Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Subsystems (22)
v11 cover Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
CET can protect applications and the kernel. This series enables only application-level protection, and has three parts:
- shadow stack [2],
- indirect branch tracking, ptrace [3], and
- selftests [4].
I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been very stable. Linux distributions with CET are available now, and Intel processors with CET are becoming available. It would be nice if CET support can be accepted into the kernel. I will be working to address any issues should they come up.
Changes in v11:
- Rebase to v5.9-rc1.
- There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap() and the input parameter was removed. Shadow stack allocation is a new user passing VM_SHSTK. Thus, reintroduce the parameter and do_mmap_pgoff().
- Selftests/x86/sigreturn does a sigreturn from 64-bit to a 32-bit context, and needs a shadow stack in the 32-bit address range. For all similar purposes, change shadow stack allocation arch_prctl() to take MAP_32BIT and MAP_POPULATE flags from the user.
- Update arch_prctl() for checking invalid inputs and using proper return codes.
- Other smaller changes are noted in each patch's log.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32- architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] CET Shadow Stack patches v10:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[3] There is no Indirect Branch Tracking patches v10. There have been no major changes since v9:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[4] I am holding off the selftests changes and working to get Acked-by's. The earlier version of the selftests patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
Yu-cheng Yu (25):
Documentation/x86: Add CET description x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow
Enforcement Technology (CET)
x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for
transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW
mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff()
x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties
ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 143 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 36 ++ arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 17 + arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 40 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 17 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 209 +++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 58 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 15 + arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 357 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 98 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 28 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 100 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 28 +- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++ arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 10 + arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 59 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 + arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 25 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +- fs/aio.c | 6 +- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 + fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 2 +- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/elf.h | 6 + include/linux/fs.h | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 46 ++- include/linux/pgtable.h | 35 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 + ipc/shm.c | 2 +- mm/gup.c | 8 +- mm/huge_memory.c | 10 +- mm/memory.c | 5 +- mm/migrate.c | 3 +- mm/mmap.c | 21 +- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/nommu.c | 6 +- mm/shmem.c | 2 +- mm/util.c | 4 +- scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh | 4 + .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 + 67 files changed, 1574 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c create mode 100755 scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 1/25 Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Explain no_user_shstk/no_user_ibt kernel parameters, and introduce a new document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
---
v11:
- Add back GLIBC tunables information.
- Add ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK information.
v10:
- Change no_cet_shstk and no_cet_ibt to no_user_shstk and no_user_ibt.
- Remove the opcode section, as it is already in the Intel SDM.
- Remove sections related to GLIBC implementation.
- Remove shadow stack memory management section, as it is already in the code comments.
- Remove legacy bitmap related information, as it is not supported now.
- Fix arch_ioctl() related text.
- Change SHSTK, IBT to plain English.
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 143 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 150 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +6 -0
@@ -3167,6 +3167,12 @@ noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default) noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings + no_user_shstk [X86-64] Disable Shadow Stack for user-mode + applications + + no_user_ibt [X86-64] Disable Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode + applications + nosmap [X86,PPC] Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention) even if it is supported by processor.
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation tlb mtrr pat + intel_cet intel-iommu intel_txt amd-memory-encryption
Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst new file +143 -0
143 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 2/25 x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAdd CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] Shadow stack CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 20] Indirect Branch Tracking
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
@@ -341,6 +341,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4)/* OS Protection Keys Enable */ #define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG (16*32+ 5)/* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6)/* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (16*32+ 7)/* Shadow Stack */ #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8)/* Galois Field New Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9)/* Vector AES */ #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10)/* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
@@ -370,6 +371,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SERIALIZE (18*32+14)/* SERIALIZE instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18)/* Intel PCONFIG */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR (18*32+19)/* Intel ARCH LBR */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBT (18*32+20)/* Indirect Branch Tracking */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26)/* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27)/* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D (18*32+28)/* Flush L1D cache */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +2 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = { { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC }, { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL }, + { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, + { X86_FEATURE_IBT, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, {} };
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 3/25 x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
In reply to Yu-cheng YuControl-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) adds five MSRs. Introduce them and their XSAVES supervisor states:
MSR_IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings), MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode Shadow Stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode Shadow Stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP (Privilege Level 1 Shadow Stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP (Privilege Level 2 Shadow Stack pointer).
---
v11:
- Drop MSR_IA32 prefix for individual bits, and use BIT_ULL().
- Drop MSR_IA32_CET_BITMAP_MASK.
v6:
- Remove __packed from struct cet_user_state, struct cet_kernel_state.
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 5 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 17 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +21 -2
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ enum xfeature {XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR ,XFEATURE_PKRU ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_10 , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11 , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_12 , +XFEATURE_CET_USER , +XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13 ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14 , XFEATURE_LBR,
@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ enum xfeature {#define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM (1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER (1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)#define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
@@ -236,6 +238,23 @@ struct pkru_state {u32 pad; } __packed; +/* +* State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states +*/ +struct cet_user_state { +u64 user_cet;/* user control-flow settings */ +u64 user_ssp;/* user shadow stack pointer */ +}; + +/* +* State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement kernel states +*/ +struct cet_kernel_state { +u64 kernel_ssp;/* kernel shadow stack */ +u64 pl1_ssp;/* privilege level 1 shadow stack */ +u64 pl2_ssp;/* privilege level 2 shadow stack */ +}; +/* * State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state. * The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h +3 -2
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)/* All currently supported supervisor features */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (0) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)/* * A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
@@ -62,7 +62,8 @@* Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is * supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask. */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)/* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */ #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +17 -0
@@ -912,4 +912,21 @@#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117 +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0/* user mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2/* kernel mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4/* kernel shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x6a5/* ring-1 shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x6a6/* ring-2 shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7/* user shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8/* exception shstk table */ + +/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */ +#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0) +#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1) +#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2) +#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3) +#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4) +#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11) +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h +2 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@#define X86_CR4_SMAP _BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)#define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT 22/* enable Protection Keys support */ #define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT) +#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23/* enable Control-flow Enforcement */ +#define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)/* * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +25 -3
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] ="Processor Trace (unused)" ,"Protection Keys User registers" ,"unknown xstate feature" , +"Control-flow User registers" , +"Control-flow Kernel registers" , + "unknown xstate feature" , }; static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
@@ -51,6 +54,9 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {X86_FEATURE_AVX512F ,X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ,X86_FEATURE_PKU , +-1 ,/* Unused */ +X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ,/* XFEATURE_CET_USER */ + X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */ };/*
@@ -318,6 +324,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256);print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU ); +print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER ); +print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL ); }/*
@@ -592,6 +600,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr) XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256, struct avx_512_zmm_uppers_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, struct avx_512_hi16_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU, struct pkru_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_USER, struct cet_user_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state);/* * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if
@@ -601,7 +611,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)if ((nr <XFEATURE_YMM ) || (nr >=XFEATURE_MAX ) || (nr ==XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR ) || - ((nr >=XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_10 ) && (nr <=XFEATURE_LBR ))) { + (nr ==XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_10 ) || + ((nr >=XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13 ) && (nr <=XFEATURE_LBR ))) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"no structure for xstate: %d\n" , nr);XSTATE_WARN_ON (1 ); }
@@ -831,8 +842,19 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)* Clear XSAVE features that are disabled in the normal CPUID. */ for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xsave_cpuid_features); i++) { -if (!boot_cpu_has (xsave_cpuid_features[i])) - xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); +if (xsave_cpuid_features[i] ==X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) { +/* +* X86_FEATURE_SHSTK and X86_FEATURE_IBT share +* same states, but can be enabled separately. +*/ +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + }else { +if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] ==-1 ) || + !boot_cpu_has (xsave_cpuid_features[i])) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + } } xfeatures_mask_all &=fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask ();
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 4/25 x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the Shadow Stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.
The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler.
---
v10:
- Change CONFIG_X86_64 to CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET.
v9:
- Add Shadow Stack pointer to the fault printout.
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +4 -0
@@ -532,6 +532,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_SS, exc_stack_segment);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_GP , exc_general_protection);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_AC , exc_alignment_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_CP , exc_control_protection); +#endif +/* Raw exception entries which need extra work */ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW (X86_TRAP_UD , exc_invalid_op);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW (X86_TRAP_BP , exc_int3);
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +4 -0
@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32 ) SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_32),#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET + INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, asm_exc_control_protection), +#endif };/*
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c +1 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)*/ BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGILL !=11 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGFPE !=15 ); -BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGSEGV !=7 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGSEGV !=8 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGBUS !=5 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGTRAP !=5 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGCHLD !=6 );
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +59 -0
65 lines not on this page · raw message
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2 -1
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {#define SEGV_ACCADI 5/* ADI not enabled for mapped object */ #define SEGV_ADIDERR 6/* Disrupting MCD error */ #define SEGV_ADIPERR 7/* Precise MCD exception */ -#define NSIGSEGV 7 +#define SEGV_CPERR 8/* Control protection fault */ +#define NSIGSEGV 8/* * SIGBUS si_codes
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 5/25 x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow Stack provides protection against function return address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER, and the application is built for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
---
v10:
- Change SHSTK to shadow stack in the help text.
- Change build-time check to config-time check.
- Change ARCH_HAS_SHSTK to ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK.
arch/x86/Kconfig | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) create mode 100755 scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
arch/x86/Kconfig +30 -0
@@ -1927,6 +1927,36 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter. endchoice +config AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh $(CC)) + help + Test the assembler for shadow stack instructions. + +config X86_INTEL_CET + def_bool n + +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool n + +config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER + prompt "Intel Shadow Stacks for user-mode" + def_bool n + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 + depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select X86_INTEL_CET + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + help + Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack + corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters + if you have the right hardware. It's a security hardening + feature and apps must be enabled to use it. You get no + protection "for free" on old userspace. The hardware can + support user and kernel, but this option is for user space + only. + + If unsure, say y. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI
scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh new file +4 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +echo "wrussq %rax, (%rbx)" | $* -x assembler -c -
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 6/25 x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuBefore introducing _PAGE_COW for non-hardware memory management purposes in the next patch, rename _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW and _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY to _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW to make meanings more clear. There are no functional changes from this patch.
---
v9:
- At some places _PAGE_DIRTY were not changed to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, because they will be changed again in the next patch to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS. However, this causes compile issues if the next patch is not yet applied. Fix it by changing all _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DRITY_HW.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 18 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 11 +++++------ arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +9 -9
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;*/ static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; }
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)static inline int pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; }static inline int pmd_young (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)static inline int pud_dirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; }static inline int pud_young (pud_t pud)
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte)
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte)
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); }static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkclean (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); }static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect (pud_t pud)
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap (pud_t pud)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +5 -6
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_PWT 3/* page write through */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PCD 4/* page cache disabled */ #define _PAGE_BIT_ACCESSED 5/* was accessed (raised by CPU) */ -#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY 6/* was written to (raised by CPU) */ +#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW 6/* was written to (raised by CPU) */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PSE 7/* 4 MB (or 2MB) page */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT 7/* on 4KB pages */ #define _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL 8/* Global TLB entry PPro+ */
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@#define _PAGE_PWT (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PWT)#define _PAGE_PCD (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PCD)#define _PAGE_ACCESSED (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_ACCESSED) -#define _PAGE_DIRTY (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY) +#define _PAGE_DIRTY_HW (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW)#define _PAGE_PSE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PSE)#define _PAGE_GLOBAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL)#define _PAGE_SOFTW1 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1)
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3)#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64 ) || defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE ) -#define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +#define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)#else #define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK 0#endif
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@* pte_modify() does modify it. */ #define _PAGE_CHG_MASK (PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT | \ - _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | \ + _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | \ _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY | _PAGE_DEVMAP | _PAGE_ENC | \ _PAGE_UFFD_WP)#define _HPAGE_CHG_MASK (_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PSE)
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {#define __RW _PAGE_RW#define _USR _PAGE_USER#define ___A _PAGE_ACCESSED -#define ___D _PAGE_DIRTY +#define ___D _PAGE_DIRTY_HW#define ___G _PAGE_GLOBAL#define __NX _PAGE_NX
@@ -205,7 +205,6 @@ enum page_cache_mode {#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO __PAGE_KERNEL#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE -#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC (__PAGE_KERNEL | _ENC)
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +1 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ */ #define PTR(x) (x << 3) -#define PAGE_ATTR (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY) +#define PAGE_ATTR (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) /* * control_page + KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
@@ -3605,7 +3605,7 @@ static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */ for (i =0 ; i <PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE ; i++) { tmp = (i <<22 ) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | - _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE); + _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_PSE); r =kvm_write_guest_page (kvm, identity_map_pfn, &tmp, i *sizeof (tmp),sizeof (tmp));if (r <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 7/25 x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages
In reply to Yu-cheng YuKernel read-only PTEs are setup as _PAGE_DIRTY_HW. Since these become shadow stack PTEs, remove the dirty bit.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +3 -3
@@ -193,10 +193,10 @@ enum page_cache_mode {#define _KERNPG_TABLE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC)#define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0)#define _PAGE_TABLE (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __NC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __WP)
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +1 -1
@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)int set_memory_ro (unsigned long addr,int numpages) { -return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW),0 ); +return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW),0 ); }int set_memory_rw (unsigned long addr,int numpages)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 8/25 x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes (not Linux). That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1.
The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by hardware and cannot normally be set by hardware on a Write=0 PTE. Software must normally be involved to create one of these PTEs, so software can simply opt to not create them.
But that leaves us with a Linux problem: we need to ensure we never create Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs. In places where we do create them, we need to find an alternative way to represent them _without_ using the same hardware bit combination. Thus, enter _PAGE_COW. This results in the following:
(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (R/O + _PAGE_COW)
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (R/O + _PAGE_COW)
The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a writable copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as R/O and _PAGE_COW.
(c) A shadow stack PTE: (R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW)
(d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (R/O + _PAGE_COW)
When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is cleared of _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, so the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is set again. This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE. That's possible today, but will not happen on processors that support shadow stack.
Use _PAGE_COW in pte_wrprotect() and _PAGE_DIRTY_HW in pte_mkwrite(). Apply the same changes to pmd and pud.
When this patch is applied, there are six free bits left in the 64-bit PTE. There are no more free bits in the 32-bit PTE (except for PAE) and shadow stack is not implemented for the 32-bit kernel.
---
v10:
- Change _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW to _PAGE_BIT_COW, as it is used for copy-on- write PTEs.
- Update pte_write() and treat shadow stack as writable.
- Change *_mkdirty_shstk() to *_mkwrite_shstk() as these make shadow stack pages writable.
- Use bit test & shift to move _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_BIT_COW.
- Change static_cpu_has() to cpu_feature_enabled().
- Revise commit log.
v9:
- Remove pte_move_flags() etc. and put the logic directly in pte_wrprotect()/pte_mkwrite() etc.
- Change compile-time conditionals to run-time checks.
- Split out pte_modify()/pmd_modify() to a new patch.
- Update comments.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 41 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +110 -10
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;* The following only work if pte_present() is true. * Undefined behaviour if not.. */ -static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) +static inline bool pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }
@@ -161,9 +161,9 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) +static inline bool pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }static inline int pmd_young (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -171,9 +171,9 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pud_dirty (pud_t pud) +static inline bool pud_dirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }static inline int pud_young (pud_t pud)
@@ -183,6 +183,12 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)static inline int pte_write (pte_t pte) { +/* +* If _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is set, the PTE must either have +* _PAGE_RW or be a shadow stack PTE, which is logically writable. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pte_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW; }
@@ -334,7 +340,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte)
@@ -344,6 +350,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PTE (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { + pte.pte |= (pte.pte & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> + _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << _PAGE_BIT_COW; + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -354,6 +371,18 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) { +pteval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1,Write=0 PTEs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !pte_write (pte)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pte_set_flags (pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte_t pte) +{ + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW);return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }
@@ -364,6 +393,13 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) { +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_COW) { + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW); + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } + } +return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -435,16 +471,41 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PMD (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pmdval_t v =native_pmd_val (pmd); + + v |= (v & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << + _PAGE_BIT_COW; + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (__pmd (v), _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { +pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1,Write=0 PMDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd_t pmd) +{ + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW);return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }
@@ -465,6 +526,13 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) { +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_COW) { + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW); + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } + } +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -489,17 +557,36 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkclean (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect (pud_t pud) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PUD (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pudval_t v =native_pud_val (pud); + + v |= (v & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << + _PAGE_BIT_COW; + pud =pud_clear_flags (__pud (v), _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1,Write=0 PUDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pud_set_flags (pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap (pud_t pud)
@@ -519,6 +606,13 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite (pud_t pud) { +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_COW) { + pud =pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_COW); + pud =pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } + } +return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -1132,6 +1226,12 @@ extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,#define pmd_write pmd_writestatic inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) { +/* +* If _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is set, then the PMD must either have +* _PAGE_RW or be a shadow stack PMD, which is logically writable. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pmd_flags (pmd) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW; }
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +40 -1
59 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 9/25 drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAfter the introduction of _PAGE_COW, a modified page's PTE can have either _PAGE_DIRTY_HW or _PAGE_COW. Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c +1 -1
@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ static int split_2MB_gtt_entry(struct intel_vgpu *vgpu, }/* Clear dirty field. */ - se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY; + se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; ops->clear_pse (se); ops->clear_ips (se);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 10/25 x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuPte_modify() changes a PTE to 'newprot'. It doesn't use the pte_*() helpers that a previous patch fixed up, so we need a new site.
Introduce fixup_dirty_pte() to set the dirty bits based on _PAGE_RW, and apply the same changes to pmd_modify().
---
v10:
- Replace _PAGE_CHG_MASK approach with fixup functions.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +33 -0
@@ -727,6 +727,21 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkinvalid(pmd_t pmd)static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard (u64 oldval,u64 val,u64 mask); +static inline pteval_t fixup_dirty_pte (pteval_t pteval) +{ +pte_t pte =__pte (pteval); + +if (pte_dirty (pte)) { + pte =pte_mkclean (pte); + +if (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +else + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW); + } +return pte_val (pte); +} +static inline pte_t pte_modify (pte_t pte,pgprot_t newprot) {pteval_t val =pte_val (pte), oldval = val;
@@ -737,16 +752,34 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)*/ val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pte (val); val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PTE_PFN_MASK );return __pte (val); } +static inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd); +static inline pmdval_t fixup_dirty_pmd (pmdval_t pmdval) +{ +pmd_t pmd =__pmd (pmdval); + +if (pmd_dirty (pmd)) { + pmd =pmd_mkclean (pmd); + +if (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW) + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +else + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW); + } +return pmd_val (pmd); +} +static inline pmd_t pmd_modify (pmd_t pmd,pgprot_t newprot) {pmdval_t val =pmd_val (pmd), oldval = val; val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pmd (val); val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK );return __pmd (val); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 11/25 x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuWhen shadow stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW] PTE is reserved for shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW].
When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:
The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient shadow stack PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting shadow stack, therefore we don't need a TLB flush here.
The second case is that when the software, without atomic, tests & replaces _PAGE_DIRTY_HW with _PAGE_COW, a transient shadow stack PTE can exist. This is prevented with cmpxchg.
Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.
---
v10:
- Replace bit shift with pte_wrprotect()/pmd_wrprotect(), which use bit test & shift.
- Move READ_ONCE of old_pte into try_cmpxchg() loop.
- Change static_cpu_has() to cpu_feature_enabled().
v9:
- Change compile-time conditionals to runtime checks.
- Fix parameters of try_cmpxchg(): change pte_t/pmd_t to pte_t.pte/pmd_t.pmd.
v4:
- Implement try_cmpxchg().
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +52 -0
@@ -1230,6 +1230,32 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pte_t *ptep) { +/* +* Some processors can start a write, but end up seeing a read-only +* PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit. In this case, they +* will set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty PTE which +* looks like a shadow stack PTE. +* +* However, this behavior has been improved and will not occur on +* processors supporting shadow stack. Without this guarantee, a +* transition to a non-present PTE and flush the TLB would be +* needed. +* +* When changing a writable PTE to read-only and if the PTE has +* _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, move that bit to _PAGE_COW so that the +* PTE is not a shadow stack PTE. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pte_t old_pte, new_pte; + +do { + old_pte =READ_ONCE (*ptep); + new_pte =pte_wrprotect (old_pte); + + }while (!try_cmpxchg (&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte)); + +return ; + }clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte); }
@@ -1286,6 +1312,32 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pmd_t *pmdp) { +/* +* Some processors can start a write, but end up seeing a read-only +* PMD by the time they get to the Dirty bit. In this case, they +* will set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty PMD which +* looks like a Shadow Stack PMD. +* +* However, this behavior has been improved and will not occur on +* processors supporting Shadow Stack. Without this guarantee, a +* transition to a non-present PMD and flush the TLB would be +* needed. +* +* When changing a writable PMD to read-only and if the PMD has +* _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, we move that bit to _PAGE_COW so that the +* PMD is not a shadow stack PMD. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd; + +do { + old_pmd =READ_ONCE (*pmdp); + new_pmd =pmd_wrprotect (old_pmd); + + }while (!try_cmpxchg ((pmdval_t *)pmdp, (pmdval_t *)&old_pmd,pmd_val (new_pmd))); + +return ; + }clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 12/25 mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA Shadow Stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set. However, read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages. These two cases are handled differently for page faults. Introduce VM_SHSTK to track shadow stack VMAs.
---
v9:
- Add VM_SHSTK case to arch_vma_name().
- Revise the commit log to explain why adding a new VM flag.
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 ++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++ include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c +2 -0
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy)const char *arch_vma_name (struct vm_area_struct *vma) { +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) +return "[shadow stack]" ;return NULL ; }
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +3 -0
@@ -663,6 +663,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) [ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)] = "",#endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER + [ilog2(VM_SHSTK)] = "ss", +#endif };size_t i;
include/linux/mm.h +8 -0
@@ -299,11 +299,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4) +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -335,6 +337,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);# define VM_MAPPED_COPY VM_ARCH_1/* T if mapped copy of data (nommu mmap) */ #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +# define VM_SHSTK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 +#else +# define VM_SHSTK VM_NONE +#endif +#ifndef VM_GROWSUP # define VM_GROWSUP VM_NONE#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 13/25 x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performed implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like WRUSSQ.
Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write.
Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping.
In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are handled as a write access.
---
v10:
-Revise commit log.
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +2 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_PROT =1 <<0 ,
@@ -58,5 +59,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_RSVD =1 <<3 ,X86_PF_INSTR =1 <<4 ,X86_PF_PK =1 <<5 , + X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6, };#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +19 -0
@@ -1063,6 +1063,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))return 1 ; +/* +* Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA. +* It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a +* shadow stack area is checked in the case followed. +*/ +if (error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) { +if (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } +if (error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) {/* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )))
@@ -1197,6 +1208,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,perf_sw_event (PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS ,1 , regs, address); +/* +* Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is used to detect shadow stack access. +* This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write. +* For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect +* copy-on-write. +*/ +if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) + flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_INSTR )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 14/25 x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow stack memory is writable, but its VMA has VM_SHSTK instead of VM_WRITE. Update maybe_mkwrite() to include the shadow stack.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ include/linux/pgtable.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/huge_memory.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -1935,6 +1935,9 @@ config AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK config X86_INTEL_CET def_bool n +config ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE + def_bool n + config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK def_bool n
@@ -1945,6 +1948,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS select X86_INTEL_CET + select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK help Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +18 -0
@@ -610,6 +610,24 @@ int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE +pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) + pte =pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte); +return pte; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) + pmd =pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd); +return pmd; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +/** * reserve_top_address - reserves a hole in the top of kernel address space * @reserve - size of hole to reserve
include/linux/mm.h +2 -0
@@ -962,6 +962,8 @@ static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); +else + pte =arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte, vma);return pte; }
include/linux/pgtable.h +24 -0
@@ -1354,6 +1354,30 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void) }#endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE +pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma); +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + +#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +static inline pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return pte; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +static inline pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return pmd; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +/* * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks *
mm/huge_memory.c +2 -0
@@ -464,6 +464,8 @@ pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd); +else + pmd =arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma);return pmd; }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 15/25 mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA shadow stack page is made writable by pte_mkwrite_shstk(), which sets _PAGE_DIRTY_HW. There are a few places that call pte_mkwrite() directly and miss the maybe_mkwrite() fixup in the previous patch. Fix them with maybe_mkwrite():
- do_anonymous_page() and migrate_vma_insert_page() check VM_WRITE directly and call pte_mkwrite(), which is the same as maybe_mkwrite(). Change them to maybe_mkwrite().
- In do_numa_page(), if the numa entry 'was-writable', then pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Fix it by doing maybe_mkwrite().
- In change_pte_range(), pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Replace it with maybe_mkwrite().
--- mm/memory.c | 5 ++--- mm/migrate.c | 3 +-- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +2 -3
@@ -3387,8 +3387,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) entry =mk_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot); entry =pte_sw_mkyoung (entry); -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =maybe_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); vmf->pte =pte_offset_map_lock (vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, &vmf->ptl);
@@ -4042,7 +4041,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) pte =pte_modify (old_pte, vma->vm_page_prot); pte =pte_mkyoung (pte);if (was_writable) - pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); + pte =maybe_mkwrite (pte, vma);ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, old_pte, pte);update_mmu_cache (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
mm/migrate.c +1 -2
@@ -2897,8 +2897,7 @@ static void migrate_vma_insert_page(struct migrate_vma *migrate, } }else { entry =mk_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot); -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =maybe_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); } ptep =pte_offset_map_lock (mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl);
mm/mprotect.c +1 -1
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,if (dirty_accountable &&pte_dirty (ptent) && (pte_soft_dirty (ptent) || !(vma->vm_flags &VM_SOFTDIRTY ))) { - ptent =pte_mkwrite (ptent); + ptent =maybe_mkwrite (ptent, vma); }ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, addr, pte, oldpte, ptent); pages++;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 16/25 mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
In reply to Yu-cheng YuINCSSP(Q/D) increments shadow stack pointer and 'pops and discards' the first and the last elements in the range, effectively touches those memory areas.
The maximum moving distance by INCSSPQ is 255 * 8 = 2040 bytes and 255 * 4 = 1020 bytes by INCSSPD. Both ranges are far from PAGE_SIZE. Thus, putting a gap page on both ends of a shadow stack prevents INCSSP, CALL, and RET from going beyond.
---
v10:
- Define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP.
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +10 -0
@@ -840,6 +840,16 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE_LOW#define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_MAX +/* +* Shadow stack pointer is moved by CALL, JMP, and INCSSP(Q/D). INCSSPQ +* moves shadow stack pointer up to 255 * 8 = ~2 KB (~1KB for INCSSPD) and +* touches the first and the last element in the range, which triggers a +* page fault if the range is not in a shadow stack. Because of this, +* creating 4-KB guard pages around a shadow stack prevents these +* instructions from going beyond. +*/ +#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP PAGE_SIZE +#define INIT_THREAD { \ .addr_limit = KERNEL_DS, \ }
include/linux/mm.h +20 -4
@@ -2608,6 +2608,10 @@ extern vm_fault_t filemap_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf);int __must_check write_one_page (struct page *page);void task_dirty_inc (struct task_struct *tsk); +#ifndef ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP +#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP 0 +#endif +extern unsigned long stack_guard_gap;/* Generic expand stack which grows the stack according to GROWS{UP,DOWN} */ extern int expand_stack (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long address);
@@ -2640,9 +2644,15 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * mstatic inline unsigned long vm_start_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start; +unsigned long gap =0 ; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) { - vm_start -= stack_guard_gap; +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) + gap = stack_guard_gap; +else if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) + gap =ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP ; + +if (gap !=0 ) { + vm_start -= gap;if (vm_start > vma->vm_start) vm_start =0 ; }
@@ -2652,9 +2662,15 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end; +unsigned long gap =0 ; + +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP ) + gap = stack_guard_gap; +else if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) + gap =ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP ; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP ) { - vm_end += stack_guard_gap; +if (gap !=0 ) { + vm_end += gap;if (vm_end < vma->vm_end) vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 17/25 mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAccount shadow stack pages to stack memory.
---
v10:
- Use arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to make meaning clear.
v8:
- Change shadow stake pages from data_vm to stack_vm.
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/pgtable.h | 11 +++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +7 -0
@@ -893,3 +893,10 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK +bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ +return (vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ); +} +#endif
include/linux/pgtable.h +11 -0
@@ -1378,6 +1378,17 @@ static inline pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK +bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags); +#else +static inline bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +/* * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks *
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
@@ -1682,6 +1682,9 @@ static inline int accountable_mapping(struct file *file, vm_flags_t vm_flags)if (file &&is_file_hugepages (file))return 0 ; +if (arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags)) +return 1 ; +return (vm_flags & (VM_NORESERVE |VM_SHARED |VM_WRITE )) ==VM_WRITE ; }
@@ -3352,6 +3355,8 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, vm_flags_t flags, long npages) mm->stack_vm += npages; else if (is_data_mapping(flags)) mm->data_vm += npages; + else if (arch_shadow_stack_mapping(flags)) + mm->stack_vm += npages; }static vm_fault_t special_mapping_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 18/25 mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuCan_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.
Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty. Thus, in the can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check. Apply the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().
---
v10:
- Reverse name changes to can_follow_write_*().
mm/gup.c | 8 +++++--- mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/gup.c +5 -3
@@ -384,9 +384,11 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,* FOLL_FORCE or a forced COW break can write even to unwritable pte's, * but only after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte (pte_t pte,unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte (pte_t pte,unsigned int flags, +struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -return pte_write (pte) || ((flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pte_dirty (pte)); +return pte_write (pte) || ((flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pte_dirty (pte) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vma->vm_flags)); }/*
@@ -439,7 +441,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, }if ((flags &FOLL_NUMA ) &&pte_protnone (pte)) goto no_page; -if ((flags &FOLL_WRITE ) && !can_follow_write_pte (pte, flags)) { +if ((flags &FOLL_WRITE ) && !can_follow_write_pte (pte, flags, vma)) {pte_unmap_unlock (ptep, ptl);return NULL ; }
mm/huge_memory.c +5 -3
@@ -1296,9 +1296,11 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)* FOLL_FORCE or a forced COW break can write even to unwritable pmd's, * but only after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd (pmd_t pmd,unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd (pmd_t pmd,unsigned int flags, +struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -return pmd_write (pmd) || ((flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd)); +return pmd_write (pmd) || ((flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vma->vm_flags)); } struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1311,7 +1313,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,assert_spin_locked (pmd_lockptr (mm, pmd)); -if (flags &FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd (*pmd, flags)) +if (flags &FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd (*pmd, flags, vma)) goto out;/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 19/25 mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff()
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was removed from the function's input by:
commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHSTK to do_mmap(). Re-introduce the vm_flags and do_mmap_pgoff().
--- fs/aio.c | 6 +++--- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 12 +++++++++++- ipc/shm.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/nommu.c | 6 +++--- mm/shmem.c | 2 +- mm/util.c | 4 ++-- 9 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +3 -3
@@ -525,9 +525,9 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events)return -EINTR ; } - ctx->mmap_base =do_mmap (ctx->aio_ring_file,0 , ctx->mmap_size, -PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , -MAP_SHARED ,0 , &unused,NULL ); + ctx->mmap_base =do_mmap_pgoff (ctx->aio_ring_file,0 , ctx->mmap_size, +PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , +MAP_SHARED ,0 , &unused,NULL );mmap_write_unlock (mm);if (IS_ERR ((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) { ctx->mmap_size =0 ;
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)* already been checked by prepare_hugepage_range. If you add * any error returns here, do so after setting VM_HUGETLB, so * is_vm_hugetlb_page tests below unmap_region go the right -* way when do_mmap unwinds (may be important on powerpc +* way when do_mmap_pgoff unwinds (may be important on powerpc * and ia64). */ vma->vm_flags |=VM_HUGETLB |VM_DONTEXPAND ;
include/linux/fs.h +1 -1
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static inline int mapping_mapped(struct address_space *mapping)/* * Might pages of this file have been modified in userspace? -* Note that i_mmap_writable counts all VM_SHARED vmas: do_mmap +* Note that i_mmap_writable counts all VM_SHARED vmas: do_mmap_pgoff * marks vma as VM_SHARED if it is shared, and the file was opened for * writing i.e. vma may be mprotected writable even if now readonly. *
include/linux/mm.h +11 -1
@@ -2553,13 +2553,23 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, struct list_head *uf);extern unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf); +vm_flags_t vm_flags,unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf);extern int __do_munmap (struct mm_struct *,unsigned long ,size_t ,struct list_head *uf,bool downgrade);extern int do_munmap (struct mm_struct *,unsigned long ,size_t ,struct list_head *uf);extern int do_madvise (unsigned long start,size_t len_in,int behavior); +static inline unsigned long +do_mmap_pgoff (struct file *file,unsigned long addr, +unsigned long len,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf) +{ +return do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flags,0 , pgoff, populate, uf); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern int __mm_populate (unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,int ignore_errors);
ipc/shm.c +1 -1
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, goto invalid; } - addr =do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 , &populate,NULL ); + addr =do_mmap_pgoff (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 , &populate,NULL ); *raddr = addr; err =0 ;if (IS_ERR_VALUE (addr))
mm/mmap.c +8 -8
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static inline int is_mergeable_anon_vma(struct anon_vma *anon_vma1,* anon_vmas, nor if same anon_vma is assigned but offsets incompatible. * * We don't check here for the merged mmap wrapping around the end of pagecache -* indices (16TB on ia32) because do_mmap() does not permit mmap's which +* indices (16TB on ia32) because do_mmap_pgoff() does not permit mmap's which * wrap, nor mmaps which cover the final page at index -1UL. */ static int
@@ -1365,11 +1365,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,*/ unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot, -unsigned long flags,unsigned long pgoff, -unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf) +unsigned long flags,vm_flags_t vm_flags, +unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf) {struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;int pkey =0 ; *populate =0 ;
@@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open * of the memory object, so we don't do any here. */ - vm_flags =calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | + vm_flags |=calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | mm->def_flags |VM_MAYREAD |VM_MAYWRITE |VM_MAYEXEC ;if (flags &MAP_LOCKED )
@@ -2233,7 +2233,7 @@ get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,/* * mmap_region() will call shmem_zero_setup() to create a file, * so use shmem's get_unmapped_area in case it can be huge. -* do_mmap() will clear pgoff, so match alignment. +* do_mmap_pgoff() will clear pgoff, so match alignment. */ pgoff =0 ; get_area = shmem_get_unmapped_area;
@@ -3006,7 +3006,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, } file =get_file (vma->vm_file); - ret =do_mmap (vma->vm_file, start, size, + ret =do_mmap_pgoff (vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, pgoff, &populate,NULL );fput (file); out:
@@ -3226,7 +3226,7 @@ int insert_vm_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma)* By setting it to reflect the virtual start address of the * vma, merges and splits can happen in a seamless way, just * using the existing file pgoff checks and manipulations. -* Similarly in do_mmap and in do_brk. +* Similarly in do_mmap_pgoff and in do_brk. */ if (vma_is_anonymous (vma)) {BUG_ON (vma->anon_vma);
mm/nommu.c +3 -3
@@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1085,7 +1086,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma;struct vm_region *region;struct rb_node *rb; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;unsigned long capabilities, result;int ret;
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we * now know into VMA flags */ - vm_flags =determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities); + vm_flags |=determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities);/* we're going to need to record the mapping */ region =kmem_cache_zalloc (vm_region_jar,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -1763,7 +1763,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(access_process_vm);* * Check the shared mappings on an inode on behalf of a shrinking truncate to * make sure that any outstanding VMAs aren't broken and then shrink the -* vm_regions that extend beyond so that do_mmap() doesn't +* vm_regions that extend beyond so that do_mmap_pgoff() doesn't * automatically grant mappings that are too large. */ int nommu_shrink_inode_mappings(struct inode *inode, size_t size,
mm/shmem.c +1 -1
@@ -4246,7 +4246,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_file_setup_with_mnt);/** * shmem_zero_setup - setup a shared anonymous mapping -* @vma: the vma to be mmapped is prepared by do_mmap +* @vma: the vma to be mmapped is prepared by do_mmap_pgoff */ int shmem_zero_setup (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {
mm/util.c +2 -2
@@ -503,8 +503,8 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,if (!ret) {if (mmap_write_lock_killable (mm))return -EINTR ; - ret =do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate, - &uf); + ret =do_mmap_pgoff (file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, + &populate, &uf);mmap_write_unlock (mm);userfaultfd_unmap_complete (mm, &uf);if (populate)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 20/25 x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThis patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines. A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
---
v11:
- Modify alloc_shstk() to take flags and pass to do_mmap(). This is to be used by an arch_prctl() introduced later.
v10:
- Change no_cet_shstk to no_user_shstk.
- Limit shadow stack size to 4 GB, and round_up to PAGE_SIZE.
- Replace checking shstk_enabled with shstk_size being zero.
- WARN_ON_ONCE() when vm_munmap() fails.
v9:
- Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
- Merge cet_disable_shstk to cet_disable_free_shstk.
- Remove the empty slot at the top of the shadow stack, as it is not needed.
- Move do_mmap_locked() to alloc_shstk(), which is a static function.
v6:
- Create a function do_mmap_locked() for shadow stack allocation.
v2:
- Change noshstk to no_cet_shstk.
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 26 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 28 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 + .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- 8 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h new file +26 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct task_struct ; +/* +* Per-thread CET status +*/ +struct cet_status { +unsigned long shstk_base; +unsigned long shstk_size; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +int cet_setup_shstk (void ); +void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p); +#else +static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {} +#endif + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif +/* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */
@@ -75,7 +81,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK13 0#define DISABLED_MASK14 0#define DISABLED_MASK15 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP) +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +5 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;#include <asm/unwind_hints.h> #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h> #include <asm/vdso/processor.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -542,6 +543,10 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +struct cet_status cet; +#endif +/* Floating point and extended processor state */ struct fpu fpu;/*
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c new file +138 -0
138 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +28 -0
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@#include <asm/microcode_intel.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> #include "cpu.h"
@@ -509,6 +510,32 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)__setup ("nopku" , setup_disable_pku);#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) +return ; + +cr4_set_bits (X86_CR4_CET ); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +static __init int setup_disable_shstk (char *s) +{ +/* require an exact match without trailing characters */ +if (s[0 ] !='\0' ) +return 0 ; + +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return 1 ; + +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); +pr_info ("x86: 'no_user_shstk' specified, disabling user Shadow Stack\n" ); +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("no_user_shstk" , setup_disable_shstk); +#endif +/* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1544,6 +1571,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)x86_init_rdrand (c);setup_pku (c); +setup_cet (c);/* * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/io_bitmap.h> #include <asm/proto.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include "process.h"
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif +/* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */
@@ -75,7 +81,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK13 0#define DISABLED_MASK14 0#define DISABLED_MASK15 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP) +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 21/25 x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuTo deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put a restore token and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack. For sigreturn, verify the token and restore the shadow stack pointer.
Introduce WRUSS, which is a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack. It is used to construct the user signal stack as described above.
Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save shadow stack restore token address and WAIT_ENDBR status. WAIT_ENDBR will be introduced later in the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) series, but add that into sc_ext now to keep the struct stable in case the IBT series is applied later.
---
v10:
- Combine with WRUSS instruction patch, since it is used only here.
- Revise signal restore code to the latest supervisor states handling. Move shadow stack restore token checking out of the fast path.
v9:
- Update CET MSR access according to XSAVES supervisor state changes.
- Add 'wait_endbr' to struct 'sc_ext'.
- Update and simplify signal frame allocation, setup, and restoration.
- Update commit log text.
v2:
- Move CET status from sigcontext to a separate struct sc_ext, which is located above the fpstate on the signal frame.
- Add a restore token for sigreturn address.
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 17 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 10 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 10 ++ 8 files changed, 338 insertions(+)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c +17 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include <asm/sigframe.h> #include <asm/sighandling.h> #include <asm/smap.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> static inline void reload_segments (struct sigcontext_32 *sc) {
@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, void __user **fpstate) {unsigned long sp, fx_aligned, math_size; +void __user *restorer =NULL ;/* Default to using normal stack */ sp = regs->sp;
@@ -218,8 +220,23 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer) sp = (unsigned long ) ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer; +if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags &SA_RESTORER ) { + restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer; + }else if (current->mm->context.vdso) { +if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags &SA_SIGINFO ) + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso + + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_rt_sigreturn; +else + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso + + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_sigreturn; + } + sp =fpu__alloc_mathframe (sp,1 , &fx_aligned, &math_size); *fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp; + +if (save_cet_to_sigframe (1 , *fpstate, (unsigned long )restorer)) +return (void __user *)-1L ; +if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned, math_size) <0 )return (void __user *)-1L ;
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +8 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#include <linux/types.h> struct task_struct ; +struct sc_ext ; +/* * Per-thread CET status */
@@ -17,8 +19,14 @@ struct cet_status {#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET int cet_setup_shstk (void );void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p); +int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp); +void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc); +int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {} +static inline void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc) {return ; } +static inline int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor, +struct sc_ext *sc) {return -EINVAL ; }#endif #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h +10 -0
@@ -442,6 +442,16 @@ static inline void copy_kernel_to_fpregs(union fpregs_state *fpstate)__copy_kernel_to_fpregs (fpstate,-1 ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +extern int save_cet_to_sigframe (int ia32,void __user *fp, +unsigned long restorer); +#else +static inline int save_cet_to_sigframe (int ia32,void __user *fp, +unsigned long restorer) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif extern int copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (void __user *buf,void __user *fp,int size);/*
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +32 -0
@@ -232,6 +232,38 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p) : [pax] "a" (p)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION ) || defined(CONFIG_X86_X32 ) +static inline int write_user_shstk_32 (unsigned long addr,unsigned int val) +{ + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %1, (%0)\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail]) + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val) + :: fail); +return 0 ; +fail: +return -EPERM ; +} +#else +static inline int write_user_shstk_32 (unsigned long addr,unsigned int val) +{ +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"%s used but not supported.\n" , __func__); +return -EFAULT ; +} +#endif + +static inline int write_user_shstk_64 (unsigned long addr,unsigned long val) +{ + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail]) + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val) + :: fail); +return 0 ; +fail: +return -EPERM ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET */ +#define nop () asm volatile ("nop")#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
@@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ struct _xstate {/* New processor state extensions go here: */ }; +/* +* Located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8. +*/ +struct sc_ext { +unsigned long total_size; +unsigned long ssp; +unsigned long wait_endbr; +}; +/* * The 32-bit signal frame: */
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +152 -0
167 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +100 -0
142 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +10 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> #include <asm/signal.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /*
@@ -239,6 +240,9 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,unsigned long buf_fx =0 ;int onsigstack =on_sig_stack (sp);int ret; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +void __user *restorer =NULL ; +#endif /* redzone */ if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))
@@ -270,6 +274,12 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,if (onsigstack && !likely (on_sig_stack (sp)))return (void __user *)-1L ; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +if (ka->sa.sa_flags &SA_RESTORER ) + restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; + ret =save_cet_to_sigframe (0 , *fpstate, (unsigned long )restorer); +#endif +/* save i387 and extended state */ ret =copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (*fpstate, (void __user *)buf_fx, math_size);if (ret <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 22/25 binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAn ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates architecture features of the file.. Introduce feature definitions for Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking.
--- include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +9 -0
@@ -454,4 +454,13 @@ typedef struct elf64_note {/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI */ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI (1U << 0) +/* .note.gnu.property types for x86: */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND 0xc0000002 + +/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT 0x00000001 +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK 0x00000002 +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_INVAL ~(GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT | \ + GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_ELF_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 23/25 ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAn ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates arch features supported by the file. These features are extracted by arch_parse_elf_property() and stored in 'arch_elf_state'. Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() for enabling such features. The first use-case of this function is shadow stack.
ARM64 is the other arch that has ARCH_USER_GNU_PROPERTY and arch_parse_elf_ property(). Add arch_setup_elf_property() for it.
---
v11:
- Combine three patches of arch_setup_elf_property() into one.
- Add empty arch_setup_elf_property() for arm64.
v9:
- Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/elf.h | 6 ++++++ 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h +5 -0
@@ -281,6 +281,11 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data,return 0 ; } +static inline int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline int arch_elf_pt_proc (void *ehdr,void *phdr,struct file *f,bool is_interp,struct arch_elf_state *state)
arch/x86/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -1950,6 +1950,8 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER select X86_INTEL_CET select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY + select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE help Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +13 -0
@@ -385,6 +385,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp);#define compat_arch_setup_additional_pages compat_arch_setup_additional_pages +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE +struct arch_elf_state { +unsigned int gnu_property; +}; + +#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE { \ + .gnu_property = 0, \ +} + +#define arch_elf_pt_proc (ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0) +#define arch_check_elf (ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0) +#endif +/* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */ enum align_flags {ALIGN_VA_32 =BIT (0 ),
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +32 -0
@@ -837,3 +837,35 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task) {return task_pt_regs (task)->sp; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY +int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data,size_t datasz, +bool compat,struct arch_elf_state *state) +{ +if (type !=GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND ) +return 0 ; + +if (datasz !=sizeof (unsigned int )) +return -ENOEXEC ; + + state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data; +return 0 ; +} + +int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *state) +{ +int r =0 ; + +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET )) +return r; + +memset (¤t->thread.cet,0 ,sizeof (struct cet_status )); + +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (state->gnu_property &GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK ) + r =cet_setup_shstk (); + } + +return r; +} +#endif
fs/binfmt_elf.c +4 -0
@@ -1217,6 +1217,10 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)set_binfmt (&elf_format); + retval =arch_setup_elf_property (&arch_state); +if (retval <0 ) + goto out; +#ifdef ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES retval =arch_setup_additional_pages (bprm, !!interpreter);if (retval <0 )
include/linux/elf.h +6 -0
@@ -82,9 +82,15 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, {return 0 ; } + +static inline int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +return 0 ; +}#else extern int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data,size_t datasz,bool compat,struct arch_elf_state *arch); +extern int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 24/25 x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThe kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new shadow stack for a pthread child.
It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall and set the child's shadow stack pointer to NULL and let the child thread allocate a shadow stack for itself. There are two issues in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before the child can successfully allocate a shadow stack.
A 64-bit shadow stack has a size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). A compat-mode thread shadow stack has a size of 1/4 min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). This allows more threads to run in a 32-bit address space.
---
v10:
- Limit shadow stack size to 4 GB.
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 7 +++++ 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +2 -0
@@ -18,11 +18,13 @@ struct cet_status {#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET int cet_setup_shstk (void ); +int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p);void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p);int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp);void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc);int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else +static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {return 0 ; }static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {}static inline void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc) {return ; } static inline int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +3 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ do { \#else #define deactivate_mm (tsk, mm) \ do { \ + if (!tsk->vfork_done) \ + cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk); \ load_gs_index(0); \ loadsegment(fs, 0); \ } while (0)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +41 -0
47 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +7 -0
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)free_vm86 (t); +cet_disable_free_shstk (tsk);fpu__drop (fpu); }
@@ -181,6 +182,12 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,if (clone_flags &CLONE_SETTLS ) ret =set_new_tls (p, tls); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */ +if (!ret && (clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK |CLONE_VM )) ==CLONE_VM ) + ret =cet_setup_thread_shstk (p); +#endif +if (!ret &&unlikely (test_tsk_thread_flag (current,TIF_IO_BITMAP )))io_bitmap_share (p);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v11 25/25 x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng Yuarch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *args)
Get CET feature status.
The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer. The kernel returns the following information:
*args = shadow stack/IBT status
*(args + 1) = shadow stack base address
*(args + 2) = shadow stack size
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, u64 features)
Disable CET features specified in 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is locked.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
Lock in CET features.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, u64 *args)
Allocate a new shadow stack.
The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer.
*args = desired size
*(args + 1) = MAP_32BIT or MAP_POPULATE
On returning, *args is the allocated shadow stack address.
Also change do_arch_prctl_common()'s parameter 'cpuid_enabled' to 'arg2', as it is now also passed to prctl_cet().
---
v11:
- Check input for invalid features.
- Fix prctl_cet() return values.
- Change ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK to ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK to take MAP_32BIT, MAP_POPULATE as inputs.
v10:
- Verify CET is enabled before handling arch_prctl.
- Change input parameters from unsigned long to u64, to make it clear they are 64-bit.
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 26 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 6 +- tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 ++ 7 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +4 -0
@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@ struct sc_ext;struct cet_status {unsigned long shstk_base;unsigned long shstk_size; +unsigned int locked:1 ; };#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +int prctl_cet (int option,u64 arg2);int cet_setup_shstk (void );int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p); +unsigned long cet_alloc_shstk (unsigned long size,int flags);void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p);int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp);void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc);int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else +static inline int prctl_cet (int option,u64 arg2) {return -EINVAL ; }static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {return 0 ; }static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {}static inline void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc) {return ; }
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +5 -0
@@ -14,4 +14,9 @@#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK 0x3004 +#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o cet_prctl.o ### # 64 bit specific files
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +26 -0
@@ -148,6 +148,32 @@ static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,return 0 ; } +unsigned long cet_alloc_shstk (unsigned long len,int flags) +{ +unsigned long token; +unsigned long addr, ssp; + + addr =alloc_shstk (round_up (len,PAGE_SIZE ), flags); + +if (IS_ERR_VALUE (addr)) +return addr; + +/* Restore token is 8 bytes and aligned to 8 bytes */ + ssp = addr + len; + token = ssp; + +if (!in_ia32_syscall ()) + token |=TOKEN_MODE_64 ; + ssp -=8 ; + +if (write_user_shstk_64 (ssp, token)) { +vm_munmap (addr, len); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +return addr; +} +int cet_setup_shstk (void ) {unsigned long addr, size;
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c new file +98 -0
98 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +3 -3
@@ -980,14 +980,14 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p) }long do_arch_prctl_common (struct task_struct *task,int option, -unsigned long cpuid_enabled) +unsigned long arg2) {switch (option) {case ARCH_GET_CPUID :return get_cpuid_mode ();case ARCH_SET_CPUID : -return set_cpuid_mode (task, cpuid_enabled); +return set_cpuid_mode (task, arg2); } -return -EINVAL ; +return prctl_cet (option, arg2); }
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +5 -0
@@ -14,4 +14,9 @@#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK 0x3004 +#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 9 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, u64 *args)
Allocate a new shadow stack.The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer.
*args = desired size
*(args + 1) =MAP_32BITorMAP_POPULATEOn returning, *args is the allocated shadow stack address.
This is hideous. Would this be better as a new syscall?
--Andy
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 5 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 3 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, u64 *args)
Allocate a new shadow stack.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer.
*args = desired size
*(args + 1) =MAP_32BITorMAP_POPULATEOn returning, *args is the allocated shadow stack address.
This is hideous. Would this be better as a new syscall?
Could you point out why this is hideous, so that I can modify the arch_prctl?
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, u64 *args)
Allocate a new shadow stack.The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer.
*args = desired size
*(args + 1) =MAP_32BITorMAP_POPULATE
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
On returning, *args is the allocated shadow stack address.
This is hideous. Would this be better as a new syscall?
Could you point out why this is hideous, so that I can modify the
arch_prctl?
Passing values in memory is hideous when we don't have to. A syscall would let you have separate arguments for size and flags and would also let you have a nice return value instead of needing to do that in memory too.
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 12 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, u64 *args)
Allocate a new shadow stack.The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer.
*args = desired size
*(args + 1) =MAP_32BITorMAP_POPULATEOn returning, *args is the allocated shadow stack address.
This is hideous. Would this be better as a new syscall?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Could you point out why this is hideous, so that I can modify the
arch_prctl?Passing values in memory is hideous when we don't have to. A syscall would let you have separate arguments for size and flags and would also let you have a nice return value instead of needing to do that in memory too.
That is a good justification.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 4 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Sure, I will do that.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 5 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Sure, I will do that.
Alternatively, would a regular prctl() work here?
arch_prctl() feels like a historical weirdness for x86 -- other arches all seem to be using regular prctl(), which allows for 4 args. I don't know the history behind the difference here.
(Since prctl() and arch_prctl() use non-clashing command numbers, I had wondered whether it would be worth just merging the x86 calls in with the rest and making the two calls aliases. That's one for later, though...)
Cheers
---Dave
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Sure, I will do that.
Alternatively, would a regular
prctl()work here?
Is this something appliation code has to call, or just the dynamic loader?
prctl in glibc is a variadic function, so if there's a mismatch between the kernel/userspace syscall convention and the userspace calling convention (for variadic functions) for specific types, it can't be made to work in a generic way.
The loader can use inline assembly for system calls and does not have this issue, but applications would be implcated by it.
Thanks,
Florian
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 25 lines · Florian Weimer
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Sure, I will do that.
Alternatively, would a regular
prctl()work here?Is this something appliation code has to call, or just the dynamic loader?
Quoted 8 lines
prctl in glibc is a variadic function, so if there's a mismatch between the kernel/userspace syscall convention and the userspace calling convention (for variadic functions) for specific types, it can't be made to work in a generic way.
The loader can use inline assembly for system calls and does not have this issue, but applications would be implcated by it.
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);
Where type is something like MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really just mmap() except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.
--Andy
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 37 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 25 lines · Florian Weimer
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Sure, I will do that.
Alternatively, would a regular
prctl()work here?Is this something appliation code has to call, or just the dynamic loader?
Quoted 8 lines
prctl in glibc is a variadic function, so if there's a mismatch between the kernel/userspace syscall convention and the userspace calling convention (for variadic functions) for specific types, it can't be made to work in a generic way.
The loader can use inline assembly for system calls and does not have this issue, but applications would be implcated by it.
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
Quoted 9 lines
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);Where type is something like
MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really justmmap()except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.
One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*. Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 44 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 42 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 25 lines · Florian Weimer
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Sure, I will do that.
Alternatively, would a regular
prctl()work here?Is this something appliation code has to call, or just the dynamic loader?
Quoted 8 lines
prctl in glibc is a variadic function, so if there's a mismatch between the kernel/userspace syscall convention and the userspace calling convention (for variadic functions) for specific types, it can't be made to work in a generic way.
The loader can use inline assembly for system calls and does not have this issue, but applications would be implcated by it.
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Where type is something like
MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really justmmap()except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*. Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h:
#define PROT_BTI 0x10 /* BTI guarded page */
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Yu, Yu-chengQuoted 5 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 5 lines
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);Where type is something like MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really just
mmap()except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*. Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
No idea.
But, mmap_special() is *basically* mmap2() with extra-big flags space. I suspect it will grow some more uses on top of shadow stacks. It could have, for instance, been used to allocate MPX bounds tables.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);Where type is something like
MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really justmmap()except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*. Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
No idea.
But,
mmap_special()is *basically*mmap2()with extra-big flags space. I suspect it will grow some more uses on top of shadow stacks. It could have, for instance, been used to allocate MPX bounds tables.
There is no reason we can't use
long arch_prctl (int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, ..);
for ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK. We just need to use
syscall (SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, ...);
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 23 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);Where type is something like
MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really justmmap()except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*. Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
No idea.
But,
mmap_special()is *basically*mmap2()with extra-big flags space. I suspect it will grow some more uses on top of shadow stacks. It could have, for instance, been used to allocate MPX bounds tables.
Quoted 7 lines
There is no reason we can't use
long
arch_prctl(int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, ..);for
ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK. We just need to usesyscall (
SYS_arch_prctl,ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, ...);
For arm64 (and sparc etc.) we continue to use the regular mmap/mprotect family of calls. One or two additional arch-specific mmap flags are sufficient for now.
Is x86 definitely not going to fit within those calls?
For now, I can't see what arg[2] is used for (and hence the type argument of mmap_special()), but I haven't dug through the whole series.
Cheers
---Dave
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 30 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 29 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);Where type is something like
MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really justmmap()except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*. Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
No idea.
But,
mmap_special()is *basically*mmap2()with extra-big flags space. I suspect it will grow some more uses on top of shadow stacks. It could have, for instance, been used to allocate MPX bounds tables.There is no reason we can't use
long
arch_prctl(int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, ..);for
ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK. We just need to use
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
syscall (
SYS_arch_prctl,ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, ...);For arm64 (and sparc etc.) we continue to use the regular mmap/mprotect family of calls. One or two additional arch-specific mmap flags are sufficient for now.
Is x86 definitely not going to fit within those calls?
That can work for x86. Andy, what if we create PROT_SHSTK, which can been seen only from the user. Once in kernel, it is translated to VM_SHSTK. One question for mremap/mprotect is, do we allow a normal data area to become shadow stack?
Quoted 3 lines
For now, I can't see what arg[2] is used for (and hence the type argument of
mmap_special()), but I haven't dug through the whole series.
If we use the approach above, then we don't need arch_prctl changes.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 39 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 37 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 23 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines
I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful syscall, how about:
mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);Where type is something like
MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK. Fundamentally, this is really justmmap()except that we want to map something a bit magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*. Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
No idea.
But,
mmap_special()is *basically*mmap2()with extra-big flags space. I suspect it will grow some more uses on top of shadow stacks. It could have, for instance, been used to allocate MPX bounds tables.Quoted 7 lines
There is no reason we can't use
long
arch_prctl(int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, ..);for
ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK. We just need to usesyscall (
SYS_arch_prctl,ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, ...);For arm64 (and sparc etc.) we continue to use the regular mmap/mprotect family of calls. One or two additional arch-specific mmap flags are sufficient for now.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is x86 definitely not going to fit within those calls?
That can work for x86. Andy, what if we create
PROT_SHSTK, which can been seen only from the user. Once in kernel, it is translated toVM_SHSTK. One question for mremap/mprotect is, do we allow a normal data area to become shadow stack?
I'm unconvinced that we want to use a somewhat precious PROT_ or VM_ bit for this. Using a flag bit makes sense if we expect anyone to ever map an fd or similar as a shadow stack, but that seems a bit odd in the first place. To me, it seems more logical for a shadow stack to be a special sort of mapping with a special vm_ops, not a normal mapping with a special flag set. Although I realize that we want shadow stacks to work like anonymous memory with respect to fork(). Dave?
--Andy
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For arm64 (and sparc etc.) we continue to use the regular mmap/mprotect family of calls. One or two additional arch-specific mmap flags are sufficient for now.
Is x86 definitely not going to fit within those calls?
That can work for x86. Andy, what if we create
PROT_SHSTK, which can been seen only from the user. Once in kernel, it is translated toVM_SHSTK. One question for mremap/mprotect is, do we allow a normal data area to become shadow stack?
Quoted 8 lines
I'm unconvinced that we want to use a somewhat precious
PROT_orVM_bit for this. Using a flag bit makes sense if we expect anyone to ever map an fd or similar as a shadow stack, but that seems a bit odd in the first place. To me, it seems more logical for a shadow stack to be a special sort of mapping with a specialvm_ops, not a normal mapping with a special flag set. Although I realize that we want shadow stacks to work like anonymous memory with respect tofork(). Dave?
I actually don't like the idea of *creating* mappings much.
I think the pkey model has worked out pretty well where we separate creating the mapping from doing something *to* it, like changing protections. For instance, it would be nice if we could preserve things like using hugetlbfs or heck even doing KSM for shadow stacks.
If we're *creating* mappings, we've pretty much ruled out things like hugetlbfs.
Something like mprotect_shstk() would allow an implementation today that only works on anonymous memory *and* sets up a special vm_ops. But, the same exact ABI could do wonky stuff in the future if we decided we wanted to do shadow stacks on DAX or hugetlbfs or whatever.
I don't really like the idea of PROT_SHSTK those are plumbed into a bunch of interfaces. But, I also can't deny that it seems to be working fine for the arm64 folks.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 29 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For arm64 (and sparc etc.) we continue to use the regular mmap/mprotect family of calls. One or two additional arch-specific mmap flags are sufficient for now.
Is x86 definitely not going to fit within those calls?
That can work for x86. Andy, what if we create
PROT_SHSTK, which can been seen only from the user. Once in kernel, it is translated toVM_SHSTK. One question for mremap/mprotect is, do we allow a normal data area to become shadow stack?Quoted 8 lines
I'm unconvinced that we want to use a somewhat precious
PROT_orVM_bit for this. Using a flag bit makes sense if we expect anyone to ever map an fd or similar as a shadow stack, but that seems a bit odd in the first place. To me, it seems more logical for a shadow stack to be a special sort of mapping with a specialvm_ops, not a normal mapping with a special flag set. Although I realize that we want shadow stacks to work like anonymous memory with respect tofork(). Dave?I actually don't like the idea of *creating* mappings much.
I think the pkey model has worked out pretty well where we separate creating the mapping from doing something *to* it, like changing protections. For instance, it would be nice if we could preserve things like using hugetlbfs or heck even doing KSM for shadow stacks.
If we're *creating* mappings, we've pretty much ruled out things like hugetlbfs.
Quoted 8 lines
Something like
mprotect_shstk()would allow an implementation today that only works on anonymous memory *and* sets up a specialvm_ops. But, the same exact ABI could do wonky stuff in the future if we decided we wanted to do shadow stacks on DAX or hugetlbfs or whatever.I don't really like the idea of
PROT_SHSTKthose are plumbed into a bunch of interfaces. But, I also can't deny that it seems to be working fine for the arm64 folks.
Note, there are some rough edges, such as what happens when someone calls mprotect() on memory marked with PROT_BTI. Unless the caller knows whether PROT_BTI should be set for that page, the flag may get unintentionally cleared. Since the flag only applies to text pages though, it's not _that_ much of a concern. Software that deals with writable text pages is also usually involved in generating the code and so will know about PROT_BTI. That's was the theory anyway.
In the longer term, it might be preferable to have a mprotect2() that can leave some flags unmodified, and that doesn't silently ignore unknown flags (at least one of mmap or mprotect does; I don't recall which). We attempt didn't go this far, for now.
For arm64 it seemed fairly natural for the BTI flag to be a PROT_ flag, but I don't know enough detail about x86 shstk to know whether it's a natural fit there.
Cheers
---Dave
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 29 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For arm64 (and sparc etc.) we continue to use the regular mmap/mprotect family of calls. One or two additional arch-specific mmap flags are sufficient for now.
Is x86 definitely not going to fit within those calls?
That can work for x86. Andy, what if we create
PROT_SHSTK, which can been seen only from the user. Once in kernel, it is translated toVM_SHSTK. One question for mremap/mprotect is, do we allow a normal data area to become shadow stack?Quoted 8 lines
I'm unconvinced that we want to use a somewhat precious
PROT_orVM_bit for this. Using a flag bit makes sense if we expect anyone to ever map an fd or similar as a shadow stack, but that seems a bit odd in the first place. To me, it seems more logical for a shadow stack to be a special sort of mapping with a specialvm_ops, not a normal mapping with a special flag set. Although I realize that we want shadow stacks to work like anonymous memory with respect tofork(). Dave?I actually don't like the idea of *creating* mappings much.
I think the pkey model has worked out pretty well where we separate creating the mapping from doing something *to* it, like changing protections. For instance, it would be nice if we could preserve things like using hugetlbfs or heck even doing KSM for shadow stacks.
If we're *creating* mappings, we've pretty much ruled out things like hugetlbfs.
Quoted 9 lines
Something like
mprotect_shstk()would allow an implementation today that only works on anonymous memory *and* sets up a specialvm_ops. But, the same exact ABI could do wonky stuff in the future if we decided we wanted to do shadow stacks on DAX or hugetlbfs or whatever.I don't really like the idea of
PROT_SHSTKthose are plumbed into a bunch of interfaces. But, I also can't deny that it seems to be working fine for the arm64 folks.
What about this:
- Do not add any new syscall or arch_prctl for creating a new shadow stack.
- Add a new arch_prctl that can turn an anonymous mapping to a shadow stack mapping.
This allows the application to do whatever is necessary. It can even allow GDB or JIT code to create or fix a call stack.
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 9 lines · Yu-cheng
What about this:
- Do not add any new syscall or
arch_prctlfor creating a new shadow stack.- Add a new
arch_prctlthat can turn an anonymous mapping to a shadow stack mapping.This allows the application to do whatever is necessary. It can even allow GDB or JIT code to create or fix a call stack.
Fine with me. But, it's going to effectively be
arch_prctl(PR_CONVERT_TO_SHS..., addr, len);
when it could just as easily be:
madvise(addr, len, MADV_SHSTK...);
Or a new syscall. The only question in my mind is whether we want to do something generic that we can use for other similar things in the future, like:
madvise2(addr, len, flags, MADV2_SHSTK...);
I don't really feel strongly about it, though. Could you please share your logic on why you want a prctl() as opposed to a whole new syscall?
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 9 lines · Yu-cheng
What about this:
- Do not add any new syscall or
arch_prctlfor creating a new shadow stack.- Add a new
arch_prctlthat can turn an anonymous mapping to a shadow stack mapping.This allows the application to do whatever is necessary. It can even allow GDB or JIT code to create or fix a call stack.
Fine with me. But, it's going to effectively be
arch_prctl(PR_CONVERT_TO_SHS..., addr, len);when it could just as easily be:
madvise(addr, len, MADV_SHSTK...);
Quoted 9 lines
Or a new syscall. The only question in my mind is whether we want to do something generic that we can use for other similar things in the future, like:
madvise2(addr, len, flags, MADV2_SHSTK...);I don't really feel strongly about it, though. Could you please share your logic on why you want a
prctl()as opposed to a whole new syscall?
A new syscall is more intrusive, I think. When creating a new shadow stack, the kernel also installs a restore token on the top of the new shadow stack, and it is somewhat x86-specific. So far no other arch's need this.
Yes, madvise is better if the kernel only needs to change the mapping. The application itself can create the restore token before calling madvise().
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 27 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 26 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng
What about this:
- Do not add any new syscall or
arch_prctlfor creating a new shadow stack.- Add a new
arch_prctlthat can turn an anonymous mapping to a shadow stack mapping.This allows the application to do whatever is necessary. It can even allow GDB or JIT code to create or fix a call stack.
Fine with me. But, it's going to effectively be
arch_prctl(PR_CONVERT_TO_SHS..., addr, len);
when it could just as easily be:
madvise(addr, len,
MADV_SHSTK...);Or a new syscall. The only question in my mind is whether we want to do something generic that we can use for other similar things in the future, like:
madvise2(addr, len, flags,
MADV2_SHSTK...);
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I don't really feel strongly about it, though. Could you please share your logic on why you want a
prctl()as opposed to a whole new syscall?A new syscall is more intrusive, I think. When creating a new shadow stack, the kernel also installs a restore token on the top of the new shadow stack, and it is somewhat x86-specific. So far no other arch's need this.
Yes, madvise is better if the kernel only needs to change the mapping. The application itself can create the restore token before calling
madvise().
After looking at this more, I found the changes are more similar to mprotect() than madvise(). We are going to change an anonymous mapping to a read-only mapping, and add the VM_SHSTK flag to it. Would an x86-specific mprotect(PROT_SHSTK) make more sense?
One alternative would be requiring a read-only mapping for madvise(MADV_SHSTK). But that is inconvenient for the application.
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng
After looking at this more, I found the changes are more similar to
mprotect()than madvise(). We are going to change an anonymous mapping to a read-only mapping, and add theVM_SHSTKflag to it. Would an x86-specificmprotect(PROT_SHSTK)make more sense?One alternative would be requiring a read-only mapping for madvise(MADV_SHSTK). But that is inconvenient for the application.
Why? It's just:
mmap()/malloc(); mprotect(PROT_READ); madvise(MADV_SHSTK);
vs.
mmap()/malloc(); mprotect(PROT_SHSTK);
I'm not sure a single syscall counts as inconvenient.
I don't quite think we should use a PROT_ bit for this. It seems like the kind of thing that could be fragile and break existing expectations.
I don't care _that_ strongly though.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 17 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng
After looking at this more, I found the changes are more similar to
mprotect()than madvise(). We are going to change an anonymous mapping to a read-only mapping, and add theVM_SHSTKflag to it. Would an x86-specificmprotect(PROT_SHSTK)make more sense?One alternative would be requiring a read-only mapping for madvise(MADV_SHSTK). But that is inconvenient for the application.
Why? It's just:
mmap()/malloc(); mprotect(PROT_READ); madvise(MADV_SHSTK);vs.
Quoted 9 lines
mmap()/malloc(); mprotect(PROT_SHSTK);I'm not sure a single syscall counts as inconvenient.
I don't quite think we should use a
PROT_bit for this. It seems like the kind of thing that could be fragile and break existing expectations.
I don't care _that_ strongly though.
What if a writable mapping is passed to madvise(MADV_SHSTK)? Should that be rejected?
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
What if a writable mapping is passed to madvise(MADV_SHSTK)? Should that be rejected?
It doesn't matter to me. Even if it's readable, it _stops_ being even directly readable after it's a shadow stack, right? I don't think writes are special in any way. If anything, we *want* it to be writable because that indicates that it can be written to, and we will want to write to it soon.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
What if a writable mapping is passed to madvise(MADV_SHSTK)? Should that be rejected?
It doesn't matter to me. Even if it's readable, it _stops_ being even directly readable after it's a shadow stack, right? I don't think writes are special in any way. If anything, we *want* it to be writable because that indicates that it can be written to, and we will want to write to it soon.
But in a PROT_WRITE mapping, all the pte's have _PAGE_BIT_RW set. To change them to shadow stack, we need to clear that bit from the pte's. That will be like mprotect_fixup()/change_protection_range().
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
What if a writable mapping is passed to madvise(MADV_SHSTK)? Should that be rejected?
It doesn't matter to me. Even if it's readable, it _stops_ being even directly readable after it's a shadow stack, right? I don't think writes are special in any way. If anything, we *want* it to be writable because that indicates that it can be written to, and we will want to write to it soon.
Quoted 3 lines
But in a
PROT_WRITEmapping, all the pte's have_PAGE_BIT_RWset. To change them to shadow stack, we need to clear that bit from the pte's. That will be like mprotect_fixup()/change_protection_range().
The page table hardware bits don't matter. The user-visible protection effects matter.
For instance, we have PROT_EXEC, which *CLEARS* a hardware NX PTE bit. The PROT_ permissions are independent of the hardware.
I don't think the interface should be influenced at *all* by what whacko PTE bit combinations we have to set to get the behavior.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 16 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
What if a writable mapping is passed to madvise(MADV_SHSTK)? Should that be rejected?
It doesn't matter to me. Even if it's readable, it _stops_ being even directly readable after it's a shadow stack, right? I don't think writes are special in any way. If anything, we *want* it to be writable because that indicates that it can be written to, and we will want to write to it soon.
Quoted 3 lines
But in a
PROT_WRITEmapping, all the pte's have_PAGE_BIT_RWset. To change them to shadow stack, we need to clear that bit from the pte's. That will be like mprotect_fixup()/change_protection_range().
Quoted 5 lines
The page table hardware bits don't matter. The user-visible protection effects matter.
For instance, we have
PROT_EXEC, which *CLEARS* a hardware NX PTE bit. ThePROT_permissions are independent of the hardware.
Same for shadow stack here. We consider shadow stack "writable", but we want to clear _PAGE_BIT_RW, which is set for the PTEs of the other type of "writable" mapping. To change a writable data mapping to a writable shadow stack mapping, we need to call change_protection_range().
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think the interface should be influenced at *all* by what whacko PTE bit combinations we have to set to get the behavior.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 16 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
What if a writable mapping is passed to
madvise(MADV_SHSTK)? Should that be rejected?It doesn't matter to me. Even if it's readable, it _stops_ being even directly readable after it's a shadow stack, right? I don't think writes are special in any way. If anything, we *want* it to be writable because that indicates that it can be written to, and we will want to write to it soon.
Quoted 3 lines
But in a
PROT_WRITEmapping, all the pte's have_PAGE_BIT_RWset. To change them to shadow stack, we need to clear that bit from the pte's. That will be like mprotect_fixup()/change_protection_range().
Quoted 8 lines
The page table hardware bits don't matter. The user-visible protection effects matter.
For instance, we have
PROT_EXEC, which *CLEARS* a hardware NX PTE bit. ThePROT_permissions are independent of the hardware.I don't think the interface should be influenced at *all* by what whacko PTE bit combinations we have to set to get the behavior.
Here are the changes if we take the mprotect(PROT_SHSTK) approach. Any comments/suggestions?
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/mprotect.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +25 -1
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10/* shadow stack pages */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS /* * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
@@ -19,13 +21,35 @@ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key)#endif +#define shstk_vm_prot_bits (prot) ( \ + (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) ? \ + VM_SHSTK : 0) + +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) \ + (pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) | shstk_vm_prot_bits(prot)) +#include <asm-generic/mman.h> +static inline bool arch_validate_prot (unsigned long prot,unsigned long addr) +{ +unsigned long supported =PROT_READ |PROT_EXEC |PROT_SEM ; + +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && (prot &PROT_SHSTK )) + supported |=PROT_SHSTK ; +else + supported |=PROT_WRITE ; + +return (prot & ~supported) ==0 ; +} +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
mm/mprotect.c +0 -0
@@ -571,6 +571,17 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t
len,
goto out;
}
}
+
+ /*
+ * Only anonymous mapping is suitable for shadow stack.
+ */
+ if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) {
+ if (vma->vm_file) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...
Quoted 2 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach. Any comments/suggestions?
I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +2
-0@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10/* shadow stack pages */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS /* * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags @@ -19,13 +21,35 @@ ((vm_flags) &VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 :0 ) | \ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h line 31
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3
-1-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key)#endif
My inner compiler doesn't think this will compile:
( | shstk_vm_prot_bits(prot))
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h line 35
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3
-0+#define shstk_vm_prot_bits (prot) ( \ + (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) ? \ + VM_SHSTK : 0)
Why do you need to filter PROT_SHSTK twice. Won't the prot passed in here be filtered by arch_validate_prot()?
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h line 39
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3
-0+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) \ + (pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) | shstk_vm_prot_bits(prot)) +
IMNHO, this is eminently more readable if you do:
#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) \ (shstk_vm_prot_bits(prot)) \ pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key))
BTW, can these be static inlines? I forget if I had a good reason for making them #defines.
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h line 49
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +8
-0+static inline bool arch_validate_prot (unsigned long prot,unsigned long addr) +{ +unsigned long supported =PROT_READ |PROT_EXEC |PROT_SEM ; + +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && (prot &PROT_SHSTK )) + supported |=PROT_SHSTK ; +else + supported |=PROT_WRITE ;
I generally like to make the common case dirt simple to understand. That would probably be:
unsigned long supported = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM;
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) {
supported |= PROT_SHSTK;
// Comment about why SHSTK and WRITE
// are mutually exclusive.
supported &= ~PROT_WRITE;
}Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +0
-0#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ mm/mprotect.c +0
-0
mm/mprotect.c static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t · line 578
Quoted 8 lines
mm/mprotect.c +4
-0@@ -571,6 +571,17 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, goto out; } } + +/* +* Only anonymous mapping is suitable for shadow stack. +*/
Why?
mm/mprotect.c static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t · line 584
Quoted 6 lines
mm/mprotect.c +6
-0+if (prot &PROT_SHSTK ) { +if (vma->vm_file) { + error = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + }
You can also save a couple of lines there. The two conditions are pretty small.
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 2 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach. Any comments/suggestions?I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.
Let’s take a step back here. Ignoring the precise API, what exactly is a shadow stack from the perspective of a Linux user program?
The simplest answer is that it’s just memory that happens to have certain protections. This enables all kinds of shenanigans. A program could map a memfd twice, once as shadow stack and once as non-shadow-stack, and change its control flow. Similarly, a program could mprotect its shadow stack, modify it, and mprotect it back. In some threat models, though could be seen as a WRSS bypass. (Although if an attacker can coerce a process to call mprotect(), the game is likely mostly over anyway.)
But we could be more restrictive, or perhaps we could allow user code to opt into more restrictions. For example, we could have shadow stacks be special memory that cannot be written from usermode by any means other than ptrace() and friends, WRSS, and actual shadow stack usage.
What is the goal?
No matter what we do, the effects of calling vfork() are going to be a bit odd with SHSTK enabled. I suppose we could disallow this, but that seems likely to cause its own issues.
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 13 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 2 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach. Any comments/suggestions?I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.
Quoted 8 lines
Let’s take a step back here. Ignoring the precise API, what exactly is a shadow stack from the perspective of a Linux user program?
The simplest answer is that it’s just memory that happens to have certain protections. This enables all kinds of shenanigans. A program could map a memfd twice, once as shadow stack and once as non-shadow-stack, and change its control flow. Similarly, a program could mprotect its shadow stack, modify it, and mprotect it back. In
What if we do the following:
- If the mapping has VM_SHARED, it cannot be turned to shadow stack. Shadow stack cannot be shared anyway.
- Only allow an anonymous mapping to be converted to shadow stack, but not the other way.
Quoted 11 lines
some threat models, though could be seen as a WRSS bypass. (Although if an attacker can coerce a process to call
mprotect(), the game is likely mostly over anyway.)But we could be more restrictive, or perhaps we could allow user code to opt into more restrictions. For example, we could have shadow stacks be special memory that cannot be written from usermode by any means other than
ptrace()and friends, WRSS, and actual shadow stack usage.What is the goal?
There primary goal is to allocate/mmap a shadow stack from user space.
Quoted 5 lines
No matter what we do, the effects of calling
vfork()are going to be a bit odd with SHSTK enabled. I suppose we could disallow this, but that seems likely to cause its own issues.
Do you mean vfork() has issues with call/return? That is taken care of in GLIBC. Or do you mean it has issues with mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)?
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Andy LutomirskiQuoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
No matter what we do, the effects of calling
vfork()are going to be a bit odd with SHSTK enabled. I suppose we could disallow this, but that seems likely to cause its own issues.
What's odd about it? If you're a vfork()'d child, you can't touch the stack at all, right? If you do, you or your parent will probably die a horrible death.
The extra shadow stacks sanity checks means we'll probably see shadow stack exceptions instead of the slightly more chaotic death without them.
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
No matter what we do, the effects of calling
vfork()are going to be a bit odd with SHSTK enabled. I suppose we could disallow this, but that seems likely to cause its own issues.What's odd about it? If you're a vfork()'d child, you can't touch the stack at all, right? If you do, you or your parent will probably die a horrible death.
An evil program could vfork(), have the child do a bunch of returns and a bunch of calls, and exit. The net effect would be to change the parent's shadow stack contents. In a sufficiently strict model, this is potentially problematic.
The question is: how much do we want to protect userspace from itself?
--Andy
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 12 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
No matter what we do, the effects of calling
vfork()are going to be a bit odd with SHSTK enabled. I suppose we could disallow this, but that seems likely to cause its own issues.What's odd about it? If you're a vfork()'d child, you can't touch the stack at all, right? If you do, you or your parent will probably die a horrible death.
Quoted 4 lines
An evil program could
vfork(), have the child do a bunch of returns and a bunch of calls, and exit. The net effect would be to change the parent's shadow stack contents. In a sufficiently strict model, this is potentially problematic.
When a vfork child returns, its parent's shadow stack pointer is where it was before the child starts. To move the shadow stack pointer and re-use the content left by the child, the parent needs to use CALL, RET, INCSSP, or RSTORSSP. This seems to be difficult.
Quoted 3 lines
The question is: how much do we want to protect userspace from itself?
If any issue comes up, people can always find ways to counter it.
Quoted 2 lines
--Andy
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Andy LutomirskiQuoted 36 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines
On Sep 14, 2020, at 7:50 AM, Dave Hansen <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 3 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach.
Any comments/suggestions?Quoted 7 lines
I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany
this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.Let’s take a step back here. Ignoring the precise API, what exactly is
a shadow stack from the perspective of a Linux user program?The simplest answer is that it’s just memory that happens to have certain protections. This enables all kinds of shenanigans. A program could map a memfd twice, once as shadow stack and once as non-shadow-stack, and change its control flow. Similarly, a program could mprotect its shadow stack, modify it, and mprotect it back. In some threat models, though could be seen as a WRSS bypass. (Although if an attacker can coerce a process to call
mprotect(), the game is likely mostly over anyway.)But we could be more restrictive, or perhaps we could allow user code to opt into more restrictions. For example, we could have shadow stacks be special memory that cannot be written from usermode by any means other than
ptrace()and friends, WRSS, and actual shadow stack usage.
Quoted 6 lines
What is the goal?
No matter what we do, the effects of calling
vfork()are going to be a
bit odd with SHSTK enabled. I suppose we could disallow this, but that seems likely to cause its own issues.
Hi,
Resurrecting this old thread to highlight a consequence of the design change that came out of it. I am going to be taking over this series from Yu-cheng, and wanted to check if people would be interested in re- visiting this interface.
The consequence I wanted to highlight, is that making userspace be responsible for mapping memory as shadow stack, also requires moving the writing of the restore token to userspace for glibc ucontext operations. Since these operations involve creating/pivoting to new stacks in userspace, ucontext cet support involves also creating a new shadow stack. For normal thread stacks, the kernel has always done the shadow stack allocation and so it is never writable (in the normal sense) from userspace. But after this change makecontext() now first has to mmap() writable memory, then write the restore token, then mprotect() it as shadow stack. See the glibc changes to support PROT_SHADOW_STACK here[0].
The writable window leaves an opening for an attacker to create an arbitrary shadow stack that could be pivoted to later by tweaking the ucontext_t structure. To try to see how much this matters, we have done a small test that uses this window to ROP from writes in another thread during the makecontext()/setcontext() window. (offensive work credit to Joao on CC). This would require a real app to already to be using ucontext in the course of normal runtime.
The original prctl solution prevents this case since the kernel did the allocation and restore token setup, but of course it had other issues. The other ideas discussed previously were a new syscall, or some sort of new madvise() operation that could be involved in setting up shadow stack, such that it is never writable in userspace. Or, simpler but uglier, tweaking the existing PROT_SHADOW_STACK based solution by making core mmap code write a restore token.
Those are still probably not enough to stop all ROP given extreme threat models, as Andy alluded. But to me, this one seemed maybe worth trying to improve. Especially thinking to avoid future ABI changes if it becomes a problem. Would anyone like to see attempts to tighten this up by revisiting this shadow stack allocation interface?
Thanks,
Rick
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 5 lines · Rick P
The original prctl solution prevents this case since the kernel did the allocation and restore token setup, but of course it had other issues. The other ideas discussed previously were a new syscall, or some sort of new
madvise()operation that could be involved in setting up shadow stack, such that it is never writable in userspace.
If I had to choose - and this is only my 2¢ anyway - I'd opt for this until there's a really good reason for allowing shstk programs to fiddle with their own shstk. Maybe there is but allowing them to do that sounds to me like: "ew, why do we go to all this trouble to have shadow stacks if programs would be allowed to fumble with it themselves? Might as well not do shadow stacks at all."
And if/when there is a good reason, the API should be defined and discussed properly at first, before we expose it to luserspace, ofc.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteAndy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Edgecombe, Rick PQuoted 63 lines · Rick P
Quoted 36 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines
On Sep 14, 2020, at 7:50 AM, Dave Hansen <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 3 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach.
Any comments/suggestions?Quoted 7 lines
I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany
this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.Let’s take a step back here. Ignoring the precise API, what exactly is
a shadow stack from the perspective of a Linux user program?The simplest answer is that it’s just memory that happens to have certain protections. This enables all kinds of shenanigans. A program could map a memfd twice, once as shadow stack and once as non-shadow-stack, and change its control flow. Similarly, a program could mprotect its shadow stack, modify it, and mprotect it back. In some threat models, though could be seen as a WRSS bypass. (Although if an attacker can coerce a process to call
mprotect(), the game is likely mostly over anyway.)But we could be more restrictive, or perhaps we could allow user code to opt into more restrictions. For example, we could have shadow stacks be special memory that cannot be written from usermode by any means other than
ptrace()and friends, WRSS, and actual shadow stack usage.Quoted 6 lines
What is the goal?
No matter what we do, the effects of calling
vfork()are going to be a
bit odd with SHSTK enabled. I suppose we could disallow this, but that seems likely to cause its own issues.Hi,
Resurrecting this old thread to highlight a consequence of the design change that came out of it. I am going to be taking over this series from Yu-cheng, and wanted to check if people would be interested in re- visiting this interface.
The consequence I wanted to highlight, is that making userspace be responsible for mapping memory as shadow stack, also requires moving the writing of the restore token to userspace for glibc ucontext operations. Since these operations involve creating/pivoting to new stacks in userspace, ucontext cet support involves also creating a new shadow stack. For normal thread stacks, the kernel has always done the shadow stack allocation and so it is never writable (in the normal sense) from userspace. But after this change
makecontext()now first has tommap()writable memory, then write the restore token, thenmprotect()it as shadow stack. See the glibc changes to supportPROT_SHADOW_STACKhere[0].
Quoted 7 lines
The writable window leaves an opening for an attacker to create an arbitrary shadow stack that could be pivoted to later by tweaking the
ucontext_tstructure. To try to see how much this matters, we have done a small test that uses this window to ROP from writes in another thread during the makecontext()/setcontext() window. (offensive work credit to Joao on CC). This would require a real app to already to be using ucontext in the course of normal runtime.
My general opinion here (take this with a grain of salt -- I haven't paged back in every single detail) is that the kernel should make it straightforward for a libc to do the right thing without nasty races, cross-thread coordination, or unnecessary permission to write to the stack. I *also* think that it should be possible for userspace to manage its own shadow stack allocation if it wants to, since I'm sure there will be JIT or green thread or other use cases that want to do crazy things that we fail to anticipate with in-kernel magic.
So perhaps we should keep the explicit allocation and free operations, have a way to opt-in to WRSS being flipped on, but also do our best to have API that handle the known cases well.
Does that make sense? Can we have both approaches work in the same kernel?
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski
My general opinion here (take this with a grain of salt -- I haven't paged back in every single detail) is that the kernel should make it straightforward for a libc to do the right thing without nasty races, cross-thread coordination, or unnecessary permission to write to the stack. I *also* think that it should be possible for userspace to manage its own shadow stack allocation if it wants to, since I'm sure there will be JIT or green thread or other use cases that want to do crazy things that we fail to anticipate with in-kernel magic.
Quoted 6 lines
So perhaps we should keep the explicit allocation and free operations, have a way to opt-in to WRSS being flipped on, but also do our best to have API that handle the known cases well.
Does that make sense? Can we have both approaches work in the same kernel?
I think so. I'll take a look at adding a prctl to enable WRSS. Since there already is ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE to disable CET, it doesn't seem like it should escalate anything. And ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK can prevent turning it on if desired.
Thanks,
Rick
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 42 lines · Dave Hansen
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 2 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach. Any comments/suggestions?I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +2
-0@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10/* shadow stack pages */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS /* * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags @@ -19,13 +21,35 @@ ((vm_flags) &VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 :0 ) | \ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h line 31
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3
-1-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key)#endif My inner compiler doesn't think this will compile:
( | shstk_vm_prot_bits(prot))
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h line 35
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3
-0+#define shstk_vm_prot_bits (prot) ( \ + (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) ? \ + VM_SHSTK : 0)Why do you need to filter
PROT_SHSTKtwice. Won't the prot passed in here be filtered byarch_validate_prot()?
X86_FEATURE_SHSTK is already checked by arch_validate_prot() and may be skipped. PROT_SHSTK needs to be tested and translated to VM_SHSTK here.
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h line 39
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3
-0+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) \ + (pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) | shstk_vm_prot_bits(prot)) +IMNHO, this is eminently more readable if you do:
Quoted 6 lines
#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) \ (shstk_vm_prot_bits(prot)) \ pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key))BTW, can these be static inlines? I forget if I had a good reason for making them #defines.
Probably, at compile time, ((key) & 0x1 ? (VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) cannot be optimized out, unless there is a #define? Since we are adding the shadow stack stuff, why don't we make it static inline?
Also do we want to check if the cpu has PKEY?
[...]
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
mm/mprotect.c +0
-0@@ -571,6 +571,17 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, goto out;
Quoted 8 lines
mm/mprotect.c static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t · line 578
Quoted 6 lines
mm/mprotect.c +4
-0} } + +/* +* Only anonymous mapping is suitable for shadow stack. +*/ Why?
When a file mapping is turned into shadow stack, then the logic is strange. For instance, when a CALL triggers a shadow stack page fault, do we page in from a file? At least this seems to defeat shadow stack.
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 2 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach. Any comments/suggestions?I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.
[...]
I revised it. If this turns out needing more work/discussion, we can split it out from the shadow stack series.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
------
From 114f3108207e3eb15fe13b3ff43d1ac273b5072a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 16:41:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). Each has its advantages and compromises.
An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of mmap()/mprotect().
The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHSTK, and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get to the syscall first.
Since arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is modified, I have moved arch_vm_get_page _prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to x86/include/asm/mman.h. This will be more consistent with other architectures.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 ++------------ mm/mprotect.c | 10 +++++ 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h new file +63 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H + +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <uapi/asm/mman.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS +/* +* Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags +* value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in +* to a pte. +* +* Only override these if Protection Keys are available +* (which is only on 64-bit). +*/ +#define arch_vm_get_page_prot (vm_flags) __pgprot( \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) + +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ + ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) (0) +#endif + +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (unsigned long prot, +unsigned long pkey) +{ +unsigned long vm_prot_bits =pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey); + + vm_prot_bits |= ((prot &PROT_SHSTK ) ?VM_SHSTK :0 ); +return vm_prot_bits; +} +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) + +static inline bool arch_validate_prot (unsigned long prot,unsigned long addr) +{ +unsigned long supported =PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC |PROT_SEM ; + +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER ) && +static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && (prot &PROT_SHSTK )) { + supported |=PROT_SHSTK ; + +/* +* A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only +* the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write +* instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually +* exclusive. +*/ + supported &= ~PROT_WRITE ; + } + +return (prot & ~supported) ==0 ; +} +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +4 -24
@@ -1,31 +1,11 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ -#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H -#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS -/* -* Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags -* value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in -* to a pte. -* -* Only override these if Protection Keys are available -* (which is only on 64-bit). -*/ -#define arch_vm_get_page_prot (vm_flags) __pgprot( \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) - -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ - ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#endif +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10/* shadow stack pages */ #include <asm-generic/mman.h> -#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
mm/mprotect.c +0 -0
@@ -571,6 +571,16 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t
len,
goto out;
}
}
+
+ /*
+ * Only anonymous mapping is suitable for shadow stack. A function
+ * call stack should not be backed by a file.
+ */
+ if ((prot & PROT_SHSTK) && (vma->vm_file)) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 6 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Quoted 5 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 4 lines · Dave Hansen
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 2 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach. Any comments/suggestions?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.
[...]
I revised it. If this turns out needing more work/discussion, we can split it out from the shadow stack series.
Where does that leave things? You only get shadow stacks for single-threaded apps which have the ELF bits set?
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 11 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Quoted 9 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
On 9/11/20 3:59 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
...Quoted 2 lines
Here are the changes if we take the
mprotect(PROT_SHSTK)approach. Any comments/suggestions?I still don't like it. :)
I'll also be much happier when there's a proper changelog to accompany this which also spells out the alternatives any why they suck so much.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
[...]
I revised it. If this turns out needing more work/discussion, we can split it out from the shadow stack series.
Where does that leave things? You only get shadow stacks for single-threaded apps which have the ELF bits set?
As long as the system supports shadow stack, any application can mmap()/mprotect() a shadow stack. A pthread can allocate a shadow stack too. However, only shadow stack-enabled programs can activate/use the shadow stack.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Florian WeimerQuoted 24 lines · Florian Weimer
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 10 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think this is more arch-specific. Even if it becomes a new syscall, we still need to pass the same parameters.
Right, but without the copying in and out of memory.
Linux-api is already on the Cc list. Do we need to add more people to get some agreements for the syscall?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
What kind of agreement are you looking for? I'd suggest just coding it up and posting the patches. Adding syscalls really is really pretty straightforward and isn't much code at all.
Sure, I will do that.
Alternatively, would a regular
prctl()work here?Is this something appliation code has to call, or just the dynamic loader?
Quoted 7 lines
prctl in glibc is a variadic function, so if there's a mismatch between the kernel/userspace syscall convention and the userspace calling convention (for variadic functions) for specific types, it can't be made to work in a generic way.
The loader can use inline assembly for system calls and does not have this issue, but applications would be implcated by it.
To the extent that this is a problem, libc's prctl() wrapper has to handle it already. New prctl() calls tend to demand precisely 4 arguments and require unused arguments to be 0, but this is more down to policy rather than because anything breaks otherwise.
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
Merging the actual prctl() and arch_prctl() syscalls doesn't acutally stop libc from retaining separate wrappers if they have different argument marshaling requirements in some corner cases.
There might be some underlying reason by x86 has its own call and nobody else followed the same model, but I don't know what it is.
Cheers
---Dave
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem for arch_prctl as well.
Thanks,
Florian
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 12 lines · Florian Weimer
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.
Argument of ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE is int and passed in register.
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 8 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.
The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
Thanks,
Florian
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 12 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
It should read:
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features)
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 19 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 12 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
It should read:
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features)
Or
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 25 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 24 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 21 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 8 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
It should read:
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features)Or
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
Like other arch_prctl()'s, this parameter was 'unsigned long' earlier. The idea was, since this arch_prctl is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel, we wanted it to look as 64-bit only. I will change it back to 'unsigned long'.
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 4 lines
Like other arch_prctl()'s, this parameter was 'unsigned long' earlier. The idea was, since this
arch_prctlis only implemented for the 64-bit kernel, we wanted it to look as 64-bit only. I will change it back to 'unsigned long'.
What about x32? In general, long is rather problematic for x32.
Thanks,
Florian
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 8 lines · Florian Weimer
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 4 lines
Like other arch_prctl()'s, this parameter was 'unsigned long' earlier. The idea was, since this
arch_prctlis only implemented for the 64-bit kernel, we wanted it to look as 64-bit only. I will change it back to 'unsigned long'.What about x32? In general, long is rather problematic for x32.
The problem is the size of 'long', right?
Because this parameter is passed in a register, and only the lower bits are used, x32 works as well.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 7 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 6 lines
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 4 lines
Like other arch_prctl()'s, this parameter was 'unsigned long' earlier. The idea was, since this
arch_prctlis only implemented for the 64-bit kernel, we wanted it to look as 64-bit only. I will change it back to 'unsigned long'.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What about x32? In general, long is rather problematic for x32.
The problem is the size of 'long', right?
Because this parameter is passed in a register, and only the lower bits are used, x32 works as well.
The userspace calling convention leaves the upper 32-bit undefined. Therefore, this only works by accident if the kernel does not check that the upper 32-bit are zero, which is probably a kernel bug.
It's unclear to me what you are trying to accomplish. Why do you want to use unsigned long here? The correct type appears to be unsigned int. This correctly expresses that the upper 32 bits of the register do not matter.
Thanks,
Florian
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 16 lines · Florian Weimer
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 7 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 6 lines
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 4 lines
Like other arch_prctl()'s, this parameter was 'unsigned long' earlier. The idea was, since this
arch_prctlis only implemented for the 64-bit kernel, we wanted it to look as 64-bit only. I will change it back to 'unsigned long'.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What about x32? In general, long is rather problematic for x32.
The problem is the size of 'long', right?
Because this parameter is passed in a register, and only the lower bits are used, x32 works as well.
Quoted 9 lines
The userspace calling convention leaves the upper 32-bit undefined. Therefore, this only works by accident if the kernel does not check that the upper 32-bit are zero, which is probably a kernel bug.
It's unclear to me what you are trying to accomplish. Why do you want to use unsigned long here? The correct type appears to be unsigned int. This correctly expresses that the upper 32 bits of the register do not matter.
unsigned int is the correct type since only the lower 32 bits are used.
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Florian WeimerQuoted 15 lines · Florian Weimer
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 7 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 6 lines
* Yu-cheng Yu:
Quoted 4 lines
Like other arch_prctl()'s, this parameter was 'unsigned long' earlier. The idea was, since this
arch_prctlis only implemented for the 64-bit kernel, we wanted it to look as 64-bit only. I will change it back to 'unsigned long'.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What about x32? In general, long is rather problematic for x32.
The problem is the size of 'long', right?
Because this parameter is passed in a register, and only the lower bits are used, x32 works as well.
Quoted 8 lines
The userspace calling convention leaves the upper 32-bit undefined. Therefore, this only works by accident if the kernel does not check that the upper 32-bit are zero, which is probably a kernel bug.
It's unclear to me what you are trying to accomplish. Why do you want to use unsigned long here? The correct type appears to be unsigned int. This correctly expresses that the upper 32 bits of the register do not matter.
Yes, you are right. I will make it 'unsigned int'.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Florian WeimerQuoted 16 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 12 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
H.J. Lu suggested that we fix x86 arch_prctl() to take four arguments, and then keep MMAP_SHSTK as an arch_prctl(). Because now the map flags and size are all in registers, this also solves problems being pointed out earlier. Without a wrapper, the shadow stack mmap call (from user space) will be:
syscall(_NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, size, MAP_32BIT).
I think this would be a nice alternative to another new syscall.
If this looks good to everyone, I can send out new patches as response to my current version, and then after all issues fixed, send v12.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 20 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 15 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 13 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 12 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
H.J. Lu suggested that we fix x86
arch_prctl()to take four arguments, and then keepMMAP_SHSTKas anarch_prctl(). Because now the map flags and size are all in registers, this also solves problems being pointed out earlier. Without a wrapper, the shadow stack mmap call (from user space) will be:
syscall(_NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, size, MAP_32BIT).
I admit I don’t see a show stopping technical reason we can’t add arguments to an existing syscall, but I’m pretty sure it’s unprecedented, and it doesn’t seem like a good idea.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 21 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 21 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 16 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 8 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
H.J. Lu suggested that we fix x86
arch_prctl()to take four arguments, and then keepMMAP_SHSTKas anarch_prctl(). Because now the map flags and size are all in registers, this also solves problems being pointed out earlier. Without a wrapper, the shadow stack mmap call (from user space) will be:
syscall(_NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, size, MAP_32BIT).I admit I don’t see a show stopping technical reason we can’t add arguments to an existing syscall, but I’m pretty sure it’s unprecedented, and it doesn’t seem like a good idea.
There are nine existing arch_prctl calls now. If the concern is the extra new arguments getting misused, we can mask them out for the existing calls. Otherwise, I have not seen anything that can break.
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Andy LutomirskiQuoted 22 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 22 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 16 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 8 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
H.J. Lu suggested that we fix x86
arch_prctl()to take four arguments, and then keepMMAP_SHSTKas anarch_prctl(). Because now the map flags and size are all in registers, this also solves problems being pointed out earlier. Without a wrapper, the shadow stack mmap call (from user space) will be:
syscall(_NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, size, MAP_32BIT).I admit I don’t see a show stopping technical reason we can’t add arguments to an existing syscall, but I’m pretty sure it’s unprecedented, and it doesn’t seem like a good idea.
prctl prototype is:
extern int prctl (int __option, ...)
and implemented in kernel as:
int prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
Not all prctl operations take all 5 arguments. It also applies
to arch_prctl. It is quite normal for different operations of arch_prctl to take different numbers of arguments.
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 37 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 22 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 22 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 16 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 8 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
H.J. Lu suggested that we fix x86
arch_prctl()to take four arguments, and then keepMMAP_SHSTKas anarch_prctl(). Because now the map flags and size are all in registers, this also solves problems being pointed out earlier. Without a wrapper, the shadow stack mmap call (from user space) will be:
syscall(_NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, size, MAP_32BIT).I admit I don’t see a show stopping technical reason we can’t add arguments to an existing syscall, but I’m pretty sure it’s unprecedented, and it doesn’t seem like a good idea.
prctl prototype is:
extern int prctl (int
__option, ...)
Quoted 8 lines
and implemented in kernel as:
int prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);Not all prctl operations take all 5 arguments. It also applies
toarch_prctl. It is quite normal for different operations ofarch_prctlto take different numbers of arguments.
If by "quite normal" you mean "does not happen", then I agree.
In any event, I will not have anything to do with a patch that changes an existing syscall signature unless Linus personally acks it. So if you want to email him and linux-abi, be my guest.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 48 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 37 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 22 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 22 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 16 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 8 lines
* Dave Martin:
Quoted 4 lines
You're right that this has implications: for i386, libc probably pulls more arguments off the stack than are really there in some situations. This isn't a new problem though. There are already generic prctls with fewer than 4 args that are used on x86.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As originally posted, glibc prctl would have to know that it has to pull an u64 argument off the argument list for
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE. But then the u64 argument is a problem forarch_prctlas well.Argument of
ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLEis int and passed in register.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The commit message and the C source say otherwise, I think (not sure about the C source, not a kernel hacker).
H.J. Lu suggested that we fix x86
arch_prctl()to take four arguments, and then keepMMAP_SHSTKas anarch_prctl(). Because now the map flags and size are all in registers, this also solves problems being pointed out earlier. Without a wrapper, the shadow stack mmap call (from user space) will be:
syscall(_NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, size, MAP_32BIT).I admit I don’t see a show stopping technical reason we can’t add arguments to an existing syscall, but I’m pretty sure it’s unprecedented, and it doesn’t seem like a good idea.
prctl prototype is:
extern int prctl (int
__option, ...)Quoted 8 lines
and implemented in kernel as:
int prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);Not all prctl operations take all 5 arguments. It also applies
toarch_prctl. It is quite normal for different operations ofarch_prctlto take different numbers of arguments.
Quoted 5 lines
If by "quite normal" you mean "does not happen", then I agree.
In any event, I will not have anything to do with a patch that changes an existing syscall signature unless Linus personally acks it. So if you want to email him and linux-abi, be my guest.
Can you think of ANY issues of passing more arguments to arch_prctl? syscall () provided by glibc always passes 6 arguments to the kernel. Arguments are already in the registers. What kind of problems do you see?
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 1 line
Can you think of ANY issues of passing more arguments to
arch_prctl?
On x32, the glibc arch_prctl system call wrapper only passes two arguments to the kernel, and applications have no way of detecting that. musl only passes two arguments on all architectures. It happens to work anyway with default compiler flags, but that's an accident.
Thanks,
Florian
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 1 line
Can you think of ANY issues of passing more arguments to
arch_prctl?On x32, the glibc
arch_prctlsystem call wrapper only passes two arguments to the kernel, and applications have no way of detecting that. musl only passes two arguments on all architectures. It happens to work anyway with default compiler flags, but that's an accident.
In the current glibc, there is no arch_prctl wrapper for i386. There are arch_prctl wrappers with 2 arguments for x86-64 and x32. But this isn't an issue for glibc since glibc is both the provider and the user of the new arch_prctl extension. Besides,
long syscall(long number, ...);
is always available.
Signature · 1 line
H.J.
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 12 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 1 line
Can you think of ANY issues of passing more arguments to
arch_prctl?On x32, the glibc
arch_prctlsystem call wrapper only passes two arguments to the kernel, and applications have no way of detecting that. musl only passes two arguments on all architectures. It happens to work anyway with default compiler flags, but that's an accident.
Quoted 8 lines
In the current glibc, there is no
arch_prctlwrapper for i386. There arearch_prctlwrappers with 2 arguments for x86-64 and x32. But this isn't an issue for glibc since glibc is both the provider and the user of the newarch_prctlextension. Besides,long
syscall(long number, ...);is always available.
Userspace is probably full of tools and libraries that contain tables of system calls and their signatures. Think tracing, audit, container management, etc. I don't know how they will react to the addition of new arguments.
Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
Quoted 19 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 17 lines · H.J. Lu
Quoted 9 lines · Florian Weimer
* H. J. Lu:
Quoted 1 line
Can you think of ANY issues of passing more arguments to
arch_prctl?On x32, the glibc
arch_prctlsystem call wrapper only passes two arguments to the kernel, and applications have no way of detecting that. musl only passes two arguments on all architectures. It happens to work anyway with default compiler flags, but that's an accident.In the current glibc, there is no
arch_prctlwrapper for i386. There arearch_prctlwrappers with 2 arguments for x86-64 and x32. But this isn't an issue for glibc since glibc is both the provider and the user of the newarch_prctlextension. Besides,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
long
syscall(long number, ...);is always available.
Userspace is probably full of tools and libraries that contain tables of system calls and their signatures. Think tracing, audit, container management, etc. I don't know how they will react to the addition of new arguments.
Yes, they need to be updated to understand other new operations added for CET.
Signature · 1 line
H.J.