Split up refactoring of fh_verify()
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainercover Split up refactoring of fh_verify()
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
These six patches are meant to replace:
nfsd: factor out __fh_verify to allow NULL rqstp to be passed
nfsd: add nfsd_file_acquire_local()
I've removed the @nfs_vers parameter to __fh_verify(), and tried something a little different with the trace points. Please check my math.
These have been compile-tested, but no more than that. Interested in comments.
Chuck Lever (2):
NFSD: Avoid using rqstp->rq_vers in nfsd_set_fh_dentry()
NFSD: Short-circuit fh_verify tracepoints for LOCALIO
NeilBrown (4):
NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
NFSD: Refactor nfsd_setuser_and_check_port()
nfsd: factor out __fh_verify to allow NULL rqstp to be passed
nfsd: add nfsd_file_acquire_local()
fs/nfsd/export.c | 29 ++++-- fs/nfsd/filecache.c | 61 +++++++++++-- fs/nfsd/filecache.h | 3 + fs/nfsd/lockd.c | 6 +- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/nfsd/nfsfh.h | 5 ++ fs/nfsd/trace.h | 18 ++-- 7 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 1/6 NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
LOCALIO-initiated open operations are not running in an nfsd thread and thus do not have an associated svc_rqst context.
--- fs/nfsd/export.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/export.c +24 -5
@@ -1074,10 +1074,29 @@ static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd,return exp; } +/** +* check_nfsd_access - check if access to export is allowed. +* @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. +* @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp (will be NULL for LOCALIO). +* +* Return values: +* %nfs_ok if access is granted, or +* %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied +*/ __be32 check_nfsd_access (struct svc_export *exp,struct svc_rqst *rqstp) {struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors; -struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt; +struct svc_xprt *xprt; + +/* +* The target use case for rqstp being NULL is LOCALIO, which +* currently only supports AUTH_UNIX. The behavior for LOCALIO +* is therefore the same as the AUTH_UNIX check below. +*/ +if (!rqstp) +return nfs_ok; + + xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt;if (exp->ex_xprtsec_modes &NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE ) {if (!test_bit (XPT_TLS_SESSION , &xprt->xpt_flags))
@@ -1098,17 +1117,17 @@ __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp) ok:/* legacy gss-only clients are always OK: */ if (exp->ex_client == rqstp->rq_gssclient) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok;/* ip-address based client; check sec= export option: */ for (f = exp->ex_flavors; f < end; f++) {if (f->pseudoflavor == rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok; }/* defaults in absence of sec= options: */ if (exp->ex_nflavors ==0 ) {if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_NULL || rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_UNIX ) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok; }/* If the compound op contains a spo_must_allowed op,
@@ -1118,7 +1137,7 @@ __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)*/ if (nfsd4_spo_must_allow (rqstp)) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok; denied:return nfserr_wrongsec;
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
Quoted 30 lines · On Wed, 28 Aug 2024, [email protected] wrote:
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
LOCALIO-initiated open operations are not running in an nfsd thread and thus do not have an associated
svc_rqstcontext.Signed-off-by NeilBrown <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Chuck Lever <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/export.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/export.c +9
-0@@ -1074,10 +1074,29 @@ static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd,return exp; } +/** +* check_nfsd_access - check if access to export is allowed. +* @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. +* @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp (will be NULL for LOCALIO). +* +* Return values: +* %nfs_ok if access is granted, or +* %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied +*/
fs/nfsd/export.c static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd, · line 1094
Quoted 10 lines
fs/nfsd/export.c +6
-1__be32 check_nfsd_access (struct svc_export *exp,struct svc_rqst *rqstp) {struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors; -struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt; +struct svc_xprt *xprt; + +/* +* The target use case for rqstp being NULL is LOCALIO, which +* currently only supports AUTH_UNIX. The behavior for LOCALIO +* is therefore the same as the AUTH_UNIX check below.
The "AUTH_UNIX check below" only applies if exp->ex_flavours == 0. To make "rqstp == NULL" mean "treat like AUTH_UNIX" I think we need to confirm that
exp->ex_xprtsec_mods & NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE
and either
exp->ex_nflavours == 0
or
one for the exp->ex_flavors->pseudoflavor values is RPC_AUTH_UNIX
I'm not sure that is all really necessary, but if not then we probably need a better comment...
NeilBrown
Quoted 42 lines
fs/nfsd/export.c +9
-4+*/ +if (!rqstp) +return nfs_ok; + + xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt;if (exp->ex_xprtsec_modes &NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE ) {if (!test_bit (XPT_TLS_SESSION , &xprt->xpt_flags))@@ -1098,17 +1117,17 @@ __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp) ok:/* legacy gss-only clients are always OK: */ if (exp->ex_client == rqstp->rq_gssclient) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok;/* ip-address based client; check sec= export option: */ for (f = exp->ex_flavors; f < end; f++) {if (f->pseudoflavor == rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok; }/* defaults in absence of sec= options: */ if (exp->ex_nflavors ==0 ) {if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_NULL || rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_UNIX ) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok; }/* If the compound op contains a spo_must_allowed op, @@ -1118,7 +1137,7 @@ __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)*/ if (nfsd4_spo_must_allow (rqstp)) -return 0 ; +return nfs_ok; denied:return nfserr_wrongsec;Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
Quoted 51 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 30 lines · On Wed, 28 Aug 2024, [email protected] wrote:
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
LOCALIO-initiated open operations are not running in an nfsd thread and thus do not have an associated
svc_rqstcontext.Signed-off-by NeilBrown <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Chuck Lever <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/export.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/export.c +9
-0@@ -1074,10 +1074,29 @@ static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd,return exp; } +/** +* check_nfsd_access - check if access to export is allowed. +* @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. +* @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp (will be NULL for LOCALIO). +* +* Return values: +* %nfs_ok if access is granted, or +* %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied +*/ fs/nfsd/export.c static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd, · line 1094
Quoted 10 lines
fs/nfsd/export.c +6
-1__be32 check_nfsd_access (struct svc_export *exp,struct svc_rqst *rqstp) {struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors; -struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt; +struct svc_xprt *xprt; + +/* +* The target use case for rqstp being NULL is LOCALIO, which +* currently only supports AUTH_UNIX. The behavior for LOCALIO +* is therefore the same as the AUTH_UNIX check below. The "
AUTH_UNIXcheck below" only applies ifexp->ex_flavours== 0. To make "rqstp == NULL" mean "treat likeAUTH_UNIX" I think we need to confirm that
exp->ex_xprtsec_mods&NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE
and either
exp->ex_nflavours== 0
or
one for theexp->ex_flavors->pseudoflavorvalues isRPC_AUTH_UNIX
Quoted 2 lines
I'm not sure that is all really necessary, but if not then we probably need a better comment...
Think extra checks aren't needed (unless you think a NULL rqstp _without_ the use of LOCALIO possible? which could trigger a false positive granting of access? seems unlikely but...)
Mike
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
Quoted 52 lines · Mike Snitzer
Quoted 51 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 30 lines · On Wed, 28 Aug 2024, [email protected] wrote:
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
LOCALIO-initiated open operations are not running in an nfsd thread and thus do not have an associated
svc_rqstcontext.Signed-off-by NeilBrown <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Chuck Lever <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/export.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/export.c +9
-0@@ -1074,10 +1074,29 @@ static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd,return exp; } +/** +* check_nfsd_access - check if access to export is allowed. +* @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. +* @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp (will be NULL for LOCALIO). +* +* Return values: +* %nfs_ok if access is granted, or +* %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied +*/ fs/nfsd/export.c static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd, · line 1094
Quoted 10 lines
fs/nfsd/export.c +6
-1__be32 check_nfsd_access (struct svc_export *exp,struct svc_rqst *rqstp) {struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors; -struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt; +struct svc_xprt *xprt; + +/* +* The target use case for rqstp being NULL is LOCALIO, which +* currently only supports AUTH_UNIX. The behavior for LOCALIO +* is therefore the same as the AUTH_UNIX check below. The "
AUTH_UNIXcheck below" only applies ifexp->ex_flavours== 0. To make "rqstp == NULL" mean "treat likeAUTH_UNIX" I think we need to confirm that
exp->ex_xprtsec_mods&NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE
and either
exp->ex_nflavours== 0
or
one for theexp->ex_flavors->pseudoflavorvalues isRPC_AUTH_UNIX
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'm not sure that is all really necessary, but if not then we probably need a better comment...
Think extra checks aren't needed (unless you think a NULL rqstp _without_ the use of LOCALIO possible? which could trigger a false positive granting of access? seems unlikely but...)
I agree they aren't needed. I think we need to have a clear understanding of why that aren't needed, and to write that understanding down. So that if some day someone wants to change this code, they can understand the consequences.
Maybe the answer is that LOCALIO would never ask for access that isn't allowed, so there is no need to check.
Maybe the client can determine the relevant xpt_flags from the client end of the session, so it can pass them reliably to check_nfsd_access().
I don't know what is best, but I think we should have a comment justifying the short-circuit, and I don't think the current proposed comment does that correctly.
Thanks,
NeilBrown
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
Quoted 24 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 11 lines · Mike Snitzer
Quoted 10 lines · NeilBrown
The "
AUTH_UNIXcheck below" only applies ifexp->ex_flavours== 0. To make "rqstp == NULL" mean "treat likeAUTH_UNIX" I think we need to confirm that
exp->ex_xprtsec_mods&NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE
and either
exp->ex_nflavours== 0
or
one for theexp->ex_flavors->pseudoflavorvalues isRPC_AUTH_UNIXQuoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'm not sure that is all really necessary, but if not then we probably need a better comment...
Think extra checks aren't needed (unless you think a NULL rqstp _without_ the use of LOCALIO possible? which could trigger a false positive granting of access? seems unlikely but...)
Quoted 8 lines
I agree they aren't needed. I think we need to have a clear understanding of why that aren't needed, and to write that understanding down. So that if some day someone wants to change this code, they can understand the consequences.
I don't know what is best, but I think we should have a comment justifying the short-circuit, and I don't think the current proposed comment does that correctly.
My goal is to document that understanding here, as you stated. I will leave it to you and Mike to adjust the wording to your liking.
--
Chuck Lever
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
In reply to NeilBrownQuoted 69 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 52 lines · Mike Snitzer
Quoted 51 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 30 lines · On Wed, 28 Aug 2024, [email protected] wrote:
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
LOCALIO-initiated open operations are not running in an nfsd thread and thus do not have an associated
svc_rqstcontext.Signed-off-by NeilBrown <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Chuck Lever <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/export.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/export.c +9
-0@@ -1074,10 +1074,29 @@ static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd,return exp; } +/** +* check_nfsd_access - check if access to export is allowed. +* @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. +* @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp (will be NULL for LOCALIO). +* +* Return values: +* %nfs_ok if access is granted, or +* %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied +*/ fs/nfsd/export.c static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd, · line 1094
Quoted 10 lines
fs/nfsd/export.c +6
-1__be32 check_nfsd_access (struct svc_export *exp,struct svc_rqst *rqstp) {struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors; -struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt; +struct svc_xprt *xprt; + +/* +* The target use case for rqstp being NULL is LOCALIO, which +* currently only supports AUTH_UNIX. The behavior for LOCALIO +* is therefore the same as the AUTH_UNIX check below. The "
AUTH_UNIXcheck below" only applies ifexp->ex_flavours== 0. To make "rqstp == NULL" mean "treat likeAUTH_UNIX" I think we need to confirm that
exp->ex_xprtsec_mods&NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE
and either
exp->ex_nflavours== 0
or
one for theexp->ex_flavors->pseudoflavorvalues isRPC_AUTH_UNIXQuoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'm not sure that is all really necessary, but if not then we probably need a better comment...
Think extra checks aren't needed (unless you think a NULL rqstp _without_ the use of LOCALIO possible? which could trigger a false positive granting of access? seems unlikely but...)
I agree they aren't needed. I think we need to have a clear understanding of why that aren't needed, and to write that understanding down. So that if some day someone wants to change this code, they can understand the consequences.
Maybe the answer is that LOCALIO would never ask for access that isn't allowed, so there is no need to check.
Quoted 6 lines
Maybe the client can determine the relevant
xpt_flagsfrom the client end of the session, so it can pass them reliably tocheck_nfsd_access().I don't know what is best, but I think we should have a comment justifying the short-circuit, and I don't think the current proposed comment does that correctly.
Just to recap, this is what you had originally, which Chuck correctly said needed improvement:
__be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors;
struct svc_xprt *xprt;
if (!rqstp)
/* Always allow LOCALIO */
return 0;I offered my suggestion and Chuck then tweaked it:
__be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors;
struct svc_xprt *xprt;- if (!rqstp) {
- /*
- * The target use case for rqstp being NULL is LOCALIO, - * which only supports AUTH_UNIX, so always allow LOCALIO - * because the other checks below aren't applicable. - */ - return 0; - } + /* + * The target use case for rqstp being NULL is LOCALIO, which + * currently only supports AUTH_UNIX. The behavior for LOCALIO + * is therefore the same as the AUTH_UNIX check below. + */
+ if (!rqstp)
+ return nfs_ok;
Now you're saying that comment needs to be more precise... ;)
localio only supports AUTH_UNIX, and the client verifies that is the method being used:
void nfs_local_probe(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
nfs_uuid_t nfs_uuid;
/* Disallow localio if disabled via sysfs or AUTH_SYS isn't used */
if (!localio_enabled ||
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_auth->au_flavor != RPC_AUTH_UNIX) {
nfs_local_disable(clp);
return;
}
...So I honestly feel like Chuck's latest revision is perfectly fine. I disagree that "The behavior for LOCALIO is therefore the same as the AUTH_UNIX check below." is inaccurate. The precondition from the client (used to establish localio and cause rqstp to be NULL in check_nfsd_access) is effectively comparable no?
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
Quoted 7 lines · Mike Snitzer
So I honestly feel like Chuck's latest revision is perfectly fine. I disagree that "The behavior for LOCALIO is therefore the same as the
AUTH_UNIXcheck below." is inaccurate. The precondition from the client (used to establish localio and cause rqstp to be NULL incheck_nfsd_access) is effectively comparable no?
I don't think the correctness of the code is at all related to AUTH_UNIX.
Suppose we did add support for krb5 somehow - would we really need a different test? I think not.
I think that the reason the code is correct and safe is that we trust the client. We *know* the client will only present an filehandle which it has received over the wire and which it verified - with the accompanying credential - it was allowed to access.
Maybe that is what you meant by "The precondition from the client". I agree that does give us sufficient safety. I don't think AUTH_UNIX is relevant.
/*
* If rqstp is NULL, this is a LOCALIO request which will only ever use
* filehandle/credential pair for which access has been affirmed (by
* ACCESS or OPEN NFS requests) over the wire. So there is no need for
* further checks here.
*/
(It wasn't quite this clear to me when I wrote previously - but I always
seems to think more clearly in the mornings!)
Thanks,
NeilBrown
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL in check_nfsd_access()
Quoted 23 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 7 lines · Mike Snitzer
So I honestly feel like Chuck's latest revision is perfectly fine. I disagree that "The behavior for LOCALIO is therefore the same as the
AUTH_UNIXcheck below." is inaccurate. The precondition from the client (used to establish localio and cause rqstp to be NULL incheck_nfsd_access) is effectively comparable no?I don't think the correctness of the code is at all related to
AUTH_UNIX.
Suppose we did add support for krb5 somehow - would we really need a different test? I think not.I think that the reason the code is correct and safe is that we trust the client. We *know* the client will only present an filehandle which it has received over the wire and which it verified - with the accompanying credential - it was allowed to access.
Maybe that is what you meant by "The precondition from the client". I agree that does give us sufficient safety. I don't think
AUTH_UNIXis relevant.
Quoted 6 lines
/*
* If rqstp is NULL, this is a LOCALIO request which will only ever use
* filehandle/credential pair for which access has been affirmed (by
* ACCESS or OPEN NFS requests) over the wire. So there is no need for
* further checks here.
*/
Makes sense, and thanks!
Quoted 2 lines
(It wasn't quite this clear to me when I wrote previously - but I always
seems to think more clearly in the mornings!)
I haven't been sleeping enough.. tonight, tonight I will!!! ;)
Mike
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 2/6 NFSD: Refactor nfsd_setuser_and_check_port()
In reply to [email protected]From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
There are several places where __fh_verify unconditionally dereferences rqstp to check that the connection is suitably secure. They look at rqstp->rq_xprt which is not meaningful in the target use case of "localio" NFS in which the client talks directly to the local server.
Prepare these to always succeed when rqstp is NULL.
--- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +10 -9
@@ -87,23 +87,24 @@ nfsd_mode_check(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t requested)return nfserr_wrong_type; } -static bool nfsd_originating_port_ok (struct svc_rqst *rqstp,int flags) +static bool nfsd_originating_port_ok (struct svc_rqst *rqstp, +struct svc_cred *cred, +struct svc_export *exp) { -if (flags &NFSEXP_INSECURE_PORT ) +if (nfsexp_flags (cred, exp) &NFSEXP_INSECURE_PORT )return true;/* We don't require gss requests to use low ports: */ -if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor >=RPC_AUTH_GSS ) +if (cred->cr_flavor >=RPC_AUTH_GSS )return true;return test_bit (RQ_SECURE , &rqstp->rq_flags); }static __be32 nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (struct svc_rqst *rqstp, +struct svc_cred *cred,struct svc_export *exp) { -int flags =nfsexp_flags (&rqstp->rq_cred, exp); -/* Check if the request originated from a secure port. */ -if (!nfsd_originating_port_ok (rqstp, flags)) { +if (rqstp && !nfsd_originating_port_ok (rqstp, cred, exp)) { RPC_IFDEBUG(char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]);dprintk ("nfsd: request from insecure port %s!\n" ,svc_print_addr (rqstp, buf,sizeof (buf)));
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ static __be32 nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, }/* Set user creds for this exportpoint */ -return nfserrno (nfsd_setuser (&rqstp->rq_cred, exp)); +return nfserrno (nfsd_setuser (cred, exp)); } static inline __be32 check_pseudo_root(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)put_cred (override_creds (new));put_cred (new); }else { - error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, exp); + error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, &rqstp->rq_cred, exp);if (error) goto out; }
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, int access)if (error) goto out; - error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, exp); + error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, &rqstp->rq_cred, exp);if (error) goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 3/6 NFSD: Avoid using rqstp->rq_vers in nfsd_set_fh_dentry()
In reply to [email protected]From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Currently, fh_verify() makes some daring assumptions about which version of file handle the caller wants, based on the things it can find in the passed-in rqstp. The about-to-be-introduced LOCALIO use case sometimes has no svc_rqst context, so this logic won't work in that case.
Instead, examine the passed-in file handle. It's .max_size field should carry information to allow nfsd_set_fh_dentry() to initialize the file handle appropriately.
lockd appears to be the only kernel consumer that does not set the file handle .max_size when during initialization.
write_filehandle() is the other question mark, as it looks possible to specify a maxsize between NFS_FHSIZE and NFS3_FHSIZE here.
--- fs/nfsd/lockd.c | 6 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/lockd.c +4 -2
@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ nlm_fopen(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfs_fh *f, struct file **filp,int access;struct svc_fh fh; -/* must initialize before using! but maxsize doesn't matter */ -fh_init (&fh,0 ); +if (rqstp->rq_vers ==4 ) +fh_init (&fh,NFS3_FHSIZE ); +else +fh_init (&fh,NFS_FHSIZE ); fh.fh_handle.fh_size = f->size;memcpy (&fh.fh_handle.fh_raw, f->data, f->size); fh.fh_export =NULL ;
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +7 -4
@@ -267,25 +267,28 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp) fhp->fh_dentry = dentry; fhp->fh_export = exp; -switch (rqstp->rq_vers) { -case 4 : +switch (fhp->fh_maxsize) { +case NFS4_FHSIZE :if (dentry->d_sb->s_export_op->flags &EXPORT_OP_NOATOMIC_ATTR ) fhp->fh_no_atomic_attr = true; fhp->fh_64bit_cookies = true;break ; -case 3 : +case NFS3_FHSIZE :if (dentry->d_sb->s_export_op->flags &EXPORT_OP_NOWCC ) fhp->fh_no_wcc = true; fhp->fh_64bit_cookies = true;if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_V4ROOT ) goto out;break ; -case 2 : +case NFS_FHSIZE : fhp->fh_no_wcc = true;if (EX_WGATHER (exp)) fhp->fh_use_wgather = true;if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_V4ROOT ) goto out; +break ; +case 0 : +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Uninitialized file handle" ); }return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/6] NFSD: Avoid using rqstp->rq_vers in nfsd_set_fh_dentry()
Quoted 12 lines · On Wed, 28 Aug 2024, [email protected] wrote:
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Currently,
fh_verify()makes some daring assumptions about which version of file handle the caller wants, based on the things it can find in the passed-in rqstp. The about-to-be-introduced LOCALIO use case sometimes has nosvc_rqstcontext, so this logic won't work in that case.Instead, examine the passed-in file handle. It's .max_size field should carry information to allow
nfsd_set_fh_dentry()to initialize the file handle appropriately.
Quoted 5 lines
lockd appears to be the only kernel consumer that does not set the file handle .max_size when during initialization.
write_filehandle()is the other question mark, as it looks possible to specify a maxsize betweenNFS_FHSIZEandNFS3_FHSIZEhere.
The file handle used by lockd and the one created by write_filehandle never need any of the version-specific fields.
Those fields affect things like write requests and getattr requests and pre/post attributes.
I wonder if the filehandle is really the best place of these flag. Having them in the file handle works really well for fh_fill_pre_attrs() and reasonably well in other places, But it makes nfsd_set_fh_dentry a little clumsy. Maybe it would be better to moved them to rqstp->rq_flags. Or possibly in the "Catering to nfsd" section of 'struct svc_rqst'.
NeilBrown
Quoted 65 lines
Signed-off-by Chuck Lever <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/lockd.c | 6 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/lockd.c +4
-2@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ nlm_fopen(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfs_fh *f, struct file **filp,int access;struct svc_fh fh; -/* must initialize before using! but maxsize doesn't matter */ -fh_init (&fh,0 ); +if (rqstp->rq_vers ==4 ) +fh_init (&fh,NFS3_FHSIZE ); +else +fh_init (&fh,NFS_FHSIZE ); fh.fh_handle.fh_size = f->size;memcpy (&fh.fh_handle.fh_raw, f->data, f->size); fh.fh_export =NULL ;fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +7
-4@@ -267,25 +267,28 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp) fhp->fh_dentry = dentry; fhp->fh_export = exp; -switch (rqstp->rq_vers) { -case 4 : +switch (fhp->fh_maxsize) { +case NFS4_FHSIZE :if (dentry->d_sb->s_export_op->flags &EXPORT_OP_NOATOMIC_ATTR ) fhp->fh_no_atomic_attr = true; fhp->fh_64bit_cookies = true;break ; -case 3 : +case NFS3_FHSIZE :if (dentry->d_sb->s_export_op->flags &EXPORT_OP_NOWCC ) fhp->fh_no_wcc = true; fhp->fh_64bit_cookies = true;if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_V4ROOT ) goto out;break ; -case 2 : +case NFS_FHSIZE : fhp->fh_no_wcc = true;if (EX_WGATHER (exp)) fhp->fh_use_wgather = true;if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_V4ROOT ) goto out; +break ; +case 0 : +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Uninitialized file handle" ); }return 0 ;Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/6] NFSD: Avoid using rqstp->rq_vers in nfsd_set_fh_dentry()
Quoted 16 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 15 lines · On Wed, 28 Aug 2024, [email protected] wrote:
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Currently,
fh_verify()makes some daring assumptions about which version of file handle the caller wants, based on the things it can find in the passed-in rqstp. The about-to-be-introduced LOCALIO use case sometimes has nosvc_rqstcontext, so this logic won't work in that case.Instead, examine the passed-in file handle. It's .max_size field should carry information to allow
nfsd_set_fh_dentry()to initialize the file handle appropriately.lockd appears to be the only kernel consumer that does not set the file handle .max_size when during initialization.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
write_filehandle()is the other question mark, as it looks possible to specify a maxsize betweenNFS_FHSIZEandNFS3_FHSIZEhere.The file handle used by lockd and the one created by
write_filehandlenever need any of the version-specific fields.
Those fields affect things like write requests and getattr requests and pre/post attributes.
Then we could simply drop the "case 0:" arm and maybe the lockd hunk from this patch.
Quoted 4 lines
I wonder if the filehandle is really the best place of these flag. Having them in the file handle works really well for
fh_fill_pre_attrs()and reasonably well in other places, But it makesnfsd_set_fh_dentrya little clumsy.
The file handle initialization code in here is indeed a bit awkward. I didn't take it further in this patch set because I didn't have any brilliant ideas, other than perhaps a version-specific initialization call-out.
I don't think we need to go there to implement LOCALIO, but we could save such a clean-up for another day.
Quoted 3 lines
Maybe it would be better to moved them to
rqstp->rq_flags. Or possibly in the "Catering to nfsd" section of 'structsvc_rqst'.
Jeff and I have agreed to migrate NFS (or any upper layer protocol) specifics out of the svc_rqst, where possible, simply to maintain proper layering. I don't have any better ideas, though.
Quoted 69 lines
NeilBrown
Quoted 65 lines
Signed-off-by Chuck Lever <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/lockd.c | 6 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/lockd.c +4
-2@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ nlm_fopen(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfs_fh *f, struct file **filp,int access;struct svc_fh fh; -/* must initialize before using! but maxsize doesn't matter */ -fh_init (&fh,0 ); +if (rqstp->rq_vers ==4 ) +fh_init (&fh,NFS3_FHSIZE ); +else +fh_init (&fh,NFS_FHSIZE ); fh.fh_handle.fh_size = f->size;memcpy (&fh.fh_handle.fh_raw, f->data, f->size); fh.fh_export =NULL ;fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +7
-4@@ -267,25 +267,28 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp) fhp->fh_dentry = dentry; fhp->fh_export = exp; -switch (rqstp->rq_vers) { -case 4 : +switch (fhp->fh_maxsize) { +case NFS4_FHSIZE :if (dentry->d_sb->s_export_op->flags &EXPORT_OP_NOATOMIC_ATTR ) fhp->fh_no_atomic_attr = true; fhp->fh_64bit_cookies = true;break ; -case 3 : +case NFS3_FHSIZE :if (dentry->d_sb->s_export_op->flags &EXPORT_OP_NOWCC ) fhp->fh_no_wcc = true; fhp->fh_64bit_cookies = true;if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_V4ROOT ) goto out;break ; -case 2 : +case NFS_FHSIZE : fhp->fh_no_wcc = true;if (EX_WGATHER (exp)) fhp->fh_use_wgather = true;if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_V4ROOT ) goto out; +break ; +case 0 : +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Uninitialized file handle" ); }return 0 ;Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Signature · 1 line
Chuck Lever
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/6] NFSD: Avoid using rqstp->rq_vers in nfsd_set_fh_dentry()
Quoted 20 lines · Chuck Lever
Quoted 19 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 17 lines · On Wed, 28 Aug 2024, [email protected] wrote:
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Currently,
fh_verify()makes some daring assumptions about which version of file handle the caller wants, based on the things it can find in the passed-in rqstp. The about-to-be-introduced LOCALIO use case sometimes has nosvc_rqstcontext, so this logic won't work in that case.Instead, examine the passed-in file handle. It's .max_size field should carry information to allow
nfsd_set_fh_dentry()to initialize the file handle appropriately.lockd appears to be the only kernel consumer that does not set the file handle .max_size when during initialization.
write_filehandle()is the other question mark, as it looks possible to specify a maxsize betweenNFS_FHSIZEandNFS3_FHSIZEhere.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The file handle used by lockd and the one created by
write_filehandlenever need any of the version-specific fields.
Those fields affect things like write requests and getattr requests and pre/post attributes.Then we could simply drop the "case 0:" arm and maybe the lockd hunk from this patch.
OK, will do.
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 4/6 NFSD: Short-circuit fh_verify tracepoints for LOCALIO
In reply to [email protected]From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
LOCALIO will be able to call fh_verify() with a NULL rqstp. In this case, the existing trace points need to be skipped because they want to dereference the address fields in the passed-in rqstp.
Temporarily make these trace points conditional to avoid a seg fault in this case. Putting the "rqstp != NULL" check in the trace points themselves makes the check more efficient.
--- fs/nfsd/trace.h | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/trace.h +10 -8
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(nfsd_compound_encode_err, { S_IFIFO, "FIFO" }, \ { S_IFSOCK, "SOCK" }) -TRACE_EVENT(nfsd_fh_verify, +TRACE_EVENT_CONDITION(nfsd_fh_verify, TP_PROTO( const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, const struct svc_fh *fhp,
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(nfsd_fh_verify,int access ),TP_ARGS (rqstp ,fhp ,type ,access ), + TP_CONDITION(rqstp != NULL), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(unsigned int, netns_ino) __sockaddr(server, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen)
@@ -239,7 +240,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT_CONDITION(nfsd_fh_verify_err,__be32 error ),TP_ARGS (rqstp ,fhp ,type ,access ,error ), - TP_CONDITION(error), + TP_CONDITION(rqstp != NULL && error), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(unsigned int, netns_ino) __sockaddr(server, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen)
@@ -295,12 +296,13 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfsd_fh_err_class, __entry->status) ) -#define DEFINE_NFSD_FH_ERR_EVENT (name) \ -DEFINE_EVENT(nfsd_fh_err_class, nfsd_##name, \ - TP_PROTO(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, \ - struct svc_fh *fhp, \ - int status), \ - TP_ARGS(rqstp, fhp, status)) +#define DEFINE_NFSD_FH_ERR_EVENT (name) \ +DEFINE_EVENT_CONDITION(nfsd_fh_err_class, nfsd_##name, \ + TP_PROTO(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, \ + struct svc_fh *fhp, \ + int status), \ + TP_ARGS(rqstp, fhp, status), \ + TP_CONDITION(rqstp != NULL))DEFINE_NFSD_FH_ERR_EVENT (set_fh_dentry_badexport);DEFINE_NFSD_FH_ERR_EVENT (set_fh_dentry_badhandle);
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 5/6 nfsd: factor out __fh_verify to allow NULL rqstp to be passed
In reply to [email protected]From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
__fh_verify() offers an interface like fh_verify() but doesn't require a struct svc_rqst *, instead it also takes the specific parts as explicit required arguments. So it is safe to call __fh_verify() with a NULL rqstp, but the net, cred, and client args must not be NULL.
__fh_verify() does not use SVC_NET(), nor does the functions it calls.
Rather then depending on rqstp->rq_vers to determine nfs version, pass it in explicitly. This removes another dependency on rqstp and ensures the correct version is checked. The rqstp can be for an NLM request and while some code tests that, other code does not.
Rather than using rqstp->rq_client pass the client and gssclient explicitly to __fh_verify and then to nfsd_set_fh_dentry().
Lastly, 4 associated tracepoints are only used if rqstp is not NULL (this is a stop-gap that should be properly fixed so localio also benefits from the utility these tracepoints provide when debugging fh_verify issues).
--- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +92 -76
@@ -142,7 +142,11 @@ static inline __be32 check_pseudo_root(struct dentry *dentry,* dentry. On success, the results are used to set fh_export and * fh_dentry. */ -static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry (struct svc_rqst *rqstp,struct svc_fh *fhp) +static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry (struct svc_rqst *rqstp,struct net *net, +struct svc_cred *cred, +struct auth_domain *client, +struct auth_domain *gssclient, +struct svc_fh *fhp) {struct knfsd_fh *fh = &fhp->fh_handle;struct fid *fid =NULL ;
@@ -184,8 +188,8 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp) data_left -= len;if (data_left <0 )return error; - exp =rqst_exp_find (&rqstp->rq_chandle,SVC_NET (rqstp), - rqstp->rq_client, rqstp->rq_gssclient, + exp =rqst_exp_find (rqstp ? &rqstp->rq_chandle :NULL , + net, client, gssclient, fh->fh_fsid_type, fh->fh_fsid); fid = (struct fid *)(fh->fh_fsid + len);
@@ -220,7 +224,7 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)put_cred (override_creds (new));put_cred (new); }else { - error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, &rqstp->rq_cred, exp); + error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, cred, exp);if (error) goto out; }
@@ -297,6 +301,87 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)return error; } +static __be32 +__fh_verify (struct svc_rqst *rqstp, +struct net *net,struct svc_cred *cred, +struct auth_domain *client, +struct auth_domain *gssclient, +struct svc_fh *fhp,umode_t type,int access) +{ +struct nfsd_net *nn =net_generic (net, nfsd_net_id); +struct svc_export *exp =NULL ; +struct dentry *dentry; +__be32 error; + +if (!fhp->fh_dentry) { + error =nfsd_set_fh_dentry (rqstp, net, cred, client, + gssclient, fhp); +if (error) + goto out; + } + dentry = fhp->fh_dentry; + exp = fhp->fh_export; + +trace_nfsd_fh_verify (rqstp, fhp, type, access); + +/* +* We still have to do all these permission checks, even when +* fh_dentry is already set: +* - fh_verify may be called multiple times with different +* "access" arguments (e.g. nfsd_proc_create calls +* fh_verify(...,NFSD_MAY_EXEC) first, then later (in +* nfsd_create) calls fh_verify(...,NFSD_MAY_CREATE). +* - in the NFSv4 case, the filehandle may have been filled +* in by fh_compose, and given a dentry, but further +* compound operations performed with that filehandle +* still need permissions checks. In the worst case, a +* mountpoint crossing may have changed the export +* options, and we may now need to use a different uid +* (for example, if different id-squashing options are in +* effect on the new filesystem). +*/ + error =check_pseudo_root (dentry, exp); +if (error) + goto out; + + error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, cred, exp); +if (error) + goto out; + + error =nfsd_mode_check (dentry, type); +if (error) + goto out; + +/* +* pseudoflavor restrictions are not enforced on NLM, +* which clients virtually always use auth_sys for, +* even while using RPCSEC_GSS for NFS. +*/ +if (access &NFSD_MAY_LOCK || access &NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS ) + goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; +/* +* Clients may expect to be able to use auth_sys during mount, +* even if they use gss for everything else; see section 2.3.2 +* of rfc 2623. +*/ +if (access &NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS_ON_ROOT + && exp->ex_path.dentry == dentry) + goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; + + error =check_nfsd_access (exp, rqstp); +if (error) + goto out; + +skip_pseudoflavor_check: +/* Finally, check access permissions. */ + error =nfsd_permission (cred, exp, dentry, access); +out: +trace_nfsd_fh_verify_err (rqstp, fhp, type, access, error); +if (error == nfserr_stale) +nfsd_stats_fh_stale_inc (nn, exp); +return error; +} +/** * fh_verify - filehandle lookup and access checking * @rqstp: pointer to current rpc request
@@ -327,80 +412,11 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)__be32 fh_verify (struct svc_rqst *rqstp,struct svc_fh *fhp,umode_t type,int access) { -struct nfsd_net *nn =net_generic (SVC_NET (rqstp), nfsd_net_id); -struct svc_export *exp =NULL ; -struct dentry *dentry; -__be32 error; - -if (!fhp->fh_dentry) { - error =nfsd_set_fh_dentry (rqstp, fhp); -if (error) - goto out; - } - dentry = fhp->fh_dentry; - exp = fhp->fh_export; - -trace_nfsd_fh_verify (rqstp, fhp, type, access); - -/* -* We still have to do all these permission checks, even when -* fh_dentry is already set: -* - fh_verify may be called multiple times with different -* "access" arguments (e.g. nfsd_proc_create calls -* fh_verify(...,NFSD_MAY_EXEC) first, then later (in -* nfsd_create) calls fh_verify(...,NFSD_MAY_CREATE). -* - in the NFSv4 case, the filehandle may have been filled -* in by fh_compose, and given a dentry, but further -* compound operations performed with that filehandle -* still need permissions checks. In the worst case, a -* mountpoint crossing may have changed the export -* options, and we may now need to use a different uid -* (for example, if different id-squashing options are in -* effect on the new filesystem). -*/ - error =check_pseudo_root (dentry, exp); -if (error) - goto out; - - error =nfsd_setuser_and_check_port (rqstp, &rqstp->rq_cred, exp); -if (error) - goto out; - - error =nfsd_mode_check (dentry, type); -if (error) - goto out; - -/* -* pseudoflavor restrictions are not enforced on NLM, -* which clients virtually always use auth_sys for, -* even while using RPCSEC_GSS for NFS. -*/ -if (access &NFSD_MAY_LOCK || access &NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS ) - goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; -/* -* Clients may expect to be able to use auth_sys during mount, -* even if they use gss for everything else; see section 2.3.2 -* of rfc 2623. -*/ -if (access &NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS_ON_ROOT - && exp->ex_path.dentry == dentry) - goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; - - error =check_nfsd_access (exp, rqstp); -if (error) - goto out; - -skip_pseudoflavor_check: -/* Finally, check access permissions. */ - error =nfsd_permission (&rqstp->rq_cred, exp, dentry, access); -out: -trace_nfsd_fh_verify_err (rqstp, fhp, type, access, error); -if (error == nfserr_stale) -nfsd_stats_fh_stale_inc (nn, exp); -return error; +return __fh_verify (rqstp,SVC_NET (rqstp), &rqstp->rq_cred, + rqstp->rq_client, rqstp->rq_gssclient, + fhp, type, access); } -/* * Compose a file handle for an NFS reply. *
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 6/6 nfsd: add nfsd_file_acquire_local()
In reply to [email protected]From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
nfsd_file_acquire_local() can be used to look up a file by filehandle without having a struct svc_rqst. This can be used by NFS LOCALIO to allow the NFS client to bypass the NFS protocol to directly access a file provided by the NFS server which is running in the same kernel.
In nfsd_file_do_acquire() care is taken to always use fh_verify() if rqstp is not NULL (as is the case for non-LOCALIO callers). Otherwise the non-LOCALIO callers will not supply the correct and required arguments to __fh_verify (e.g. gssclient isn't passed).
Also, use GC for nfsd_file returned by nfsd_file_acquire_local. GC offers performance improvements if/when a file is reopened before launderette cleans it from the filecache's LRU.
--- fs/nfsd/filecache.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ fs/nfsd/filecache.h | 3 +++ fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 18 ++++++++++++- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.h | 5 ++++ 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/filecache.c +54 -7
@@ -982,12 +982,14 @@ nfsd_file_is_cached(struct inode *inode) }static __be32 -nfsd_file_do_acquire (struct svc_rqst *rqstp,struct svc_fh *fhp, +nfsd_file_do_acquire (struct svc_rqst *rqstp,struct net *net, +struct svc_cred *cred, +struct auth_domain *client, +struct svc_fh *fhp,unsigned int may_flags,struct file *file,struct nfsd_file **pnf,bool want_gc) {unsigned char need = may_flags &NFSD_FILE_MAY_MASK ; -struct net *net =SVC_NET (rqstp);struct nfsd_file *new, *nf;bool stale_retry = true;bool open_retry = true;
@@ -996,8 +998,13 @@ nfsd_file_do_acquire(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,int ret; retry: - status =fh_verify (rqstp, fhp,S_IFREG , - may_flags|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE ); +if (rqstp) { + status =fh_verify (rqstp, fhp,S_IFREG , + may_flags|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE ); + }else { + status =__fh_verify (NULL , net, cred, client,NULL , fhp, +S_IFREG , may_flags|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE ); + }if (status != nfs_ok)return status; inode =d_inode (fhp->fh_dentry);
@@ -1143,7 +1150,8 @@ __be32 nfsd_file_acquire_gc(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, unsigned int may_flags, struct nfsd_file **pnf) { - return nfsd_file_do_acquire(rqstp, fhp, may_flags, NULL, pnf, true); + return nfsd_file_do_acquire(rqstp, SVC_NET(rqstp), NULL, NULL, + fhp, may_flags, NULL, pnf, true); }/**
@@ -1167,7 +1175,45 @@ __be32 nfsd_file_acquire(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, unsigned int may_flags, struct nfsd_file **pnf) { - return nfsd_file_do_acquire(rqstp, fhp, may_flags, NULL, pnf, false); + return nfsd_file_do_acquire(rqstp, SVC_NET(rqstp), NULL, NULL, + fhp, may_flags, NULL, pnf, false); +} + +/** +* nfsd_file_acquire_local - Get a struct nfsd_file with an open file for localio +* @net: The network namespace in which to perform a lookup +* @cred: the user credential with which to validate access +* @client: the auth_domain for LOCALIO lookup +* @fhp: the NFS filehandle of the file to be opened +* @may_flags: NFSD_MAY_ settings for the file +* @pnf: OUT: new or found "struct nfsd_file" object +* +* This file lookup interface provide access to a file given the +* filehandle and credential. No connection-based authorisation +* is performed and in that way it is quite different to other +* file access mediated by nfsd. It allows a kernel module such as the NFS +* client to reach across network and filesystem namespaces to access +* a file. The security implications of this should be carefully +* considered before use. +* +* The nfsd_file object returned by this API is reference-counted +* and garbage-collected. The object is retained for a few +* seconds after the final nfsd_file_put() in case the caller +* wants to re-use it. +* +* Return values: +* %nfs_ok - @pnf points to an nfsd_file with its reference +* count boosted. +* +* On error, an nfsstat value in network byte order is returned. +*/ +__be32 +nfsd_file_acquire_local (struct net *net,struct svc_cred *cred, +struct auth_domain *client,struct svc_fh *fhp, +unsigned int may_flags,struct nfsd_file **pnf) +{ +return nfsd_file_do_acquire (NULL , net, cred, client, + fhp, may_flags,NULL , pnf, true); }/**
@@ -1193,7 +1239,8 @@ nfsd_file_acquire_opened(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, unsigned int may_flags, struct file *file, struct nfsd_file **pnf) { - return nfsd_file_do_acquire(rqstp, fhp, may_flags, file, pnf, false); + return nfsd_file_do_acquire(rqstp, SVC_NET(rqstp), NULL, NULL, +fhp ,may_flags ,file ,pnf ,false ); }/*
fs/nfsd/filecache.h +3 -0
@@ -66,5 +66,8 @@ __be32 nfsd_file_acquire(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,__be32 nfsd_file_acquire_opened (struct svc_rqst *rqstp,struct svc_fh *fhp,unsigned int may_flags,struct file *file,struct nfsd_file **nfp); +__be32 nfsd_file_acquire_local (struct net *net,struct svc_cred *cred, +struct auth_domain *client,struct svc_fh *fhp, +unsigned int may_flags,struct nfsd_file **pnf);int nfsd_file_cache_stats_show (struct seq_file *m,void *v);#endif /* _FS_NFSD_FILECACHE_H */
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +17 -1
@@ -301,7 +301,23 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct net *net,return error; } -static __be32 +/** +* __fh_verify - filehandle lookup and access checking +* @rqstp: RPC transaction context, or NULL +* @net: net namespace in which to perform the export lookup +* @cred: RPC user credential +* @client: RPC auth domain +* @gssclient: RPC GSS auth domain +* @fhp: filehandle to be verified +* @type: expected type of object pointed to by filehandle +* @access: type of access needed to object +* +* This internal API can be used by callers who do not have an RPC +* transaction context (ie are not running in an nfsd thread). +* +* See fh_verify() for further descriptions of @fhp, @type, and @access. +*/ +__be32 __fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct net *net, struct svc_cred *cred, struct auth_domain *client,
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.h +5 -0
@@ -217,6 +217,11 @@ extern char * SVCFH_fmt(struct svc_fh *fhp);* Function prototypes */ __be32 fh_verify (struct svc_rqst *,struct svc_fh *,umode_t ,int ); +__be32 __fh_verify (struct svc_rqst *rqstp, +struct net *net,struct svc_cred *cred, +struct auth_domain *client, +struct auth_domain *gssclient, +struct svc_fh *fhp,umode_t type,int access);__be32 fh_compose (struct svc_fh *,struct svc_export *,struct dentry *,struct svc_fh *);__be32 fh_update (struct svc_fh *);void fh_put (struct svc_fh *);
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Quoted 7 lines · On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 08:44:39PM -0400, [email protected] wrote:
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
These six patches are meant to replace:
nfsd: factor out
__fh_verifyto allow NULL rqstp to be passed
nfsd: addnfsd_file_acquire_local()
Quoted 6 lines
I've removed the @nfs_vers parameter to
__fh_verify(), and tried something a little different with the trace points. Please check my math.These have been compile-tested, but no more than that. Interested in comments.
Reviewed quickly just now, nicely done!
I'll go over it very carefully now by replacing the 2 patches you noted and updating the localio patches thaa follow. I noticed some typos and mentioning nfs_vers usage in a header despite you having removed the need to pass it. So I'll fix up those nits along the way.
But I just wanted to immediately say: thanks!
Quoted 22 lines
Chuck Lever (2):
NFSD: Avoid usingrqstp->rq_versinnfsd_set_fh_dentry()
NFSD: Short-circuitfh_verifytracepoints for LOCALIONeilBrown (4):
NFSD: Handle @rqstp == NULL incheck_nfsd_access()
NFSD: Refactornfsd_setuser_and_check_port()
nfsd: factor out__fh_verifyto allow NULL rqstp to be passed
nfsd: addnfsd_file_acquire_local()fs/nfsd/export.c | 29 ++++-- fs/nfsd/filecache.c | 61 +++++++++++-- fs/nfsd/filecache.h | 3 + fs/nfsd/lockd.c | 6 +- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/nfsd/nfsfh.h | 5 ++ fs/nfsd/trace.h | 18 ++-- 7 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Quoted 15 lines · Mike Snitzer
Quoted 7 lines · On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 08:44:39PM -0400, [email protected] wrote:
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
These six patches are meant to replace:
nfsd: factor out
__fh_verifyto allow NULL rqstp to be passed
nfsd: addnfsd_file_acquire_local()Quoted 6 lines
I've removed the @nfs_vers parameter to
__fh_verify(), and tried something a little different with the trace points. Please check my math.These have been compile-tested, but no more than that. Interested in comments.
Quoted 8 lines
Reviewed quickly just now, nicely done!
I'll go over it very carefully now by replacing the 2 patches you noted and updating the localio patches thaa follow. I noticed some typos and mentioning
nfs_versusage in a header despite you having removed the need to pass it. So I'll fix up those nits along the way.But I just wanted to immediately say: thanks!
I reviewed and incorporated your 6 patches and successfully tested the result (by issuing IO with and without LOCALIO enabled with both NFS v3 and NFS v4.2).
I've pushed the latest code to my branch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/snitzer/linux.git/log/?h=nfs-localio-for-next
I'm approaching the end of addressing all the v13 review feedback, but still have to sort through a couple issues that Neil pointed out about nfs_local_disable() racing with nfsd_open_local_fh().
But in case you're curious here is a preview of the changelog for what'll be in v14 (hopefully will post by end of day tomorrow):
- Extended the nn->nfsd_serv reference lifetime to be identical to the nfsd_file (until after localio's IO is complete), suggested by Neil. This is made easier by introducing a 'struct nfs_localio_ctx' that contains both the 'nfsd_file' and 'nfsd_net' associated with localio.
- Switched nfs_common's 'nfs_to' symbol management locking from using mutex to spinlock, suggested by Neil.
- Eliminated nfs_local_file_open() by folding it into nfs_local_open_fh(), suggested by Neil.
- Update nfs_uuid_is_local() to get reference on the net, drop it in nfs_local_disable(), suggested by Neil.
- Pushed saving/restoring of client's cred down from nfsd_open_local_fh() to nfsd_file_acquire_local(), suggested by Neil.
- Updated NFSD_LOCALIO in fs/nfsd/Kconfig to explicitly 'default n' and improve description, suggested by Chuck. Also made the same updates to NFS_LOCALIO in fs/nfs/Kconfig.
- Split out a separate preliminary patch that introduces nfsd_serv_try_get() and nfsd_serv_put() and the associated percpu_ref, suggested by Chuck.
- Improved "Always allow LOCALIO" comment in check_nfsd_access() and added Kdoc above check_nfsd_access(), suggested by Chuck.
- Moved rpcauth_map_clnt_to_svc_cred_local from net/sunrpc/auth.c to net/sunrpc/svcauth.c and renamed it to svcauth_map_clnt_to_svc_cred_local. Also added kdoc. Suggested by Chuck.
- Added Chuck's Acked-by to 2 patches
- Incorporated Chuck's 6 patches that split up and improved the __fh_verify and nfsd_file_acquire_local patches.