_ADDCX 4 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE 5 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG 6 +#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK 7 +#define TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG 8 +#define TDH_MNG_CREATE 9 +#define TDH_VP_CREATE 10 +#define TDH_MNG_RD 11 +#define TDH_MR_EXTEND 16 +#define TDH_MR_FINALIZE 17 +#define TDH_VP_FLUSH 18 +#define TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE 19 +#define TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID 20 +#define TDH_MNG_INIT 21 +#define TDH_VP_INIT 22 +#define TDH_VP_RD 26 +#define TDH_MNG_KEY_RECLAIMID 27 +#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM 28 +#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE 29 +#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE 30 +#define TDH_MEM_TRACK 38 +#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK 39 +#define TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB 40 +#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD 41 +#define TDH_VP_WR 43 +#define TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN 44 + +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO 0x10000 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR 0x10003 +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT 0x10004 + +/* TDX control structure (TDR/TDCS/TDVPS) field access codes */ +#define TDX_NON_ARCH BIT_ULL(63) +#define TDX_CLASS_SHIFT 56 +#define TDX_FIELD_MASK GENMASK_ULL(31, 0) + +#define __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(non_arch, class, field) \ + (((non_arch) ? TDX_NON_ARCH : 0) | \ + ((u64)(class) << TDX_CLASS_SHIFT) | \ + ((u64)(field) & TDX_FIELD_MASK)) + +#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD(class, field) \ + __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(false, (class), (field)) + +#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(class, field) \ + __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(true, (class), (field)) + + +/* @field is the VMCS field encoding */ +#define TDVPS_VMCS(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(0, (field)) + +enum tdx_guest_other_state { + TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_NON_ARCH = 0x100, +}; + +union tdx_vcpu_state_details { + struct { + u64 vmxip : 1; + u64 reserved : 63;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h line 86
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h new file +10
-0+ }; +u64 full; +}; + +/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_other_state */ +#define TDVPS_STATE (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(17, (field)) +#define TDVPS_STATE_NON_ARCH (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(17, (field)) + +/* Management class fields */ +enum tdx_guest_management {
More accurate to use tdx_vcpu_management?
Quoted 71 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h new file +71
-0+ TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI = 11, +}; + +/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_management */ +#define TDVPS_MANAGEMENT (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(32, (field)) + +enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control { +TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET =10 , +}; + +/* @field is any of enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control */ +#define TDCS_EXEC (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(17, (field)) + +#define TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE 256 + +struct tdx_cpuid_value { +u32 eax; +u32 ebx; +u32 ecx; +u32 edx; +} __packed; + +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG BIT_ULL(0) +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PKS BIT_ULL(30) +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_KL BIT_ULL(31) +#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON BIT_ULL(63) + +/* +* TD_PARAMS is provided as an input to TDH_MNG_INIT, the size of which is 1024B. +*/ +struct td_params { +u64 attributes; +u64 xfam; +u32 max_vcpus; +u32 reserved0; + +u64 eptp_controls; +u64 exec_controls; +u16 tsc_frequency; +u8 reserved1[38 ]; + +u64 mrconfigid[6 ]; +u64 mrowner[6 ]; +u64 mrownerconfig[6 ]; +u64 reserved2[4 ]; + +union { +struct tdx_cpuid_value cpuid_values[0 ]; +u8 reserved3[768 ]; + }; +} __packed__aligned(1024) ; + +/* +* Guest uses MAX_PA for GPAW when set. +* 0: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[47] +* 1: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[51] +*/ +#define TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW BIT_ULL(0) + +/* +* TDX requires the frequency to be defined in units of 25MHz, which is the +* frequency of the core crystal clock on TDX-capable platforms, i.e. the TDX +* module can only program frequencies that are multiples of 25MHz. The +* frequency must be between 100mhz and 10ghz (inclusive). +*/ +#define TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ (tsc_in_khz) ((tsc_in_khz) / (25 * 1000)) +#define TDX_TSC_25MHZ_TO_KHZ (tsc_in_25mhz) ((tsc_in_25mhz) * (25 * 1000)) +#define TDX_MIN_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (100 * 1000) +#define TDX_MAX_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (10 * 1000 * 1000) + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H */
Re: [PATCH v8 013/103] KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
Quoted 8 lines · Binbin Wu
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h line 86
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h new file +6
-0+/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_other_state */ +#define TDVPS_STATE (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(17, (field)) +#define TDVPS_STATE_NON_ARCH (field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(17, (field)) + +/* Management class fields */ +enum tdx_guest_management {More accurate to use
tdx_vcpu_management?
Thanks for pointing it out. I cleaned up it as follows for more consitency and better match with the TDX module.
/* Class code for TD */
#define TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS 17ULL
/* Class code for TDVPS */
#define TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS 0ULL #define TDVPS_CLASS_GUEST_GPR 16ULL #define TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST 17ULL #define TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT 32ULL
enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control {
TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET = 10,
};/* @field is any of enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control */
#define TDCS_EXEC(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS, (field))
/* @field is the VMCS field encoding */
#define TDVPS_VMCS(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS, (field))
enum tdx_vcpu_guest_other_state {
TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_NON_ARCH = 0x100,
};union tdx_vcpu_state_details {
struct {
u64 vmxip : 1;
u64 reserved : 63;
};
u64 full;
};/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_other_state */
#define TDVPS_STATE(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
#define TDVPS_STATE_NON_ARCH(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
/* Management class fields */
enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management {
TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI = 11,
};/* @field is any of enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management */
#define TDVPS_MANAGEMENT(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT, (field))
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
PATCH v8 14/103 KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add error codes for the TDX SEAMCALLs both for TDX VMM side for TDH SEAMCALL and TDX guest side for TDG.VP.VMCALL. KVM issues the TDX SEAMCALLs and checks its error code. KVM handles hypercall from the TDX guest and may return an error. So error code for the TDX guest is also needed.
TDX SEAMCALL uses bits 31:0 to return more information, so these error codes will only exactly match RAX[63:32]. Error codes for TDG.VP.VMCALL is defined by TDX Guest-Host-Communication interface spec.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */ + +#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H +#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H + +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL + +/* +* TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX) +*/ +#define TDX_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL +#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU 0x4000000100000000ULL +#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE 0x8000000300000000ULL +#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL +#define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED 0x8000070200000000ULL +#define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED 0x8000080000000000ULL +#define TDX_KEY_STATE_INCORRECT 0xC000081100000000ULL +#define TDX_KEY_CONFIGURED 0x0000081500000000ULL +#define TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE 0x0000082100000000ULL +#define TDX_EPT_WALK_FAILED 0xC0000B0000000000ULL + +/* +* TDG.VP.VMCALL Status Codes (returned in R10) +*/ +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY 0x0000000000000001ULL +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND 0x8000000000000000ULL +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_TDREPORT_FAILED 0x8000000000000001ULL + +/* +* TDX module operand ID, appears in 31:0 part of error code as +* detail information +*/ +#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT 0x92 + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 15/103 KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
A VMM interacts with the TDX module using a new instruction (SEAMCALL). A TDX VMM uses SEAMCALLs where a VMX VMM would have directly interacted with VMX instructions. For instance, a TDX VMM does not have full access to the VM control structure corresponding to VMX VMCS. Instead, a VMM induces the TDX module to act on behalf via SEAMCALLs.
Export __seamcall and define C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs for readability. Some SEAMCALL APIs donates pages to TDX module or guest TD. The pages are encrypted with TDX private host key id set in high bits of physical address. If any modified cache lines may exit for these pages, flush them to memory by clflush_cache_range().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 2 + 3 files changed, 189 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +2 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ struct tdsysinfo_struct {bool platform_tdx_enabled (void );int tdx_init (void );const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ); +u64 __seamcall (u64 op,u64 rcx,u64 rdx,u64 r8,u64 r9, +struct tdx_module_output *out);#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled (void ) {return false; }static inline int tdx_init (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h new file +185 -0
185 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S +2 -0
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/frame.h> #include "tdxcall.S"
@@ -50,3 +51,4 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall) FRAME_END RET SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__seamcall)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 16/103 KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Add helper functions to print out errors from the TDX module in a uniform manner.
--- arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o -kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o +kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o vmx/tdx_error.o kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c new file +22 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* functions to record TDX SEAMCALL error */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> + +#include "tdx_ops.h" + +void pr_tdx_error (u64 op,u64 error_code,const struct tdx_module_output *out) +{ +if (!out) { +pr_err_ratelimited ("SEAMCALL[%lld] failed: 0x%llx\n" , + op, error_code); +return ; + } + +pr_err_ratelimited ( +"SEAMCALL[%lld] failed: 0x%llx " +"RCX 0x%llx, RDX 0x%llx, R8 0x%llx, R9 0x%llx, R10 0x%llx, R11 0x%llx\n" , + op, error_code, + out->rcx, out->rdx, out->r8, out->r9, out->r10, out->r11); +}
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h +3 -0
@@ -9,12 +9,15 @@#include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/kvm_host.h> +#include <asm/tdx.h> #include "tdx_errno.h" #include "tdx_arch.h" #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +void pr_tdx_error (u64 op,u64 error_code,const struct tdx_module_output *out); +static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx (hpa_t tdr,hpa_t addr) {clflush_cache_range (__va (addr),PAGE_SIZE );
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 17/103 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD VM creation/destruction.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -2
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ Patch Layer status ------------------ Patch layer Status * TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied -* TDX architectural definitions: Applying -* TD VM creation/destruction: Not yet +* TDX architectural definitions: Applied +* TD VM creation/destruction: Applying * TD vcpu creation/destruction: Not yet * TDX EPT violation: Not yet * TD finalization: Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 18/103 KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Stub in kvm_tdx, vcpu_tdx, and their various accessors. TDX defines SEAMCALL APIs to access TDX control structures corresponding to the VMX VMCS. Introduce helper accessors to hide its SEAMCALL ABI details.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 101 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +101 -2
@@ -3,16 +3,29 @@#define __KVM_X86_TDX_H#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST + +#include "tdx_ops.h" +int tdx_module_setup (void ); +struct tdx_td_page { +unsigned long va; +hpa_t pa; +bool added; +}; +struct kvm_tdx {struct kvm kvm; -/* TDX specific members follow. */ + +struct tdx_td_page tdr; +struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; };struct vcpu_tdx {struct kvm_vcpu vcpu; -/* TDX specific members follow. */ + +struct tdx_td_page tdvpr; +struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx; };static inline bool is_td (struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -34,6 +47,92 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); } + +static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (__builtin_constant_p (field) && (field) &0x1 , +"Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported" ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (bits !=16 && bits !=32 && bits !=64 ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=64 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + (((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x2000 || + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x6000 ), +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field" ); +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=32 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x4000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field" ); +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=16 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x0000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field" ); +} + +static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {} +static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {} + +#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (bits, uclass, lclass) \ +static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_rd(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) { \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_RD["#uclass".0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, err); \ + return 0; \ + } \ + return (u##bits)out.r8; \ +} \ +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val, \ + GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0), &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] = 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, (u64)val, err); \ +} \ +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field, u64 bit) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit, \ + &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] |= 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, bit, err); \ +} \ +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field, u64 bit) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit, \ + &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] &= ~0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, bit, err); \ +} + +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (16 ,VMCS , vmcs); +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (32 ,VMCS , vmcs); +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (64 ,VMCS , vmcs); + +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (64 ,STATE_NON_ARCH , state_non_arch); +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (8 ,MANAGEMENT , management); +#else static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
Quoted 54 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Stub in
kvm_tdx,vcpu_tdx, and their various accessors. TDX defines SEAMCALL APIs to access TDX control structures corresponding to the VMX VMCS. Introduce helper accessors to hide its SEAMCALL ABI details.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 101 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +17
-2@@ -3,16 +3,29 @@#define __KVM_X86_TDX_H#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST + +#include "tdx_ops.h" +int tdx_module_setup (void ); +struct tdx_td_page { +unsigned long va; +hpa_t pa; +bool added; +}; +struct kvm_tdx {struct kvm kvm; -/* TDX specific members follow. */ + +struct tdx_td_page tdr; +struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; };struct vcpu_tdx {struct kvm_vcpu vcpu; -/* TDX specific members follow. */ + +struct tdx_td_page tdvpr; +struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx; };static inline bool is_td (struct kvm *kvm)@@ -34,6 +47,92 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); } + +static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 61
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +10
-0+{ +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (__builtin_constant_p (field) && (field) &0x1 , +"Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported" ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (bits !=16 && bits !=32 && bits !=64 ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=64 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + (((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x2000 || + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x6000 ), +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field" );
if bits is 64 here, "bits != 64" is false, how could this check for "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"?
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 64
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3
-0+BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=32 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x4000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field" );
ditto
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 67
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3
-0+BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=16 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x0000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field" );
ditto
Quoted 71 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +68
-0+} + +static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {} +static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {} + +#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (bits, uclass, lclass) \ +static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_rd(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) { \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_RD["#uclass".0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, err); \ + return 0; \ + } \ + return (u##bits)out.r8; \ +} \ +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val, \ + GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0), &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] = 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, (u64)val, err); \ +} \ +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field, u64 bit) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit, \ + &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] |= 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, bit, err); \ +} \ +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \ + u32 field, u64 bit) \ +{ \ + struct tdx_module_output out; \ + u64 err; \ + \ + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \ + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit, \ + &out); \ + if (unlikely(err)) \ + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] &= ~0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \ + field, bit, err); \ +} + +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (16 ,VMCS , vmcs); +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (32 ,VMCS , vmcs); +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (64 ,VMCS , vmcs); + +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (64 ,STATE_NON_ARCH , state_non_arch); +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (8 ,MANAGEMENT , management); +#else static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; };
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
Quoted 16 lines · Binbin Wu
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 61
Quoted 11 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +11
-0+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (__builtin_constant_p (field) && (field) &0x1 , +"Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported" ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (bits !=16 && bits !=32 && bits !=64 ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=64 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + (((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x2000 || + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x6000 ), +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field" );if bits is 64 here, "bits != 64" is false, how could this check for "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"?
Bits 14:13 of the encoding, which is extracted by "(field) & 0x6000", encodes the width of the VMCS field. Bit 0 of the encoding, "(field) & 0x1" above, is a modifier that is only relevant when operating in 32-bit mode, and is disallowed because TDX is 64-bit only.
This yields four possibilities for TDX:
(field) & 0x6000) == 0x0000 : 16-bit field
(field) & 0x6000) == 0x2000 : 64-bit field
(field) & 0x6000) == 0x4000 : 32-bit field
(field) & 0x6000) == 0x6000 : 64-bit field (technically "natural width", but
effectively 64-bit because TDX is 64-bit only)
The assertion is that if the encoding indicates a 64-bit field (0x2000 or 0x6000), then the number of bits KVM is accessing must be '64'. The below assertions do the same thing for 32-bit and 16-bit fields.
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 64
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3
-0+BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=32 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x4000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field" );ditto
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 67
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3
-0+BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=16 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x0000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field" );ditto
Re: [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
Quoted 32 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 16 lines · Binbin Wu
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 61
Quoted 11 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +11
-0+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (__builtin_constant_p (field) && (field) &0x1 , +"Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported" ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (bits !=16 && bits !=32 && bits !=64 ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=64 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + (((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x2000 || + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x6000 ), +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field" );if bits is 64 here, "bits != 64" is false, how could this check for "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"?
Bits 14:13 of the encoding, which is extracted by "(field) &
0x6000", encodes the width of the VMCS field. Bit 0 of the encoding, "(field) &0x1" above, is a modifier that is only relevant when operating in 32-bit mode, and is disallowed because TDX is 64-bit only.This yields four possibilities for TDX:
(field) &
0x6000) ==0x0000: 16-bit field
(field) &0x6000) ==0x2000: 64-bit field
(field) &0x6000) ==0x4000: 32-bit field
(field) &0x6000) ==0x6000: 64-bit field (technically "natural width", but
effectively 64-bit because TDX is 64-bit only)
Quoted 3 lines
The assertion is that if the encoding indicates a 64-bit field (
0x2000or0x6000), then the number of bits KVM is accessing must be '64'. The below assertions do the same thing for 32-bit and 16-bit fields.
Thanks for explanation. I've updated it as follows to use symbolic value.
#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL 0x0UL
#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH 0x1UL
#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)
/* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH, "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported"); BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);
#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK GENMASK_UL(14, 13)
#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT (0UL << 13)
#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT (1UL << 13)
#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT (2UL << 13)
#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL (3UL << 13)
#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
/* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT || VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL), "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"); BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT, "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field"); BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT, "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
Quoted 60 lines · Isaku Yamahata
Quoted 32 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 16 lines · Binbin Wu
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 61
Quoted 11 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +11
-0+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (__builtin_constant_p (field) && (field) &0x1 , +"Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported" ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (bits !=16 && bits !=32 && bits !=64 ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=64 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + (((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x2000 || + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x6000 ), +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field" );if bits is 64 here, "bits != 64" is false, how could this check for "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"?
Bits 14:13 of the encoding, which is extracted by "(field) &
0x6000", encodes the width of the VMCS field. Bit 0 of the encoding, "(field) &0x1" above, is a modifier that is only relevant when operating in 32-bit mode, and is disallowed because TDX is 64-bit only.This yields four possibilities for TDX:
(field) &
0x6000) ==0x0000: 16-bit field
(field) &0x6000) ==0x2000: 64-bit field
(field) &0x6000) ==0x4000: 32-bit field
(field) &0x6000) ==0x6000: 64-bit field (technically "natural width", but
effectively 64-bit because TDX is 64-bit only)Quoted 3 lines
The assertion is that if the encoding indicates a 64-bit field (
0x2000or0x6000), then the number of bits KVM is accessing must be '64'. The below assertions do the same thing for 32-bit and 16-bit fields.Thanks for explanation. I've updated it as follows to use symbolic value.
#define
VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK0x1UL
#defineVMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL0x0UL
#defineVMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH0x1UL
#defineVMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field)((field) &VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)/* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH, "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported"); BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);#define
VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASKGENMASK_UL(14, 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT(0UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT(1UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT(2UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL(3UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field)((field) &VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
Quoted 12 lines
/* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT || VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL), "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"); BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT, "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field"); BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT, "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
These are standard VMCS definition, I suggest to put them into arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h but not only in tdx.h, actually you can find an already defined "enum vmcs_field_width" there.
Quoted 2 lines
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
In reply to Isaku YamahataQuoted 60 lines · Isaku Yamahata
Quoted 32 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 16 lines · Binbin Wu
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 61
Quoted 11 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +11
-0+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (__builtin_constant_p (field) && (field) &0x1 , +"Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported" ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (bits !=16 && bits !=32 && bits !=64 ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=64 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + (((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x2000 || + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x6000 ), +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field" );if bits is 64 here, "bits != 64" is false, how could this check for "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"?
Bits 14:13 of the encoding, which is extracted by "(field) &
0x6000", encodes the width of the VMCS field. Bit 0 of the encoding, "(field) &0x1" above, is a modifier that is only relevant when operating in 32-bit mode, and is disallowed because TDX is 64-bit only.This yields four possibilities for TDX:
(field) & 0x6000) == 0x0000 : 16-bit field (field) & 0x6000) == 0x2000 : 64-bit field (field) & 0x6000) == 0x4000 : 32-bit field (field) & 0x6000) == 0x6000 : 64-bit field (technically "natural width", but effectively 64-bit because TDX is 64-bit only)Quoted 3 lines
The assertion is that if the encoding indicates a 64-bit field (
0x2000or0x6000), then the number of bits KVM is accessing must be '64'. The below assertions do the same thing for 32-bit and 16-bit fields.Thanks for explanation. I've updated it as follows to use symbolic value.
#define
VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK0x1UL
#defineVMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL0x0UL
#defineVMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH0x1UL
#defineVMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field)((field) &VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)/* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH, "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported"); BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);#define
VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASKGENMASK_UL(14, 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT(0UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT(1UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT(2UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL(3UL << 13)
#defineVMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field)((field) &VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
Quoted 11 lines
/* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT || VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL), "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"); BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT, "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field"); BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) && VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT, "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
Actually, the original code is written by me that is copied from vmcs_check{16/32/64/l} in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
If you are going to do above change, you'd better cook a patch to change it for vmx_ops.h at first and see opinion from community.
Re: [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 29 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 14 lines · Binbin Wu
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 61
Quoted 11 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +11
-0+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (__builtin_constant_p (field) && (field) &0x1 , +"Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported" ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (bits !=16 && bits !=32 && bits !=64 ); + +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=64 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + (((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x2000 || + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x6000 ), +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field" );if bits is 64 here, "bits != 64" is false, how could this check for "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field"?
Bits 14:13 of the encoding, which is extracted by "(field) &
0x6000", encodes the width of the VMCS field. Bit 0 of the encoding, "(field) &0x1" above, is a modifier that is only relevant when operating in 32-bit mode, and is disallowed because TDX is 64-bit only.This yields four possibilities for TDX:
(field) & 0x6000) == 0x0000 : 16-bit field (field) & 0x6000) == 0x2000 : 64-bit field (field) & 0x6000) == 0x4000 : 32-bit field (field) & 0x6000) == 0x6000 : 64-bit field (technically "natural width", but effectively 64-bit because TDX is 64-bit only)
Quoted 3 lines
The assertion is that if the encoding indicates a 64-bit field (
0x2000or0x6000), then the number of bits KVM is accessing must be '64'. The below assertions do the same thing for 32-bit and 16-bit fields.
Thanks for explanation, it is crystal clear to me now. :)
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 64
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3
-0+BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=32 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x4000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field" );ditto
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 67
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3
-0+BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (bits !=16 &&__builtin_constant_p (field) && + ((field) &0x6000 ) ==0x0000 , +"Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field" );ditto
PATCH v8 19/103 x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX private host key id is assigned to guest TD. The memory controller encrypts guest TD memory with the assigned TDX private host key id (HIKD). Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id so that TDX KVM manage it.
Also export the global TDX private host key id that is used to encrypt TDX module, its memory and some dynamic data (TDR). When VMM releasing encrypted page to reuse it, the page needs to be flushed with the used host key id. VMM needs the global TDX private host key id to flush such pages TDX module accesses with the global TDX private host key id.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +12 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,16 @@ struct tdsysinfo_struct {bool platform_tdx_enabled (void );int tdx_init (void );const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ); +/* +* Key id globally used by TDX module: TDX module maps TDR with this TDX global +* key id. TDR includes key id assigned to the TD. Then TDX module maps other +* TD-related pages with the assigned key id. TDR requires this TDX global key +* id for cache flush unlike other TD-related pages. +*/ +extern u32 tdx_global_keyid__read_mostly ; +int tdx_keyid_alloc (void ); +void tdx_keyid_free (int keyid); +u64 __seamcall (u64 op,u64 rcx,u64 rdx,u64 r8,u64 r9,struct tdx_module_output *out);#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
@@ -151,6 +161,8 @@ static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) { return false; }static inline int tdx_init (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }struct tdsysinfo_struct ;static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; } +static inline int tdx_keyid_alloc (void ) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_keyid_free (int keyid) { }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +27 -1
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENstatic int tdx_cmr_num;/* TDX module global KeyID. Used in TDH.SYS.CONFIG ABI. */ -static u32 tdx_global_keyid; +u32 tdx_global_keyid__read_mostly ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_global_keyid);/* Detect whether CPU supports SEAM */ static int detect_seam (void )
@@ -80,6 +81,31 @@ static int detect_seam(void)return 0 ; } +/* TDX KeyID pool */ +static DEFINE_IDA (tdx_keyid_pool); + +int tdx_keyid_alloc (void ) +{ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!tdx_keyid_start || !tdx_keyid_num)) +return -EINVAL ; + +/* The first keyID is reserved for the global key. */ +return ida_alloc_range (&tdx_keyid_pool, tdx_keyid_start +1 , + tdx_keyid_start + tdx_keyid_num -1 , +GFP_KERNEL ); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_keyid_alloc); + +void tdx_keyid_free (int keyid) +{ +/* keyid = 0 is reserved. */ +if (!keyid || keyid <=0 ) +return ; + +ida_free (&tdx_keyid_pool, keyid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_keyid_free); +static int detect_tdx_keyids (void ) {u64 keyid_part;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 019/103] x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id
Quoted 76 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:04PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX private host key id is assigned to guest TD. The memory controller encrypts guest TD memory with the assigned TDX private host key id (HIKD). Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id so that TDX KVM manage it.
Also export the global TDX private host key id that is used to encrypt TDX module, its memory and some dynamic data (TDR). When VMM releasing encrypted page to reuse it, the page needs to be flushed with the used host key id. VMM needs the global TDX private host key id to flush such pages TDX module accesses with the global TDX private host key id.
Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +12
-0@@ -144,6 +144,16 @@ struct tdsysinfo_struct {bool platform_tdx_enabled (void );int tdx_init (void );const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ); +/* +* Key id globally used by TDX module: TDX module maps TDR with this TDX global +* key id. TDR includes key id assigned to the TD. Then TDX module maps other +* TD-related pages with the assigned key id. TDR requires this TDX global key +* id for cache flush unlike other TD-related pages. +*/ +extern u32 tdx_global_keyid__read_mostly ; +int tdx_keyid_alloc (void ); +void tdx_keyid_free (int keyid); +u64 __seamcall (u64 op,u64 rcx,u64 rdx,u64 r8,u64 r9,struct tdx_module_output *out);#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ @@ -151,6 +161,8 @@ static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) { return false; }static inline int tdx_init (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }struct tdsysinfo_struct ;static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; } +static inline int tdx_keyid_alloc (void ) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_keyid_free (int keyid) { }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +11
-1@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENstatic int tdx_cmr_num;/* TDX module global KeyID. Used in TDH.SYS.CONFIG ABI. */ -static u32 tdx_global_keyid; +u32 tdx_global_keyid__read_mostly ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_global_keyid);/* Detect whether CPU supports SEAM */ static int detect_seam (void )@@ -80,6 +81,31 @@ static int detect_seam(void)return 0 ; } +/* TDX KeyID pool */ +static DEFINE_IDA (tdx_keyid_pool); + +int tdx_keyid_alloc (void ) +{ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!tdx_keyid_start || !tdx_keyid_num)) +return -EINVAL ; + +/* The first keyID is reserved for the global key. */
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static int detect_seam(void) · line 102
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+return ida_alloc_range (&tdx_keyid_pool, tdx_keyid_start +1 , + tdx_keyid_start + tdx_keyid_num -1 , +GFP_KERNEL ); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_keyid_alloc); + +void tdx_keyid_free (int keyid) +{ +/* keyid = 0 is reserved. */ +if (!keyid || keyid <=0 )
keyid <=0 covers !keyid.
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +6
-1+return ; + +ida_free (&tdx_keyid_pool, keyid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_keyid_free); +static int detect_tdx_keyids (void ) {u64 keyid_part; --2.25.1
PATCH v8 20/103 KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID.
Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down private page tables for it.
Add a second kvm_x86_ops hook in kvm_arch_destroy_vm() to support TDX's destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state, then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 364 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 + 7 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +2 -0
@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid) KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported) KVM_X86_OP(vm_init) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
@@ -1458,7 +1458,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);unsigned int vm_size;int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */ int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +31 -3
@@ -39,18 +39,44 @@ static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup(void)return 0 ; } +static void vt_hardware_unsetup (void ) +{ +tdx_hardware_unsetup (); +vmx_hardware_unsetup (); +} +static int vt_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {if (is_td (kvm)) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ;/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */ +return tdx_vm_init (kvm);return vmx_vm_init (kvm); } +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_mmu_release_hkid (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return ; + +vmx_vm_destroy (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_vm_free (kvm); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" , - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup, + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup, .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility, .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
@@ -60,7 +86,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported, .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_init = vt_vm_init, - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private, + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, + .vm_free = vt_vm_free, .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +364 -0
384 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +2 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdr;struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; + +int hkid; };struct vcpu_tdx {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +11 -0
@@ -131,9 +131,20 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type); +void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ); + +int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; } +static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) {} + +static inline int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {}#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8 -0
@@ -12248,6 +12248,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)kvm_page_track_cleanup (kvm);kvm_xen_destroy_vm (kvm);kvm_hv_destroy_vm (kvm); +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm); }static void memslot_rmap_free (struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
@@ -12512,6 +12513,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all (struct kvm *kvm) { +/* +* kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before +* tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to +* be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke +* kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this. +*/ +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);kvm_mmu_zap_all (kvm); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
Quoted 162 lines · On Sun, Aug 7, 2022 at 3:03 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID.
Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add
flush_shadow_all_privatecallback before tearing down private page tables for it.Add a second
kvm_x86_opshook inkvm_arch_destroy_vm()to support TDX's destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state, then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.Co-developed-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 364 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 + 7 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +2
-0@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid) KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported) KVM_X86_OP(vm_init) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2
-0@@ -1458,7 +1458,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);unsigned int vm_size;int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */ int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +31
-3@@ -39,18 +39,44 @@ static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup(void)return 0 ; } +static void vt_hardware_unsetup (void ) +{ +tdx_hardware_unsetup (); +vmx_hardware_unsetup (); +} +static int vt_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {if (is_td (kvm)) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ;/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */ +return tdx_vm_init (kvm);return vmx_vm_init (kvm); } +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_mmu_release_hkid (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return ; + +vmx_vm_destroy (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_vm_free (kvm); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" , - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup, + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup, .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility, .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,@@ -60,7 +86,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported, .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_init = vt_vm_init, - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private, + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, + .vm_free = vt_vm_free, .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +33
-0@@ -31,6 +31,353 @@ struct tdx_capabilities {/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */ static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps; +/* +* Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB, +* TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a global lock +* internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is returned without +* spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's caller's +* responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use this mutex +* to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about scheduling. +*/ +static DEFINE_MUTEX (tdx_lock); +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock; + +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid) +{ +return pa | ((hpa_t )hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); +} + +static inline bool is_td_created (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->tdr.added; +} + +static inline void tdx_hkid_free (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +tdx_keyid_free (kvm_tdx->hkid); + kvm_tdx->hkid =-1 ; +} + +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->hkid >0 ; +} + +static void tdx_clear_page (unsigned long page)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 76
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+{ +const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 ))); +unsigned long i; + +/* +* Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i: +* when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is +* required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity +* error when read on the page with new keyid. +*/
Are we saying that we do not need to use MOVDIR64B to clear pages with Li?
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 84
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +8
-0+if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B )) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i <4096 ; i +=64 ) +/* MOVDIR64B [rdx], es:rdi */ + asm (".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0x38, 0xf8, 0x3a" + : :"d" (zero_page),"D" (page + i) :"memory" ); +}
According to the Software Developer Manual, mfence is required for a strong ordering on stores. Should we not use mfence here?
Quoted 399 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +313
-0+ +static int tdx_reclaim_page (unsigned long va,hpa_t pa,bool do_wb,u16 hkid) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_phymem_page_reclaim (pa, &out); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM , err, &out); +return -EIO ; + } + +if (do_wb) { + err =tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd (set_hkid_to_hpa (pa, hkid)); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + } + +tdx_clear_page (va); +return 0 ; +} + +static int tdx_alloc_td_page (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ + page->va =__get_free_page (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); +if (!page->va) +return -ENOMEM ; + + page->pa =__pa (page->va); +return 0 ; +} + +static void tdx_mark_td_page_added (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ +WARN_ON_ONCE (page->added); + page->added = true; +} + +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ +if (page->added) { +/* +* TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID +* assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD +* was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So +* cache doesn't need to be flushed again. +*/ +if (tdx_reclaim_page (page->va, page->pa, false,0 )) +return ; + + page->added = false; + } +free_page (page->va); +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb (void *param) +{ +u64 err =0 ; + +do { + err =tdh_phymem_cache_wb (!!err); + }while (err ==TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE ); + +/* Other thread may have done for us. */ +if (err ==TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE ) + err =TDX_SUCCESS ; +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +cpumask_var_t packages; +bool cpumask_allocated; +u64 err; +int ret; +int i; + +if (!is_hkid_assigned (kvm_tdx)) +return ; + +if (!is_td_created (kvm_tdx)) + goto free_hkid; + + cpumask_allocated =zalloc_cpumask_var (&packages,GFP_KERNEL ); +cpus_read_lock (); +for_each_online_cpu (i) { +if (cpumask_allocated && +cpumask_test_and_set_cpu (topology_physical_package_id (i), + packages)) +continue ; + +/* +* We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously. +* Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by +* serialization. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + ret =smp_call_on_cpu (i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb,NULL ,1 ); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (ret) +break ; + } +cpus_read_unlock (); +free_cpumask_var (packages); + +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + err =tdh_mng_key_freeid (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID , err,NULL ); +pr_err ("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n" , + kvm_tdx->hkid); +return ; + } + +free_hkid: +tdx_hkid_free (kvm_tdx); +} + +void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +int i; + +/* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */ +if (is_hkid_assigned (kvm_tdx)) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) +tdx_reclaim_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); +kfree (kvm_tdx->tdcs); + +/* +* TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR +* while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with +* TDX global HKID is needed. +*/ +if (kvm_tdx->tdr.added && +tdx_reclaim_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va, kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true, + tdx_global_keyid)) +return ; + +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va); +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config (void *param) +{ +hpa_t *tdr_p = param; +u64 err; + +do { + err =tdh_mng_key_config (*tdr_p); + +/* +* If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this +* is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random +* number generator. +*/ + }while (err ==TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED ); + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +cpumask_var_t packages; +int ret, i; +u64 err; + +/* vCPUs can't be created until after KVM_TDX_INIT_VM. */ + kvm->max_vcpus =0 ; + + kvm_tdx->hkid =tdx_keyid_alloc (); +if (kvm_tdx->hkid <0 ) +return -EBUSY ; + + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdr); +if (ret) + goto free_hkid; + + kvm_tdx->tdcs =kcalloc (tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages,sizeof (*kvm_tdx->tdcs), +GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); +if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs) + goto free_tdr; +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) { + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); +if (ret) + goto free_tdcs; + } + +/* +* Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY: +* TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner +* Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin +* to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the +* caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation +* usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process +* scheduling. +* +* APIs to acquire the lock of KOT: +* TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and +* TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + err =tdh_mng_create (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->hkid); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_CREATE , err,NULL ); + ret = -EIO ; + goto free_tdcs; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&kvm_tdx->tdr); + +if (!zalloc_cpumask_var (&packages,GFP_KERNEL )) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto free_tdcs; + } +cpus_read_lock (); +for_each_online_cpu (i) { +int pkg =topology_physical_package_id (i); + +if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu (pkg, packages)) +continue ; + +/* +* Program the memory controller in the package with an +* encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id +* assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory +* controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by +* mutex. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); + ret =smp_call_on_cpu (i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config, + &kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); +if (ret) +break ; + } +cpus_read_unlock (); +free_cpumask_var (packages); +if (ret) + goto teardown; + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) { + err =tdh_mng_addcx (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].pa); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_ADDCX , err,NULL ); + ret = -EIO ; + goto teardown; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); + } + +/* +* Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated +* ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD. +*/ +return 0 ; + +/* +* The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD +* varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred. +* Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice +* with partial initialization. +*/ +teardown: +tdx_mmu_release_hkid (kvm); +tdx_vm_free (kvm); +return ret; + +free_tdcs: +/* @i points at the TDCS page that failed allocation. */ +for (--i; i >=0 ; i--) +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va); +kfree (kvm_tdx->tdcs); +free_tdr: +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va); +free_hkid: +tdx_hkid_free (kvm_tdx); +return ret; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;@@ -78,6 +425,9 @@ bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { +int max_pkgs; +int i; +if (!enable_ept) {pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n" );return -EINVAL ;@@ -88,8 +438,22 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)return -ENODEV ; } + max_pkgs =topology_max_packages (); + tdx_mng_key_config_lock =kcalloc (max_pkgs,sizeof (*tdx_mng_key_config_lock), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock) +return -ENOMEM ; +for (i =0 ; i < max_pkgs; i++) +mutex_init (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]); +pr_info ("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n" , boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);return 0 ; } + +void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) +{ +/* kfree accepts NULL. */ +kfree (tdx_mng_key_config_lock); +}arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +2
-0@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdr;struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; + +int hkid; };struct vcpu_tdx {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +11
-0@@ -131,9 +131,20 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type); +void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ); + +int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; } +static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) {} + +static inline int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {}#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8
-1@@ -12248,6 +12248,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)kvm_page_track_cleanup (kvm);kvm_xen_destroy_vm (kvm);kvm_hv_destroy_vm (kvm); +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm); }static void memslot_rmap_free (struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)@@ -12512,6 +12513,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all (struct kvm *kvm) { +/* +* kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before +* tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to +* be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke +* kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this. +*/ +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);kvm_mmu_zap_all (kvm); } --2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
Quoted 15 lines · Erdem Aktas
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 76
Quoted 11 lines · On Sun, Aug 7, 2022 at 3:03 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +11
-0+static void tdx_clear_page (unsigned long page) +{ +const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 ))); +unsigned long i; + +/* +* Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i: +* when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is +* required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity +* error when read on the page with new keyid. +*/ Are we saying that we do not need to use MOVDIR64B to clear pages with Li?
Yes. TDX module spec, Table 15.3: Checks on Memory Reads in Li mode says that read with shared HKID doesn't result in #MC. Read of poisoned cache line is another story, though.
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 84
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +8
-0+if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B )) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i <4096 ; i +=64 ) +/* MOVDIR64B [rdx], es:rdi */ + asm (".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0x38, 0xf8, 0x3a" + : :"d" (zero_page),"D" (page + i) :"memory" ); +}According to the Software Developer Manual, mfence is required for a strong ordering on stores. Should we not use mfence here?
Right. I'll add __mb(). thanks for catching it.
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 163 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID.
Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add
flush_shadow_all_privatecallback before tearing down private page tables for it.Add a second
kvm_x86_opshook inkvm_arch_destroy_vm()to support TDX's destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state, then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.Co-developed-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 364 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 + 7 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +2
-0@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid) KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported) KVM_X86_OP(vm_init) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2
-0@@ -1458,7 +1458,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);unsigned int vm_size;int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */ int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +31
-3@@ -39,18 +39,44 @@ static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup(void)return 0 ; } +static void vt_hardware_unsetup (void ) +{ +tdx_hardware_unsetup (); +vmx_hardware_unsetup (); +} +static int vt_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {if (is_td (kvm)) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ;/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */ +return tdx_vm_init (kvm);return vmx_vm_init (kvm); } +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_mmu_release_hkid (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return ; + +vmx_vm_destroy (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_vm_free (kvm); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" , - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup, + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup, .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility, .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,@@ -60,7 +86,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported, .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_init = vt_vm_init, - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private, + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, + .vm_free = vt_vm_free, .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +35
-0@@ -31,6 +31,353 @@ struct tdx_capabilities {/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */ static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps; +/* +* Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB, +* TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a global lock +* internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is returned without +* spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's caller's +* responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use this mutex +* to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about scheduling. +*/ +static DEFINE_MUTEX (tdx_lock); +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock; + +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid) +{ +return pa | ((hpa_t )hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); +} + +static inline bool is_td_created (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->tdr.added; +} + +static inline void tdx_hkid_free (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +tdx_keyid_free (kvm_tdx->hkid); + kvm_tdx->hkid =-1 ; +} + +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->hkid >0 ; +} + +static void tdx_clear_page (unsigned long page) +{ +const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 )));
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 78
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+unsigned long i; + +/* +* Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i: +* when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is +* required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity +* error when read on the page with new keyid. +*/ +if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B )) +return ;
TDX relies on MKTME, and MOVDIR64B is a must have feature. The check should not fail at this point?
It feels a bit strange to check the feature here and return siliently if the check failed.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 83
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +5
-0+ +for (i =0 ; i <4096 ; i +=64 ) +/* MOVDIR64B [rdx], es:rdi */ + asm (".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0x38, 0xf8, 0x3a" + : :"d" (zero_page),"D" (page + i) :"memory" );
There is already have a inline function movdir64b defined in arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h, can we use it directly here?
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +12
-0+} + +static int tdx_reclaim_page (unsigned long va,hpa_t pa,bool do_wb,u16 hkid) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_phymem_page_reclaim (pa, &out); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM , err, &out); +return -EIO ; + }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 105
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ +if (do_wb) { + err =tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd (set_hkid_to_hpa (pa, hkid)); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + } + +tdx_clear_page (va);
Is it really necessary to clear the reclaimed page using MOVDIR64?
According to the TDX module spec, when add a page to TD, both for control structures and TD private memory, during the process some function of the TDX module will initialize the page using binding hkid and direct write (MOVDIR64B).
So still need to clear the page using direct write to avoid integrity error when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid as you mentioned in the comment?
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +8
-0+return 0 ; +} + +static int tdx_alloc_td_page (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ + page->va =__get_free_page (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); +if (!page->va) +return -ENOMEM ;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 123
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ + page->pa =__pa (page->va); +return 0 ; +} + +static void tdx_mark_td_page_added (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ +WARN_ON_ONCE (page->added); + page->added = true; +}
Make it inline?
Quoted 66 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +66
-0+ +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ +if (page->added) { +/* +* TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID +* assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD +* was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So +* cache doesn't need to be flushed again. +*/ +if (tdx_reclaim_page (page->va, page->pa, false,0 )) +return ; + + page->added = false; + } +free_page (page->va); +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb (void *param) +{ +u64 err =0 ; + +do { + err =tdh_phymem_cache_wb (!!err); + }while (err ==TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE ); + +/* Other thread may have done for us. */ +if (err ==TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE ) + err =TDX_SUCCESS ; +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +cpumask_var_t packages; +bool cpumask_allocated; +u64 err; +int ret; +int i; + +if (!is_hkid_assigned (kvm_tdx)) +return ; + +if (!is_td_created (kvm_tdx)) + goto free_hkid; + + cpumask_allocated =zalloc_cpumask_var (&packages,GFP_KERNEL ); +cpus_read_lock (); +for_each_online_cpu (i) { +if (cpumask_allocated && +cpumask_test_and_set_cpu (topology_physical_package_id (i), + packages)) +continue ; + +/* +* We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously. +* Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by +* serialization. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 199
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ ret =smp_call_on_cpu (i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb,NULL ,1 ); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (ret) +break ; + } +cpus_read_unlock (); +free_cpumask_var (packages); + +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + err =tdh_mng_key_freeid (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
According to the TDX module spec, there is a API called TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, which is used to put the TD in blocked state.
I didn't see the API used in the patch. Is it not used or did I miss something?
Quoted 42 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +42
-0+mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID , err,NULL ); +pr_err ("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n" , + kvm_tdx->hkid); +return ; + } + +free_hkid: +tdx_hkid_free (kvm_tdx); +} + +void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +int i; + +/* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */ +if (is_hkid_assigned (kvm_tdx)) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) +tdx_reclaim_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); +kfree (kvm_tdx->tdcs); + +/* +* TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR +* while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with +* TDX global HKID is needed. +*/ +if (kvm_tdx->tdr.added && +tdx_reclaim_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va, kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true, + tdx_global_keyid)) +return ; + +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va); +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config (void *param) +{ +hpa_t *tdr_p = param; +u64 err;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 251
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ +do { + err =tdh_mng_key_config (*tdr_p); + +/* +* If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this +* is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random +* number generator. +*/ + }while (err ==TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED );
Is there any corner case that could lead to deadloop?
Quoted 229 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +146
-0+ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +cpumask_var_t packages; +int ret, i; +u64 err; + +/* vCPUs can't be created until after KVM_TDX_INIT_VM. */ + kvm->max_vcpus =0 ; + + kvm_tdx->hkid =tdx_keyid_alloc (); +if (kvm_tdx->hkid <0 ) +return -EBUSY ; + + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdr); +if (ret) + goto free_hkid; + + kvm_tdx->tdcs =kcalloc (tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages,sizeof (*kvm_tdx->tdcs), +GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); +if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs) + goto free_tdr; +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) { + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); +if (ret) + goto free_tdcs; + } + +/* +* Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY: +* TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner +* Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin +* to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the +* caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation +* usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process +* scheduling. +* +* APIs to acquire the lock of KOT: +* TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and +* TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + err =tdh_mng_create (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->hkid); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_CREATE , err,NULL ); + ret = -EIO ; + goto free_tdcs; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&kvm_tdx->tdr); + +if (!zalloc_cpumask_var (&packages,GFP_KERNEL )) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto free_tdcs; + } +cpus_read_lock (); +for_each_online_cpu (i) { +int pkg =topology_physical_package_id (i); + +if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu (pkg, packages)) +continue ; + +/* +* Program the memory controller in the package with an +* encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id +* assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory +* controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by +* mutex. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); + ret =smp_call_on_cpu (i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config, + &kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); +if (ret) +break ; + } +cpus_read_unlock (); +free_cpumask_var (packages); +if (ret) + goto teardown; + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) { + err =tdh_mng_addcx (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].pa); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_ADDCX , err,NULL ); + ret = -EIO ; + goto teardown; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); + } + +/* +* Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated +* ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD. +*/ +return 0 ; + +/* +* The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD +* varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred. +* Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice +* with partial initialization. +*/ +teardown: +tdx_mmu_release_hkid (kvm); +tdx_vm_free (kvm); +return ret; + +free_tdcs: +/* @i points at the TDCS page that failed allocation. */ +for (--i; i >=0 ; i--) +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va); +kfree (kvm_tdx->tdcs); +free_tdr: +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va); +free_hkid: +tdx_hkid_free (kvm_tdx); +return ret; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;@@ -78,6 +425,9 @@ bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { +int max_pkgs; +int i; +if (!enable_ept) {pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n" );return -EINVAL ;@@ -88,8 +438,22 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)return -ENODEV ; } + max_pkgs =topology_max_packages (); + tdx_mng_key_config_lock =kcalloc (max_pkgs,sizeof (*tdx_mng_key_config_lock), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock) +return -ENOMEM ; +for (i =0 ; i < max_pkgs; i++) +mutex_init (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]); +pr_info ("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n" , boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);return 0 ; } + +void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) +{ +/* kfree accepts NULL. */ +kfree (tdx_mng_key_config_lock); +}arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +2
-0@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdr;struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; + +int hkid; };struct vcpu_tdx {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +11
-0@@ -131,9 +131,20 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type); +void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ); + +int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; } +static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) {} + +static inline int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {}#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8
-0@@ -12248,6 +12248,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)kvm_page_track_cleanup (kvm);kvm_xen_destroy_vm (kvm);kvm_hv_destroy_vm (kvm); +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm); }static void memslot_rmap_free (struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)@@ -12512,6 +12513,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all (struct kvm *kvm) { +/* +* kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before +* tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to +* be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke +* kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this. +*/ +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);kvm_mmu_zap_all (kvm); }
Re: [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
Quoted 17 lines · Binbin Wu
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 78
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +13
-0+static void tdx_clear_page (unsigned long page) +{ +const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 ))); +unsigned long i; + +/* +* Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i: +* when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is +* required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity +* error when read on the page with new keyid. +*/ +if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B )) +return ;TDX relies on MKTME, and MOVDIR64B is a must have feature. The check should not fail at this point?
Quoted 2 lines
It feels a bit strange to check the feature here and return siliently if the check failed.
Makes sense. This code is carried from the early devel phase. I'll move this check to tdx module initialization.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 83
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +5
-0+ +for (i =0 ; i <4096 ; i +=64 ) +/* MOVDIR64B [rdx], es:rdi */ + asm (".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0x38, 0xf8, 0x3a" + : :"d" (zero_page),"D" (page + i) :"memory" );There is already have a inline function movdir64b defined in
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h, can we use it directly here?
Sure I'll use the function.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +12
-0+} + +static int tdx_reclaim_page (unsigned long va,hpa_t pa,bool do_wb,u16 hkid) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_phymem_page_reclaim (pa, &out); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM , err, &out); +return -EIO ; + }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 105
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ +if (do_wb) { + err =tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd (set_hkid_to_hpa (pa, hkid)); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + } + +tdx_clear_page (va);Is it really necessary to clear the reclaimed page using MOVDIR64?
Quoted 8 lines
According to the TDX module spec, when add a page to TD, both for control structures and TD private memory, during the process some function of the TDX module will initialize the page using binding hkid and direct write (MOVDIR64B).
So still need to clear the page using direct write to avoid integrity error when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid as you mentioned in the comment?
Yes. As you described above, TDX module does when assining a page to a private hkid. i.e. TDH.MEM.PAGE.{ADD, AUG}. But when re-assigning a page from an old private hkid to a new _shared_ hkid, i.e. TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE or TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM, TDX module doesn't.
Quoted 43 lines
Quoted 29 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +29
-0+void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +cpumask_var_t packages; +bool cpumask_allocated; +u64 err; +int ret; +int i; + +if (!is_hkid_assigned (kvm_tdx)) +return ; + +if (!is_td_created (kvm_tdx)) + goto free_hkid; + + cpumask_allocated =zalloc_cpumask_var (&packages,GFP_KERNEL ); +cpus_read_lock (); +for_each_online_cpu (i) { +if (cpumask_allocated && +cpumask_test_and_set_cpu (topology_physical_package_id (i), + packages)) +continue ; + +/* +* We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously. +* Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by +* serialization. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock);arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 199
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ ret =smp_call_on_cpu (i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb,NULL ,1 ); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (ret) +break ; + } +cpus_read_unlock (); +free_cpumask_var (packages); + +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + err =tdh_mng_key_freeid (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);According to the TDX module spec, there is a API called TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, which is used to put the TD in blocked state.
Quoted 2 lines
I didn't see the API used in the patch. Is it not used or did I miss something?
In the public spec of TDX module of 344425-004US June 2022, table 2.4 says "TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID 27 Does nothing; provided for backward compatibility"
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +8
-0+static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config (void *param) +{ +hpa_t *tdr_p = param; +u64 err; + + do { + err = tdh_mng_key_config(*tdr_p); +
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 251
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6
-0+/* +* If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this +* is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random +* number generator. +*/ + }while (err ==TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED );Is there any corner case that could lead to deadloop?
The error happens due to the lack of entropy of pconfig instruction. If the entropy on the platform could be drained constantly somehow, the dead loop could be possible. I think it's very unlikely.
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
Quoted 30 lines · Isaku Yamahata
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +12
-0+} + +static int tdx_reclaim_page (unsigned long va,hpa_t pa,bool do_wb,u16 hkid) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_phymem_page_reclaim (pa, &out); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM , err, &out); +return -EIO ; + }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 105
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ +if (do_wb) { + err =tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd (set_hkid_to_hpa (pa, hkid)); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + } + +tdx_clear_page (va);Is it really necessary to clear the reclaimed page using MOVDIR64?
According to the TDX module spec, when add a page to TD, both for control structures and TD private memory, during the process some function of the TDX module will initialize the page using binding hkid and direct write (MOVDIR64B).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
So still need to clear the page using direct write to avoid integrity error when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid as you mentioned in the comment?
Yes. As you described above, TDX module does when assining a page to a private hkid. i.e. TDH.MEM.PAGE.{ADD, AUG}. But when re-assigning a page from an old private hkid to a new _shared_ hkid, i.e. TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE or TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM, TDX module doesn't.
Is the reason you added the tdx_clear_page() here due to the description in 1.3.1 of Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification for TDX (343754-002US)?
The description as following:
"MKTME on an SOC that supports SEAM might support an integrity protected, memory encryption mode. When using keys with integrity enabled, the MKTME associates a message authentication code (MAC) with each cache line. By design, when reading a cache line using a KeyID with integrity enabled, if the MAC stored in the metadata does not match the MAC regenerated by the MKTME, then the cache line is marked poisoned to prevent the data from being consumed. Integrity protected memory must be initialized before being read, and such initialization must be performed using 64-bytes direct-store with 64-byte write atomicity using the MOVDIR64B instruction"
Actually I have a question about the description, does the initialization using MOVDIR64B must associated with the according hkid?
Re: [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
Quoted 36 lines · Binbin Wu
Quoted 34 lines · Isaku Yamahata
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +3
-0+} + +static int tdx_reclaim_page(unsigned long va, hpa_t pa, bool do_wb,u16 hkid)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +9
-0+{ + struct tdx_module_output out; + u64 err; + + err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(pa, &out); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, &out); + return -EIO; + }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 105
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ + if (do_wb) { + err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(set_hkid_to_hpa(pa, hkid)); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err, NULL); + return -EIO; + } + } + + tdx_clear_page(va);Is it really necessary to clear the reclaimed page using MOVDIR64?
According to the TDX module spec, when add a page to TD, both for control structures and TD private memory, during the process some function of the TDX module will initialize the page using binding hkid and direct write (MOVDIR64B).
So still need to clear the page using direct write to avoid integrity error when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid as you mentioned in the comment?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes. As you described above, TDX module does when assining a page to a private hkid. i.e. TDH.MEM.PAGE.{ADD, AUG}. But when re-assigning a page from an old private hkid to a new _shared_ hkid, i.e. TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE or TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM, TDX module doesn't.
Is the reason you added the
tdx_clear_page()here due to the description in 1.3.1 of Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification for TDX (343754-002US)?
NO. The purpose of tdx_clear_page() is to update the HKID associated with the memory to 0. Otherwise the page cannot be used for host/KVM. Because the cacheline is still associated with a TD HKID, and it will get TD-bit mismatch when host accesses it without MOVDIR64B to update the HKID.
Quoted 5 lines
The description as following:
"MKTME on an SOC that supports SEAM might support an integrity protected, memory encryption mode. When using keys with integrity enabled, the MKTME associates a message authentication code (MAC) with each cache line. By design, when reading a cache line using a KeyID with integrity enabled, if the MAC stored in the metadata does not match the MAC regenerated by the MKTME, then the cache line is marked poisoned to prevent the data from being consumed. Integrity protected memory must be initialized before being read, and such initialization must be performed using 64-bytes direct-store with 64-byte write atomicity using the MOVDIR64B instruction"Actually I have a question about the description, does the initialization using MOVDIR64B must associated with the according hkid?
MOVDIR64B is just an instruction to write memory. What HKID is used depends on your purpose. When TDX module tries to initialize the private memory for TDs, TD's HKID is embedded into the PA. When host kernel/KVM tries to reclaim the memory from TD, it needs to embed HKID 0 into PA to clear the page.
Re: [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 405 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:05PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID.
Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add
flush_shadow_all_privatecallback before tearing down private page tables for it.Add a second
kvm_x86_opshook inkvm_arch_destroy_vm()to support TDX's destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state, then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.Co-developed-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 364 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 + 7 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +2
-0@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid) KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported) KVM_X86_OP(vm_init) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2
-0@@ -1458,7 +1458,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);unsigned int vm_size;int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm); +void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */ int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +31
-3@@ -39,18 +39,44 @@ static int __init vt_post_hardware_enable_setup(void)return 0 ; } +static void vt_hardware_unsetup (void ) +{ +tdx_hardware_unsetup (); +vmx_hardware_unsetup (); +} +static int vt_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {if (is_td (kvm)) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ;/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */ +return tdx_vm_init (kvm);return vmx_vm_init (kvm); } +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_mmu_release_hkid (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return ; + +vmx_vm_destroy (kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return tdx_vm_free (kvm); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" , - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup, + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup, .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility, .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,@@ -60,7 +86,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported, .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_init = vt_vm_init, - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private, + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, + .vm_free = vt_vm_free, .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +277
-0@@ -31,6 +31,353 @@ struct tdx_capabilities {/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */ static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps; +/* +* Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB, +* TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a global lock +* internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is returned without +* spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's caller's +* responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use this mutex +* to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about scheduling. +*/ +static DEFINE_MUTEX (tdx_lock); +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock; + +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid) +{ +return pa | ((hpa_t )hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); +} + +static inline bool is_td_created (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->tdr.added; +} + +static inline void tdx_hkid_free (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +tdx_keyid_free (kvm_tdx->hkid); + kvm_tdx->hkid =-1 ; +} + +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->hkid >0 ; +} + +static void tdx_clear_page (unsigned long page) +{ +const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 ))); +unsigned long i; + +/* +* Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i: +* when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is +* required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity +* error when read on the page with new keyid. +*/ +if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B )) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i <4096 ; i +=64 ) +/* MOVDIR64B [rdx], es:rdi */ + asm (".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0x38, 0xf8, 0x3a" + : :"d" (zero_page),"D" (page + i) :"memory" ); +} + +static int tdx_reclaim_page (unsigned long va,hpa_t pa,bool do_wb,u16 hkid) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_phymem_page_reclaim (pa, &out); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM , err, &out); +return -EIO ; + } + +if (do_wb) { + err =tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd (set_hkid_to_hpa (pa, hkid)); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + } + +tdx_clear_page (va); +return 0 ; +} + +static int tdx_alloc_td_page (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ + page->va =__get_free_page (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); +if (!page->va) +return -ENOMEM ; + + page->pa =__pa (page->va); +return 0 ; +} + +static void tdx_mark_td_page_added (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ +WARN_ON_ONCE (page->added); + page->added = true; +} + +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page (struct tdx_td_page *page) +{ +if (page->added) { +/* +* TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID +* assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD +* was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So +* cache doesn't need to be flushed again. +*/ +if (tdx_reclaim_page (page->va, page->pa, false,0 )) +return ; + + page->added = false; + } +free_page (page->va); +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb (void *param) +{ +u64 err =0 ; + +do { + err =tdh_phymem_cache_wb (!!err); + }while (err ==TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE ); + +/* Other thread may have done for us. */ +if (err ==TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE ) + err =TDX_SUCCESS ; +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +cpumask_var_t packages; +bool cpumask_allocated; +u64 err; +int ret; +int i; + +if (!is_hkid_assigned (kvm_tdx)) +return ; + +if (!is_td_created (kvm_tdx)) + goto free_hkid; + + cpumask_allocated =zalloc_cpumask_var (&packages,GFP_KERNEL ); +cpus_read_lock (); +for_each_online_cpu (i) { +if (cpumask_allocated && +cpumask_test_and_set_cpu (topology_physical_package_id (i), + packages)) +continue ; + +/* +* We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously. +* Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by +* serialization. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + ret =smp_call_on_cpu (i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb,NULL ,1 ); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (ret) +break ; + } +cpus_read_unlock (); +free_cpumask_var (packages); + +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + err =tdh_mng_key_freeid (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID , err,NULL ); +pr_err ("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n" , + kvm_tdx->hkid); +return ; + } + +free_hkid: +tdx_hkid_free (kvm_tdx); +} + +void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +int i; + +/* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */ +if (is_hkid_assigned (kvm_tdx)) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) +tdx_reclaim_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); +kfree (kvm_tdx->tdcs); + +/* +* TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR +* while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with +* TDX global HKID is needed. +*/ +if (kvm_tdx->tdr.added && +tdx_reclaim_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va, kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true, + tdx_global_keyid)) +return ; + +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va); +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config (void *param) +{ +hpa_t *tdr_p = param; +u64 err; + +do { + err =tdh_mng_key_config (*tdr_p); + +/* +* If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this +* is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random +* number generator. +*/ + }while (err ==TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED ); + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +cpumask_var_t packages; +int ret, i; +u64 err; + +/* vCPUs can't be created until after KVM_TDX_INIT_VM. */ + kvm->max_vcpus =0 ; + + kvm_tdx->hkid =tdx_keyid_alloc (); +if (kvm_tdx->hkid <0 ) +return -EBUSY ; + + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdr); +if (ret) + goto free_hkid; + + kvm_tdx->tdcs =kcalloc (tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages,sizeof (*kvm_tdx->tdcs), +GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); +if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs) + goto free_tdr; +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) { + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); +if (ret) + goto free_tdcs; + } + +/* +* Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY: +* TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner +* Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin +* to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the +* caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation +* usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process +* scheduling. +* +* APIs to acquire the lock of KOT: +* TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and +* TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_lock); + err =tdh_mng_create (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->hkid); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_lock); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_CREATE , err,NULL ); + ret = -EIO ; + goto free_tdcs; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&kvm_tdx->tdr);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c struct tdx_capabilities { · line 320
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ +if (!zalloc_cpumask_var (&packages,GFP_KERNEL )) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto free_tdcs; + } +cpus_read_lock (); +for_each_online_cpu (i) { +int pkg =topology_physical_package_id (i); + +if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu (pkg, packages))
"package" is cpumask but used for tracking packages, it works if number of CPU >= number of NODE, but looks odd.
How about rely on "for_each_node_state" and "cpumask_of_node" ? Below RFC code also eliminates the memeory allocation for the cpumask and the code duplication in tdx_mmu_release_hkid(), by quick testing it can boot up TDX guest successfully on 2 nodes system:
#define for_each_node_first_online_cpu(mask, node, cpu) \
for_each_node_state(node, N_ONLINE) \
if (!(mask = cpumask_of_node(node)) || \
(cpu = cpumask_first_and(mask, cpu_online_mask)) \
>= nr_cpu_ids) { } else \
const struct cpumask *cpumask;
int node_id;
int i;
...
cpus_read_lock();
for_each_node_first_online_cpu(cpumask, node_id, i) {
/*
* Program the memory controller in the package with an
* encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id
* assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory
* controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by
* mutex.
*/
mutex_lock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[node_id]);
ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config,
&kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true);
mutex_unlock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[node_id]);
if (ret)
break;
}
cpus_read_unlock();
if (ret)
goto teardown;Quoted 163 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +77
-0+continue ; + +/* +* Program the memory controller in the package with an +* encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id +* assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory +* controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by +* mutex. +*/ +mutex_lock (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); + ret =smp_call_on_cpu (i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config, + &kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true); +mutex_unlock (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); +if (ret) +break ; + } +cpus_read_unlock (); +free_cpumask_var (packages); +if (ret) + goto teardown; + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) { + err =tdh_mng_addcx (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].pa); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_ADDCX , err,NULL ); + ret = -EIO ; + goto teardown; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]); + } + +/* +* Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated +* ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD. +*/ +return 0 ; + +/* +* The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD +* varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred. +* Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice +* with partial initialization. +*/ +teardown: +tdx_mmu_release_hkid (kvm); +tdx_vm_free (kvm); +return ret; + +free_tdcs: +/* @i points at the TDCS page that failed allocation. */ +for (--i; i >=0 ; i--) +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va); +kfree (kvm_tdx->tdcs); +free_tdr: +free_page (kvm_tdx->tdr.va); +free_hkid: +tdx_hkid_free (kvm_tdx); +return ret; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;@@ -78,6 +425,9 @@ bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { +int max_pkgs; +int i; +if (!enable_ept) {pr_warn ("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n" );return -EINVAL ;@@ -88,8 +438,22 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)return -ENODEV ; } + max_pkgs =topology_max_packages (); + tdx_mng_key_config_lock =kcalloc (max_pkgs,sizeof (*tdx_mng_key_config_lock), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock) +return -ENOMEM ; +for (i =0 ; i < max_pkgs; i++) +mutex_init (&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]); +pr_info ("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n" , boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);return 0 ; } + +void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) +{ +/* kfree accepts NULL. */ +kfree (tdx_mng_key_config_lock); +}arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +2
-0@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdr;struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; + +int hkid; };struct vcpu_tdx {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +11
-0@@ -131,9 +131,20 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type); +void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ); + +int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; } +static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) {} + +static inline int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {}#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8
-1@@ -12248,6 +12248,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)kvm_page_track_cleanup (kvm);kvm_xen_destroy_vm (kvm);kvm_hv_destroy_vm (kvm); +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm); }static void memslot_rmap_free (struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)@@ -12512,6 +12513,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all (struct kvm *kvm) { +/* +* kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before +* tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to +* be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke +* kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this. +*/ +static_call_cond (kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);kvm_mmu_zap_all (kvm); } --2.25.1
PATCH v8 21/103 KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Implement a system-scoped ioctl to get system-wide parameters for TDX.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++ tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 154 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(smi_allowed) KVM_X86_OP(enter_smm) KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm) KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(dev_mem_enc_ioctl) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1611,6 +1611,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {int (*leave_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,const char *smstate);void (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +int (*dev_mem_enc_ioctl)(void __user *argp);int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp);int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_enc_region *argp);int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +48 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +2 -0
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp, .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, + + .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl, };struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +46 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int __init tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type);void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ); +int tdx_dev_ioctl (void __user *argp);int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; }static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup (void ) {} +static inline int tdx_dev_ioctl (void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; };static inline int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {}
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +6 -0
@@ -4643,6 +4643,12 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp, r =kvm_x86_dev_has_attr (&attr);break ; } +case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP : + r = -EINVAL ; +if (!kvm_x86_ops.dev_mem_enc_ioctl) + goto out; + r =static_call (kvm_x86_dev_mem_enc_ioctl)(argp); +break ;default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +48 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 22/103 KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Add a place holder function for TDX specific VM-scoped ioctl as mem_enc_op. TDX specific sub-commands will be added to retrieve/pass TDX specific parameters.
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP was introduced for VM-scoped operations specific for guest state-protected VM. It defined subcommands for technology-specific operations under KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. Despite its name, the subcommands are not limited to memory encryption, but various technology-specific operations are defined. It's natural to repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP for TDX specific operations and define subcommands.
TDX requires VM-scoped TDX-specific operations for device model, for example, qemu. Getting system-wide parameters, TDX-specific VM initialization.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)return tdx_vm_free (kvm); } +static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) +{ +if (!is_td (kvm)) +return -ENOTTY ; + +return tdx_vm_ioctl (kvm, argp); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,
@@ -214,6 +222,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl, + .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl, };struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +26 -0
@@ -424,6 +424,32 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)return 0 ; } +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) +{ +struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd; +int r; + +if (copy_from_user (&tdx_cmd, argp,sizeof (struct kvm_tdx_cmd ))) +return -EFAULT ; +if (tdx_cmd.error || tdx_cmd.unused) +return -EINVAL ; + +mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); + +switch (tdx_cmd.id) { +default : + r = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + +if (copy_to_user (argp, &tdx_cmd,sizeof (struct kvm_tdx_cmd ))) + r = -EFAULT ; + +out: +mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); +return r; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4 -0
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp);int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm); + +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; }
@@ -147,6 +149,8 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {} + +static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 022/103] KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
Quoted 44 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Add a place holder function for TDX specific VM-scoped ioctl as
mem_enc_op. TDX specific sub-commands will be added to retrieve/pass TDX specific parameters.
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPwas introduced for VM-scoped operations specific for guest state-protected VM. It defined subcommands for technology-specific operations underKVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. Despite its name, the subcommands are not limited to memory encryption, but various technology-specific operations are defined. It's natural to repurposeKVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPfor TDX specific operations and define subcommands.TDX requires VM-scoped TDX-specific operations for device model, for example, qemu. Getting system-wide parameters, TDX-specific VM initialization.
Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +8
-0@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)return tdx_vm_free (kvm); } +static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) +{ +if (!is_td (kvm)) +return -ENOTTY ; + +return tdx_vm_ioctl (kvm, argp); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { · line 225
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +1
-0@@ -214,6 +222,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl, + .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,
suggeust to align the interafce/function name style with the scop.
patch 21 and 27 have the scope in interafce names(dev / vcpu), may be clearer to use vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl?
Quoted 62 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +0
-0};struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +26
-0@@ -424,6 +424,32 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)return 0 ; } +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) +{ +struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd; +int r; + +if (copy_from_user (&tdx_cmd, argp,sizeof (struct kvm_tdx_cmd ))) +return -EFAULT ; +if (tdx_cmd.error || tdx_cmd.unused) +return -EINVAL ; + +mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); + +switch (tdx_cmd.id) { +default : + r = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + +if (copy_to_user (argp, &tdx_cmd,sizeof (struct kvm_tdx_cmd ))) + r = -EFAULT ; + +out: +mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); +return r; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4
-0@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp);int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm); + +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; }@@ -147,6 +149,8 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {} + +static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Re: [PATCH v8 022/103] KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
Quoted 24 lines · Binbin Wu
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +8
-0@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)return tdx_vm_free (kvm); } +static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) +{ +if (!is_td (kvm)) +return -ENOTTY ; + +return tdx_vm_ioctl (kvm, argp); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { · line 224
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +1
-0@@ -214,6 +222,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl, + .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,suggeust to align the interafce/function name style with the scop.
Quoted 2 lines
patch 21 and 27 have the scope in interafce names(dev / vcpu), may be clearer to use
vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl?
This is a matter of preference. I intentionally chose to drop mem_enc part because actually KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP is abused for TDX or SEV(-SNP) specific operation. Subcommand for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP is not directly related to memory encryption. It should be KVM_CONFIDENTIAL_OP or something. Unfortunately it's too late to rename it.
Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v8 022/103] KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 56 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:07PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Add a place holder function for TDX specific VM-scoped ioctl as
mem_enc_op. TDX specific sub-commands will be added to retrieve/pass TDX specific parameters.
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPwas introduced for VM-scoped operations specific for guest state-protected VM. It defined subcommands for technology-specific operations underKVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. Despite its name, the subcommands are not limited to memory encryption, but various technology-specific operations are defined. It's natural to repurposeKVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPfor TDX specific operations and define subcommands.TDX requires VM-scoped TDX-specific operations for device model, for example, qemu. Getting system-wide parameters, TDX-specific VM initialization.
Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9
-0@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)return tdx_vm_free (kvm); } +static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) +{ +if (!is_td (kvm)) +return -ENOTTY ; + +return tdx_vm_ioctl (kvm, argp); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -214,6 +222,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl, + .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl, };struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) · line 432
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6
-0@@ -424,6 +424,32 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)return 0 ; } +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) +{ +struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd; +int r; + +if (copy_from_user (&tdx_cmd, argp,sizeof (struct kvm_tdx_cmd )))
Minor: sizeof(tdx_cmd), escape from type change & better readability.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) · line 445
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +13
-0+return -EFAULT ; +if (tdx_cmd.error || tdx_cmd.unused) +return -EINVAL ; + +mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); + +switch (tdx_cmd.id) { +default : + r = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + +if (copy_to_user (argp, &tdx_cmd,sizeof (struct kvm_tdx_cmd )))
Ditto
Quoted 35 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +7
-0+ r = -EFAULT ; + +out: +mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); +return r; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4
-1@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp);int tdx_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm); + +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; }@@ -147,6 +149,8 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {} + +static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ --2.25.1
PATCH v8 23/103 KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters
In reply to [email protected]From: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to protect its confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including VMM. When creating guest TD VM before creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (that is same among vcpus. and it can't be changed.) CPUIDs which is emulated by the TDX module. It means guest can trust those CPUIDs. and sha384 values for measurement.
Add new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for TDX guest. It assigns encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX encrypts memory per-guest bases. It assigns device model passes per-VM parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, tsc frequency (TDX guest has fised VM-wide TSC frequency. not per-vcpu. The TDX guest can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended features (which is reflected into guest XCR0, IA32_XSS MSR), cpuids, sha384 measurements, and etc.
This subcommand is called before creating vcpu and KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e. cpuids configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values needs to be passed in struct kvm_init_vm. It's device model responsibility to make this cpuid config for KVM_TDX_INIT_VM and KVM_SET_CPUID2.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 22 +++ tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++++ 5 files changed, 290 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +3 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST + +/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */ +#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((u32)-1) struct tdx_cpuid_config { u32 leaf; u32 sub_leaf;
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +33 -0
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VM ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };
@@ -583,4 +584,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities { struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0]; }; +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm { +__u64 attributes; +__u32 max_vcpus; +__u32 padding; +__u64 mrconfigid[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrowner[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrownerconfig[6 ];/* sha348 digest */ +union { +/* +* KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before +* KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed. +* +* This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}. +* The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent +* with this values. +* sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256) +* = 8KB. +*/ +struct { +struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; +/* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */ +struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[]; + }; +/* +* For future extensibility. +* The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB. +* This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024 +*/ +__u64 reserved[2028 ]; + }; +}; +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +199 -0
211 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +22 -0
@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdr;struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; +u64 attributes; +u64 xfam;int hkid; + +u64 tsc_offset; };struct vcpu_tdx {
@@ -50,6 +54,11 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); } +static inline bool is_td_initialized (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return !!kvm->max_vcpus; +} + static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) { BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && (field) & 0x1,
@@ -135,6 +144,19 @@ TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (64 ,STATE_NON_ARCH , state_non_arch);TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (8 ,MANAGEMENT , management); +static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_mng_rd (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa,TDCS_EXEC (field), &out); +if (unlikely (err)) { +pr_err ("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n" , field, err); +return 0 ; + } +return out.r8; +} +#else static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; };
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +33 -0
@@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VM ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };
@@ -577,4 +578,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities { struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0]; }; +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm { +__u64 attributes; +__u32 max_vcpus; +__u32 padding; +__u64 mrconfigid[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrowner[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrownerconfig[6 ];/* sha348 digest */ +union { +/* +* KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before +* KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed. +* +* This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}. +* The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent +* with this values. +* sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256) +* = 8KB. +*/ +struct { +struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; +/* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */ +struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[]; + }; +/* +* For future extensibility. +* The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB. +* This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024 +*/ +__u64 reserved[2028 ]; + }; +}; +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 023/103] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters
Quoted 156 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
From: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to protect its confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including VMM. When creating guest TD VM before creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (that is same among vcpus. and it can't be changed.) CPUIDs which is emulated by the TDX module. It means guest can trust those CPUIDs. and sha384 values for measurement.
Add new subcommand,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for TDX guest. It assigns encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX encrypts memory per-guest bases. It assigns device model passes per-VM parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, tsc frequency (TDX guest has fised VM-wide TSC frequency. not per-vcpu. The TDX guest can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended features (which is reflected into guest XCR0,IA32_XSSMSR), cpuids, sha384 measurements, and etc.This subcommand is called before creating vcpu and
KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e. cpuids configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values needs to be passed in structkvm_init_vm. It's device model responsibility to make this cpuid config forKVM_TDX_INIT_VMandKVM_SET_CPUID2.Signed-off-by Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 22 +++ tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++++ 5 files changed, 290 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +3
-0@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST + +/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */ +#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((u32)-1) struct tdx_cpuid_config { u32 leaf; u32 sub_leaf;arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +33
-0@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VM ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };@@ -583,4 +584,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities { struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0]; }; +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm { +__u64 attributes; +__u32 max_vcpus; +__u32 padding; +__u64 mrconfigid[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrowner[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrownerconfig[6 ];/* sha348 digest */ +union { +/* +* KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before +* KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed. +* +* This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}. +* The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent +* with this values. +* sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256) +* = 8KB. +*/ +struct { +struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; +/* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */ +struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[]; + }; +/* +* For future extensibility. +* The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB. +* This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024 +*/ +__u64 reserved[2028 ]; + }; +}; +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +51
-0@@ -424,6 +424,202 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)return 0 ; } +/* +* cpuid entry lookup in TDX cpuid config way. +* The difference is how to specify index(subleaves). +* Specify index to TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF for CPUID leaf with no-subleaves. +*/ +static const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *tdx_find_cpuid_entry ( +const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,u32 function,u32 index) +{ +int i; + +/* In TDX CPU CONFIG, TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF means index = 0. */ +if (index ==TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ) + index =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < cpuid->nent; i++) { +const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &cpuid->entries[i]; + +if (e->function == function && + (e->index == index || + !(e->flags &KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX ))) +return e; + } +return NULL ; +} + +static int setup_tdparams (struct kvm *kvm,struct td_params *td_params, +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm) +{ +const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid = &init_vm->cpuid; +const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry; +u64 guest_supported_xcr0; +u64 guest_supported_xss; +int max_pa; +int i; + + td_params->max_vcpus = init_vm->max_vcpus; + + td_params->attributes = init_vm->attributes; +if (td_params->attributes &TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON ) { +/* +* TODO: save/restore PMU related registers around TDENTER. +* Once it's done, remove this guard. +*/ +pr_warn ("TD doesn't support perfmon yet. KVM needs to save/restore " +"host perf registers properly.\n" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs; i++) { +const struct tdx_cpuid_config *config = &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs[i]; + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry =
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) · line 487
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid, config->leaf, config->sub_leaf); +struct tdx_cpuid_value *value = &td_params->cpuid_values[i]; + +if (!entry) +continue ; + + value->eax = entry->eax & config->eax; + value->ebx = entry->ebx & config->ebx; + value->ecx = entry->ecx & config->ecx; + value->edx = entry->edx & config->edx;
Add some comments about the meaning of bits in config->eax/ebx...?
Quoted 87 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +87
-0+ } + + max_pa =36 ; + entry =tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid,0x80000008 ,0 ); +if (entry) + max_pa = entry->eax &0xff ; + + td_params->eptp_controls =VMX_EPTP_MT_WB ; +/* +* No CPU supports 4-level && max_pa > 48. +* "5-level paging and 5-level EPT" section 4.1 4-level EPT +* "4-level EPT is limited to translating 48-bit guest-physical +* addresses." +* cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() check is just in case. +*/ +if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels () && max_pa >48 ) { + td_params->eptp_controls |=VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 ; + td_params->exec_controls |=TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW ; + }else { + td_params->eptp_controls |=VMX_EPTP_PWL_4 ; + } + +/* Setup td_params.xfam */ + entry =tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid,0xd ,0 ); +if (entry) + guest_supported_xcr0 = (entry->eax | ((u64 )entry->edx <<32 )); +else + guest_supported_xcr0 =0 ; + guest_supported_xcr0 &= kvm_caps.supported_xcr0; + + entry =tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid,0xd ,1 ); +if (entry) + guest_supported_xss = (entry->ecx | ((u64 )entry->edx <<32 )); +else + guest_supported_xss =0 ; +/* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */ + guest_supported_xss &= (kvm_caps.supported_xss |XFEATURE_MASK_PT ); + + td_params->xfam = guest_supported_xcr0 | guest_supported_xss; +if (td_params->xfam &XFEATURE_MASK_LBR ) { +/* +* TODO: once KVM supports LBR(save/restore LBR related +* registers around TDENTER), remove this guard. +*/ +pr_warn ("TD doesn't support LBR yet. KVM needs to save/restore " +"IA32_LBR_DEPTH properly.\n" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } + +if (td_params->xfam &XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE ) { +/* +* TODO: once KVM supports AMX(save/restore AMX related +* registers around TDENTER), remove this guard. +*/ +pr_warn ("TD doesn't support AMX yet. KVM needs to save/restore " +"IA32_XFD, IA32_XFD_ERR properly.\n" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } + + td_params->tsc_frequency = +TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ (kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz); + +#define MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (dst, src) \ + do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dst) != sizeof(src)); \ + memcpy((dst), (src), sizeof(dst)); \ + } while (0) + +MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (td_params->mrconfigid, init_vm->mrconfigid); +MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (td_params->mrowner, init_vm->mrowner); +MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (td_params->mrownerconfig, init_vm->mrownerconfig); + +return 0 ; +} + +static int tdx_td_init (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm =NULL ; +struct td_params *td_params =NULL ; +struct tdx_module_output out; +int ret; +u64 err; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (*init_vm) !=16 *1024 ); + BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*init_vm) - offsetof(typeof(*init_vm), entries)) / +sizeof (init_vm->entries[0 ]) <KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES );
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) · line 584
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (struct td_params ) !=1024 ); + +if (is_td_initialized (kvm)) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (cmd->flags) +return -EINVAL ; + + init_vm =kzalloc (sizeof (*init_vm),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (copy_from_user (init_vm, (void __user *)cmd->data,sizeof (*init_vm))) {
Does copy_from_user accept null pointer as destination?
Quoted 82 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +41
-0+ ret = -EFAULT ; + goto out; + } + +if (init_vm->max_vcpus >KVM_MAX_VCPUS ) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + + td_params =kzalloc (sizeof (struct td_params ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!td_params) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; + } + + ret =setup_tdparams (kvm, td_params, init_vm); +if (ret) + goto out; + + err =tdh_mng_init (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa,__pa (td_params), &out); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_INIT , err, &out); + ret = -EIO ; + goto out; + } + + kvm_tdx->tsc_offset =td_tdcs_exec_read64 (kvm_tdx,TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET ); + kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes; + kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam; + kvm->max_vcpus = td_params->max_vcpus; + +out: +/* kfree() accepts NULL. */ +kfree (init_vm); +kfree (td_params); +return ret; +} +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;@@ -437,6 +633,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)mutex_lock (&kvm->lock);switch (tdx_cmd.id) { +case KVM_TDX_INIT_VM : + r =tdx_td_init (kvm, &tdx_cmd); +break ;default : r = -EINVAL ; goto out;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +9
-0@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdr;struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; +u64 attributes; +u64 xfam;int hkid; + +u64 tsc_offset; };struct vcpu_tdx {@@ -50,6 +54,11 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); } +static inline bool is_td_initialized (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return !!kvm->max_vcpus; +} + static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) { BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && (field) & 0x1,@@ -135,6 +144,19 @@ TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (64 ,STATE_NON_ARCH , state_non_arch);TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (8 ,MANAGEMENT , management);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs); · line 155
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +9
-0+static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_mng_rd (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa,TDCS_EXEC (field), &out); +if (unlikely (err)) { +pr_err ("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n" , field, err); +return 0 ;
So, the caller doesn't know whether the function succeeded or not.
Would it cause any issue if the tdh_mng_rd failed and the right value is not 0?
Quoted 56 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +4
-0+ } +return out.r8; +} +#else static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; };tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +33
-0@@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VM ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };@@ -577,4 +578,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities { struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0]; }; +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm { +__u64 attributes; +__u32 max_vcpus; +__u32 padding; +__u64 mrconfigid[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrowner[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrownerconfig[6 ];/* sha348 digest */ +union { +/* +* KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before +* KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed. +* +* This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}. +* The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent +* with this values. +* sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256) +* = 8KB. +*/ +struct { +struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; +/* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */ +struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[]; + }; +/* +* For future extensibility. +* The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB. +* This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024 +*/ +__u64 reserved[2028 ]; + }; +}; +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
Re: [PATCH v8 023/103] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 10 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:08PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to protect its confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including VMM. When creating guest TD VM before creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (that is same among vcpus. and it can't be changed.) CPUIDs which is emulated by the TDX module. It means guest can trust those CPUIDs. and sha384 values for measurement.
Quoted 2 lines
Add new subcommand,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for TDX guest. It assigns encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX
This paragraph talks about the parameters carried with KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, but the encryption key is not part of them, suggest to move the encryption related things to solo paragraph or just remove them.
Quoted 10 lines
encrypts memory per-guest bases. It assigns device model passes per-VM parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, tsc frequency (TDX guest has fised VM-wide TSC frequency. not per-vcpu. The TDX guest can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended features (which is reflected into guest XCR0,
IA32_XSSMSR), cpuids, sha384 measurements, and etc.This subcommand is called before creating vcpu and
KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e. cpuids configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values needs to be passed in structkvm_init_vm. It's device model responsibility
s/kvm_init_vm/kvm_tdx_init_vm OR:
"So CPUIDs configuration values need to be passed with KVM_TDX_INIT_VM"
Quoted 59 lines
to make this cpuid config for
KVM_TDX_INIT_VMandKVM_SET_CPUID2.Signed-off-by Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 22 +++ tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++++ 5 files changed, 290 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +3
-0@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST + +/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */ +#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((u32)-1) struct tdx_cpuid_config { u32 leaf; u32 sub_leaf;arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +18
-0@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VM ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };@@ -583,4 +584,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0 ]; }; +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm { +__u64 attributes; +__u32 max_vcpus; +__u32 padding; +__u64 mrconfigid[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrowner[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrownerconfig[6 ];/* sha348 digest */ +union { +/* +* KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before +* KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed. +* +* This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}. +* The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent +* with this values. +* sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256) +* = 8KB.
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h struct kvm_tdx_capabilities { · line 613
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +10
-0+*/ +struct { +struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; +/* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */ +struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[]; + }; +/* +* For future extensibility. +* The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB. +* This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
Do you mean that in TD_PARAMS now maximum CPUID item count is 48 (1024
- CPUID ITEM START(is 256)) / CPUID size(is 16)) and here we already defined 256 which is much enough for TD_PARAMS ?
Quoted 60 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +5
-0+*/ + __u64 reserved[2028]; + }; +}; +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +46
-0@@ -424,6 +424,202 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)return 0 ; } +/* +* cpuid entry lookup in TDX cpuid config way. +* The difference is how to specify index(subleaves). +* Specify index to TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF for CPUID leaf with no-subleaves. +*/ +static const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *tdx_find_cpuid_entry ( +const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,u32 function,u32 index) +{ +int i; + +/* In TDX CPU CONFIG, TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF means index = 0. */ +if (index ==TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ) + index =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < cpuid->nent; i++) { +const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &cpuid->entries[i]; + +if (e->function == function && + (e->index == index || + !(e->flags &KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX ))) +return e; + } +return NULL ; +} + +static int setup_tdparams (struct kvm *kvm,struct td_params *td_params, +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm) +{ +const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid = &init_vm->cpuid; +const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry; +u64 guest_supported_xcr0; +u64 guest_supported_xss; +int max_pa; +int i; + + td_params->max_vcpus = init_vm->max_vcpus; + + td_params->attributes = init_vm->attributes; +if (td_params->attributes &TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON ) { +/* +* TODO: save/restore PMU related registers around TDENTER. +* Once it's done, remove this guard. +*/ +pr_warn ("TD doesn't support perfmon yet. KVM needs to save/restore " +"host perf registers properly.\n" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) · line 482
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ } + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs; i++) { +const struct tdx_cpuid_config *config = &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs[i]; +const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry = +tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid, config->leaf, config->sub_leaf); +struct tdx_cpuid_value *value = &td_params->cpuid_values[i]; + +if (!entry) +continue ;
So the corresponding CPUID's configurable bits are all set to 0 if user space doesn't pass it down, a pr_warn() is needed here if this isn't the expected case.
Quoted 253 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +143
-0+ + value->eax = entry->eax & config->eax; + value->ebx = entry->ebx & config->ebx; + value->ecx = entry->ecx & config->ecx; + value->edx = entry->edx & config->edx; + } + + max_pa =36 ; + entry =tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid,0x80000008 ,0 ); +if (entry) + max_pa = entry->eax &0xff ; + + td_params->eptp_controls =VMX_EPTP_MT_WB ; +/* +* No CPU supports 4-level && max_pa > 48. +* "5-level paging and 5-level EPT" section 4.1 4-level EPT +* "4-level EPT is limited to translating 48-bit guest-physical +* addresses." +* cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() check is just in case. +*/ +if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels () && max_pa >48 ) { + td_params->eptp_controls |=VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 ; + td_params->exec_controls |=TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW ; + }else { + td_params->eptp_controls |=VMX_EPTP_PWL_4 ; + } + +/* Setup td_params.xfam */ + entry =tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid,0xd ,0 ); +if (entry) + guest_supported_xcr0 = (entry->eax | ((u64 )entry->edx <<32 )); +else + guest_supported_xcr0 =0 ; + guest_supported_xcr0 &= kvm_caps.supported_xcr0; + + entry =tdx_find_cpuid_entry (cpuid,0xd ,1 ); +if (entry) + guest_supported_xss = (entry->ecx | ((u64 )entry->edx <<32 )); +else + guest_supported_xss =0 ; +/* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */ + guest_supported_xss &= (kvm_caps.supported_xss |XFEATURE_MASK_PT ); + + td_params->xfam = guest_supported_xcr0 | guest_supported_xss; +if (td_params->xfam &XFEATURE_MASK_LBR ) { +/* +* TODO: once KVM supports LBR(save/restore LBR related +* registers around TDENTER), remove this guard. +*/ +pr_warn ("TD doesn't support LBR yet. KVM needs to save/restore " +"IA32_LBR_DEPTH properly.\n" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } + +if (td_params->xfam &XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE ) { +/* +* TODO: once KVM supports AMX(save/restore AMX related +* registers around TDENTER), remove this guard. +*/ +pr_warn ("TD doesn't support AMX yet. KVM needs to save/restore " +"IA32_XFD, IA32_XFD_ERR properly.\n" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } + + td_params->tsc_frequency = +TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ (kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz); + +#define MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (dst, src) \ + do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dst) != sizeof(src)); \ + memcpy((dst), (src), sizeof(dst)); \ + } while (0) + +MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (td_params->mrconfigid, init_vm->mrconfigid); +MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (td_params->mrowner, init_vm->mrowner); +MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE (td_params->mrownerconfig, init_vm->mrownerconfig); + +return 0 ; +} + +static int tdx_td_init (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (kvm); +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm =NULL ; +struct td_params *td_params =NULL ; +struct tdx_module_output out; +int ret; +u64 err; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (*init_vm) !=16 *1024 ); + BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*init_vm) - offsetof(typeof(*init_vm), entries)) / +sizeof (init_vm->entries[0 ]) <KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (struct td_params ) !=1024 ); + +if (is_td_initialized (kvm)) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (cmd->flags) +return -EINVAL ; + + init_vm =kzalloc (sizeof (*init_vm),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (copy_from_user (init_vm, (void __user *)cmd->data,sizeof (*init_vm))) { + ret = -EFAULT ; + goto out; + } + +if (init_vm->max_vcpus >KVM_MAX_VCPUS ) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + + td_params =kzalloc (sizeof (struct td_params ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!td_params) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; + } + + ret =setup_tdparams (kvm, td_params, init_vm); +if (ret) + goto out; + + err =tdh_mng_init (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa,__pa (td_params), &out); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_MNG_INIT , err, &out); + ret = -EIO ; + goto out; + } + + kvm_tdx->tsc_offset =td_tdcs_exec_read64 (kvm_tdx,TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET ); + kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes; + kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam; + kvm->max_vcpus = td_params->max_vcpus; + +out: +/* kfree() accepts NULL. */ +kfree (init_vm); +kfree (td_params); +return ret; +} +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;@@ -437,6 +633,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)mutex_lock (&kvm->lock);switch (tdx_cmd.id) { +case KVM_TDX_INIT_VM : + r =tdx_td_init (kvm, &tdx_cmd); +break ;default : r = -EINVAL ; goto out;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +22
-0@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdr;struct tdx_td_page *tdcs; +u64 attributes; +u64 xfam;int hkid; + +u64 tsc_offset; };struct vcpu_tdx {@@ -50,6 +54,11 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu); } +static inline bool is_td_initialized (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return !!kvm->max_vcpus; +} + static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits) { BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && (field) & 0x1,@@ -135,6 +144,19 @@ TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (64 ,STATE_NON_ARCH , state_non_arch);TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS (8 ,MANAGEMENT , management); +static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field) +{ +struct tdx_module_output out; +u64 err; + + err =tdh_mng_rd (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa,TDCS_EXEC (field), &out); +if (unlikely (err)) { +pr_err ("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n" , field, err); +return 0 ; + } +return out.r8; +} +#else static inline int tdx_module_setup (void ) {return -ENODEV ; };tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +33
-1@@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VM ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };@@ -577,4 +578,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities { struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0]; }; +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm { +__u64 attributes; +__u32 max_vcpus; +__u32 padding; +__u64 mrconfigid[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrowner[6 ];/* sha384 digest */ +__u64 mrownerconfig[6 ];/* sha348 digest */ +union { +/* +* KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before +* KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed. +* +* This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}. +* The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent +* with this values. +* sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256) +* = 8KB. +*/ +struct { +struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; +/* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */ +struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[]; + }; +/* +* For future extensibility. +* The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB. +* This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024 +*/ +__u64 reserved[2028 ]; + }; +}; +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */ --2.25.1
PATCH v8 24/103 KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Because TDX KVM doesn't support PMU yet (it's future work of TDX KVM support as another patch series) and pmu_intel.c touches vmx specific structure in vcpu initialization, as workaround add dummy structure to struct vcpu_tdx and pmu_intel.c can ignore TDX case.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 22 +------------------- 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c +38 -1
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include "lapic.h" #include "nested.h" #include "pmu.h" +#include "tdx.h" #define MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT (MSR_IA32_PMC0 - MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)
@@ -35,6 +36,26 @@ static struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping intel_arch_events[] = {/* mapping between fixed pmc index and intel_arch_events array */ static int fixed_pmc_events[] = {1 ,0 ,7 }; +struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return &to_tdx (vcpu)->lbr_desc; +#endif + +return &to_vmx (vcpu)->lbr_desc; +} + +struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return &to_tdx (vcpu)->lbr_desc.records; +#endif + +return &to_vmx (vcpu)->lbr_desc.records; +} +static void reprogram_fixed_counters (struct kvm_pmu *pmu,u64 data) {struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
@@ -171,10 +192,20 @@ static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_fw_gp_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr)return get_gp_pmc (pmu, msr,MSR_IA32_PMC0 ); } +bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return false; +return cpuid_model_is_consistent (vcpu); +} +bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct x86_pmu_lbr *lbr =vcpu_to_lbr_records (vcpu); +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return false; +return lbr->nr && (vcpu_get_perf_capabilities (vcpu) &PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT ); }
@@ -288,6 +319,9 @@ int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER, }; +if (WARN_ON (is_td_vcpu (vcpu))) +return 0 ; +if (unlikely (lbr_desc->event)) {__set_bit (INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR , pmu->pmc_in_use);return 0 ;
@@ -592,7 +626,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)bitmap_set (pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx,INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC , pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters); -if (cpuid_model_is_consistent (vcpu)) +if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible (vcpu))x86_perf_get_lbr (&lbr_desc->records);else lbr_desc->records.nr =0 ;
@@ -649,6 +683,9 @@ static void intel_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct kvm_pmc *pmc =NULL ;int i; +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return ; +for (i =0 ; i <INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC ; i++) { pmc = &pmu->gp_counters[i];
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H +#define __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H + +struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +struct lbr_desc { +/* Basic info about guest LBR records. */ +struct x86_pmu_lbr records; + +/* +* Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the +* per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu. +* +* The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR. +*/ +struct perf_event *event; + +/* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */ +bool msr_passthrough; +}; + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +7 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST +#include "pmu_intel.h" #include "tdx_ops.h" int tdx_module_setup (void );
@@ -32,6 +33,12 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx; + +/* +* Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory. +* TODO: Support PMU for TDX. Future work. +*/ +struct lbr_desc lbr_desc; };static inline bool is_td (struct kvm *kvm)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
@@ -2327,7 +2327,7 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)if ((data &PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT ) != (vmx_get_perf_capabilities () &PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT ))return 1 ; -if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent (vcpu)) +if (!intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible (vcpu))return 1 ; }if (data &PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT ) {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +1 -21
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include "capabilities.h" #include "../kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "posted_intr.h" +#include "pmu_intel.h" #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmx_ops.h" #include "../cpuid.h"
@@ -104,31 +105,10 @@ static inline bool intel_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(struct kvm_pmu *pmu)return pmu->version >1 ; } -#define vcpu_to_lbr_desc (vcpu) (&to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc) -#define vcpu_to_lbr_records (vcpu) (&to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.records) -void intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check (struct kvm_pmu *pmu); -bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -struct lbr_desc { -/* Basic info about guest LBR records. */ -struct x86_pmu_lbr records; - -/* -* Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the -* per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu. -* -* The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR. -*/ -struct perf_event *event; - -/* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */ -bool msr_passthrough; -}; -/* * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 25/103 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD vcpu creation/destruction.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +3 -3
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ Layer status What qemu can do ---------------- - TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu. -- Qemu can try to create VM of TDX VM type and then fails. +- Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type. Patch Layer status ------------------ Patch layer Status * TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied * TDX architectural definitions: Applied -* TD VM creation/destruction: Applying -* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Not yet +* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied +* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applying * TDX EPT violation: Not yet * TD finalization: Not yet * TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 26/103 KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
The next step of TDX guest creation is to create vcpu. Allocate TDX vcpu structures, initialize it. Allocate pages of TDX vcpu for the TDX module.
In the case of the conventional case, cpuid is empty at the initialization. and cpuid is configured after the vcpu initialization. Because TDX supports only X2APIC mode, cpuid is forcibly initialized to support X2APIC on the vcpu initialization.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 40 +++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 8 +++ 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +36 -4
@@ -73,6 +73,38 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)return tdx_vm_free (kvm); } +static int vt_vcpu_precreate (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return 0 ; + +return vmx_vcpu_precreate (kvm); +} + +static int vt_vcpu_create (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return tdx_vcpu_create (vcpu); + +return vmx_vcpu_create (vcpu); +} + +static void vt_vcpu_free (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return tdx_vcpu_free (vcpu); + +return vmx_vcpu_free (vcpu); +} + +static void vt_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event) +{ +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return tdx_vcpu_reset (vcpu, init_event); + +return vmx_vcpu_reset (vcpu, init_event); +} +static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {if (!is_td (kvm))
@@ -98,10 +130,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, .vm_free = vt_vm_free, - .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, - .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create, - .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free, - .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset, + .vcpu_precreate = vt_vcpu_precreate, + .vcpu_create = vt_vcpu_create, + .vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free, + .vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset, .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest, .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +135 -0
153 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +8 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm); +int tdx_vcpu_create (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void tdx_vcpu_free (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event); +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }
@@ -150,6 +154,10 @@ static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline int tdx_vcpu_create (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_vcpu_free (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} +static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event) {} +static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 026/103] KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
Quoted 154 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
The next step of TDX guest creation is to create vcpu. Allocate TDX vcpu structures, initialize it. Allocate pages of TDX vcpu for the TDX module.
In the case of the conventional case, cpuid is empty at the initialization. and cpuid is configured after the vcpu initialization. Because TDX supports only X2APIC mode, cpuid is forcibly initialized to support X2APIC on the vcpu initialization.
Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 40 +++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 8 +++ 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +36
-4@@ -73,6 +73,38 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)return tdx_vm_free (kvm); } +static int vt_vcpu_precreate (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (is_td (kvm)) +return 0 ; + +return vmx_vcpu_precreate (kvm); +} + +static int vt_vcpu_create (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return tdx_vcpu_create (vcpu); + +return vmx_vcpu_create (vcpu); +} + +static void vt_vcpu_free (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return tdx_vcpu_free (vcpu); + +return vmx_vcpu_free (vcpu); +} + +static void vt_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event) +{ +if (is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return tdx_vcpu_reset (vcpu, init_event); + +return vmx_vcpu_reset (vcpu, init_event); +} +static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {if (!is_td (kvm))@@ -98,10 +130,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, .vm_free = vt_vm_free, - .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, - .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create, - .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free, - .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset, + .vcpu_precreate = vt_vcpu_precreate, + .vcpu_create = vt_vcpu_create, + .vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free, + .vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset, .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest, .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +57
-0@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include "capabilities.h" #include "x86_ops.h" #include "tdx.h" +#include "x86.h" #undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "tdx: " fmt@@ -47,6 +48,11 @@ static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)return pa | ((hpa_t )hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); } +static inline bool is_td_vcpu_created (struct vcpu_tdx *tdx) +{ +return tdx->tdvpr.added; +} +static inline bool is_td_created (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) {return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;@@ -378,6 +384,135 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)return ret; } +int tdx_vcpu_create (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +struct vcpu_tdx *tdx =to_tdx (vcpu); +int ret, i; + +/* TDX only supports x2APIC, which requires an in-kernel local APIC. */ +if (!vcpu->arch.apic) +return -EINVAL ; + +fpstate_set_confidential (&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu); + + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&tdx->tdvpr); +if (ret) +return ret; + + tdx->tdvpx =kcalloc (tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages,sizeof (*tdx->tdvpx), +GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); +if (!tdx->tdvpx) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto free_tdvpr; + } +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) { + ret =tdx_alloc_td_page (&tdx->tdvpx[i]); +if (ret) + goto free_tdvpx; + } + + vcpu->arch.efer =EFER_SCE |EFER_LME |EFER_LMA |EFER_NX ; + + vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits =-1ul ; + vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits =-1ul ; + + vcpu->arch.tsc_offset =to_kvm_tdx (vcpu->kvm)->tsc_offset; + vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset; + vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = + !(to_kvm_tdx (vcpu->kvm)->attributes &TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG ); + +return 0 ; + +free_tdvpx: +/* @i points at the TDVPX page that failed allocation. */ +for (--i; i >=0 ; i--) +free_page (tdx->tdvpx[i].va); +kfree (tdx->tdvpx); +free_tdvpr: +free_page (tdx->tdvpr.va); + +return ret; +} + +void tdx_vcpu_free (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) · line 447
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+{ +struct vcpu_tdx *tdx =to_tdx (vcpu); +int i; + +/* Can't reclaim or free pages if teardown failed. */ +if (is_hkid_assigned (to_kvm_tdx (vcpu->kvm))) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) +tdx_reclaim_td_page (&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
What if some of the pages failed to be reclaimed?
Quoted 40 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +40
-0+kfree (tdx->tdvpx); +tdx_reclaim_td_page (&tdx->tdvpr); +} + +void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (vcpu->kvm); +struct vcpu_tdx *tdx =to_tdx (vcpu); +struct msr_data apic_base_msr; +u64 err; +int i; + +/* TDX doesn't support INIT event. */ +if (WARN_ON (init_event)) + goto td_bugged; +if (WARN_ON (is_td_vcpu_created (tdx))) + goto td_bugged; + + err =tdh_vp_create (kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, tdx->tdvpr.pa); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_VP_CREATE , err,NULL ); + goto td_bugged; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&tdx->tdvpr); + +for (i =0 ; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) { + err =tdh_vp_addcx (tdx->tdvpr.pa, tdx->tdvpx[i].pa); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_VP_ADDCX , err,NULL ); + goto td_bugged; + } +tdx_mark_td_page_added (&tdx->tdvpx[i]); + } + +if (!vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries) { +/* +* On cpu creation, cpuid entry is blank. Forcibly enable +* X2APIC feature to allow X2APIC. +*/ +struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) · line 497
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10
-0+ + e =kvmalloc_array (1 ,sizeof (*e),GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); + *e = (struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 ) { + .function =1 ,/* Features for X2APIC */ + .index =0 , + .eax =0 , + .ebx =0 , + .ecx =1ULL <<21 ,/* X2APIC */ + .edx =0 , + };
Just out of curiosity, where will this info be used afterwards?
Quoted 47 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +18
-0+ vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e; + vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent =1 ; + } + apic_base_msr.data =APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC ; +if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp (vcpu)) + apic_base_msr.data |=MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP ; + apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true; +if (WARN_ON (kvm_set_apic_base (vcpu, &apic_base_msr))) + goto td_bugged; + + vcpu->arch.mp_state =KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE ; + +return ; + +td_bugged: + vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true; +} +int tdx_dev_ioctl (void __user *argp) {struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +8
-0@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_mmu_release_hkid (struct kvm *kvm);void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm); +int tdx_vcpu_create (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void tdx_vcpu_free (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event); +int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }@@ -150,6 +154,10 @@ static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private (struct kvm *kvm) {}static inline void tdx_vm_free (struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline int tdx_vcpu_create (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void tdx_vcpu_free (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} +static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event) {} +static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }#endif
PATCH v8 27/103 KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
TD guest vcpu need to be configured before ready to run which requests addtional information from Device model (e.g. qemu), one 64bit value is passed to vcpu's RCX as an initial value. Repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to vcpu-scope and add new sub-commands KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU under it for such additional vcpu configuration.
Add callback for kvm vCPU-scoped operations of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP and add a new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU, for further vcpu initialization.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++++ tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm) KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(dev_mem_enc_ioctl) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_copy_enc_context_from)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1613,6 +1613,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {int (*dev_mem_enc_ioctl)(void __user *argp);int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); +int (*vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp);int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_enc_region *argp);int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_enc_region *argp);int (*vm_copy_enc_context_from)(struct kvm *kvm,unsigned int source_fd);
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 ,KVM_TDX_INIT_VM , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,14 @@ static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)return tdx_vm_ioctl (kvm, argp); } +static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp) +{ +if (!is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return -EINVAL ; + +return tdx_vcpu_ioctl (vcpu, argp); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,
@@ -255,6 +263,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl, .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl, + .vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl, };struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +36 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)return kvm_tdx->hkid >0 ; } +static inline bool is_td_finalized (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->finalized; +} +static void tdx_clear_page (unsigned long page) {const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 )));
@@ -784,6 +789,37 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)return r; } +int tdx_vcpu_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (vcpu->kvm); +struct vcpu_tdx *tdx =to_tdx (vcpu); +struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd; +u64 err; + +if (tdx->vcpu_initialized) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!is_td_initialized (vcpu->kvm) ||is_td_finalized (kvm_tdx)) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&cmd, argp,sizeof (cmd))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (cmd.error || cmd.unused) +return -EINVAL ; +if (cmd.flags || cmd.id !=KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU ) +return -EINVAL ; + + err =tdh_vp_init (tdx->tdvpr.pa, cmd.data); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_VP_INIT , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + + tdx->vcpu_initialized = true; +return 0 ; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +4 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {u64 xfam;int hkid; +bool finalized; +u64 tsc_offset; };
@@ -34,6 +36,8 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx; +bool vcpu_initialized; +/* * Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory. * TODO: Support PMU for TDX. Future work.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event);int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); +int tdx_vcpu_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; }
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event) {}static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +6 -0
@@ -5901,6 +5901,12 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR : r =kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr (vcpu, ioctl, argp);break ; +case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP : + r = -ENOTTY ; +if (!kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl) + goto out; + r = kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl (vcpu, argp); +break ;default : r = -EINVAL ; }
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 ,KVM_TDX_INIT_VM , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 027/103] KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
Quoted 189 lines · On 2022/8/8 6:01, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
TD guest vcpu need to be configured before ready to run which requests addtional information from Device model (e.g. qemu), one 64bit value is passed to vcpu's RCX as an initial value. Repurpose
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPto vcpu-scope and add new sub-commandsKVM_TDX_INIT_VCPUunder it for such additional vcpu configuration.Add callback for kvm vCPU-scoped operations of
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPand add a new subcommand,KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU, for further vcpu initialization.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++++ tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 61 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1
-0@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm) KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(dev_mem_enc_ioctl) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_copy_enc_context_from)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1613,6 +1613,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {int (*dev_mem_enc_ioctl)(void __user *argp);int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); +int (*vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp);int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_enc_region *argp);int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_enc_region *argp);int (*vm_copy_enc_context_from)(struct kvm *kvm,unsigned int source_fd);arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1
-0@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 ,KVM_TDX_INIT_VM , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9
-0@@ -113,6 +113,14 @@ static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)return tdx_vm_ioctl (kvm, argp); } +static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp) +{ +if (!is_td_vcpu (vcpu)) +return -EINVAL ; + +return tdx_vcpu_ioctl (vcpu, argp); +} +struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -255,6 +263,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl, .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl, + .vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl, };struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +36
-0@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)return kvm_tdx->hkid >0 ; } +static inline bool is_td_finalized (struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ +return kvm_tdx->finalized; +} +static void tdx_clear_page (unsigned long page) {const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 )));@@ -784,6 +789,37 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)return r; } +int tdx_vcpu_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp) +{ +struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx =to_kvm_tdx (vcpu->kvm); +struct vcpu_tdx *tdx =to_tdx (vcpu); +struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd; +u64 err; + +if (tdx->vcpu_initialized) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!is_td_initialized (vcpu->kvm) ||is_td_finalized (kvm_tdx)) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&cmd, argp,sizeof (cmd))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (cmd.error || cmd.unused) +return -EINVAL ; +if (cmd.flags || cmd.id !=KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU ) +return -EINVAL ; + + err =tdh_vp_init (tdx->tdvpr.pa, cmd.data); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (err)) { +pr_tdx_error (TDH_VP_INIT , err,NULL ); +return -EIO ; + } + + tdx->vcpu_initialized = true; +return 0 ; +} +int __init tdx_module_setup (void ) {const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +4
-0@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {u64 xfam;int hkid; +bool finalized; +u64 tsc_offset; };@@ -34,6 +36,8 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx; +bool vcpu_initialized; +/* * Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory. * TODO: Support PMU for TDX. Future work. arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2
-0@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event);int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); +int tdx_vcpu_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp);#else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup (struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {return 0 ; }static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported (unsigned long type) {return false; }@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool init_event) {}static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,void __user *argp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp, · line 5908
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5
-0@@ -5901,6 +5901,12 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR : r =kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr (vcpu, ioctl, argp);break ; +case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP : + r = -ENOTTY ; +if (!kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl) + goto out; + r = kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl (vcpu, argp);
In previous 2 added ioctl handing, static_call is used, is this one different for a reason?
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0+break ;default : r = -EINVAL ; }tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1
-0@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES =0 ,KVM_TDX_INIT_VM , +KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU ,KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX , };
PATCH v8 28/103 The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM MMU GPA shared bits.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +3 -2
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ What qemu can do ---------------- - TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu. - Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type. +- Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type. Patch Layer status ------------------
@@ -17,13 +18,13 @@ Patch Layer status * TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied * TDX architectural definitions: Applied * TD VM creation/destruction: Applied -* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applying +* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied * TDX EPT violation: Not yet * TD finalization: Not yet * TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet -* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Not yet +* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applying * KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Not yet * KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet * KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 29/103 KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
To keep the case of non TDX intact, introduce a new config option for private KVM MMU support. At the moment, this is synonym for CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST && CONFIG_KVM_INTEL. The config makes it clear that the config is only for x86 KVM MMU.
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -129,4 +129,8 @@ config KVM_XEN config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING bool +config KVM_MMU_PRIVATE + def_bool y + depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST && KVM_INTEL + endif # VIRTUALIZATION
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 30/103 KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of GPA
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX repurposes one GPA bit (51 bit or 47 bit based on configuration) to indicate the GPA is private(if cleared) or shared (if set) with VMM. If GPA.shared is set, GPA is covered by the existing conventional EPT pointed by EPTP. If GPA.shared bit is cleared, GPA is covered by TDX module. VMM has to issue SEAMCALLs to operate.
Add a member to remember GPA shared bit for each guest TDs, add address conversion functions between private GPA and shared GPA and test if GPA is private.
Because struct kvm_arch (or struct kvm which includes struct kvm_arch. See kvm_arch_alloc_vm() that passes __GPF_ZERO) is zero-cleared when allocated, the new member to remember GPA shared bit is guaranteed to be zero with this patch unless it's initialized explicitly.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4 -0
@@ -1358,6 +1358,10 @@ struct kvm_arch {*/ #define SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS (SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE + 1)struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache split_desc_cache; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE +gfn_t gfn_shared_mask; +#endif };struct kvm_vm_stat {
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +32 -0
@@ -276,4 +276,36 @@ static inline gpa_t kvm_translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,return gpa;return translate_nested_gpa (vcpu, gpa, access, exception); } + +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared_mask (const struct kvm *kvm) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE +return kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask; +#else +return 0 ; +#endif +} + +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared (const struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) +{ +return gfn |kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm); +} + +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_private (const struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) +{ +return gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm); +} + +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_private (const struct kvm *kvm,gpa_t gpa) +{ +return gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa (kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm)); +} + +static inline bool kvm_is_private_gpa (const struct kvm *kvm,gpa_t gpa) +{ +gfn_t mask =kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm); + +return mask && !(gpa_to_gfn (gpa) & mask); +} +#endif
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +5 -0
@@ -753,6 +753,11 @@ static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd) kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam; kvm->max_vcpus = td_params->max_vcpus; +if (td_params->exec_controls &TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW ) + kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask =gpa_to_gfn (BIT_ULL (51 )); +else + kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask =gpa_to_gfn (BIT_ULL (47 )); + out:/* kfree() accepts NULL. */ kfree (init_vm);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 030/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of GPA
Quoted 12 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:15PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX repurposes one GPA bit (51 bit or 47 bit based on configuration) to indicate the GPA is private(if cleared) or shared (if set) with VMM. If GPA.shared is set, GPA is covered by the existing conventional EPT pointed by EPTP. If GPA.shared bit is cleared, GPA is covered by TDX module. VMM has to issue SEAMCALLs to operate.
Add a member to remember GPA shared bit for each guest TDs, add address conversion functions between private GPA and shared GPA and test if GPA is private.
Quoted 8 lines
Because struct
kvm_arch(or struct kvm which includes structkvm_arch. Seekvm_arch_alloc_vm()that passes__GPF_ZERO) is zero-cleared when allocated, the new member to remember GPA shared bit is guaranteed to be zero with this patch unless it's initialized explicitly.Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Quoted 81 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4
-0@@ -1358,6 +1358,10 @@ struct kvm_arch {*/ #define SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS (SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE + 1)struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache split_desc_cache; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE +gfn_t gfn_shared_mask; +#endif };struct kvm_vm_stat {arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +32
-0@@ -276,4 +276,36 @@ static inline gpa_t kvm_translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,return gpa;return translate_nested_gpa (vcpu, gpa, access, exception); } + +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared_mask (const struct kvm *kvm) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE +return kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask; +#else +return 0 ; +#endif +} + +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared (const struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) +{ +return gfn |kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm); +} + +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_private (const struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) +{ +return gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm); +} + +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_private (const struct kvm *kvm,gpa_t gpa) +{ +return gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa (kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm)); +} + +static inline bool kvm_is_private_gpa (const struct kvm *kvm,gpa_t gpa) +{ +gfn_t mask =kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm); + +return mask && !(gpa_to_gfn (gpa) & mask); +} +#endif arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +5
-1@@ -753,6 +753,11 @@ static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd) kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam; kvm->max_vcpus = td_params->max_vcpus; +if (td_params->exec_controls &TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW ) + kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask =gpa_to_gfn (BIT_ULL (51 )); +else + kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask =gpa_to_gfn (BIT_ULL (47 )); + out:/* kfree() accepts NULL. */ kfree (init_vm); --2.25.1
PATCH v8 31/103 The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM TDP refactoring for TDX.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -2
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Patch Layer status * TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet -* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applying -* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Not yet +* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied +* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applying * KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet * KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 32/103 KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
For TD guest, the current way to emulate MMIO doesn't work any more, as KVM is not able to access the private memory of TD guest and do the emulation. Instead, TD guest expects to receive #VE when it accesses the MMIO and then it can explicitly makes hypercall to KVM to get the expected information.
To achieve this, the TDX module always enables "EPT-violation #VE" in the VMCS control. And accordingly, KVM needs to configure the MMIO spte to trigger EPT violation (instead of misconfiguration) and at the same time, also clear the "suppress #VE" bit so the TD guest can get the #VE instead of causing actual EPT violation to KVM.
In order for KVM to be able to have chance to set up the correct SPTE for MMIO for TD guest, the default non-present SPTE must have the "suppress guest accesses the MMIO.
Also, when TD guest accesses the actual shared memory, it should continue to trigger EPT violation to the KVM instead of receiving the #VE (the TDX module guarantees KVM will receive EPT violation for private memory access). This means for the shared memory, the SPTE also must have the "suppress #VE" bit set for the non-present SPTE.
Add support to allow a non-zero value for the non-present SPTE (i.e. when the page table is firstly allocated, and when the SPTE is zapped) to allow setting "suppress #VE" bit for the non-present SPTE.
Introduce a new macro SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE to be the "suppress #VE" bit. Unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit (which is bit 63) for both AMD and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for normal VMX guest, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 28 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 23 ++++++---- 6 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {#define VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT (1ull << 6)#define VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT (1ull << 8)#define VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT (1ull << 9) +#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT (1ull << 63)#define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK | \ VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK | \ VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +71 -6
108 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +2 -1
@@ -1036,7 +1036,8 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)gpa_t pte_gpa;gfn_t gfn; -if (!sp->spt[i]) +/* spt[i] has initial value of shadow page table allocation */ +if (sp->spt[i] !=SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE )continue ; pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i *sizeof (pt_element_t);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +3 -1
@@ -391,7 +391,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only) shadow_dirty_mask = has_ad_bits ?VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT :0ull ; shadow_nx_mask =0ull ; shadow_x_mask =VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK ; - shadow_present_mask = has_exec_only ?0ull :VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK ; +/* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */ + shadow_present_mask = + (has_exec_only ?0ull :VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK ) |VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT ;/* * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired * memtype directly into the SPTEs. Note, this mask is just the mask
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +26 -2
@@ -136,6 +136,19 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0) +/* +* non-present SPTE value for both VMX and SVM for TDP MMU. +* For SVM NPT, for non-present spte (bit 0 = 0), other bits are ignored. +* For VMX EPT, bit 63 is ignored if #VE is disabled. +* bit 63 is #VE suppress if #VE is enabled. +*/ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE BIT_ULL(63) +static_assert (!(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE &SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK )); +#else +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE 0ULL +#endif +extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
@@ -175,16 +188,27 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;* non-present intermediate value. Other threads which encounter this value * should not modify the SPTE. * +* For X86_64 case, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, "suppress #VE" bit, is set because +* "EPT violation #VE" in the secondary VM execution control may be enabled. +* Because TDX module sets "EPT violation #VE" for TD, "suppress #VE" bit for +* the conventional EPT needs to be set. +* * Use a semi-arbitrary value that doesn't set RWX bits, i.e. is not-present on * bot AMD and Intel CPUs, and doesn't set PFN bits, i.e. doesn't create a L1TF * vulnerability. Use only low bits to avoid 64-bit immediates. * * Only used by the TDP MMU. */ -#define REMOVED_SPTE 0x5a0ULL +#define __REMOVED_SPTE 0x5a0ULL/* Removed SPTEs must not be misconstrued as shadow present PTEs. */ -static_assert (!(REMOVED_SPTE &SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK )); +static_assert (!(__REMOVED_SPTE &SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK )); + +/* +* See above comment around __REMOVED_SPTE. REMOVED_SPTE is the actual +* intermediate value set to the removed SPET. it sets the "suppress #VE" bit. +*/ +#define REMOVED_SPTE (SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE | __REMOVED_SPTE)static inline bool is_removed_spte (u64 spte) {
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +16 -7
@@ -682,8 +682,16 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,* overwrite the special removed SPTE value. No bookkeeping is needed * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present. Use * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits. +* +* Set non-present value to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, rather than 0. +* It is because when TDX is enabled, TDX module always +* enables "EPT-violation #VE", so KVM needs to set +* "suppress #VE" bit in EPT table entries, in order to get +* real EPT violation, rather than TDVMCALL. KVM sets +* SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE (which sets "suppress #VE" bit) so it +* can be set when EPT table entries are zapped. */ -__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte (iter->sptep,0 ); +__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte (iter->sptep,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE );return 0 ; }
@@ -860,8 +868,8 @@ static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,continue ;if (!shared) -tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,0 ); -else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic (kvm, &iter,0 )) +tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE ); +else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic (kvm, &iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE )) goto retry; } }
@@ -917,8 +925,9 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!is_shadow_present_pte (old_spte)))return false; -__tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm,kvm_mmu_page_as_id (sp), sp->ptep, old_spte,0 , - sp->gfn, sp->role.level +1 , true, true); +__tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm,kvm_mmu_page_as_id (sp), sp->ptep, old_spte, +SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE , sp->gfn, sp->role.level +1 , + true, true);return true; }
@@ -952,7 +961,7 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root, !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))continue ; -tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,0 ); +tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE ); flush = true; }
@@ -1316,7 +1325,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,* invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never change. * See __handle_changed_spte(). */ -tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, iter,0 ); +tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE );if (!pte_write (range->pte)) { new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 032/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE
Quoted 27 lines · On Sun, 2022-08-07 at 15:01 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
For TD guest, the current way to emulate MMIO doesn't work any more, as KVM is not able to access the private memory of TD guest and do the emulation. Instead, TD guest expects to receive #VE when it accesses the MMIO and then it can explicitly makes hypercall to KVM to get the expected information.
To achieve this, the TDX module always enables "EPT-violation #VE" in the VMCS control. And accordingly, KVM needs to configure the MMIO spte to trigger EPT violation (instead of misconfiguration) and at the same time, also clear the "suppress #VE" bit so the TD guest can get the #VE instead of causing actual EPT violation to KVM.
In order for KVM to be able to have chance to set up the correct SPTE for MMIO for TD guest, the default non-present SPTE must have the "suppress guest accesses the MMIO.
Also, when TD guest accesses the actual shared memory, it should continue to trigger EPT violation to the KVM instead of receiving the #VE (the TDX module guarantees KVM will receive EPT violation for private memory access). This means for the shared memory, the SPTE also must have the "suppress #VE" bit set for the non-present SPTE.
Add support to allow a non-zero value for the non-present SPTE (i.e. when the page table is firstly allocated, and when the SPTE is zapped) to allow setting "suppress #VE" bit for the non-present SPTE.
Quoted 6 lines
Introduce a new macro
SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUEto be the "suppress #VE" bit. Unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit (which is bit 63) for both AMD and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for normal VMX guest, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.
Sorry I made a mistake on why always setting bit 63 on AMD is OK. It turns out the bit 63 on AMD is NX bit, so "AMD hardware doesn't use this bit" is absolutely wrong. More information please see:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, -Kai
Re: [PATCH v8 032/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 178 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:17PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
For TD guest, the current way to emulate MMIO doesn't work any more, as KVM is not able to access the private memory of TD guest and do the emulation. Instead, TD guest expects to receive #VE when it accesses the MMIO and then it can explicitly makes hypercall to KVM to get the expected information.
To achieve this, the TDX module always enables "EPT-violation #VE" in the VMCS control. And accordingly, KVM needs to configure the MMIO spte to trigger EPT violation (instead of misconfiguration) and at the same time, also clear the "suppress #VE" bit so the TD guest can get the #VE instead of causing actual EPT violation to KVM.
In order for KVM to be able to have chance to set up the correct SPTE for MMIO for TD guest, the default non-present SPTE must have the "suppress guest accesses the MMIO.
Also, when TD guest accesses the actual shared memory, it should continue to trigger EPT violation to the KVM instead of receiving the #VE (the TDX module guarantees KVM will receive EPT violation for private memory access). This means for the shared memory, the SPTE also must have the "suppress #VE" bit set for the non-present SPTE.
Add support to allow a non-zero value for the non-present SPTE (i.e. when the page table is firstly allocated, and when the SPTE is zapped) to allow setting "suppress #VE" bit for the non-present SPTE.
Introduce a new macro
SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUEto be the "suppress #VE" bit. Unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit (which is bit 63) for both AMD and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for normal VMX guest, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 28 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 23 ++++++---- 6 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +1
-0@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {#define VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT (1ull << 6)#define VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT (1ull << 8)#define VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT (1ull << 9) +#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT (1ull << 63)#define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK | \ VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK | \ VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +71
-6@@ -538,9 +538,9 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)if (!is_shadow_present_pte (old_spte) || !spte_has_volatile_bits (old_spte)) -__update_clear_spte_fast (sptep,0ull ); +__update_clear_spte_fast (sptep,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE );else - old_spte =__update_clear_spte_slow (sptep,0ull ); + old_spte =__update_clear_spte_slow (sptep,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE );if (!is_shadow_present_pte (old_spte))return old_spte;@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)*/ static void mmu_spte_clear_no_track (u64 *sptep) { -__update_clear_spte_fast (sptep,0ull ); +__update_clear_spte_fast (sptep,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE ); }static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless (u64 *sptep)@@ -642,6 +642,55 @@ static void walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +static inline void kvm_init_shadow_page (void *page) +{ +int ign; + +/* +* AMD: "suppress #VE" bit is ignored +* Intel non-TD(VMX): "suppress #VE" bit is ignored because +* EPT_VIOLATION_VE isn't set. +* guest TD: TDX module sets EPT_VIOLATION_VE +* conventional SEPT: "suppress #VE" bit must be set to get EPT violation +* private SEPT: "suppress #VE" bit is ignored. CPU doesn't walk it +* +* For simplicity, unconditionally initialize SPET to set "suppress #VE". +*/ + asmvolatile ("rep stosq\n\t" + :"=c" (ign),"=D" (page) + :"a" (SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE ),"c" (4096 /8 ),"D" (page) + :"memory" + ); +} + +static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc = &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache; +int start, end, i, r; + + start =kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects (mc); + r =kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache (mc,PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL ); + +/* +* Note, topup may have allocated objects even if it failed to allocate +* the minimum number of objects required to make forward progress _at +* this time_. Initialize newly allocated objects even on failure, as +* userspace can free memory and rerun the vCPU in response to -ENOMEM. +*/ + end =kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects (mc); +for (i = start; i < end; i++) +kvm_init_shadow_page (mc->objects[i]); +return r; +} +#else +static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache (vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache, +PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL ); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +static int mmu_topup_memory_caches (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool maybe_indirect) {int r;@@ -651,8 +700,7 @@ static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect) 1 + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + PTE_PREFETCH_NUM);if (r)return r; - r =kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache (&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache, -PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL ); + r =mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache (vcpu);if (r)return r;if (maybe_indirect) {@@ -5815,7 +5863,24 @@ int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache; vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO; - vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO; +/* +* When X86_64, initial SEPT entries are initialized with +* SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE. Otherwise zeroed. See +* mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(). +* +* Shared EPTEs need to be initialized with SUPPRESS_VE=1, otherwise +* not-present EPT violations would be reflected into the guest by +* hardware as #VE exceptions. This is handled by initializing page +* allocations via kvm_init_shadow_page() during cache topup. +* In that case, telling the page allocation to zero-initialize the page +* would be wasted effort. +* +* The initialization is harmless for S-EPT entries because KVM's copy +* of the S-EPT isn't consumed by hardware, and because under the hood +* S-EPT entries should never #VE. +*/ +if (!IS_ENABLED (X86_64 )) + vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO; vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu; vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) · line 1040
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +2
-1@@ -1036,7 +1036,8 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)gpa_t pte_gpa;gfn_t gfn; -if (!sp->spt[i]) +/* spt[i] has initial value of shadow page table allocation */ +if (sp->spt[i] !=SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE )
Shuold this be "if (sp->spt[i] == SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE)" ? Otherwise any present shadow ptes are skipped for 32 and 64 bit KVM.
Quoted 138 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +0
-0continue ; pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i *sizeof (pt_element_t);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +3
-1@@ -391,7 +391,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only) shadow_dirty_mask = has_ad_bits ?VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT :0ull ; shadow_nx_mask =0ull ; shadow_x_mask =VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK ; - shadow_present_mask = has_exec_only ?0ull :VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK ; +/* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */ + shadow_present_mask = + (has_exec_only ?0ull :VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK ) |VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT ;/* * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired * memtype directly into the SPTEs. Note, this mask is just the mask arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +26
-2@@ -136,6 +136,19 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0) +/* +* non-present SPTE value for both VMX and SVM for TDP MMU. +* For SVM NPT, for non-present spte (bit 0 = 0), other bits are ignored. +* For VMX EPT, bit 63 is ignored if #VE is disabled. +* bit 63 is #VE suppress if #VE is enabled. +*/ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE BIT_ULL(63) +static_assert (!(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE &SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK )); +#else +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE 0ULL +#endif +extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;@@ -175,16 +188,27 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;* non-present intermediate value. Other threads which encounter this value * should not modify the SPTE. * +* For X86_64 case, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, "suppress #VE" bit, is set because +* "EPT violation #VE" in the secondary VM execution control may be enabled. +* Because TDX module sets "EPT violation #VE" for TD, "suppress #VE" bit for +* the conventional EPT needs to be set. +* * Use a semi-arbitrary value that doesn't set RWX bits, i.e. is not-present on * bot AMD and Intel CPUs, and doesn't set PFN bits, i.e. doesn't create a L1TF * vulnerability. Use only low bits to avoid 64-bit immediates. * * Only used by the TDP MMU. */ -#define REMOVED_SPTE 0x5a0ULL +#define __REMOVED_SPTE 0x5a0ULL/* Removed SPTEs must not be misconstrued as shadow present PTEs. */ -static_assert (!(REMOVED_SPTE &SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK )); +static_assert (!(__REMOVED_SPTE &SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK )); + +/* +* See above comment around __REMOVED_SPTE. REMOVED_SPTE is the actual +* intermediate value set to the removed SPET. it sets the "suppress #VE" bit. +*/ +#define REMOVED_SPTE (SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE | __REMOVED_SPTE)static inline bool is_removed_spte (u64 spte) {arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +16
-8@@ -682,8 +682,16 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,* overwrite the special removed SPTE value. No bookkeeping is needed * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present. Use * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits. +* +* Set non-present value to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, rather than 0. +* It is because when TDX is enabled, TDX module always +* enables "EPT-violation #VE", so KVM needs to set +* "suppress #VE" bit in EPT table entries, in order to get +* real EPT violation, rather than TDVMCALL. KVM sets +* SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE (which sets "suppress #VE" bit) so it +* can be set when EPT table entries are zapped. */ -__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte (iter->sptep,0 ); +__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte (iter->sptep,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE );return 0 ; }@@ -860,8 +868,8 @@ static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,continue ;if (!shared) -tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,0 ); -else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic (kvm, &iter,0 )) +tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE ); +else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic (kvm, &iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE )) goto retry; } }@@ -917,8 +925,9 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!is_shadow_present_pte (old_spte)))return false; -__tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm,kvm_mmu_page_as_id (sp), sp->ptep, old_spte,0 , - sp->gfn, sp->role.level +1 , true, true); +__tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm,kvm_mmu_page_as_id (sp), sp->ptep, old_spte, +SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE , sp->gfn, sp->role.level +1 , + true, true);return true; }@@ -952,7 +961,7 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root, !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))continue ; -tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,0 ); +tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, &iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE ); flush = true; }@@ -1316,7 +1325,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,* invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never change. * See __handle_changed_spte(). */ -tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, iter,0 ); +tdp_mmu_set_spte (kvm, iter,SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE );if (!pte_write (range->pte)) { new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte, --2.25.1
PATCH v8 33/103 KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
TDX will use a different shadow PTE entry value for MMIO from VMX. Add members to kvm_arch and track value for MMIO per-VM instead of global variables. By using the per-VM EPT entry value for MMIO, the existing VMX logic is kept working. To untangle the logic to initialize shadow_mmio_access_mask, introduce a separate setter function.
At the same time, disallow MMIO emulation path for protected guest because VMM can't parse instructions in protected guest memory.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 9 ++++--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 45 +++++++++------------------------ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 10 +++----- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 13 +++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 11 +++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4 -0
@@ -1157,6 +1157,10 @@ struct kvm_arch {*/ spinlock_t mmu_unsync_pages_lock; +bool enable_mmio_caching; +u64 shadow_mmio_value; +u64 shadow_mmio_mask; +struct list_head assigned_dev_head;struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;bool iommu_noncoherent;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +2 -1
@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ static inline u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; } -void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask,u64 access_mask); +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (struct kvm *kvm,u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask); +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (u64 mmio_access_mask);void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask (u64 me_value,u64 me_mask);void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks (bool has_ad_bits,bool has_exec_only);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +5 -4
@@ -2418,7 +2418,7 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, child, invalid_list); } - }else if (is_mmio_spte (pte)) { + }else if (is_mmio_spte (kvm, pte)) {mmu_spte_clear_no_track (spte); }return 0 ;
@@ -3222,7 +3222,8 @@ static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fau* and only if L1's MAXPHYADDR is inaccurate with respect to * the hardware's). */ -if (unlikely (!enable_mmio_caching) || +if (unlikely (!vcpu->kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching && + !kvm_gfn_shared_mask (vcpu->kvm)) ||unlikely (fault->gfn >kvm_mmu_max_gfn ()))return RET_PF_EMULATE ; }
@@ -4074,7 +4075,7 @@ static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)if (WARN_ON (reserved))return -EINVAL ; -if (is_mmio_spte (spte)) { +if (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, spte)) {gfn_t gfn =get_mmio_spte_gfn (spte);unsigned int access =get_mmio_spte_access (spte);
@@ -4529,7 +4530,7 @@ static unsigned long get_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static bool sync_mmio_spte (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *sptep,gfn_t gfn,unsigned int access) { -if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (*sptep))) { +if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, *sptep))) {if (gfn !=get_mmio_spte_gfn (*sptep)) {mmu_spte_clear_no_track (sptep);return true;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +12 -33
89 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +3 -7
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@#include "mmu_internal.h" -extern bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching; -/* * A MMU present SPTE is backed by actual memory and may or may not be present * in hardware. E.g. MMIO SPTEs are not considered present. Use bit 11, as it
@@ -156,8 +154,6 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask; -extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value; -extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;
@@ -231,10 +227,10 @@ static inline int spte_index(u64 *sptep)*/ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask; -static inline bool is_mmio_spte (u64 spte) +static inline bool is_mmio_spte (struct kvm *kvm,u64 spte) { -return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value && -likely (enable_mmio_caching); +return (spte & kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value && +likely (kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching ||kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm)); }static inline bool is_shadow_present_pte (u64 pte)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +10 -3
@@ -569,8 +569,8 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,* impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs * are nonpresent. */ -if (WARN_ON (!is_mmio_spte (old_spte) && - !is_mmio_spte (new_spte) && +if (WARN_ON (!is_mmio_spte (kvm, old_spte) && + !is_mmio_spte (kvm, new_spte) && !is_removed_spte (new_spte)))pr_err ("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n" "should not be replaced with another,\n"
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, }/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */ -if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (new_spte))) { +if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) { vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;trace_mark_mmio_spte (rcu_dereference (iter->sptep), iter->gfn, new_spte);
@@ -1863,6 +1863,13 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes, *root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level; +/* +* mmio page fault isn't supported for protected guest because +* instructions in protected guest memory can't be parsed by VMM. +*/ +if (WARN_ON (kvm_gfn_shared_mask (vcpu->kvm))) +return leaf; +tdp_mmu_for_each_pte (iter, mmu, gfn, gfn +1 ) { leaf = iter.level; sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +7 -4
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);bool intercept_smi = true;module_param (intercept_smi, bool,0444 ); +static u64 __read_mostly svm_shadow_mmio_mask;static bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;
@@ -4729,6 +4730,9 @@ static bool svm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)static int svm_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) { +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm, svm_shadow_mmio_mask, + svm_shadow_mmio_mask); +if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh) kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
@@ -4878,7 +4882,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask (void ) {unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit; -u64 msr, mask; +u64 msr;/* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */ if (cpuid_eax (0x80000000 ) <0x8000001f )
@@ -4905,9 +4909,8 @@ static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void)* * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask. */ - mask = (mask_bit <52 ) ?rsvd_bits (mask_bit,51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; - -kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (mask, mask,PT_WRITABLE_MASK |PT_USER_MASK ); + svm_shadow_mmio_mask = (mask_bit <52 ) ?rsvd_bits (mask_bit,51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (PT_WRITABLE_MASK |PT_USER_MASK ); }static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps (void )
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +26 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;module_param (allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool,S_IRUGO ); +u64 __ro_after_init vmx_shadow_mmio_mask; +#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \
@@ -7359,6 +7361,17 @@ int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)if (!ple_gap) kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true; +/* +* EPT Misconfigurations can be generated if the value of bits 2:0 +* of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute). +*/ +if (enable_ept) +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm,VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE , +VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ); +else +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm, vmx_shadow_mmio_mask, + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_L1TF ) && enable_ept) {switch (l1tf_mitigation) {case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF :
@@ -8357,6 +8370,19 @@ int __init vmx_init(void)if (!enable_ept) allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true; +/* +* Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with +* PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses. 64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT +* paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports +* 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the +* PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled. +*/ +if (kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits () <52 ) + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask =BIT_ULL (51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK ; +else + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask =0 ; +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (0 ); +return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ void hv_vp_assist_page_exit(void);void __init vmx_init_early (void );int __init vmx_init (void );void vmx_exit (void ); +extern u64 __ro_after_init vmx_shadow_mmio_mask;__init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support (void );__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 033/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis
Quoted 30 lines · On Sun, 2022-08-07 at 15:01 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
TDX will use a different shadow PTE entry value for MMIO from VMX. Add members to
kvm_archand track value for MMIO per-VM instead of global variables. By using the per-VM EPT entry value for MMIO, the existing VMX logic is kept working. To untangle the logic to initializeshadow_mmio_access_mask, introduce a separate setter function.At the same time, disallow MMIO emulation path for protected guest because VMM can't parse instructions in protected guest memory.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 9 ++++--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 45 +++++++++------------------------ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 10 +++----- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 13 +++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 11 +++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0
-0
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h struct kvm_arch { · line 1162
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +3
-0@@ -1157,6 +1157,10 @@ struct kvm_arch {*/ spinlock_t mmu_unsync_pages_lock; +bool enable_mmio_caching; +u64 shadow_mmio_value; +u64 shadow_mmio_mask;
Sean suggested we only need pre-VM mmio_value. mmio_caching and mmio_mask can still be global:
Quoted 32 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0+struct list_head assigned_dev_head;struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;bool iommu_noncoherent;arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +2
-1@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ static inline u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; } -void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask,u64 access_mask); +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (struct kvm *kvm,u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask); +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (u64 mmio_access_mask);void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask (u64 me_value,u64 me_mask);void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks (bool has_ad_bits,bool has_exec_only);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1
-1@@ -2418,7 +2418,7 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, child, invalid_list); } - }else if (is_mmio_spte (pte)) { + }else if (is_mmio_spte (kvm, pte)) {mmu_spte_clear_no_track (spte); }return 0 ;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fau · line 3226
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-1@@ -3222,7 +3222,8 @@ static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fau* and only if L1's MAXPHYADDR is inaccurate with respect to * the hardware's). */ - if (unlikely(!enable_mmio_caching) || + if (unlikely(!vcpu->kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching && + !kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)) ||
Sean also suggested we should treat enable_mmio_caching as enabled for TDX:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
So this change isn't necessary.
Again, I still think splitting this patch into multiple patches would be easier to review. For instance, support per-VM MMIO value could be one patch which doesn't have functional change. Allow mmio_value to be 0 when enable_mmio_caching is true can be a separate patch too. Enabling MMIO caching for TDX could be another patch, etc.
Quoted 104 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-2unlikely(fault->gfn > kvm_mmu_max_gfn()))return RET_PF_EMULATE ; }@@ -4074,7 +4075,7 @@ static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)if (WARN_ON (reserved))return -EINVAL ; -if (is_mmio_spte (spte)) { +if (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, spte)) {gfn_t gfn =get_mmio_spte_gfn (spte);unsigned int access =get_mmio_spte_access (spte);@@ -4529,7 +4530,7 @@ static unsigned long get_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static bool sync_mmio_spte (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *sptep,gfn_t gfn,unsigned int access) { -if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (*sptep))) { +if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, *sptep))) {if (gfn !=get_mmio_spte_gfn (*sptep)) {mmu_spte_clear_no_track (sptep);return true;arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +7
-23@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask; -u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value; -u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;@@ -60,10 +58,10 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)u64 spte =generation_mmio_spte_mask (gen);u64 gpa = gfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ; -WARN_ON_ONCE (!shadow_mmio_value); +WARN_ON_ONCE (!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value); access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask; - spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access; + spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access; spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask; spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask) <<SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN ;@@ -335,9 +333,8 @@ u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)return spte; } -void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask,u64 access_mask) +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (struct kvm *kvm,u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask) { -BUG_ON ((u64 )(unsigned )access_mask != access_mask);WARN_ON (mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);if (!enable_mmio_caching)@@ -364,12 +361,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask) WARN_ON(mmio_value && (REMOVED_SPTE & mmio_mask) == mmio_value)) mmio_value =0 ; -if (!mmio_value) - enable_mmio_caching = false; - - shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value; - shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask; - shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask; + kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching = !!mmio_value; + kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value; + kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);@@ -404,20 +398,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only) shadow_acc_track_mask =VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ; shadow_host_writable_mask =EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE ; shadow_mmu_writable_mask =EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE ; - -/* -* EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0 -* of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute). -*/ -kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE , -VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ,0 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks (void ) {u8 low_phys_bits; -u64 mask; shadow_phys_bits =kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits ();@@ -464,18 +450,11 @@ void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void) shadow_host_writable_mask =DEFAULT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE ; shadow_mmu_writable_mask =DEFAULT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE ; +} -/* -* Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with -* PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses. 64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void) · line 480
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +0
-10-* paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports -* 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the -* PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled. -*/ -if (shadow_phys_bits <52 ) - mask =BIT_ULL (51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK ; -else - mask =0 ; - -kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (mask, mask,ACC_WRITE_MASK |ACC_USER_MASK );
Sorry perhaps Sean will not like this code change. In Sean's MMIO caching bug fixing series I suggested to remove setting MMIO mask/value from kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks() but enforce vendor specific code to always call it depending on what features vendor is going to use. But Sean didn't like it:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Will leave this to Sean.
Quoted 67 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +5
-0+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (u64 mmio_access_mask) +{ +BUG_ON ((u64 )(unsigned )mmio_access_mask != mmio_access_mask); + shadow_mmio_access_mask = mmio_access_mask; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +3
-7@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@#include "mmu_internal.h" -extern bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching; -/* * A MMU present SPTE is backed by actual memory and may or may not be present * in hardware. E.g. MMIO SPTEs are not considered present. Use bit 11, as it @@ -156,8 +154,6 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask; -extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value; -extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;@@ -231,10 +227,10 @@ static inline int spte_index(u64 *sptep)*/ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask; -static inline bool is_mmio_spte (u64 spte) +static inline bool is_mmio_spte (struct kvm *kvm,u64 spte) { -return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value && -likely (enable_mmio_caching); +return (spte & kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value && +likely (kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching ||kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm)); }static inline bool is_shadow_present_pte (u64 pte)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +3
-3@@ -569,8 +569,8 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,* impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs * are nonpresent. */ -if (WARN_ON (!is_mmio_spte (old_spte) && - !is_mmio_spte (new_spte) && +if (WARN_ON (!is_mmio_spte (kvm, old_spte) && + !is_mmio_spte (kvm, new_spte) && !is_removed_spte (new_spte)))pr_err ("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n" "should not be replaced with another,\n"@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, }/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */ -if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (new_spte))) { +if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) { vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;trace_mark_mmio_spte (rcu_dereference (iter->sptep), iter->gfn, new_spte);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes, · line 1872
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +7
-0@@ -1863,6 +1863,13 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes, *root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level; +/* +* mmio page fault isn't supported for protected guest because +* instructions in protected guest memory can't be parsed by VMM. +*/ +if (WARN_ON (kvm_gfn_shared_mask (vcpu->kvm))) +return leaf; +
Why not putting to handle_mmio_page_fault() directly?
Quoted 35 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +0
-0tdp_mmu_for_each_pte (iter, mmu, gfn, gfn +1 ) { leaf = iter.level; sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +5
-1@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);bool intercept_smi = true;module_param (intercept_smi, bool,0444 ); +static u64 __read_mostly svm_shadow_mmio_mask;static bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;@@ -4729,6 +4730,9 @@ static bool svm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)static int svm_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) { +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm, svm_shadow_mmio_mask, + svm_shadow_mmio_mask); +if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh) kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;@@ -4878,7 +4882,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask (void ) {unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit; -u64 msr, mask; +u64 msr;/* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */ if (cpuid_eax (0x80000000 ) <0x8000001f )
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void) · line 4913
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2
-3@@ -4905,9 +4909,8 @@ static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void)* * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask. */ - mask = (mask_bit <52 ) ?rsvd_bits (mask_bit,51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; - -kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (mask, mask,PT_WRITABLE_MASK |PT_USER_MASK ); + svm_shadow_mmio_mask = (mask_bit <52 ) ?rsvd_bits (mask_bit,51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (PT_WRITABLE_MASK |PT_USER_MASK );
svm_shadow_mmio_mask is left as '0' if AMD memory encryption isn't supported:
Also see here:
Quoted 66 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0}static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps (void )arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +26
-0@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;module_param (allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool,S_IRUGO ); +u64 __ro_after_init vmx_shadow_mmio_mask; +#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \@@ -7359,6 +7361,17 @@ int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)if (!ple_gap) kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true; +/* +* EPT Misconfigurations can be generated if the value of bits 2:0 +* of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute). +*/ +if (enable_ept) +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm,VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE , +VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ); +else +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm, vmx_shadow_mmio_mask, + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_L1TF ) && enable_ept) {switch (l1tf_mitigation) {case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF :@@ -8357,6 +8370,19 @@ int __init vmx_init(void)if (!enable_ept) allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true; +/* +* Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with +* PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses. 64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT +* paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports +* 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the +* PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled. +*/ +if (kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits () <52 ) + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask =BIT_ULL (51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK ; +else + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask =0 ; +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (0 ); +return 0 ; }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +1
-0@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ void hv_vp_assist_page_exit(void);void __init vmx_init_early (void );int __init vmx_init (void );void vmx_exit (void ); +extern u64 __ro_after_init vmx_shadow_mmio_mask;__init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support (void );__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios (void );
Re: [PATCH v8 033/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 316 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:18PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
TDX will use a different shadow PTE entry value for MMIO from VMX. Add members to
kvm_archand track value for MMIO per-VM instead of global variables. By using the per-VM EPT entry value for MMIO, the existing VMX logic is kept working. To untangle the logic to initializeshadow_mmio_access_mask, introduce a separate setter function.At the same time, disallow MMIO emulation path for protected guest because VMM can't parse instructions in protected guest memory.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 9 ++++--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 45 +++++++++------------------------ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 10 +++----- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 13 +++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 11 +++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4
-0@@ -1157,6 +1157,10 @@ struct kvm_arch {*/ spinlock_t mmu_unsync_pages_lock; +bool enable_mmio_caching; +u64 shadow_mmio_value; +u64 shadow_mmio_mask; +struct list_head assigned_dev_head;struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;bool iommu_noncoherent;arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +2
-1@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ static inline u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; } -void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask,u64 access_mask); +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (struct kvm *kvm,u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask); +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (u64 mmio_access_mask);void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask (u64 me_value,u64 me_mask);void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks (bool has_ad_bits,bool has_exec_only);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +5
-4@@ -2418,7 +2418,7 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, child, invalid_list); } - }else if (is_mmio_spte (pte)) { + }else if (is_mmio_spte (kvm, pte)) {mmu_spte_clear_no_track (spte); }return 0 ;@@ -3222,7 +3222,8 @@ static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fau* and only if L1's MAXPHYADDR is inaccurate with respect to * the hardware's). */ -if (unlikely (!enable_mmio_caching) || +if (unlikely (!vcpu->kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching && + !kvm_gfn_shared_mask (vcpu->kvm)) ||unlikely (fault->gfn >kvm_mmu_max_gfn ()))return RET_PF_EMULATE ; }@@ -4074,7 +4075,7 @@ static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)if (WARN_ON (reserved))return -EINVAL ; -if (is_mmio_spte (spte)) { +if (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, spte)) {gfn_t gfn =get_mmio_spte_gfn (spte);unsigned int access =get_mmio_spte_access (spte);@@ -4529,7 +4530,7 @@ static unsigned long get_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static bool sync_mmio_spte (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *sptep,gfn_t gfn,unsigned int access) { -if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (*sptep))) { +if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, *sptep))) {if (gfn !=get_mmio_spte_gfn (*sptep)) {mmu_spte_clear_no_track (sptep);return true;arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +12
-33@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask; -u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value; -u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;@@ -60,10 +58,10 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)u64 spte =generation_mmio_spte_mask (gen);u64 gpa = gfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ; -WARN_ON_ONCE (!shadow_mmio_value); +WARN_ON_ONCE (!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value); access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask; - spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access; + spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access; spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask; spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask) <<SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN ;@@ -335,9 +333,8 @@ u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)return spte; } -void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask,u64 access_mask) +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (struct kvm *kvm,u64 mmio_value,u64 mmio_mask) { -BUG_ON ((u64 )(unsigned )access_mask != access_mask);WARN_ON (mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);if (!enable_mmio_caching)@@ -364,12 +361,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask) WARN_ON(mmio_value && (REMOVED_SPTE & mmio_mask) == mmio_value)) mmio_value =0 ; -if (!mmio_value) - enable_mmio_caching = false; - - shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value; - shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask; - shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask; + kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching = !!mmio_value; + kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value; + kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);@@ -404,20 +398,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only) shadow_acc_track_mask =VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ; shadow_host_writable_mask =EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE ; shadow_mmu_writable_mask =EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE ; - -/* -* EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0 -* of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute). -*/ -kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE , -VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ,0 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks (void ) {u8 low_phys_bits; -u64 mask; shadow_phys_bits =kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits ();@@ -464,18 +450,11 @@ void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void) shadow_host_writable_mask =DEFAULT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE ; shadow_mmu_writable_mask =DEFAULT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE ; +} -/* -* Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with -* PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses. 64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT -* paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports -* 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the -* PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled. -*/ -if (shadow_phys_bits <52 ) - mask =BIT_ULL (51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK ; -else - mask =0 ; - -kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (mask, mask,ACC_WRITE_MASK |ACC_USER_MASK ); +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (u64 mmio_access_mask) +{ +BUG_ON ((u64 )(unsigned )mmio_access_mask != mmio_access_mask); + shadow_mmio_access_mask = mmio_access_mask; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +3
-7@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@#include "mmu_internal.h" -extern bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching; -/* * A MMU present SPTE is backed by actual memory and may or may not be present * in hardware. E.g. MMIO SPTEs are not considered present. Use bit 11, as it @@ -156,8 +154,6 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask; -extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value; -extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;@@ -231,10 +227,10 @@ static inline int spte_index(u64 *sptep)*/ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask; -static inline bool is_mmio_spte (u64 spte) +static inline bool is_mmio_spte (struct kvm *kvm,u64 spte) { -return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value && -likely (enable_mmio_caching); +return (spte & kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value && +likely (kvm->arch.enable_mmio_caching ||kvm_gfn_shared_mask (kvm)); }static inline bool is_shadow_present_pte (u64 pte)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +10
-3@@ -569,8 +569,8 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,* impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs * are nonpresent. */ -if (WARN_ON (!is_mmio_spte (old_spte) && - !is_mmio_spte (new_spte) && +if (WARN_ON (!is_mmio_spte (kvm, old_spte) && + !is_mmio_spte (kvm, new_spte) && !is_removed_spte (new_spte)))pr_err ("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n" "should not be replaced with another,\n"@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, }/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */ -if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (new_spte))) { +if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) { vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;trace_mark_mmio_spte (rcu_dereference (iter->sptep), iter->gfn, new_spte);@@ -1863,6 +1863,13 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes, *root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level; +/* +* mmio page fault isn't supported for protected guest because +* instructions in protected guest memory can't be parsed by VMM. +*/ +if (WARN_ON (kvm_gfn_shared_mask (vcpu->kvm))) +return leaf; +tdp_mmu_for_each_pte (iter, mmu, gfn, gfn +1 ) { leaf = iter.level; sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +7
-4@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);bool intercept_smi = true;module_param (intercept_smi, bool,0444 ); +static u64 __read_mostly svm_shadow_mmio_mask;static bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;@@ -4729,6 +4730,9 @@ static bool svm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)static int svm_vm_init (struct kvm *kvm) { +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm, svm_shadow_mmio_mask, + svm_shadow_mmio_mask); +if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh) kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;@@ -4878,7 +4882,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask (void ) {unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit; -u64 msr, mask; +u64 msr;/* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */ if (cpuid_eax (0x80000000 ) <0x8000001f )@@ -4905,9 +4909,8 @@ static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void)* * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask. */ - mask = (mask_bit <52 ) ?rsvd_bits (mask_bit,51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; - -kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (mask, mask,PT_WRITABLE_MASK |PT_USER_MASK ); + svm_shadow_mmio_mask = (mask_bit <52 ) ?rsvd_bits (mask_bit,51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (PT_WRITABLE_MASK |PT_USER_MASK ); }static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps (void )arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO); · line 144
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1
-0@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;module_param (allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool,S_IRUGO ); +u64 __ro_after_init vmx_shadow_mmio_mask;
I see only vmx.c uses it, it's possible to make it static if no other users out of vmx.c, looks it's variable to pass some decision made in vmx_init() to vmx_vm_init() for per VM.
Quoted 47 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +25
-0+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \@@ -7359,6 +7361,17 @@ int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)if (!ple_gap) kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true; +/* +* EPT Misconfigurations can be generated if the value of bits 2:0 +* of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute). +*/ +if (enable_ept) +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm,VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE , +VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ); +else +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask (kvm, vmx_shadow_mmio_mask, + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_L1TF ) && enable_ept) {switch (l1tf_mitigation) {case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF :@@ -8357,6 +8370,19 @@ int __init vmx_init(void)if (!enable_ept) allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true; +/* +* Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with +* PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses. 64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT +* paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports +* 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the +* PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled. +*/ +if (kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits () <52 ) + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask =BIT_ULL (51 ) |PT_PRESENT_MASK ; +else + vmx_shadow_mmio_mask =0 ; +kvm_mmu_set_mmio_access_mask (0 ); +return 0 ; }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h void hv_vp_assist_page_exit(void); · line 16
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +1
-0@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ void hv_vp_assist_page_exit(void);void __init vmx_init_early (void );int __init vmx_init (void );void vmx_exit (void ); +extern u64 __ro_after_init vmx_shadow_mmio_mask;
Ditto.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +0
-1__init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support (void );__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios (void ); --2.25.1
PATCH v8 34/103 KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
TDX requires TDX SEAMCALL to operate Secure EPT instead of direct memory access and TDX SEAMCALL is heavy operation. Fast page fault on private GPA doesn't make sense. Disallow fast page fault on private GPA.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +10 -2
@@ -3231,8 +3231,16 @@ static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *faureturn RET_PF_CONTINUE ; } -static bool page_fault_can_be_fast (struct kvm_page_fault *fault) +static bool page_fault_can_be_fast (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault) { +/* +* TDX private mapping doesn't support fast page fault because the EPT +* entry is read/written with TDX SEAMCALLs instead of direct memory +* access. +*/ +if (kvm_is_private_gpa (kvm, fault->addr)) +return false; +/* * Page faults with reserved bits set, i.e. faults on MMIO SPTEs, only * reach the common page fault handler if the SPTE has an invalid MMIO
@@ -3342,7 +3350,7 @@ static int fast_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)u64 *sptep =NULL ;uint retry_count =0 ; -if (!page_fault_can_be_fast (fault)) +if (!page_fault_can_be_fast (vcpu->kvm, fault))return ret;walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin (vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 35/103 KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
In reply to [email protected]From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
TDX requires special handling to support large private page. For simplicity, only support 4K page for TD guest for now. Add per-VM maximum page level support to support different maximum page sizes for TD guest and conventional VMX guest.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1142,6 +1142,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages; +int tdp_max_page_level;u8 mmu_valid_gen;struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES ];struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -0
@@ -6063,6 +6063,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm) kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.kmem_cache = pte_list_desc_cache; kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO; + kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level =KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL ;return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +1 -1
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, .nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled = is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm), - .max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL, + .max_level = vcpu->kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level, .req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K, .goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K, };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 035/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
Quoted 9 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:20PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
TDX requires special handling to support large private page. For simplicity, only support 4K page for TD guest for now. Add per-VM maximum page level support to support different maximum page sizes for TD guest and conventional VMX guest.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Quoted 46 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1142,6 +1142,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages; +int tdp_max_page_level;u8 mmu_valid_gen;struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES ];struct list_head active_mmu_pages;arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1
-0@@ -6063,6 +6063,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm) kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.kmem_cache = pte_list_desc_cache; kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO; + kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level =KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL ;return 0 ; }arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +1
-2@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, .nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled = is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm), - .max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL, + .max_level = vcpu->kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level, .req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K, .goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K, }; --2.25.1
PATCH v8 36/103 KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM programs to inject #VE conditionally and set #VE suppress bit in EPT entry. For VMX case, #VE isn't used. If #VE happens for VMX, it's a bug. To be defensive (test that VMX case isn't broken), introduce option ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, set error.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 12 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 4 +++ 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +12 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(ENCLS_EXITING)#define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDSEED_EXITING)#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PAGE_MOD_LOGGING) +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(EPT_VIOLATION_VE)#define SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PT_CONCEAL_VMX)#define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(XSAVES)#define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC)
@@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {VMREAD_BITMAP_HIGH =0x00002027 ,VMWRITE_BITMAP =0x00002028 ,VMWRITE_BITMAP_HIGH =0x00002029 , +VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS =0x0000202A , +VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS_HIGH =0x0000202B ,XSS_EXIT_BITMAP =0x0000202C ,XSS_EXIT_BITMAP_HIGH =0x0000202D , ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP = 0x0000202E,
@@ -628,4 +631,13 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation; +struct vmx_ve_information { +u32 exit_reason; +u32 delivery; +u64 exit_qualification; +u64 guest_linear_address; +u64 guest_physical_address; +u16 eptp_index; +}; +#endif
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +69 -2
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arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +4 -0
@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {DECLARE_BITMAP (read,MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS );DECLARE_BITMAP (write,MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS ); } shadow_msr_intercept; + +/* ve_info must be page aligned. */ +struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info; };struct kvm_vmx {
@@ -566,6 +569,7 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING | \SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING | \SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML | \ +SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE | \SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING | \SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE | \ SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | \
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 37/103 The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM TDP MMU hooks.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -2
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@ Patch Layer status * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet * KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied -* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applying -* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet +* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applied +* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Applying * KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v8 38/103 KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Factor out non-leaf SPTE population logic from kvm_tdp_mmu_map(). MapGPA hypercall needs to populate non-leaf SPTE to record which GPA, private or shared, is allowed in the leaf EPT entry.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +19 -7
@@ -1145,6 +1145,24 @@ static int tdp_mmu_link_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,return 0 ; } +static int tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf ( +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct tdp_iter *iter,bool account_nx) +{ +struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; +int ret; + +WARN_ON (is_shadow_present_pte (iter->old_spte)); +WARN_ON (is_removed_spte (iter->old_spte)); + + sp =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu); +tdp_mmu_init_child_sp (sp, iter); + + ret =tdp_mmu_link_sp (vcpu->kvm, iter, sp, account_nx, true); +if (ret) +tdp_mmu_free_sp (sp); +return ret; +} +/* * Handle a TDP page fault (NPT/EPT violation/misconfiguration) by installing * page tables and SPTEs to translate the faulting guest physical address.
@@ -1153,7 +1171,6 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault) {struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;struct tdp_iter iter; -struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;int ret;kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (vcpu, fault);
@@ -1199,13 +1216,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)if (is_removed_spte (iter.old_spte))break ; - sp =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu); -tdp_mmu_init_child_sp (sp, &iter); - -if (tdp_mmu_link_sp (vcpu->kvm, &iter, sp, account_nx, true)) { -tdp_mmu_free_sp (sp); +if (tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf (vcpu, &iter, account_nx))break ; - } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 038/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()
Quoted 17 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:23PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Factor out non-leaf SPTE population logic from
kvm_tdp_mmu_map(). MapGPA hypercall needs to populate non-leaf SPTE to record which GPA, private or shared, is allowed in the leaf EPT entry.Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +0
-0@@ -1145,6 +1145,24 @@ static int tdp_mmu_link_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,return 0 ;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c static int tdp_mmu_link_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter, · line 1155
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +8
-0} +static int tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf ( +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct tdp_iter *iter,bool account_nx) +{ +struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; +int ret; + +WARN_ON (is_shadow_present_pte (iter->old_spte)); +WARN_ON (is_removed_spte (iter->old_spte));
Why these 2 WARN_ON are necessary here ?
In TPD MMU the changes of PTE with shared lock is not surprised and should be handle properly (e.g. the page is freed below for this case), or this function will be called without checking the present and removed state of the pte ?
Quoted 39 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +11
-8+ + sp =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu); +tdp_mmu_init_child_sp (sp, iter); + + ret =tdp_mmu_link_sp (vcpu->kvm, iter, sp, account_nx, true); +if (ret) +tdp_mmu_free_sp (sp); +return ret; +} +/* * Handle a TDP page fault (NPT/EPT violation/misconfiguration) by installing * page tables and SPTEs to translate the faulting guest physical address. @@ -1153,7 +1171,6 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault) {struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;struct tdp_iter iter; -struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;int ret;kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (vcpu, fault);@@ -1199,13 +1216,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)if (is_removed_spte (iter.old_spte))break ; - sp =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu); -tdp_mmu_init_child_sp (sp, &iter); - -if (tdp_mmu_link_sp (vcpu->kvm, &iter, sp, account_nx, true)) { -tdp_mmu_free_sp (sp); +if (tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf (vcpu, &iter, account_nx))break ; - } } } --2.25.1
PATCH v8 39/103 KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Refactor tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() and tdp_mmu_init_sp and eliminate tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(). Currently tdp_mmu_init_sp() (or tdp_mmu_init_child_sp()) sets kvm_mmu_page.role after tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() allocating struct kvm_mmu_page and its page table page. This patch makes tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() initialize kvm_mmu_page.role instead of tdp_mmu_init_sp().
To handle private page tables, argument of is_private needs to be passed down. Given that already page level is passed down, it would be cumbersome to add one more parameter about sp. Instead replace the level argument with union kvm_mmu_page_role. Thus the number of argument won't be increased and more info about sp can be passed down.
For private sp, secure page table will be also allocated in addition to struct kvm_mmu_page and page table (spt member). The allocation functions (tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() and __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split()) need to know if the allocation is for the conventional page table or private page table. Pass union kvm_mmu_role to those functions and initialize role member of struct kvm_mmu_page.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 12 ++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h +12 -0
@@ -115,4 +115,16 @@ void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,void tdp_iter_next (struct tdp_iter *iter);void tdp_iter_restart (struct tdp_iter *iter); +static inline union kvm_mmu_page_role tdp_iter_child_role (struct tdp_iter *iter) +{ +union kvm_mmu_page_role child_role; +struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp; + + parent_sp =sptep_to_sp (rcu_dereference (iter->sptep)); + + child_role = parent_sp->role; + child_role.level--; +return child_role; +} +#endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_ITER_H */
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +20 -25
118 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v8 039/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation
Quoted 9 lines · On Sun, Aug 07, 2022 at 03:01:24PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Refactor
tdp_mmu_alloc_sp()andtdp_mmu_init_spand eliminatetdp_mmu_init_child_sp(). Currentlytdp_mmu_init_sp()(ortdp_mmu_init_child_sp()) sets kvm_mmu_page.role aftertdp_mmu_alloc_sp()allocating structkvm_mmu_pageand its page table page. This patch makestdp_mmu_alloc_sp()initialize kvm_mmu_page.role instead oftdp_mmu_init_sp().
Quoted 5 lines
To handle private page tables, argument of
is_privateneeds to be passed down. Given that already page level is passed down, it would be cumbersome to add one more parameter about sp. Instead replace the level argument with unionkvm_mmu_page_role. Thus the number of argument won't be increased and more info about sp can be passed down.
Please update the description, no level argument is replaced in this patch.
Quoted 170 lines
For private sp, secure page table will be also allocated in addition to struct
kvm_mmu_pageand page table (spt member). The allocation functions (tdp_mmu_alloc_sp()and__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split()) need to know if the allocation is for the conventional page table or private page table. Pass unionkvm_mmu_roleto those functions and initialize role member of structkvm_mmu_page.Signed-off-by Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 12 ++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h +12
-0@@ -115,4 +115,16 @@ void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,void tdp_iter_next (struct tdp_iter *iter);void tdp_iter_restart (struct tdp_iter *iter); +static inline union kvm_mmu_page_role tdp_iter_child_role (struct tdp_iter *iter) +{ +union kvm_mmu_page_role child_role; +struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp; + + parent_sp =sptep_to_sp (rcu_dereference (iter->sptep)); + + child_role = parent_sp->role; + child_role.level--; +return child_role; +} +#endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_ITER_H */ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +20
-26@@ -271,22 +271,28 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_next_root(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(_root) != _as_id) { \ } else -static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +union kvm_mmu_page_role role) {struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; sp =kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc (&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache); sp->spt =kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc (&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache); + sp->role = role;return sp; }static void tdp_mmu_init_sp (struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,tdp_ptep_t sptep, -gfn_t gfn,union kvm_mmu_page_role role) +gfn_t gfn) {set_page_private (virt_to_page (sp->spt), (unsigned long )sp); - sp->role = role; +/* +* role must be set before calling this function. At least role.level +* is not 0 (PG_LEVEL_NONE). +*/ +WARN_ON (!sp->role.word); sp->gfn = gfn; sp->ptep = sptep; sp->tdp_mmu_page = true;@@ -294,20 +300,6 @@ static void tdp_mmu_init_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, tdp_ptep_t sptep,trace_kvm_mmu_get_page (sp, true); } -static void tdp_mmu_init_child_sp (struct kvm_mmu_page *child_sp, -struct tdp_iter *iter) -{ -struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp; -union kvm_mmu_page_role role; - - parent_sp =sptep_to_sp (rcu_dereference (iter->sptep)); - - role = parent_sp->role; - role.level--; - -tdp_mmu_init_sp (child_sp, iter->sptep, iter->gfn, role); -} -hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {union kvm_mmu_page_role role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role;@@ -326,8 +318,8 @@ hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto out; } - root =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu); -tdp_mmu_init_sp (root,NULL ,0 , role); + root =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu, role); +tdp_mmu_init_sp (root,NULL ,0 );refcount_set (&root->tdp_mmu_root_count,1 );@@ -1154,8 +1146,8 @@ static int tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf(WARN_ON (is_shadow_present_pte (iter->old_spte));WARN_ON (is_removed_spte (iter->old_spte)); - sp =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu); -tdp_mmu_init_child_sp (sp, iter); + sp =tdp_mmu_alloc_sp (vcpu,tdp_iter_child_role (iter)); +tdp_mmu_init_sp (sp, iter->sptep, iter->gfn); ret =tdp_mmu_link_sp (vcpu->kvm, iter, sp, account_nx, true);if (ret)@@ -1423,7 +1415,8 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(struct kvm *kvm,return spte_set; } -static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split (gfp_t gfp) +static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split ( +gfp_t gfp,union kvm_mmu_page_role role) {struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;@@ -1433,6 +1426,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp)if (!sp)return NULL ; + sp->role = role; sp->spt = (void *)__get_free_page (gfp);if (!sp->spt) {kmem_cache_free (mmu_page_header_cache, sp);@@ -1446,6 +1440,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter, bool shared) { +union kvm_mmu_page_role role =tdp_iter_child_role (iter);struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;/* @@ -1457,7 +1452,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,* If this allocation fails we drop the lock and retry with reclaim * allowed. */ - sp =__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split (GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_ACCOUNT); + sp =__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split (GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_ACCOUNT, role);if (sp)return sp;@@ -1469,7 +1464,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,write_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock); iter->yielded = true; - sp =__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); + sp =__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT , role);if (shared)read_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);@@ -1488,7 +1483,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_split_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,const int level = iter->level;int ret, i; -tdp_mmu_init_child_sp (sp, iter); +tdp_mmu_init_sp (sp, iter->sptep, iter->gfn);/* * No need for atomics when writing to sp->spt since the page table has -- 2.25.1
PATCH v8 40/103 KVM: x86/mmu: Require TDP MMU for TDX
In reply to [email protected]From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Require the TDP MMU for guest TDs, the so called "shadow" MMU does not support mapping guest private memory, i.e. does not support Secure-EPT.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +5 -1
@@ -18,8 +18,12 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm) {struct workqueue_struct *wq; +/* +* Because only the TDP MMU supports TDX, require the TDP MMU for guest +* TDs. +*/ if (!tdp_enabled || !READ_ONCE (tdp_mmu_enabled)) -return 0 ; +return kvm->arch.vm_type ==KVM_X86_TDX_VM ? -EOPNOTSUPP :0 ; wq =alloc_workqueue ("kvm" ,WQ_UNBOUND |WQ_MEM_RECLAIM |WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE ,0 );if (!wq)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1