f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()
PATCH v2 1/1 f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()
f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.
Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return -EFSCORRUPTED for malformed on-disk ACL blobs so corrupted ACL xattrs are reported as filesystem corruption instead of generic invalid arguments.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968) Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?) vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?) do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?) filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?) do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?) path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?) cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?) lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?) trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
---
Changes in v2:
- Wrap the new ACL entry-size checks in unlikely().
- Return -EFSCORRUPTED for malformed on-disk ACL blobs.
fs/f2fs/acl.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/acl.c +12 -5
@@ -53,14 +53,14 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)const char *end = value + size;if (size <sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_header )) -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED );if (hdr->a_version !=cpu_to_le32 (F2FS_ACL_VERSION )) -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED ); count =f2fs_acl_count (size);if (count <0 ) -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED );if (count ==0 )return NULL ;
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { -if ((char *)entry > end) +if (unlikely ((char *)entry + +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry_short ) > end)) goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_tag =le16_to_cpu (entry->e_tag);
@@ -86,6 +87,9 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)break ;case ACL_USER : +if (unlikely ((char *)entry + +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)) + goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));
@@ -93,6 +97,9 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));break ;case ACL_GROUP : +if (unlikely ((char *)entry + +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)) + goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));
@@ -108,7 +115,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)return acl; fail:posix_acl_release (acl); -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED ); } static void *f2fs_acl_to_disk(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Chao Yu
maintainerQuoted 60 lines · Zhang Cen
f2fs_acl_count()only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still placeACL_USERorACL_GROUPin a slot that only contains structf2fs_acl_entry_shortbytes, andf2fs_acl_from_disk()then readsentry->e_idbefore verifying that a full entry fits.Require a short entry before reading
e_tagande_perm, and require a full entry before readinge_idforACL_USERandACL_GROUP. Return-EFSCORRUPTEDfor malformed on-disk ACL blobs so corrupted ACL xattrs are reported as filesystem corruption instead of generic invalid arguments.Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in__f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968) Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?) vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?) do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?) filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?) do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?) path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?) cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?) lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?) trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)Fixes af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5Signed-off-by Zhang Cen <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
- Wrap the new ACL entry-size checks inunlikely().
- Return-EFSCORRUPTEDfor malformed on-disk ACL blobs.fs/f2fs/acl.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)fs/f2fs/acl.c +0
-0
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 56
Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-1@@ -53,14 +53,14 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)const char *end = value + size;if (size <sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_header )) -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED );
The change is not related to this patch, right? I suspect you only give the hint to let LLM to replace EINVAL w/ EFSCORRUPTED in f2fs_acl_from_disk(), rather than replacing in newly added lines.
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 59
Quoted 4 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-1if (hdr->a_version !=cpu_to_le32 (F2FS_ACL_VERSION )) -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED );
Ditto,
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 63
Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-1count =f2fs_acl_count (size);if (count <0 ) -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED );
Ditto,
Quoted 34 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +8
-1if (count ==0 )return NULL ;@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { -if ((char *)entry > end) +if (unlikely ((char *)entry + +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry_short ) > end)) goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_tag =le16_to_cpu (entry->e_tag);@@ -86,6 +87,9 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)break ;case ACL_USER : +if (unlikely ((char *)entry + +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)) + goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));@@ -93,6 +97,9 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));break ;case ACL_GROUP : +if (unlikely ((char *)entry + +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)) + goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 118
Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-1@@ -108,7 +115,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)return acl; fail:posix_acl_release (acl); -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ERR_PTR (-EFSCORRUPTED );
Ditto,
Thanks,
Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +0
-0} static void *f2fs_acl_to_disk(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
Quoted 3 lines
The change is not related to this patch, right? I suspect you only give the hint to let LLM to replace EINVAL w/ EFSCORRUPTED in
f2fs_acl_from_disk(), rather than replacing in newly added lines.
Hi Chao,
Sorry for the noise.
I did use AI assistance when preparing v2 based on the bug details and your review comments, but I did not review the resulting semantic scope carefully enough. I am sorry for this.
I will send a v3 following your suggestion and I will be more careful with both the generated patch and my own review before sending future revisions. Thanks for your guidance and careful review.
Best regards,
Zhang Cen