Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Subsystems (20)
v15 cover Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
CET can protect applications and the kernel. This series enables only application-level protection, and has three parts:
- Shadow stack [2],
- Indirect branch tracking [3], and
- Selftests [4].
I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been very stable. Linux distributions with CET are available now, and Intel processors with CET are becoming available. It would be nice if CET support can be accepted into the kernel. I will be working to address any issues should they come up.
Changes in v15:
- Rebase to v5.10-rc3.
- Small changes to the documentation to make meanings clear.
- Remove changes to tools/arch/x86/include/ files.
- Remove Reviewed-by tags from patches that have been revised too many times.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32- architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] CET Shadow Stack patches v14:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[3] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v14.
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[4] I am holding off the selftests changes and working to get Acked-by's. The earlier version of the selftests patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[5] The kernel ptrace patch is tested with an Intel-internal updated GDB. I am holding off the kernel ptrace patch to re-test it with my earlier patch for fixing regset holes.
Yu-cheng Yu (26):
Documentation/x86: Add CET description x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow
Enforcement Technology (CET)
x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for
transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW
mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties
ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 138 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 39 ++ arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 17 + arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 42 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 83 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 20 + arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 209 ++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 57 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 343 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 68 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 28 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 100 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 25 +- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++ arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 10 + arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 59 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 + arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 25 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +- fs/aio.c | 2 +- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/elf.h | 6 + include/linux/mm.h | 38 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 35 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 + ipc/shm.c | 2 +- mm/gup.c | 8 +- mm/huge_memory.c | 10 +- mm/memory.c | 5 +- mm/migrate.c | 3 +- mm/mmap.c | 23 +- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/nommu.c | 4 +- mm/util.c | 2 +- scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh | 4 + 65 files changed, 1594 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c create mode 100755 scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 1/26 Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Explain no_user_shstk/no_user_ibt kernel parameters, and introduce a new document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 138 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 145 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +6 -0
@@ -3193,6 +3193,12 @@ noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default) noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings + no_user_shstk [X86-64] Disable Shadow Stack for user-mode + applications + + no_user_ibt [X86-64] Disable Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode + applications + nosmap [X86,PPC] Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention) even if it is supported by processor.
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation tlb mtrr pat + intel_cet intel-iommu intel_txt amd-memory-encryption
Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst new file +138 -0
138 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
RE: [PATCH v15 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
(In response to https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/)
Quoted 2 lines
These need to be enabled to build a CET-enabled kernel, and Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or later are required to build a CET kernel.
What about LLVM? Surely CrOS might be of interest to ship this on (we ship the equivalent for aarch64 on Android).
Quoted 6 lines
An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be verified from the following command output, in the
NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0field:readelf -n <application> | grep SHSTK
properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK
Same for llvm-readelf.
Re: [PATCH v15 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Quoted 8 lines · Nick Desaulniers
(In response to https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/)
Quoted 2 lines
These need to be enabled to build a CET-enabled kernel, and Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or later are required to build a CET kernel.
What about LLVM? Surely CrOS might be of interest to ship this on (we ship the equivalent for aarch64 on Android).
I have not built with LLVM, but think it probably will work as well. I will test it.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be verified from the following command output, in the
NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0field:readelf -n <application> | grep SHSTK
properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTKSame for llvm-readelf.
I will add that to the document.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v15 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Quoted 21 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 8 lines · Nick Desaulniers
(In response to https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/)
Quoted 2 lines
These need to be enabled to build a CET-enabled kernel, and Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or later are required to build a CET kernel.
What about LLVM? Surely CrOS might be of interest to ship this on (we ship the equivalent for aarch64 on Android).
I have not built with LLVM, but think it probably will work as well. I will test it.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be verified from the following command output, in the
NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0field:readelf -n <application> | grep SHSTK
properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Same for llvm-readelf.
I will add that to the document.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
The baseline LLVM version is 10.0.1, which is good enough for clang -fcf-protection=full, llvm-readelf -n, LLD's .note.gnu.property handling (the LLD option is -z force-ibt, though)
Signature · 1 line
宋方睿
Re: [PATCH v15 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Quoted 25 lines · Fāng-ruì Sòng
Quoted 24 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 8 lines · Nick Desaulniers
(In response to https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/)
Quoted 2 lines
These need to be enabled to build a CET-enabled kernel, and Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or later are required to build a CET kernel.
What about LLVM? Surely CrOS might be of interest to ship this on (we ship the equivalent for aarch64 on Android).
I have not built with LLVM, but think it probably will work as well. I will test it.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be verified from the following command output, in the
NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0field:readelf -n <application> | grep SHSTK
properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTKSame for llvm-readelf.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I will add that to the document.
Thanks,
Yu-chengThe baseline LLVM version is 10.0.1, which is good enough for clang -fcf-protection=full, llvm-readelf -n, LLD's .note.gnu.property handling (the LLD option is
-z force-ibt, though)
Thanks!
Yu-cheng
PATCH v15 2/26 x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAdd CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] Shadow stack CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 20] Indirect Branch Tracking
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4)/* OS Protection Keys Enable */ #define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG (16*32+ 5)/* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6)/* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (16*32+ 7)/* Shadow Stack */ #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8)/* Galois Field New Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9)/* Vector AES */ #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10)/* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
@@ -374,6 +375,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_TSXLDTRK (18*32+16)/* TSX Suspend Load Address Tracking */ #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18)/* Intel PCONFIG */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR (18*32+19)/* Intel ARCH LBR */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBT (18*32+20)/* Indirect Branch Tracking */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26)/* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27)/* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D (18*32+28)/* Flush L1D cache */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +2 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = { { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL }, { X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, { X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, X86_FEATURE_MBA }, + { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, + { X86_FEATURE_IBT, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, {} };
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 3/26 x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
In reply to Yu-cheng YuControl-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) adds five MSRs. Introduce them and their XSAVES supervisor states:
MSR_IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings), MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode Shadow Stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode Shadow Stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP (Privilege Level 1 Shadow Stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP (Privilege Level 2 Shadow Stack pointer).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +21 -2
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ enum xfeature {XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR ,XFEATURE_PKRU ,XFEATURE_PASID , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11 , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_12 , +XFEATURE_CET_USER , +XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13 ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14 , XFEATURE_LBR,
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ enum xfeature {#define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID (1 << XFEATURE_PASID) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER (1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)#define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
@@ -237,6 +239,23 @@ struct pkru_state {u32 pad; } __packed; +/* +* State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states +*/ +struct cet_user_state { +u64 user_cet;/* user control-flow settings */ +u64 user_ssp;/* user shadow stack pointer */ +}; + +/* +* State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement kernel states +*/ +struct cet_kernel_state { +u64 kernel_ssp;/* kernel shadow stack */ +u64 pl1_ssp;/* privilege level 1 shadow stack */ +u64 pl2_ssp;/* privilege level 2 shadow stack */ +}; +/* * State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state. * The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h +4 -2
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)/* All currently supported supervisor features */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)/* * A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@* Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is * supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask. */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)/* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */ #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +20 -0
@@ -922,4 +922,24 @@#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117 +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0/* user mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2/* kernel mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4/* kernel shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x6a5/* ring-1 shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x6a6/* ring-2 shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7/* user shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8/* exception shstk table */ + +/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */ +#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0) +#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1) +#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2) +#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3) +#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4) +#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE BIT_ULL(5) +#define CET_RESERVED (BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9)) +#define CET_SUPPRESS BIT_ULL(10) +#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11) +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h +2 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@#define X86_CR4_SMAP _BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)#define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT 22/* enable Protection Keys support */ #define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT) +#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23/* enable Control-flow Enforcement */ +#define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)/* * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +22 -3
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] ="Processor Trace (unused)" ,"Protection Keys User registers" ,"PASID state" , +"Control-flow User registers" , +"Control-flow Kernel registers" , "unknown xstate feature" , };
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ,X86_FEATURE_PKU ,X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD , +X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ,/* XFEATURE_CET_USER */ + X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */ };/*
@@ -321,6 +325,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU );print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID ); +print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER ); +print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL ); }/*
@@ -596,6 +602,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr) XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, struct avx_512_hi16_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU, struct pkru_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PASID, struct ia32_pasid_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_USER, struct cet_user_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state);/* * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if
@@ -605,7 +613,7 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)if ((nr <XFEATURE_YMM ) || (nr >=XFEATURE_MAX ) || (nr ==XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR ) || - ((nr >=XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11 ) && (nr <=XFEATURE_LBR ))) { + ((nr >=XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13 ) && (nr <=XFEATURE_LBR ))) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"no structure for xstate: %d\n" , nr);XSTATE_WARN_ON (1 ); }
@@ -835,8 +843,19 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)* Clear XSAVE features that are disabled in the normal CPUID. */ for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xsave_cpuid_features); i++) { -if (!boot_cpu_has (xsave_cpuid_features[i])) - xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); +if (xsave_cpuid_features[i] ==X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) { +/* +* X86_FEATURE_SHSTK and X86_FEATURE_IBT share +* same states, but can be enabled separately. +*/ +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + }else { +if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] ==-1 ) || + !boot_cpu_has (xsave_cpuid_features[i])) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + } } xfeatures_mask_all &=fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask ();
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +0
-0@@ -922,4 +922,24 @@#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h line 934
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +10
-0+/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0/* user mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2/* kernel mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4/* kernel shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x6a5/* ring-1 shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x6a6/* ring-2 shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7/* user shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8/* exception shstk table */ + +/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */
Pls put the bit defines under the MSRs they belong to.
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +9
-0+#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0) +#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1) +#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2) +#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3) +#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4) +#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE BIT_ULL(5) +#define CET_RESERVED (BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9)) +#define CET_SUPPRESS BIT_ULL(10) +#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11)
...
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +0
-2* Clear XSAVE features that are disabled in the normal CPUID. */ for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xsave_cpuid_features); i++) { -if (!boot_cpu_has (xsave_cpuid_features[i])) - xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i);
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +10
-0+if (xsave_cpuid_features[i] ==X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) { +/* +* X86_FEATURE_SHSTK and X86_FEATURE_IBT share +* same states, but can be enabled separately. +*/ +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + }else { + if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] == -1) ||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
That is a new check. I guess it could be done first to simplify the code:
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xsave_cpuid_features); i++) {
if (xsave_cpuid_features[i] == -1) {
xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL(i);
continue;
}
/* the rest of the bla */Yes?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
In reply to Yu-cheng YuQuoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) adds five MSRs. Introduce them and their XSAVES supervisor states:
MSR_IA32_U_CET(user-mode CET settings),MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP(user-mode Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP(kernel-mode Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP(Privilege Level 1 Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP(Privilege Level 2 Shadow Stack pointer).
This patch goes into a bunch of XSAVE work that this changelog only briefly touches on. I think it needs to be beefed up a bit.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +0
-2@@ -835,8 +843,19 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)* Clear XSAVE features that are disabled in the normal CPUID. */ for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xsave_cpuid_features); i++) { -if (!boot_cpu_has (xsave_cpuid_features[i])) - xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i);
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) · line 855
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +10
-0+if (xsave_cpuid_features[i] ==X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) { +/* +* X86_FEATURE_SHSTK and X86_FEATURE_IBT share +* same states, but can be enabled separately. +*/ +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + }else { + if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] == -1) ||
Where did the -1 come from? Was that introduced earlier in this series?
I don't see any way a xsave_cpuid_features[] can be -1 in the current tree.
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) · line 859
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +3
-0+ !boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[i])) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + } }
Do we have any other spots in the kernel where we care about:
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)
? If so, we could also address this by declaring a software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET and then setting it if SHSTK||IBT is supported, then we just put that one feature in xsave_cpuid_features[].
I'm also not crazy about the loop as it is. I'd much rather see this in a helper like:
bool cpu_supports_xsave_deps(int xfeature)
{
bool ret;
ret = boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[xfeature])
/*
* X86_FEATURE_SHSTK is checked in xsave_cpuid_features()
* but the CET states are needed if either SHSTK or IBT are
* available.
*/
if (xfeature == XFEATURE_CET_USER ||
xfeature == XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)
ret |= boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)
return ret;
}See how that's extensible? You can add as many special cases as you want.
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 4 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) adds five MSRs. Introduce them and their XSAVES supervisor states:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
MSR_IA32_U_CET(user-mode CET settings),MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP(user-mode Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP(kernel-mode Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP(Privilege Level 1 Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP(Privilege Level 2 Shadow Stack pointer).This patch goes into a bunch of XSAVE work that this changelog only briefly touches on. I think it needs to be beefed up a bit.
I will do that.
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +5
-2@@ -835,8 +843,19 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)* Clear XSAVE features that are disabled in the normal CPUID. */ for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xsave_cpuid_features); i++) { -if (!boot_cpu_has (xsave_cpuid_features[i])) - xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); +if (xsave_cpuid_features[i] ==X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) { +/* +* X86_FEATURE_SHSTK and X86_FEATURE_IBT share +* same states, but can be enabled separately. +*/
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) · line 855
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +5
-0+if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + }else { + if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] == -1) ||Where did the -1 come from? Was that introduced earlier in this series?
I don't see any way a xsave_cpuid_features[] can be -1 in the current tree.
Yes, we used to have a hole in xsave_cpuid_features[] and put -1 there. Do we want to keep this in case we again have holes in the future?
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) · line 859
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +3
-0+ !boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[i])) + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL (i); + } }Do we have any other spots in the kernel where we care about:
Quoted 6 lines
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)? If so, we could also address this by declaring a software-defined
X86_FEATURE_CETand then setting it if SHSTK||IBT is supported, then we just put that one feature in xsave_cpuid_features[].
That is a better solution. I will look into that.
Quoted 22 lines
I'm also not crazy about the loop as it is. I'd much rather see this in a helper like:
bool
cpu_supports_xsave_deps(int xfeature){ bool ret; ret = boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[xfeature]) /* * X86_FEATURE_SHSTK is checked in xsave_cpuid_features() * but the CET states are needed if either SHSTK or IBT are * available. */ if (xfeature == XFEATURE_CET_USER || xfeature == XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL) ret |= boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT) return ret; }
Quoted 2 lines
See how that's extensible? You can add as many special cases as you want.
Yes.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 6 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) +
xfeatures_mask_all&= ~BIT_ULL(i); + } else {
+ if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] == -1) ||
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Where did the -1 come from? Was that introduced earlier in this series? I don't see any way a xsave_cpuid_features[] can be -1 in the current tree.
Yes, we used to have a hole in xsave_cpuid_features[] and put -1 there. Do we want to keep this in case we again have holes in the future?
So, it's dead code for the moment and it's impossible to tell what -1 means without looking at git history? That seems, um, suboptimal.
Shouldn't we have:
#define XFEATURE_NO_DEP -1
?
And then this code becomes:
if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] == XFEATURE_NO_DEP)) // skip it...
We can even put a comment in xsave_cpuid_features[] to tell folks to use it.
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 23 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) +
xfeatures_mask_all&= ~BIT_ULL(i); + } else {
+ if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] == -1) ||Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Where did the -1 come from? Was that introduced earlier in this series?
I don't see any way a xsave_cpuid_features[] can be -1 in the
current tree.Yes, we used to have a hole in xsave_cpuid_features[] and put -1 there. Do we want to keep this in case we again have holes in the future?
So, it's dead code for the moment and it's impossible to tell what -1 means without looking at git history? That seems, um, suboptimal.
Shouldn't we have:
#define
XFEATURE_NO_DEP-1?
Quoted 8 lines
And then this code becomes:
if ((xsave_cpuid_features[i] == XFEATURE_NO_DEP)) // skip it...We can even put a comment in xsave_cpuid_features[] to tell folks to use it.
Yes, I will work on that.
Yu-cheng
Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) adds five MSRs. Introduce them and their XSAVES supervisor states:
MSR_IA32_U_CET(user-mode CET settings),MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP(user-mode Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP(kernel-mode Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP(Privilege Level 1 Shadow Stack pointer),MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP(Privilege Level 2 Shadow Stack pointer).This patch goes into a bunch of XSAVE work that this changelog only briefly touches on. I think it needs to be beefed up a bit.
[...]
Quoted 10 lines
Do we have any other spots in the kernel where we care about:
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)? If so, we could also address this by declaring a software-defined
X86_FEATURE_CETand then setting it if SHSTK||IBT is supported, then we just put that one feature in xsave_cpuid_features[].
These features have different CPUIDs but are complementary parts. I don't know if someday there will be shadow-stack-only CPUs, but an IBT-only CPU is weird. What if the kernel checks that the CPU has both features and presents only one feature flag (X86_FEATURE_CET), no X86_FEATURE_SHSTK or X86_FEATURE_IBT?
Re: [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines
Do we have any other spots in the kernel where we care about:
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)? If so, we could also address this by declaring a software-defined
X86_FEATURE_CETand then setting it if SHSTK||IBT is supported, then we just put that one feature in xsave_cpuid_features[].
Quoted 5 lines
These features have different CPUIDs but are complementary parts. I don't know if someday there will be shadow-stack-only CPUs, but an IBT-only CPU is weird. What if the kernel checks that the CPU has both features and presents only one feature flag (
X86_FEATURE_CET), noX86_FEATURE_SHSTKorX86_FEATURE_IBT?
Logically, that's probably fine. But, X86_FEATURE_IBT/SHSTK are in a non-scattered leaf, so we'll kinda define them whether we like it or not. We'd have to go out of our way to *not* define them.
Re: [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 18 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 10 lines
Do we have any other spots in the kernel where we care about:
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)? If so, we could also address this by declaring a software-defined
X86_FEATURE_CETand then setting it if SHSTK||IBT is supported, then we just put that one feature in xsave_cpuid_features[].Quoted 5 lines
These features have different CPUIDs but are complementary parts. I don't know if someday there will be shadow-stack-only CPUs, but an IBT-only CPU is weird. What if the kernel checks that the CPU has both features and presents only one feature flag (
X86_FEATURE_CET), noX86_FEATURE_SHSTKorX86_FEATURE_IBT?
Quoted 4 lines
Logically, that's probably fine. But, X86_FEATURE_IBT/SHSTK are in a non-scattered leaf, so we'll kinda define them whether we like it or not. We'd have to go out of our way to *not* define them.
After more thoughts, I think it is better to just add X86_FEATURE_CET and not more. We cannot predict what is going to happen later. So, like what you suggested, X86_FEATURE_CET means (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK | X86_FEATURE_IBT).
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
PATCH v15 4/26 x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the Shadow Stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.
The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +4 -0
@@ -577,6 +577,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_SS, exc_stack_segment);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_GP , exc_general_protection);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_AC , exc_alignment_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_CP , exc_control_protection); +#endif +/* Raw exception entries which need extra work */ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW (X86_TRAP_UD , exc_invalid_op);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW (X86_TRAP_BP , exc_int3);
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +4 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32 ) SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_32),#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET + INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, asm_exc_control_protection), +#endif };/*
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c +1 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)*/ BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGILL !=11 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGFPE !=15 ); -BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGSEGV !=9 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGSEGV !=10 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGBUS !=5 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGTRAP !=5 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGCHLD !=6 );
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +59 -0
65 lines not on this page · raw message
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2 -1
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7/* Precise MCD exception */ #define SEGV_MTEAERR 8/* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */ #define SEGV_MTESERR 9/* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */ -#define NSIGSEGV 9 +#define SEGV_CPERR 10/* Control protection fault */ +#define NSIGSEGV 10/* * SIGBUS si_codes
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 14 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +6
-0@@ -598,6 +598,65 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)cond_local_irq_disable (regs); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +static const char *const control_protection_err[] = { +"unknown" , +"near-ret" , +"far-ret/iret" , + "endbranch",
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 616
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +10
-0+"rstorssp" , + "setssbsy", +}; + +/* +* When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal +* to the responsible application. Currently, control +* protection is only enabled for the user mode. This +* exception should not come from the kernel mode. +*/
Make that 80 cols wide.
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 623
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +7
-0+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (exc_control_protection) +{ +struct task_struct *tsk; + +if (notify_die (DIE_TRAP ,"control protection fault" , regs, + error_code,X86_TRAP_CP ,SIGSEGV ) ==NOTIFY_STOP ) +return ;
What is the intent here, notifiers can prevent the machine from printing the CP error below?
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 627
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +4
-0+cond_local_irq_enable (regs); + +if (!user_mode (regs)) +die ("kernel control protection fault" , regs, error_code);
Let's write that more explicitly:
die("Unexpected/unsupported control protection fault"...
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 630
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +3
-0+ +if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT ))
Why static_cpu_has?
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 631
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +1
-0+WARN_ONCE (1 ,"CET is disabled but got control protection fault\n" );
"Control protection fault with CET support disabled\n"
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 644
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +13
-0+ + tsk = current; + tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; + tsk->thread.trap_nr =X86_TRAP_CP ; + +if (show_unhandled_signals &&unhandled_signal (tsk,SIGSEGV ) && +printk_ratelimit ()) { +unsigned int max_err; +unsigned long ssp; + + max_err =ARRAY_SIZE (control_protection_err) -1 ; +if ((error_code <0 ) || (error_code > max_err)) + error_code =0 ;
<---- newline here.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +8
-0+rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP , ssp); +pr_info ("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)" , + tsk->comm,task_pid_nr (tsk), + regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code, + control_protection_err[error_code]); +print_vma_addr (KERN_CONT " in " , regs->ip); +pr_cont ("\n" ); + }
...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePATCH v15 5/26 x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow Stack provides protection against function return address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER, and the application is built for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100755 scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
arch/x86/Kconfig +33 -0
@@ -1930,6 +1930,39 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter. endchoice +config AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh $(CC)) + help + Test the assembler for shadow stack instructions. + +config X86_CET + def_bool n + +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool n + +config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER + prompt "Intel Shadow Stacks for user-mode" + def_bool n + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 + depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select X86_CET + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + help + Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack + corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters + if you have the right hardware. It's a security hardening + feature and apps must be enabled to use it. You get no + protection "for free" on old userspace. The hardware can + support user and kernel, but this option is for user space + only. + Support for this feature is only known to be present on + processors released in 2020 or later. CET features are also + known to increase kernel text size by 3.7 KB. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI
scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh new file +4 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +echo "wrussq %rax, (%rbx)" | $* -x assembler -c -
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
arch/x86/Kconfig config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO · line 1944
Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/Kconfig +7
-0+config X86_CET + def_bool n + +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool n + +config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER
Is X86_SHADOW_STACK_KERNEL coming too?
Regardless, you can add it when it comes and you can use only X86_CET for now and drop this one and simplify this pile of Kconfig symbols.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +8
-0+ prompt "Intel Shadow Stacks for user-mode" + def_bool n + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 + depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select X86_CET + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + help
arch/x86/Kconfig config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO · line 1962
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +10
-0+ Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack + corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters + if you have the right hardware. It's a security hardening + feature and apps must be enabled to use it. You get no + protection "for free" on old userspace. The hardware can + support user and kernel, but this option is for user space + only. + Support for this feature is only known to be present on + processors released in 2020 or later. CET features are also + known to increase kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
This help text needs some rewriting. You can find an inspiration about more adequate style in that same Kconfig file.
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +3
-0+ + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPIscripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh new file +0
-0
scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh line 4
Quoted 4 lines
scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh new file +4
-0@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +echo "wrussq %rax, (%rbx)" | $* -x assembler -c -
2> /dev/null
otherwise you get
{standard input}: Assembler messages:
{standard input}:1: Error: no such instruction: `wrussq %rax,(%rbx)
on non-enlightened toolchains during build.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov
arch/x86/Kconfig config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO · line 1944
Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/Kconfig +7
-0+config X86_CET + def_bool n + +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool n + +config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USERIs
X86_SHADOW_STACK_KERNELcoming too?
Quoted 2 lines
Regardless, you can add it when it comes and you can use only
X86_CETfor now and drop this one and simplify this pile ofKconfigsymbols.
We have X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER too. My thought was, X86_CET means any of kernel/user shadow stack/ibt.
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +13
-0+ prompt "Intel Shadow Stacks for user-mode" + def_bool n + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 + depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select X86_CET + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + help + Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack + corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters + if you have the right hardware. It's a security hardening + feature and apps must be enabled to use it. You get no + protection "for free" on old userspace. The hardware can
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO · line 1962
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +5
-0+ support user and kernel, but this option is for user space + only. + Support for this feature is only known to be present on + processors released in 2020 or later. CET features are also + known to increase kernel text size by 3.7 KB.This help text needs some rewriting. You can find an inspiration about more adequate style in that same
Kconfigfile.
I will work on it.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +3
-0+ + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPIscripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh new file +0
-0scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh line 4
Quoted 4 lines
scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh new file +4
-0@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +echo "wrussq %rax, (%rbx)" | $* -x assembler -c -2> /dev/null
Quoted 7 lines
otherwise you get
{standard input}: Assembler messages:
{standard input}:1: Error: no such instruction: `wrussq %rax,(%rbx)on non-enlightened toolchains during build.
Yes, I will fix this in the next revision.
Yu-cheng
Quoted 2 lines
Thx.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
We have
X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USERtoo. My thought was,X86_CETmeans any of kernel/user shadow stack/ibt.
It is not about what it means - it is what you're going to use/need. You have ifdeffery both with X86_CET and X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER.
This one
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
for example, is clearly wrong and wants to be #ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET, for example. Unless I'm missing something totally obvious.
In any case, you need to analyze what Kconfig defines the code will need and to what they belong and add only the minimal subset needed. Our Kconfig symbols space is already nuts so adding more needs to be absolutely justified.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
Quoted 15 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
We have
X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USERtoo. My thought was,X86_CETmeans any of kernel/user shadow stack/ibt.It is not about what it means - it is what you're going to use/need. You have ifdeffery both with
X86_CETandX86_SHADOW_STACK_USER.This one
(quoted diff) +5
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif
Quoted 2 lines
for example, is clearly wrong and wants to be #ifdef
CONFIG_X86_CET, for example. Unless I'm missing something totally obvious.
Logically, enabling IBT without shadow stack does not make sense, but these features have different CPUIDs, and CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER and CONFIG_X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER can be selected separately.
Do we want to have only one selection for both features? In other words, we turn on both or neither.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Quoted 8 lines
In any case, you need to analyze what
Kconfigdefines the code will need and to what they belong and add only the minimal subset needed. OurKconfigsymbols space is already nuts so adding more needs to be absolutely justified.Thx.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
Quoted 6 lines · Yu-cheng
Logically, enabling IBT without shadow stack does not make sense, but these features have different CPUIDs, and
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USERandCONFIG_X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USERcan be selected separately.Do we want to have only one selection for both features? In other words, we turn on both or neither.
Question is, do they need to be handled separately at all?
If not and IOW, I like dhansen's X86_FEATURE_CET synthetic feature suggestion.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuIn response to https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/.
Hi Yu-cheng,
This feature reminds me very much of ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK/CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK implemented in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=5287569a790d2546a06db07e391bf84b8bd6cf51.
Do you think it would be worthwhile to share the same config name between x86 and aarch64?
(Though, it seems on x86 there will be a distinction between kernel mode and user mode configs, if I understand correctly?)
Re: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
Quoted 9 lines · Nick Desaulniers
In response to https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/.
Hi Yu-cheng,
This feature reminds me very much of ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK/CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK implemented in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=5287569a790d2546a06db07e391bf84b8bd6cf51.Do you think it would be worthwhile to share the same config name between x86 and aarch64?
The CET series has ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK. In response to Boris' earlier comment, I think this maybe eliminated. In case it is still needed, I think it is better to have different names (but I am open to changing it).
Quoted 4 lines
(Though, it seems on x86 there will be a distinction between kernel mode and user mode configs, if I understand correctly?)
Yes, on x86, kernel and user-mode can be enabled separately.
Yu-cheng
PATCH v15 6/26 x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuBefore introducing _PAGE_COW for non-hardware memory management purposes in the next patch, rename _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW and _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY to _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW to make meanings more clear. There are no functional changes from this patch.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 18 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +9 -9
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;*/ static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; }
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)static inline int pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; }static inline int pmd_young (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)static inline int pud_dirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; }static inline int pud_young (pud_t pud)
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte)
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte)
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); }static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkclean (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); }static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect (pud_t pud)
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap (pud_t pud)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +5 -5
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_PWT 3/* page write through */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PCD 4/* page cache disabled */ #define _PAGE_BIT_ACCESSED 5/* was accessed (raised by CPU) */ -#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY 6/* was written to (raised by CPU) */ +#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW 6/* was written to (raised by CPU) */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PSE 7/* 4 MB (or 2MB) page */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT 7/* on 4KB pages */ #define _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL 8/* Global TLB entry PPro+ */
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@#define _PAGE_PWT (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PWT)#define _PAGE_PCD (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PCD)#define _PAGE_ACCESSED (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_ACCESSED) -#define _PAGE_DIRTY (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY) +#define _PAGE_DIRTY_HW (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW)#define _PAGE_PSE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PSE)#define _PAGE_GLOBAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL)#define _PAGE_SOFTW1 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1)
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3)#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64 ) || defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE ) -#define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +#define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)#else #define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK 0#endif
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@* pte_modify() does modify it. */ #define _PAGE_CHG_MASK (PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT | \ - _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | \ + _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | \ _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY | _PAGE_DEVMAP | _PAGE_ENC | \ _PAGE_UFFD_WP)#define _HPAGE_CHG_MASK (_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PSE)
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {#define __RW _PAGE_RW#define _USR _PAGE_USER#define ___A _PAGE_ACCESSED -#define ___D _PAGE_DIRTY +#define ___D _PAGE_DIRTY_HW#define ___G _PAGE_GLOBAL#define __NX _PAGE_NX
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +1 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ */ #define PTR(x) (x << 3) -#define PAGE_ATTR (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY) +#define PAGE_ATTR (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) /* * control_page + KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
@@ -3574,7 +3574,7 @@ static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */ for (i =0 ; i <PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE ; i++) { tmp = (i <<22 ) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | - _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE); + _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_PSE); r =kvm_write_guest_page (kvm, identity_map_pfn, &tmp, i *sizeof (tmp),sizeof (tmp));if (r <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
Quoted 4 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Before introducing
_PAGE_COWfor non-hardware memory management purposes in the next patch, rename_PAGE_DIRTYto_PAGE_DIRTY_HWand_PAGE_BIT_DIRTYto_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HWto make meanings more clear. There are no functional changes from this patch.
There's no guarantee for "next" or "this" patch when a patch gets applied so reword your commit message pls.
Also, I fail to understand here what _PAGE_DIRTY_HW makes more clear? The page dirty bit is clear enough to me so why the churn?
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Before introducing
_PAGE_COWfor non-hardware memory management purposes in the next patch, rename_PAGE_DIRTYto_PAGE_DIRTY_HWand_PAGE_BIT_DIRTYto_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HWto make meanings more clear. There are no functional changes from this patch.There's no guarantee for "next" or "this" patch when a patch gets applied so reword your commit message pls.
Also, I fail to understand here what
_PAGE_DIRTY_HWmakes more clear? The page dirty bit is clear enough to me so why the churn?
Once upon a time in this set, we had:
_PAGE_DIRTY (the old hardware bit)
and
_PAGE_DIRTY_SW (the new shadow stack necessitated bit)
In *that* case, it made sense to change the name of the hardware one to help differentiate them. But, over time, we changed _PAGE_DIRTY_SW to _PAGE_COW.
I think you're right. The renaming is just churn now with the current naming.
Re: [PATCH v15 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
Quoted 18 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Before introducing
_PAGE_COWfor non-hardware memory management purposes in the next patch, rename_PAGE_DIRTYto_PAGE_DIRTY_HWand_PAGE_BIT_DIRTYto_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HWto make meanings more clear. There are no functional changes from this patch.There's no guarantee for "next" or "this" patch when a patch gets applied so reword your commit message pls.
Also, I fail to understand here what
_PAGE_DIRTY_HWmakes more clear? The page dirty bit is clear enough to me so why the churn?Once upon a time in this set, we had:
_PAGE_DIRTY(the old hardware bit)
and
_PAGE_DIRTY_SW(the new shadow stack necessitated bit)
Quoted 7 lines
In *that* case, it made sense to change the name of the hardware one to help differentiate them. But, over time, we changed
_PAGE_DIRTY_SWto_PAGE_COW.I think you're right. The renaming is just churn now with the current naming.
Ok, I will drop this patch.
PATCH v15 7/26 x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages
In reply to Yu-cheng YuKernel read-only PTEs are setup as _PAGE_DIRTY_HW. Since these become shadow stack PTEs, remove the dirty bit.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +3 -3
@@ -193,10 +193,10 @@ enum page_cache_mode {#define _KERNPG_TABLE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC)#define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0)#define _PAGE_TABLE (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __NC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __WP)
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +1 -1
@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)int set_memory_ro (unsigned long addr,int numpages) { -return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW),0 ); +return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW),0 ); }int set_memory_rw (unsigned long addr,int numpages)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Kernel read-only PTEs are setup as
_PAGE_DIRTY_HW. Since these become shadow stack PTEs, remove the dirty bit.
This commit message is laconic to say the least. You need to start explaining what you're doing because everytime I look at a patch of yours, I'm always grepping the SDM and looking forward in the patchset, trying to rhyme up what that is all about.
Like for this one. I had to fast-forward to the next patch where all that is explained. But this is not how review works - each patch's commit message needs to be understandable on its own because when they land upstream, they're not in a patchset like here. And review should be done in the order the patches are numbered - not by jumping back'n'forth.
So please think of the readers of your patches when writing those commit messages. Latter are *not* write-only and not unimportant.
And those readers haven't spent copious amounts of time on the technology so being more verbose and explaining things is a Good Thing(tm). Don't worry about explaining too much - better too much than too little.
And last but not least, having understandable and properly written commit messages increases the chances of your patches landing upstream considerably.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages
Quoted 24 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Kernel read-only PTEs are setup as
_PAGE_DIRTY_HW. Since these become shadow stack PTEs, remove the dirty bit.This commit message is laconic to say the least. You need to start explaining what you're doing because everytime I look at a patch of yours, I'm always grepping the SDM and looking forward in the patchset, trying to rhyme up what that is all about.
Like for this one. I had to fast-forward to the next patch where all that is explained. But this is not how review works - each patch's commit message needs to be understandable on its own because when they land upstream, they're not in a patchset like here. And review should be done in the order the patches are numbered - not by jumping back'n'forth.
So please think of the readers of your patches when writing those commit messages. Latter are *not* write-only and not unimportant.
And those readers haven't spent copious amounts of time on the technology so being more verbose and explaining things is a Good Thing(tm). Don't worry about explaining too much - better too much than too little.
Quoted 6 lines
And last but not least, having understandable and properly written commit messages increases the chances of your patches landing upstream considerably.
Thx.
Thanks for your feedback. I will improve the commit logs.
--
Yu-cheng
PATCH v15 8/26 x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes (not Linux). That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1.
The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by hardware and cannot normally be set by hardware on a Write=0 PTE. Software must normally be involved to create one of these PTEs, so software can simply opt to not create them.
But that leaves us with a Linux problem: we need to ensure we never create Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs. In places where we do create them, we need to find an alternative way to represent them _without_ using the same hardware bit combination. Thus, enter _PAGE_COW. This results in the following:
(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (R/O + _PAGE_COW)
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (R/O + _PAGE_COW)
The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a writable copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as R/O and _PAGE_COW.
(c) A shadow stack PTE: (R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW)
(d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (R/O + _PAGE_COW)
When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is cleared of _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, so the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is set again. This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE. That's possible today, but will not happen on processors that support shadow stack.
Use _PAGE_COW in pte_wrprotect() and _PAGE_DIRTY_HW in pte_mkwrite(). Apply the same changes to pmd and pud.
When this patch is applied, there are six free bits left in the 64-bit PTE. There are no more free bits in the 32-bit PTE (except for PAE) and shadow stack is not implemented for the 32-bit kernel.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 41 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +110 -10
@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;* The following only work if pte_present() is true. * Undefined behaviour if not.. */ -static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) +static inline bool pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }
@@ -160,9 +160,9 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) +static inline bool pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }static inline int pmd_young (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -170,9 +170,9 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pud_dirty (pud_t pud) +static inline bool pud_dirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }static inline int pud_young (pud_t pud)
@@ -182,6 +182,12 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)static inline int pte_write (pte_t pte) { +/* +* If _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is set, the PTE must either have +* _PAGE_RW or be a shadow stack PTE, which is logically writable. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pte_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW; }
@@ -333,7 +339,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte)
@@ -343,6 +349,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PTE (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { + pte.pte |= (pte.pte & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> + _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << _PAGE_BIT_COW; + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -353,6 +370,18 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) { +pteval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1,Write=0 PTEs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !pte_write (pte)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pte_set_flags (pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte_t pte) +{ + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW);return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }
@@ -363,6 +392,13 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) { +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_COW) { + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW); + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } + } +return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -434,16 +470,41 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PMD (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pmdval_t v =native_pmd_val (pmd); + + v |= (v & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << + _PAGE_BIT_COW; + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (__pmd (v), _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { +pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1,Write=0 PMDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd_t pmd) +{ + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW);return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }
@@ -464,6 +525,13 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) { +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_COW) { + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW); + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } + } +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -488,17 +556,36 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkclean (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect (pud_t pud) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PUD (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pudval_t v =native_pud_val (pud); + + v |= (v & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << + _PAGE_BIT_COW; + pud =pud_clear_flags (__pud (v), _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1,Write=0 PUDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pud_set_flags (pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap (pud_t pud)
@@ -518,6 +605,13 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite (pud_t pud) { +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_COW) { + pud =pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_COW); + pud =pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); + } + } +return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); }
@@ -1131,6 +1225,12 @@ extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,#define pmd_write pmd_writestatic inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) { +/* +* If _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is set, then the PMD must either have +* _PAGE_RW or be a shadow stack PMD, which is logically writable. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pmd_flags (pmd) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW; }
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +40 -1
59 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 4 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
There is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes (not Linux). That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1.
It is not clear to me what the definition and semantics of that bit is.
+#define _PAGE_BIT_COW _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* copy-on-write */
Is it set by hw or by sw and hw uses it to know it is a shadow stack page, and so on.
I think you should lead with its definition.
Quoted 6 lines
The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by hardware and cannot normally be set by hardware on a Write=0 PTE. Software must normally be involved to create one of these PTEs, so software can simply opt to not create them.
But that leaves us with a Linux problem: we need to ensure we never create
Please use passive voice in your commit message: no "we" or "I", etc.
Quoted 6 lines
Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs. In places where we do create them, we need to find an alternative way to represent them _without_ using the same hardware bit combination. Thus, enter
_PAGE_COW. This results in the following:(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (R/O +
_PAGE_COW)
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (R/O +_PAGE_COW)
Both are "R/O + _PAGE_COW". Where's the difference? The dirty bit?
Quoted 4 lines
The user page is in a R/O VMA, and
get_user_pages()needs a writable copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as R/O and_PAGE_COW.
(c) A shadow stack PTE: (R/O +_PAGE_DIRTY_HW)
So W=0, D=1 ?
Quoted 8 lines
(d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (R/O +
_PAGE_COW)
When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens atfork()), its PTE is cleared of_PAGE_DIRTY_HW, so the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and_PAGE_DIRTY_HWis set again. This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE.
How does that happen? Something changed the PTE's W bit to 0 in-between?
Quoted 7 lines
That's possible today, but
will not happen on processors that support shadow stack.Use
_PAGE_COWinpte_wrprotect()and_PAGE_DIRTY_HWinpte_mkwrite(). Apply the same changes to pmd and pud.When this patch is applied, there are six free bits left in the 64-bit PTE.
s/When this patch is applied/After this/
Avoid having "This patch" or "This commit" in the commit message. It is tautologically useless.
Also, do
$ git grep 'This patch' Documentation/process
for more details.
Quoted 14 lines
There are no more free bits in the 32-bit PTE (except for PAE) and shadow stack is not implemented for the 32-bit kernel.
Signed-off-by Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 41 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +0
-0
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags; · line 126
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +2
-2@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;* The following only work if pte_present() is true. * Undefined behaviour if not.. */ -static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) +static inline bool pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
Why?
Does _PAGE_COW mean dirty too?
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte) · line 359
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +8
-0@@ -343,6 +349,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PTE (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { + pte.pte |= (pte.pte & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> + _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << _PAGE_BIT_COW;
Let that line stick out. And that shifting is not grokkable at a quick glance, at least not to me. Simplify?
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd) · line 481
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-0static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PMD (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit.
This whole carefully sidestepping the possiblity of creating a shadow stack pXd is kinda sucky...
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +2
-1@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2 10/* " */ #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 11/* " */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE 12/* On 2MB or 1GB pages */ -#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 58/* available for programmer */ +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 57/* available for programmer */ +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 58/* available for programmer */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0 59/* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1 60/* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2 61/* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h line 44
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +5
-0@@ -36,6 +37,16 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3/* software dirty tracking */ #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 +/* +* This bit indicates a copy-on-write page, and is different from +* _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY, which tracks which pages a task writes to. +*/ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
CONFIG_X86_64 ? Do all x86 machines out there support CET?
If anything, CONFIG_X86_CET...
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +5
-0+#define _PAGE_BIT_COW _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5/* copy-on-write */ +#else +#define _PAGE_BIT_COW 0 +#endif +/* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */ /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
There is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes (not Linux). That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1.
Quoted 8 lines
It is not clear to me what the definition and semantics of that bit is.
+#define
_PAGE_BIT_COW_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5/* copy-on-write */Is it set by hw or by sw and hw uses it to know it is a shadow stack page, and so on.
I think you should lead with its definition.
Ok.
...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs. In places where we do create them, we need to find an alternative way to represent them _without_ using the same hardware bit combination. Thus, enter
_PAGE_COW. This results in the following:(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (R/O +
_PAGE_COW)
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (R/O +_PAGE_COW)Both are "R/O +
_PAGE_COW". Where's the difference? The dirty bit?
The PTEs are the same for both (a) and (b), but come from different routes.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The user page is in a R/O VMA, and
get_user_pages()needs a writable copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as R/O and_PAGE_COW.
(c) A shadow stack PTE: (R/O +_PAGE_DIRTY_HW)So W=0, D=1 ?
Yes.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
(d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (R/O +
_PAGE_COW)
When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens atfork()), its PTE is cleared of_PAGE_DIRTY_HW, so the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and_PAGE_DIRTY_HWis set again. This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE.How does that happen? Something changed the PTE's W bit to 0 in-between?
Yes.
...
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags; · line 126
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +2
-2@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;* The following only work if pte_present() is true. * Undefined behaviour if not.. */ -static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) +static inline bool pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW; +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;Why?
Quoted 1 line
Does
_PAGE_COWmean dirty too?
Yes. Basically [read-only & dirty] is created by software. Now the software uses a different bit.
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte) · line 359
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +8
-0@@ -343,6 +349,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PTE (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { + pte.pte |= (pte.pte & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >> + _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << _PAGE_BIT_COW;Let that line stick out. And that shifting is not grokkable at a quick glance, at least not to me. Simplify?
Ok.
Quoted 36 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd) · line 481
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-0static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd) { +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PMD (RW=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. This whole carefully sidestepping the possiblity of creating a shadow stack pXd is kinda sucky...
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +2
-1@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2 10/* " */ #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 11/* " */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE 12/* On 2MB or 1GB pages */ -#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 58/* available for programmer */ +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 57/* available for programmer */ +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 58/* available for programmer */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0 59/* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1 60/* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */ #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2 61/* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h line 44
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +5
-0@@ -36,6 +37,16 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3/* software dirty tracking */ #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 +/* +* This bit indicates a copy-on-write page, and is different from +* _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY, which tracks which pages a task writes to. +*/ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
CONFIG_X86_64? Do all x86 machines out there support CET?
Quoted 1 line
If anything,
CONFIG_X86_CET...
Ok.
--
Yu-cheng
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 3 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 1 line
Both are "R/O +
_PAGE_COW". Where's the difference? The dirty bit?The PTEs are the same for both (a) and (b), but come from different routes.
Do not be afraid to go into detail and explain to me what those routes are please.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE.
How does that happen? Something changed the PTE's W bit to 0 in-between?
Yes.
Also do not scare from going into detail and explaining what you mean here. Example?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Does
_PAGE_COWmean dirty too?Yes. Basically [read-only & dirty] is created by software. Now the software uses a different bit.
That convention:
"[read-only & dirty] is created by software."
needs some prominent writeup somewhere explaining what it is.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 1 line
Both are "R/O +
_PAGE_COW". Where's the difference? The dirty bit?The PTEs are the same for both (a) and (b), but come from different routes.
Do not be afraid to go into detail and explain to me what those routes are please.
Case (a) is a normal writable data page that has gone through fork(). So it has W=0, D=1. But here, the software chooses not to use the D bit, and instead, W=0, COW=1.
Case (b) is a normal read-only data page. Since it is read-only, fork() won't affect it. In __get_user_pages(), a copy of the read-only page is needed, and the page is duplicated. The software sets COW=1 for the new copy.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE.
How does that happen? Something changed the PTE's W bit to 0 in-between?
Yes.
Also do not scare from going into detail and explaining what you mean here. Example?
Thread-A is writing to a writable page, and the page's PTE is becoming W=1, D=1. In the middle of it, Thread-B is changing the PTE to W=0.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Does
_PAGE_COWmean dirty too?Yes. Basically [read-only & dirty] is created by software. Now the software uses a different bit.
Quoted 8 lines
That convention:
"[read-only & dirty] is created by software."
needs some prominent writeup somewhere explaining what it is.
Thx.
I will put these into the comments.
--
Yu-cheng
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 1 line · Yu-cheng
Case (a) is a normal writable data page that has gone through
fork(). So it
Writable?
Quoted 1 line
has W=0, D=1. But here, the software chooses not to use the D bit, and
But it has W=0. So not writable?
Quoted 1 line
instead, W=0, COW=1.
So the "new" way of denoting that the page is modified is COW=1 *when* on CET hw. The D=1 bit is still used on the rest thus the two _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS.
Am I close?
Quoted 4 lines
Case (b) is a normal read-only data page. Since it is read-only,
fork()won't affect it. In__get_user_pages(), a copy of the read-only page is needed, and the page is duplicated. The software sets COW=1 for the new copy.
That makes more sense.
Quoted 2 lines
Thread-A is writing to a writable page, and the page's PTE is becoming W=1, D=1. In the middle of it, Thread-B is changing the PTE to W=0.
Yah, add that to the explanation pls.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v15 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Yu-cheng
Case (a) is a normal writable data page that has gone through
fork(). So itWritable >
Quoted 1 line
has W=0, D=1. But here, the software chooses not to use the D bit, and
But it has W=0. So not writable?
Maybe I will change to: A page in a writable vma, has been modified and gone through fork().
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
instead, W=0, COW=1.
So the "new" way of denoting that the page is modified is COW=1 *when* on CET hw. The D=1 bit is still used on the rest thus the two
_PAGE_DIRTY_BITS.Am I close?
COW=1 is only used in copy-on-write situation (when CET is enabled). If W=1, D bit is used.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Case (b) is a normal read-only data page. Since it is read-only,
fork()won't affect it. In__get_user_pages(), a copy of the read-only page is needed, and the page is duplicated. The software sets COW=1 for the new copy.
Quoted 7 lines
That makes more sense.
Quoted 2 lines
Thread-A is writing to a writable page, and the page's PTE is becoming W=1, D=1. In the middle of it, Thread-B is changing the PTE to W=0.
Yah, add that to the explanation pls.
Sure.
PATCH v15 9/26 drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAfter the introduction of _PAGE_COW, a modified page's PTE can have either _PAGE_DIRTY_HW or _PAGE_COW. Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c +1 -1
@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ static int split_2MB_gtt_entry(struct intel_vgpu *vgpu, }/* Clear dirty field. */ - se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY; + se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; ops->clear_pse (se); ops->clear_ips (se);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 10/26 x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuPte_modify() changes a PTE to 'newprot'. It doesn't use the pte_*() helpers that a previous patch fixed up, so we need a new site.
Introduce fixup_dirty_pte() to set the dirty bits based on _PAGE_RW, and apply the same changes to pmd_modify().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +33 -0
@@ -726,6 +726,21 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkinvalid(pmd_t pmd)static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard (u64 oldval,u64 val,u64 mask); +static inline pteval_t fixup_dirty_pte (pteval_t pteval) +{ +pte_t pte =__pte (pteval); + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) &&pte_dirty (pte)) { + pte =pte_mkclean (pte); + +if (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +else + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW); + } +return pte_val (pte); +} +static inline pte_t pte_modify (pte_t pte,pgprot_t newprot) {pteval_t val =pte_val (pte), oldval = val;
@@ -736,16 +751,34 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)*/ val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pte (val); val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PTE_PFN_MASK );return __pte (val); } +static inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd); +static inline pmdval_t fixup_dirty_pmd (pmdval_t pmdval) +{ +pmd_t pmd =__pmd (pmdval); + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd)) { + pmd =pmd_mkclean (pmd); + +if (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW) + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW); +else + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW); + } +return pmd_val (pmd); +} +static inline pmd_t pmd_modify (pmd_t pmd,pgprot_t newprot) {pmdval_t val =pmd_val (pmd), oldval = val; val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pmd (val); val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK );return __pmd (val); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 11/26 x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuWhen shadow stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW] PTE is reserved for shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW].
When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:
The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient shadow stack PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting shadow stack, therefore we don't need a TLB flush here.
The second case is that when the software, without atomic, tests & replaces _PAGE_DIRTY_HW with _PAGE_COW, a transient shadow stack PTE can exist. This is prevented with cmpxchg.
Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +52 -0
@@ -1229,6 +1229,32 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pte_t *ptep) { +/* +* Some processors can start a write, but end up seeing a read-only +* PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit. In this case, they +* will set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty PTE which +* looks like a shadow stack PTE. +* +* However, this behavior has been improved and will not occur on +* processors supporting shadow stack. Without this guarantee, a +* transition to a non-present PTE and flush the TLB would be +* needed. +* +* When changing a writable PTE to read-only and if the PTE has +* _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, move that bit to _PAGE_COW so that the +* PTE is not a shadow stack PTE. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pte_t old_pte, new_pte; + +do { + old_pte =READ_ONCE (*ptep); + new_pte =pte_wrprotect (old_pte); + + }while (!try_cmpxchg (&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte)); + +return ; + }clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte); }
@@ -1285,6 +1311,32 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pmd_t *pmdp) { +/* +* Some processors can start a write, but end up seeing a read-only +* PMD by the time they get to the Dirty bit. In this case, they +* will set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty PMD which +* looks like a Shadow Stack PMD. +* +* However, this behavior has been improved and will not occur on +* processors supporting Shadow Stack. Without this guarantee, a +* transition to a non-present PMD and flush the TLB would be +* needed. +* +* When changing a writable PMD to read-only and if the PMD has +* _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, we move that bit to _PAGE_COW so that the +* PMD is not a shadow stack PMD. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd; + +do { + old_pmd =READ_ONCE (*pmdp); + new_pmd =pmd_wrprotect (old_pmd); + + }while (!try_cmpxchg ((pmdval_t *)pmdp, (pmdval_t *)&old_pmd,pmd_val (new_pmd))); + +return ; + }clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 12/26 mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA Shadow Stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set. However, read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages. These two cases are handled differently for page faults. Introduce VM_SHSTK to track shadow stack VMAs.
--- arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 ++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++ include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c +2 -0
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy)const char *arch_vma_name (struct vm_area_struct *vma) { +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) +return "[shadow stack]" ;return NULL ; }
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +3 -0
@@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) [ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)] = "",#endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER + [ilog2(VM_SHSTK)] = "ss", +#endif };size_t i;
include/linux/mm.h +8 -0
@@ -304,11 +304,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4) +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -324,6 +326,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER +# define VM_SHSTK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 +#else +# define VM_SHSTK VM_NONE +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_X86 )# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 13/26 x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performed implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like WRUSSQ.
Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write.
Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping.
In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are handled as a write access.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_PROT =1 <<0 ,
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_RSVD =1 <<3 ,X86_PF_INSTR =1 <<4 ,X86_PF_PK =1 <<5 , + X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6, };#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAP_PF_H */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +19 -0
@@ -1110,6 +1110,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))return 1 ; +/* +* Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA. +* It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a +* shadow stack area is checked in the case followed. +*/ +if (error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) { +if (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } +if (error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) {/* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )))
@@ -1275,6 +1286,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,perf_sw_event (PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS ,1 , regs, address); +/* +* Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is used to detect shadow stack access. +* This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write. +* For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect +* copy-on-write. +*/ +if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) + flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_INSTR )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 14/26 x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow stack memory is writable, but its VMA has VM_SHSTK instead of VM_WRITE. Update maybe_mkwrite() to include the shadow stack.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ include/linux/pgtable.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/huge_memory.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -1938,6 +1938,9 @@ config AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK config X86_CET def_bool n +config ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE + def_bool n + config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK def_bool n
@@ -1948,6 +1951,7 @@ config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS select X86_CET + select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK help Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +18 -0
@@ -610,6 +610,24 @@ int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE +pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) + pte =pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte); +return pte; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) + pmd =pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd); +return pmd; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +/** * reserve_top_address - reserves a hole in the top of kernel address space * @reserve - size of hole to reserve
include/linux/mm.h +2 -0
@@ -977,6 +977,8 @@ static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); +else + pte =arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte, vma);return pte; }
include/linux/pgtable.h +24 -0
@@ -1384,6 +1384,30 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void) }#endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE +pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma); +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + +#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +static inline pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return pte; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +static inline pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return pmd; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +/* * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks *
mm/huge_memory.c +2 -0
@@ -464,6 +464,8 @@ pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd); +else + pmd =arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma);return pmd; }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 15/26 mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA shadow stack page is made writable by pte_mkwrite_shstk(), which sets _PAGE_DIRTY_HW. There are a few places that call pte_mkwrite() directly and miss the maybe_mkwrite() fixup in the previous patch. Fix them with maybe_mkwrite():
- do_anonymous_page() and migrate_vma_insert_page() check VM_WRITE directly and call pte_mkwrite(), which is the same as maybe_mkwrite(). Change them to maybe_mkwrite().
- In do_numa_page(), if the numa entry 'was-writable', then pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Fix it by doing maybe_mkwrite().
- In change_pte_range(), pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Replace it with maybe_mkwrite().
--- mm/memory.c | 5 ++--- mm/migrate.c | 3 +-- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +2 -3
@@ -3536,8 +3536,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) entry =mk_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot); entry =pte_sw_mkyoung (entry); -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =maybe_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); vmf->pte =pte_offset_map_lock (vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, &vmf->ptl);
@@ -4192,7 +4191,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) pte =pte_modify (old_pte, vma->vm_page_prot); pte =pte_mkyoung (pte);if (was_writable) - pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); + pte =maybe_mkwrite (pte, vma);ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, old_pte, pte);update_mmu_cache (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
mm/migrate.c +1 -2
@@ -2914,8 +2914,7 @@ static void migrate_vma_insert_page(struct migrate_vma *migrate, } }else { entry =mk_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot); -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =maybe_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); } ptep =pte_offset_map_lock (mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl);
mm/mprotect.c +1 -1
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,if (dirty_accountable &&pte_dirty (ptent) && (pte_soft_dirty (ptent) || !(vma->vm_flags &VM_SOFTDIRTY ))) { - ptent =pte_mkwrite (ptent); + ptent =maybe_mkwrite (ptent, vma); }ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, addr, pte, oldpte, ptent); pages++;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 16/26 mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
In reply to Yu-cheng YuINCSSP(Q/D) increments shadow stack pointer and 'pops and discards' the first and the last elements in the range, effectively touches those memory areas.
The maximum moving distance by INCSSPQ is 255 * 8 = 2040 bytes and 255 * 4 = 1020 bytes by INCSSPD. Both ranges are far from PAGE_SIZE. Thus, putting a gap page on both ends of a shadow stack prevents INCSSP, CALL, and RET from going beyond.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h +10 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,16 @@#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE_LOW#define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_MAX +/* +* Shadow stack pointer is moved by CALL, JMP, and INCSSP(Q/D). INCSSPQ +* moves shadow stack pointer up to 255 * 8 = ~2 KB (~1KB for INCSSPD) and +* touches the first and the last element in the range, which triggers a +* page fault if the range is not in a shadow stack. Because of this, +* creating 4-KB guard pages around a shadow stack prevents these +* instructions from going beyond. +*/ +#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP PAGE_SIZE +/* * Maximum kernel image size is limited to 1 GiB, due to the fixmap living * in the next 1 GiB (see level2_kernel_pgt in arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S).
include/linux/mm.h +20 -4
@@ -2639,6 +2639,10 @@ extern vm_fault_t filemap_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf);int __must_check write_one_page (struct page *page);void task_dirty_inc (struct task_struct *tsk); +#ifndef ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP +#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP 0 +#endif +extern unsigned long stack_guard_gap;/* Generic expand stack which grows the stack according to GROWS{UP,DOWN} */ extern int expand_stack (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long address);
@@ -2671,9 +2675,15 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * mstatic inline unsigned long vm_start_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start; +unsigned long gap =0 ; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) { - vm_start -= stack_guard_gap; +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) + gap = stack_guard_gap; +else if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) + gap =ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP ; + +if (gap !=0 ) { + vm_start -= gap;if (vm_start > vma->vm_start) vm_start =0 ; }
@@ -2683,9 +2693,15 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end; +unsigned long gap =0 ; + +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP ) + gap = stack_guard_gap; +else if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) + gap =ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP ; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP ) { - vm_end += stack_guard_gap; +if (gap !=0 ) { + vm_end += gap;if (vm_end < vma->vm_end) vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 17/26 mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAccount shadow stack pages to stack memory.
--- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/pgtable.h | 11 +++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +7 -0
@@ -893,3 +893,10 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK +bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ +return (vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ); +} +#endif
include/linux/pgtable.h +11 -0
@@ -1408,6 +1408,17 @@ static inline pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK +bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags); +#else +static inline bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +/* * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks *
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
@@ -1720,6 +1720,9 @@ static inline int accountable_mapping(struct file *file, vm_flags_t vm_flags)if (file &&is_file_hugepages (file))return 0 ; +if (arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags)) +return 1 ; +return (vm_flags & (VM_NORESERVE |VM_SHARED |VM_WRITE )) ==VM_WRITE ; }
@@ -3391,6 +3394,8 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, vm_flags_t flags, long npages) mm->stack_vm += npages; else if (is_data_mapping(flags)) mm->data_vm += npages; + else if (arch_shadow_stack_mapping(flags)) + mm->stack_vm += npages; }static vm_fault_t special_mapping_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 18/26 mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuCan_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.
Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty. Thus, in the can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check. Apply the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().
--- mm/gup.c | 8 +++++--- mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/gup.c +5 -3
@@ -391,10 +391,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte (pte_t pte,unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte (pte_t pte,unsigned int flags, +struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pte_write (pte) || - ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pte_dirty (pte)); + ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pte_dirty (pte) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vma->vm_flags)); } static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, }if ((flags &FOLL_NUMA ) &&pte_protnone (pte)) goto no_page; -if ((flags &FOLL_WRITE ) && !can_follow_write_pte (pte, flags)) { +if ((flags &FOLL_WRITE ) && !can_follow_write_pte (pte, flags, vma)) {pte_unmap_unlock (ptep, ptl);return NULL ; }
mm/huge_memory.c +5 -3
@@ -1324,10 +1324,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd (pmd_t pmd,unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd (pmd_t pmd,unsigned int flags, +struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pmd_write (pmd) || - ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd)); + ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vma->vm_flags)); } struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1340,7 +1342,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,assert_spin_locked (pmd_lockptr (mm, pmd)); -if (flags &FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd (*pmd, flags)) +if (flags &FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd (*pmd, flags, vma)) goto out;/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 19/26 mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was removed from the function's input by:
commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHSTK to do_mmap(). Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap(), but without the old wrapper do_mmap_pgoff(). Instead, make all callers of the wrapper pass a zero vm_flags to do_mmap().
--- fs/aio.c | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++- ipc/shm.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++----- mm/nommu.c | 4 ++-- mm/util.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +1 -1
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events) ctx->mmap_base =do_mmap (ctx->aio_ring_file,0 , ctx->mmap_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , -MAP_SHARED ,0 , &unused,NULL ); +MAP_SHARED ,0 ,0 , &unused,NULL );mmap_write_unlock (mm);if (IS_ERR ((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) { ctx->mmap_size =0 ;
include/linux/mm.h +2 -1
@@ -2584,7 +2584,8 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, struct list_head *uf);extern unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf); +vm_flags_t vm_flags,unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf);extern int __do_munmap (struct mm_struct *,unsigned long ,size_t ,struct list_head *uf,bool downgrade); extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
ipc/shm.c +1 -1
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, goto invalid; } - addr =do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 , &populate,NULL ); + addr =do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 ,0 , &populate,NULL ); *raddr = addr; err =0 ;if (IS_ERR_VALUE (addr))
mm/mmap.c +5 -5
@@ -1403,11 +1403,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,*/ unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot, -unsigned long flags,unsigned long pgoff, -unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf) +unsigned long flags,vm_flags_t vm_flags, +unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf) {struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;int pkey =0 ; *populate =0 ;
@@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open * of the memory object, so we don't do any here. */ - vm_flags =calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | + vm_flags |=calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | mm->def_flags |VM_MAYREAD |VM_MAYWRITE |VM_MAYEXEC ;if (flags &MAP_LOCKED )
@@ -3051,7 +3051,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, file =get_file (vma->vm_file); ret =do_mmap (vma->vm_file, start, size, - prot, flags, pgoff, &populate,NULL ); + prot, flags,0 , pgoff, &populate,NULL );fput (file); out:mmap_write_unlock (mm);
mm/nommu.c +2 -2
@@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1078,7 +1079,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma;struct vm_region *region;struct rb_node *rb; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;unsigned long capabilities, result;int ret;
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we * now know into VMA flags */ - vm_flags =determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities); + vm_flags |=determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities);/* we're going to need to record the mapping */ region =kmem_cache_zalloc (vm_region_jar,GFP_KERNEL );
mm/util.c +1 -1
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,if (!ret) {if (mmap_write_lock_killable (mm))return -EINTR ; - ret =do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate, + ret =do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flag,0 , pgoff, &populate, &uf);mmap_write_unlock (mm);userfaultfd_unmap_complete (mm, &uf);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 20/26 x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThis patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines. A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 28 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 28 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 + 7 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct task_struct ; +/* +* Per-thread CET status +*/ +struct cet_status { +unsigned long shstk_base; +unsigned long shstk_size; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +int cet_setup_shstk (void ); +void cet_disable_shstk (void ); +void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p); +#else +static inline void cet_disable_shstk (void ) {} +static inline void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {} +#endif + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@# define DISABLE_ENQCMD (1 << (X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD & 31))#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif +/* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */
@@ -82,7 +88,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK14 0#define DISABLED_MASK15 0#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \ - DISABLE_ENQCMD) + DISABLE_ENQCMD|DISABLE_SHSTK)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +5 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;#include <asm/unwind_hints.h> #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h> #include <asm/vdso/processor.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -536,6 +537,10 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +struct cet_status cet; +#endif +/* Floating point and extended processor state */ struct fpu fpu;/*
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c new file +147 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +28 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@#include <asm/microcode_intel.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> #include "cpu.h"
@@ -510,6 +511,32 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)__setup ("nopku" , setup_disable_pku);#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && + !cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) +return ; + +cr4_set_bits (X86_CR4_CET ); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER +static __init int setup_disable_shstk (char *s) +{ +/* require an exact match without trailing characters */ +if (s[0 ] !='\0' ) +return 0 ; + +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return 1 ; + +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); +pr_info ("x86: 'no_user_shstk' specified, disabling user Shadow Stack\n" ); +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("no_user_shstk" , setup_disable_shstk); +#endif +/* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1591,6 +1618,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)x86_init_rdrand (c);setup_pku (c); +setup_cet (c);/* * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include <asm/io_bitmap.h> #include <asm/proto.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include "process.h"
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 21/26 x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuTo deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put a restore token and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack. For sigreturn, verify the token and restore the shadow stack pointer.
Introduce WRUSS, which is a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack. It is used to construct the user signal stack as described above.
Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save shadow stack restore token address and WAIT_ENDBR status. WAIT_ENDBR will be introduced later in the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) series, but add that into sc_ext now to keep the struct stable in case the IBT series is applied later.
--- arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 17 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 10 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 10 ++ 8 files changed, 338 insertions(+)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c +17 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include <asm/sigframe.h> #include <asm/sighandling.h> #include <asm/smap.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> static inline void reload_segments (struct sigcontext_32 *sc) {
@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, void __user **fpstate) {unsigned long sp, fx_aligned, math_size; +void __user *restorer =NULL ;/* Default to using normal stack */ sp = regs->sp;
@@ -218,8 +220,23 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer) sp = (unsigned long ) ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer; +if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags &SA_RESTORER ) { + restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer; + }else if (current->mm->context.vdso) { +if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags &SA_SIGINFO ) + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso + + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_rt_sigreturn; +else + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso + + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_sigreturn; + } + sp =fpu__alloc_mathframe (sp,1 , &fx_aligned, &math_size); *fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp; + +if (save_cet_to_sigframe (1 , *fpstate, (unsigned long )restorer)) +return (void __user *)-1L ; +if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned, math_size) <0 )return (void __user *)-1L ;
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +8 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#include <linux/types.h> struct task_struct ; +struct sc_ext ; +/* * Per-thread CET status */
@@ -18,9 +20,15 @@ struct cet_status {int cet_setup_shstk (void );void cet_disable_shstk (void );void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p); +int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp); +void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc); +int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else static inline void cet_disable_shstk (void ) {}static inline void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {} +static inline void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc) {return ; } +static inline int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor, +struct sc_ext *sc) {return -EINVAL ; }#endif #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h +10 -0
@@ -443,6 +443,16 @@ static inline void copy_kernel_to_fpregs(union fpregs_state *fpstate)__copy_kernel_to_fpregs (fpstate,-1 ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +extern int save_cet_to_sigframe (int ia32,void __user *fp, +unsigned long restorer); +#else +static inline int save_cet_to_sigframe (int ia32,void __user *fp, +unsigned long restorer) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif extern int copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (void __user *buf,void __user *fp,int size);/*
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +32 -0
@@ -234,6 +234,38 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p) : [pax] "a" (p)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION ) || defined(CONFIG_X86_X32 ) +static inline int write_user_shstk_32 (unsigned long addr,unsigned int val) +{ + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %1, (%0)\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail]) + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val) + :: fail); +return 0 ; +fail: +return -EPERM ; +} +#else +static inline int write_user_shstk_32 (unsigned long addr,unsigned int val) +{ +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"%s used but not supported.\n" , __func__); +return -EFAULT ; +} +#endif + +static inline int write_user_shstk_64 (unsigned long addr,unsigned long val) +{ + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail]) + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val) + :: fail); +return 0 ; +fail: +return -EPERM ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_CET */ +#define nop () asm volatile ("nop")static inline void serialize (void )
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
@@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ struct _xstate {/* New processor state extensions go here: */ }; +/* +* Located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8. +*/ +struct sc_ext { +unsigned long total_size; +unsigned long ssp; +unsigned long wait_endbr; +}; +/* * The 32-bit signal frame: */
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +152 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +100 -0
142 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +10 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> #include <asm/signal.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /*
@@ -239,6 +240,9 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,unsigned long buf_fx =0 ;int onsigstack =on_sig_stack (sp);int ret; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +void __user *restorer =NULL ; +#endif /* redzone */ if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))
@@ -270,6 +274,12 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,if (onsigstack && !likely (on_sig_stack (sp)))return (void __user *)-1L ; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +if (ka->sa.sa_flags &SA_RESTORER ) + restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; + ret =save_cet_to_sigframe (0 , *fpstate, (unsigned long )restorer); +#endif +/* save i387 and extended state */ ret =copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (*fpstate, (void __user *)buf_fx, math_size);if (ret <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 22/26 binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAn ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates architecture features of the file.. Introduce feature definitions for Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking.
--- include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +9 -0
@@ -455,4 +455,13 @@ typedef struct elf64_note {/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI */ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI (1U << 0) +/* .note.gnu.property types for x86: */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND 0xc0000002 + +/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT 0x00000001 +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK 0x00000002 +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_INVAL ~(GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT | \ + GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_ELF_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 23/26 ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAn ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates arch features supported by the file. These features are extracted by arch_parse_elf_property() and stored in 'arch_elf_state'. Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() for enabling such features. The first use-case of this function is shadow stack.
ARM64 is the other arch that has ARCH_USER_GNU_PROPERTY and arch_parse_elf_ property(). Add arch_setup_elf_property() for it.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/elf.h | 6 ++++++ 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h +5 -0
@@ -281,6 +281,11 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data,return 0 ; } +static inline int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline int arch_elf_pt_proc (void *ehdr,void *phdr,struct file *f,bool is_interp,struct arch_elf_state *state)
arch/x86/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -1953,6 +1953,8 @@ config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER select X86_CET select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY + select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE help Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +13 -0
@@ -385,6 +385,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp);#define compat_arch_setup_additional_pages compat_arch_setup_additional_pages +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE +struct arch_elf_state { +unsigned int gnu_property; +}; + +#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE { \ + .gnu_property = 0, \ +} + +#define arch_elf_pt_proc (ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0) +#define arch_check_elf (ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0) +#endif +/* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */ enum align_flags {ALIGN_VA_32 =BIT (0 ),
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +32 -0
@@ -837,3 +837,35 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task) {return task_pt_regs (task)->sp; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY +int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data,size_t datasz, +bool compat,struct arch_elf_state *state) +{ +if (type !=GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND ) +return 0 ; + +if (datasz !=sizeof (unsigned int )) +return -ENOEXEC ; + + state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data; +return 0 ; +} + +int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *state) +{ +int r =0 ; + +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_CET )) +return r; + +memset (¤t->thread.cet,0 ,sizeof (struct cet_status )); + +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (state->gnu_property &GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK ) + r =cet_setup_shstk (); + } + +return r; +} +#endif
fs/binfmt_elf.c +4 -0
@@ -1245,6 +1245,10 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)set_binfmt (&elf_format); + retval =arch_setup_elf_property (&arch_state); +if (retval <0 ) + goto out; +#ifdef ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES retval =arch_setup_additional_pages (bprm, !!interpreter);if (retval <0 )
include/linux/elf.h +6 -0
@@ -82,9 +82,15 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, {return 0 ; } + +static inline int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +return 0 ; +}#else extern int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data,size_t datasz,bool compat,struct arch_elf_state *arch); +extern int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 24/26 x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThe kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new shadow stack for a pthread child.
It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall and set the child's shadow stack pointer to NULL and let the child thread allocate a shadow stack for itself. There are two issues in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before the child can successfully allocate a shadow stack.
A 64-bit shadow stack has a size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). A compat-mode thread shadow stack has a size of 1/4 min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). This allows more threads to run in a 32-bit address space.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 7 +++++ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +3 -0
@@ -18,12 +18,15 @@ struct cet_status {#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET int cet_setup_shstk (void ); +int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags);void cet_disable_shstk (void );void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p);int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp);void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc);int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else +static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p, +unsigned long clone_flags) {return 0 ; }static inline void cet_disable_shstk (void ) {}static inline void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {}static inline void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc) {return ; }
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +3 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ do { \#else #define deactivate_mm (tsk, mm) \ do { \ + if (!tsk->vfork_done) \ + cet_free_shstk(tsk); \ load_gs_index(0); \ loadsegment(fs, 0); \ } while (0)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +44 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/process.c +7 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)free_vm86 (t); +cet_free_shstk (tsk);fpu__drop (fpu); }
@@ -182,6 +183,12 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,if (clone_flags &CLONE_SETTLS ) ret =set_new_tls (p, tls); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */ +if (!ret) + ret =cet_setup_thread_shstk (p, clone_flags); +#endif +if (!ret &&unlikely (test_tsk_thread_flag (current,TIF_IO_BITMAP )))io_bitmap_share (p);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 25/26 x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng Yuarch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *args)
Get CET feature status.
The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer. The kernel returns the following information:
*args = shadow stack/IBT status
*(args + 1) = shadow stack base address
*(args + 2) = shadow stack size
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
Disable CET features specified in 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is locked.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
Lock in CET features.
Also change do_arch_prctl_common()'s parameter 'cpuid_enabled' to 'arg2', as it is now also passed to prctl_cet().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 6 +-- 5 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +3 -0
@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ struct sc_ext;struct cet_status {unsigned long shstk_base;unsigned long shstk_size; +unsigned int locked:1 ; };#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +int prctl_cet (int option,u64 arg2);int cet_setup_shstk (void );int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags);void cet_disable_shstk (void );
@@ -25,6 +27,7 @@ int cet_verify_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *new_ssp)void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc);int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else +static inline int prctl_cet (int option,u64 arg2) {return -EINVAL ; }static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags) {return 0 ; }static inline void cet_disable_shstk (void ) {}
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +4 -0
@@ -14,4 +14,8 @@#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003 +#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o cet_prctl.o ### # 64 bit specific files
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c new file +68 -0
68 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +3 -3
@@ -977,14 +977,14 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p) }long do_arch_prctl_common (struct task_struct *task,int option, -unsigned long cpuid_enabled) +unsigned long arg2) {switch (option) {case ARCH_GET_CPUID :return get_cpuid_mode ();case ARCH_SET_CPUID : -return set_cpuid_mode (task, cpuid_enabled); +return set_cpuid_mode (task, arg2); } -return -EINVAL ; +return prctl_cet (option, arg2); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v15 26/26 mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). Each has its advantages and compromises.
An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of mmap()/mprotect().
The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHSTK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get to the syscall first.
Since arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is modified, I have moved arch_vm_get_page _prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to x86/include/asm/mman.h. This will be more consistent with other architectures.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 ++--------- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 8 ++- 4 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h new file +83 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H + +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <uapi/asm/mman.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS +/* +* Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags +* value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in +* to a pte. +* +* Only override these if Protection Keys are available +* (which is only on 64-bit). +*/ +#define arch_vm_get_page_prot (vm_flags) __pgprot( \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) + +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ + ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) (0) +#endif + +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (unsigned long prot, +unsigned long pkey) +{ +unsigned long vm_prot_bits =pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey); + +if (!(prot &PROT_WRITE ) && (prot &PROT_SHSTK )) + vm_prot_bits |=VM_SHSTK ; + +return vm_prot_bits; +} +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER +static inline bool arch_validate_prot (unsigned long prot,unsigned long addr) +{ +unsigned long valid =PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC |PROT_SEM ; + +if (prot & ~(valid |PROT_SHSTK )) +return false; + +if (prot &PROT_SHSTK ) { +struct vm_area_struct *vma; + +if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size) +return false; + +/* +* A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only +* the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write +* instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually +* exclusive. +*/ +if (prot &PROT_WRITE ) +return false; + + vma =find_vma (current->mm, addr); +if (!vma) +return false; + +/* +* Shadow stack cannot be backed by a file or shared. +*/ +if (vma->vm_file || (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHARED )) +return false; + } + +return true; +} +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot +#endif + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +4 -24
@@ -1,31 +1,11 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ -#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H -#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS -/* -* Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags -* value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in -* to a pte. -* -* Only override these if Protection Keys are available -* (which is only on 64-bit). -*/ -#define arch_vm_get_page_prot (vm_flags) __pgprot( \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) - -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ - ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#endif +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10/* shadow stack pages */ #include <asm-generic/mman.h> -#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
include/linux/mm.h +1 -0
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#if defined(CONFIG_X86 )# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHSTK#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC )# define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1/* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC )
mm/mmap.c +7 -1
@@ -1483,6 +1483,12 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);unsigned long flags_mask; +/* +* Call stack cannot be backed by a file. +*/ +if (vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (!file_mmap_ok (file, inode, pgoff, len))return -EOVERFLOW ;
@@ -1547,7 +1553,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, }else {switch (flags &MAP_TYPE ) {case MAP_SHARED : -if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN |VM_GROWSUP )) +if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN |VM_GROWSUP |VM_SHSTK ))return -EINVAL ;/* * Ignore pgoff.
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
CET can protect applications and the kernel. This series enables only application-level protection, and has three parts:
- Shadow stack [2],
- Indirect branch tracking [3], and
- Selftests [4].
Quoted 6 lines
I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been very stable. Linux distributions with CET are available now, and Intel processors with CET are becoming available. It would be nice if CET support can be accepted into the kernel. I will be working to address any issues should they come up.
Is there a way to run these patches for testing? Bochs emulation or anything else? I presume you've been testing against violations of CET in user space? Can you share your testing?
Balbir Singh.
Quoted 19 lines · Balbir Singh
Quoted 11 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
CET can protect applications and the kernel. This series enables only application-level protection, and has three parts:
- Shadow stack [2],
- Indirect branch tracking [3], and
- Selftests [4].Quoted 6 lines
I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been very stable. Linux distributions with CET are available now, and Intel processors with CET are becoming available. It would be nice if CET support can be accepted into the kernel. I will be working to address any issues should they come up.
Quoted 6 lines
Is there a way to run these patches for testing? Bochs emulation or anything else? I presume you've been testing against violations of CET in user space? Can you share your testing?
Balbir Singh.
Machines with CET are already available on the market. I tested these on real machines with Fedora. There is a quick test in my earlier selftest patches:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-api/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Yu-cheng