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PATCH In review Steve Sakoman 2 participants 18 messages Jul 25, 2025 – Aug 1, 2025

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v2 cover Patch review

Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Monday, July 28

Passed a-full on autobuilder:

https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/2091

The following changes since commit 24c0ab18045920bb5c1e965c0ea6d176fd6de234:

oe-debuginfod: add option for data storage (2025-07-16 14:09:39 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut

Alexander Kanavin (1):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.43 -> 4.0.44

Archana Polampalli (1):
openssl: CVE-2024-41996

Deepesh Varatharajan (2):
binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7545
glibc: stable 2.39 branch updates

Hitendra Prajapati (1):
libpam: fix CVE-2025-6020

Jinfeng Wang (1):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.48 -> 4.0.49

Peter Marko (2):
orc: set CVE_PRODUCT
openssl: patch CVE-2025-27587

Richard Purdie (1):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.46 -> 4.0.47

Roland Kovacs (2):
libxml2: fix CVE-2025-49795
sqlite3: fix CVE-2025-6965

Vijay Anusuri (1):
xserver-xorg: upgrade 21.1.6 -> 21.1.18

Wang Mingyu (3):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.44 -> 4.0.45
mtools: upgrade 4.0.45 -> 4.0.46
mtools: upgrade 4.0.47 -> 4.0.48

Yash Shinde (1):
binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7546

 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch      |   44 +
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch    | 1918 +++++++++++++++++
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch    |  129 ++
 .../openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb                  |    3 +
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc     |    2 +-
 .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch       |   92 +
 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb   |    1 +
 .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc                |    2 +
 .../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch         |   39 +
 .../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch         |   58 +
 .../mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch          |   19 +-
 .../mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch    |    7 +-
 .../mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch       |   19 +-
 .../{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb}    |    2 +-
 meta/recipes-devtools/orc/orc_0.4.40.bb       |    3 +
 .../libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch |  101 +
 .../libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch    |  750 +++++++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch         | 1128 ++++++++++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch         |  187 ++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch         |   35 +
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb     |    5 +
 ...org_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb} |    2 +-
 .../sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch        |  112 +
 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb |    1 +
 24 files changed, 4636 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb} (93%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch
 rename meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/{xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb} (92%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/16 libxml2: fix CVE-2025-49795

From: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]>

A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability was found in libxml2 when processing XPath XML expressions. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a malicious XML input to libxml2, leading to a denial of service.

---
 .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch       | 92 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb   |  1 +
 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch new file +92 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e21a99b45
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+From 19e0a3ed092085a4d6689397d4f08cf5d86267af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 12:11:30 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Schematron: Fix null pointer dereference leading to DoS
+
+(CVE-2025-49795)
+
+Fixes #932
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/c24909ba2601848825b49a60f988222da3019667]
+CVE: CVE-2025-49795
+
+(cherry picked from commit c24909ba2601848825b49a60f988222da3019667)
+Signed-off-by: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]>
+---
+ result/schematron/zvon16_0     | 6 ++++++
+ result/schematron/zvon16_0.err | 5 +++++
+ schematron.c                   | 5 +++++
+ test/schematron/zvon16.sct     | 7 +++++++
+ test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml   | 5 +++++
+ 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 result/schematron/zvon16_0
+ create mode 100644 result/schematron/zvon16_0.err
+ create mode 100644 test/schematron/zvon16.sct
+ create mode 100644 test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml
+
+diff --git a/result/schematron/zvon16_0 b/result/schematron/zvon16_0
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..768cf6f5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/result/schematron/zvon16_0
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++<?xml version="1.0"?>
++<library>
++	<book title="Test Book" id="bk101">
++		<author>Test Author</author>
++	</book>
++</library>
+diff --git a/result/schematron/zvon16_0.err b/result/schematron/zvon16_0.err
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..a4fab4c8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/result/schematron/zvon16_0.err
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
++Pattern: TestPattern
++xmlXPathCompOpEval: function falae not found
++XPath error : Unregistered function
++/library/book line 2: Book 
++./test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml fails to validate
+diff --git a/schematron.c b/schematron.c
+index a8259201..86c63e64 100644
+--- a/schematron.c
++++ b/schematron.c
+@@ -1481,6 +1481,11 @@ xmlSchematronFormatReport(xmlSchematronValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
+             select = xmlGetNoNsProp(child, BAD_CAST "select");
+             comp = xmlXPathCtxtCompile(ctxt->xctxt, select);
+             eval = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp, ctxt->xctxt);
++            if (eval == NULL) {
++                xmlXPathFreeCompExpr(comp);
++                xmlFree(select);
++                return ret;
++            }
+ 
+             switch (eval->type) {
+             case XPATH_NODESET: {
+diff --git a/test/schematron/zvon16.sct b/test/schematron/zvon16.sct
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..f03848aa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/schematron/zvon16.sct
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++<sch:schema xmlns:sch="http://purl.oclc.org/dsdl/schematron">
++	<sch:pattern id="TestPattern">
++		<sch:rule context="book">
++			<sch:report test="not(@available)">Book <sch:value-of select="falae()"/> test</sch:report>
++		</sch:rule>
++	</sch:pattern>
++</sch:schema>
+diff --git a/test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml b/test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..551e2d65
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
++<library>
++	<book title="Test Book" id="bk101">
++		<author>Test Author</author>
++	</book>
++</library>
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
index 488ace62e5..c289de6f73 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt
            file://CVE-2025-32415.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-6021.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-49794-CVE-2025-49796.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-49795.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/16 binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7546

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Yash Shinde <[email protected]>

Report corrupted group section instead of trying to recover.

CVE: CVE-2025-7546
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=41461010eb7c79fee7a9d5f6209accdaac66cc6b]
PR 33050 [https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=33050]

---
 .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc                |  1 +
 .../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch         | 58 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.42.inc +1 -0
index 9471e6accd..a3ad655dbe 100644
@@ -53,5 +53,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://CVE-2025-1179.patch \
      file://0022-CVE-2025-5245.patch \
      file://0022-CVE-2025-5244.patch \
+     file://0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch new file +58 -0

58 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/16 binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7545

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>

objcopy: Don't extend the output section size
Since the output section contents are copied from the input, don't extend the output section size beyond the input section size.

Backport a patch from upstream to fix CVE-2025-7545
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=08c3cbe5926e4d355b5cb70bbec2b1eeb40c2944]

---
 .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc                |  1 +
 .../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch         | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.42.inc +1 -0
index a3ad655dbe..fb34ea9763 100644
@@ -54,5 +54,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://0022-CVE-2025-5245.patch \
      file://0022-CVE-2025-5244.patch \
      file://0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch \
+     file://0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de132f74fc
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 06:36:56 +0800
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h08c3cbe5926e4d355b5cb70bbec2b1eeb40c2944]
+CVE: CVE-2025-7545
+
+Since the output section contents are copied from the input, don't
+extend the output section size beyond the input section size.
+
+	PR binutils/33049
+	* objcopy.c (copy_section): Don't extend the output section
+	size beyond the input section size.
+
+Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>
+
+diff --git a/binutils/objcopy.c b/binutils/objcopy.c
+index a85d2620..18cd1bfd 100644
+--- a/binutils/objcopy.c
++++ b/binutils/objcopy.c
+@@ -4547,6 +4547,7 @@ copy_section (bfd *ibfd, sec_ptr isection, void *obfdarg)
+ 	  char *to = (char *) memhunk;
+ 	  char *end = (char *) memhunk + size;
+ 	  int i;
++	  bfd_size_type memhunk_size = size;
+ 
+ 	  /* If the section address is not exactly divisible by the interleave,
+ 	     then we must bias the from address.  If the copy_byte is less than
+@@ -4566,6 +4567,11 @@ copy_section (bfd *ibfd, sec_ptr isection, void *obfdarg)
+ 	      }
+ 
+ 	  size = (size + interleave - 1 - copy_byte) / interleave * copy_width;
++
++         /* Don't extend the output section size.  */
++         if (size > memhunk_size)
++           size = memhunk_size;
++	  
+ 	  osection->lma /= interleave;
+ 	  if (copy_byte < extra)
+ 	    osection->lma++;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/16 sqlite3: fix CVE-2025-6965

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]>

There exists a vulnerability in SQLite versions before 3.50.2 where the number of aggregate terms could exceed the number of columns available. This could lead to a memory corruption issue.

---
 .../sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch        | 112 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch new file +112 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..233d8697ec
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From a91c0d55011d06858726d4783fd16ed8ec71e793 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: drh <>
+Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2025 19:02:21 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Raise an error right away if the number of aggregate terms in
+ a query exceeds the maximum number of columns.
+
+FossilOrigin-Name: 5508b56fd24016c13981ec280ecdd833007c9d8dd595edb295b984c2b487b5c8
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-6965
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/c52e9d97d485a3eb168e3f8f3674a7bc4b419703]
+Signed-off-by: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]>
+---
+ sqlite3.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c
+index 1ee8de4a85..5c7c126076 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.c
++++ b/sqlite3.c
+@@ -15000,6 +15000,14 @@ typedef INT16_TYPE LogEst;
+ #define LARGEST_UINT64 (0xffffffff|(((u64)0xffffffff)<<32))
+ #define SMALLEST_INT64 (((i64)-1) - LARGEST_INT64)
+ 
++/*
++** Macro SMXV(n) return the maximum value that can be held in variable n,
++** assuming n is a signed integer type.  UMXV(n) is similar for unsigned
++** integer types.
++*/
++#define SMXV(n) ((((i64)1)<<(sizeof(n)*8-1))-1)
++#define UMXV(n) ((((i64)1)<<(sizeof(n)*8))-1)
++
+ /*
+ ** Round up a number to the next larger multiple of 8.  This is used
+ ** to force 8-byte alignment on 64-bit architectures.
+@@ -18785,7 +18793,7 @@ struct AggInfo {
+                           ** from source tables rather than from accumulators */
+   u8 useSortingIdx;       /* In direct mode, reference the sorting index rather
+                           ** than the source table */
+-  u16 nSortingColumn;     /* Number of columns in the sorting index */
++  u32 nSortingColumn;     /* Number of columns in the sorting index */
+   int sortingIdx;         /* Cursor number of the sorting index */
+   int sortingIdxPTab;     /* Cursor number of pseudo-table */
+   int iFirstReg;          /* First register in range for aCol[] and aFunc[] */
+@@ -18794,8 +18802,8 @@ struct AggInfo {
+     Table *pTab;             /* Source table */
+     Expr *pCExpr;            /* The original expression */
+     int iTable;              /* Cursor number of the source table */
+-    i16 iColumn;             /* Column number within the source table */
+-    i16 iSorterColumn;       /* Column number in the sorting index */
++    int iColumn;             /* Column number within the source table */
++    int iSorterColumn;       /* Column number in the sorting index */
+   } *aCol;
+   int nColumn;            /* Number of used entries in aCol[] */
+   int nAccumulator;       /* Number of columns that show through to the output.
+@@ -115162,7 +115170,9 @@ static void findOrCreateAggInfoColumn(
+ ){
+   struct AggInfo_col *pCol;
+   int k;
++  int mxTerm = pParse->db->aLimit[SQLITE_LIMIT_COLUMN];
+ 
++  assert( mxTerm <= SMXV(i16) );
+   assert( pAggInfo->iFirstReg==0 );
+   pCol = pAggInfo->aCol;
+   for(k=0; k<pAggInfo->nColumn; k++, pCol++){
+@@ -115180,6 +115190,10 @@ static void findOrCreateAggInfoColumn(
+     assert( pParse->db->mallocFailed );
+     return;
+   }
++  if( k>mxTerm ){
++    sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "more than %d aggregate terms", mxTerm);
++    k = mxTerm;
++  }
+   pCol = &pAggInfo->aCol[k];
+   assert( ExprUseYTab(pExpr) );
+   pCol->pTab = pExpr->y.pTab;
+@@ -115213,6 +115227,7 @@ fix_up_expr:
+   if( pExpr->op==TK_COLUMN ){
+     pExpr->op = TK_AGG_COLUMN;
+   }
++  assert( k <= SMXV(pExpr->iAgg) );
+   pExpr->iAgg = (i16)k;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -115297,13 +115312,19 @@ static int analyzeAggregate(Walker *pWalker, Expr *pExpr){
+         ** function that is already in the pAggInfo structure
+         */
+         struct AggInfo_func *pItem = pAggInfo->aFunc;
++        int mxTerm = pParse->db->aLimit[SQLITE_LIMIT_COLUMN];
++        assert( mxTerm <= SMXV(i16) );
+         for(i=0; i<pAggInfo->nFunc; i++, pItem++){
+           if( NEVER(pItem->pFExpr==pExpr) ) break;
+           if( sqlite3ExprCompare(0, pItem->pFExpr, pExpr, -1)==0 ){
+             break;
+           }
+         }
+-        if( i>=pAggInfo->nFunc ){
++        if( i>mxTerm ){
++          sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "more than %d aggregate terms", mxTerm);
++          i = mxTerm;
++          assert( i<pAggInfo->nFunc );
++        }else if( i>=pAggInfo->nFunc ){
+           /* pExpr is original.  Make a new entry in pAggInfo->aFunc[]
+           */
+           u8 enc = ENC(pParse->db);
+@@ -115357,6 +115378,7 @@ static int analyzeAggregate(Walker *pWalker, Expr *pExpr){
+         */
+         assert( !ExprHasProperty(pExpr, EP_TokenOnly|EP_Reduced) );
+         ExprSetVVAProperty(pExpr, EP_NoReduce);
++        assert( i <= SMXV(pExpr->iAgg) );
+         pExpr->iAgg = (i16)i;
+         pExpr->pAggInfo = pAggInfo;
+         return WRC_Prune;
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb +1 -0
index d39cb3805b..60a8f1449b 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://sqlite3.h;endline=11;md5=786d3dc581eff03f4fd9e4a77ed0
 SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2024/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2025-3277.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-29088.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6965.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b2809ca53124c19c60f42bf627736eae011afdcc205bb48270a5ee9a38191531"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/16 orc: set CVE_PRODUCT

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

There are new CVEs reported for this recipe which are not for this componene, but for a component with same name from apache.

sqlite> select vendor, product, id, count(*) from products where product like 'orc' group by vendor, product, id;

apache|orc|CVE-2018-8015|1
apache|orc|CVE-2025-47436|4

gstreamer|orc|CVE-2024-40897|1

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/orc/orc_0.4.40.bb | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/orc/orc_0.4.40.bb +3 -0
index e437831cd7..ee96ca0a4c 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3fc2bee78dfb7c41fd9605061fc69138db7df007eae2f669a1f56e8bac
 
 inherit meson pkgconfig gtk-doc
 
+# distinguish from apache:orc
+CVE_PRODUCT = "gstreamer:orc"
+
 GTKDOC_MESON_OPTION = "gtk_doc"
 GTKDOC_MESON_ENABLE_FLAG = "enabled"
 GTKDOC_MESON_DISABLE_FLAG = "disabled"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 6/16 openssl: CVE-2024-41996

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

As discussed in [1], this commit fixes CVE-2024-41996. Although openssl project does not consider this a vulnerability, it got CVE number assigned so it deserves attention.

[1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25088

---
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch      | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc18e0bef1
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From e70e34d857d4003199bcb5d3b52ca8102ccc1b98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 17:54:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] dh_kmgmt.c: Avoid expensive public key validation for known
+ safe-prime groups
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The partial validation is fully sufficient to check the key validity.
+
+Thanks to Szilárd Pfeiffer for reporting the issue.
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25088)
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-41996
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e70e34d857d4003199bcb5d3b52ca8102ccc1b98]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c | 8 +++++---
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+index 82c3093b12..ebdce76710 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+@@ -387,9 +387,11 @@ static int dh_validate_public(const DH *dh, int checktype)
+     if (pub_key == NULL)
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    /* The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2 */
+-    if (checktype == OSSL_KEYMGMT_VALIDATE_QUICK_CHECK
+-        && ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh))
++    /*
++     * The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2
++     * but for that case it is also fully sufficient to check the key validity.
++     */
++    if (ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh))
+         return ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(dh, pub_key, &res);
+ 
+     return DH_check_pub_key_ex(dh, pub_key);
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb +1 -0
index c4ad80e734..d6bf32d989 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
            file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
            file://0001-Added-handshake-history-reporting-when-test-fails.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 7/16 openssl: patch CVE-2025-27587

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick commits for Minerva fix between 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 release.

Update to 3.2.5 is blocked due to problem with python ptest errors, so use patch instead of upgrade for now.

---
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch    | 1918 +++++++++++++++++
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch    |  129 ++
 .../openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb                  |    2 +
 3 files changed, 2049 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch new file +1918 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb3fc52dca
@@ -0,0 +1,1918 @@
+From 14ac0f0e4e1f36793d09b41ffd5e482575289ab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Danny Tsen <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 13:48:01 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix Minerva timing side-channel signal for P-384 curve on PPC
+
+1. bn_ppc.c: Used bn_mul_mont_int() instead of bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6()
+   for Montgomery multiplication.
+2. ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl:
+   - Re-wrote p384_felem_mul and p384_felem_square for easier maintenance with
+     minumum perl wrapper.
+   - Implemented p384_felem_reduce, p384_felem_mul_reduce and p384_felem_square_reduce.
+   - Implemented p384_felem_diff64, felem_diff_128_64 and felem_diff128 in assembly.
+3. ecp_nistp384.c:
+   - Added wrapper function for p384_felem_mul_reduce and p384_felem_square_reduce.
+
+Signed-off-by: Danny Tsen <[email protected]>
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26709)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 85cabd94958303859b1551364a609d4ff40b67a5)
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-27587
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/14ac0f0e4e1f36793d09b41ffd5e482575289ab2]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c                  |    3 +
+ crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl | 1724 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c            |   28 +-
+ 3 files changed, 1504 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
+index 1e9421bee2..29293bad55 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
+@@ -41,12 +41,15 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+      */
+ 
+ #if defined(_ARCH_PPC64) && !defined(__ILP32__)
++    /* Minerva side-channel fix danny */
++# if defined(USE_FIXED_N6)
+     if (num == 6) {
+         if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300)
+             return bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+         else
+             return bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+     }
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+     return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
+index 28f4168e52..b663bddfc6 100755
+--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
++++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
+@@ -7,13 +7,15 @@
+ # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ #
+ # ====================================================================
+-# Written by Rohan McLure <[email protected]> for the OpenSSL
+-# project.
++# Written by Danny Tsen <[email protected]> # for the OpenSSL project.
++#
++# Copyright 2025- IBM Corp.
+ # ====================================================================
+ #
+-# p384 lower-level primitives for PPC64 using vector instructions.
++# p384 lower-level primitives for PPC64.
+ #
+ 
++
+ use strict;
+ use warnings;
+ 
+@@ -21,7 +23,7 @@ my $flavour = shift;
+ my $output = "";
+ while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+ if (!$output) {
+-    $output = "-";
++        $output = "-";
+ }
+ 
+ my ($xlate, $dir);
+@@ -35,271 +37,1495 @@ open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+ 
+ my $code = "";
+ 
+-my ($sp, $outp, $savelr, $savesp) = ("r1", "r3", "r10", "r12");
+-
+-my $vzero = "v32";
+-
+-sub startproc($)
+-{
+-    my ($name) = @_;
+-
+-    $code.=<<___;
+-    .globl ${name}
+-    .align 5
+-${name}:
+-
+-___
+-}
+-
+-sub endproc($)
+-{
+-    my ($name) = @_;
+-
+-    $code.=<<___;
+-    blr
+-        .size ${name},.-${name}
+-
+-___
+-}
+-
+-sub load_vrs($$)
+-{
+-    my ($pointer, $reg_list) = @_;
+-
+-    for (my $i = 0; $i <= 6; $i++) {
+-        my $offset = $i * 8;
+-        $code.=<<___;
+-    lxsd        $reg_list->[$i],$offset($pointer)
+-___
+-    }
+-
+-    $code.=<<___;
+-
+-___
+-}
+-
+-sub store_vrs($$)
+-{
+-    my ($pointer, $reg_list) = @_;
+-
+-    for (my $i = 0; $i <= 12; $i++) {
+-        my $offset = $i * 16;
+-        $code.=<<___;
+-    stxv        $reg_list->[$i],$offset($pointer)
+-___
+-    }
+-
+-    $code.=<<___;
+-
+-___
+-}
+-
+ $code.=<<___;
+-.machine    "any"
++.machine "any"
+ .text
+ 
+-___
++.globl  p384_felem_mul
++.type   p384_felem_mul,\@function
++.align	4
++p384_felem_mul:
+ 
+-{
+-    # mul/square common
+-    my ($t1, $t2, $t3, $t4) = ("v33", "v34", "v42", "v43");
+-    my ($zero, $one) = ("r8", "r9");
+-    my $out = "v51";
++	stdu	1, -176(1)
++	mflr	0
++	std	14, 56(1)
++	std	15, 64(1)
++	std	16, 72(1)
++	std	17, 80(1)
++	std	18, 88(1)
++	std	19, 96(1)
++	std	20, 104(1)
++	std	21, 112(1)
++	std	22, 120(1)
+ 
+-    {
+-        #
+-        # p384_felem_mul
+-        #
++	bl	_p384_felem_mul_core
+ 
+-        my ($in1p, $in2p) = ("r4", "r5");
+-        my @in1 = map("v$_",(44..50));
+-        my @in2 = map("v$_",(35..41));
++	mtlr	0
++	ld	14, 56(1)
++	ld	15, 64(1)
++	ld	16, 72(1)
++	ld	17, 80(1)
++	ld	18, 88(1)
++	ld	19, 96(1)
++	ld	20, 104(1)
++	ld	21, 112(1)
++	ld	22, 120(1)
++	addi	1, 1, 176
++	blr
++.size   p384_felem_mul,.-p384_felem_mul
+ 
+-        startproc("p384_felem_mul");
++.globl  p384_felem_square
++.type   p384_felem_square,\@function
++.align	4
++p384_felem_square:
+ 
+-        $code.=<<___;
+-    vspltisw    $vzero,0
++	stdu	1, -176(1)
++	mflr	0
++	std	14, 56(1)
++	std	15, 64(1)
++	std	16, 72(1)
++	std	17, 80(1)
+ 
+-___
++	bl	_p384_felem_square_core
+ 
+-        load_vrs($in1p, \@in1);
+-        load_vrs($in2p, \@in2);
+-
+-        $code.=<<___;
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in1[0],$in2[0],$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,0($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[0],$in1[1],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,16($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in1[2],$in2[0],$out
+-    stxv        $out,32($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t3,$in1[2],$in1[3],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t4,$in2[3],$in2[2],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t4,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t2,$out
+-    stxv        $out,48($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[4],$in2[3],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t4,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in1[4],$in2[0],$out
+-    stxv        $out,64($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[5],$in2[4],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t4,$in2[3],$in2[2],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+-    xxpermdi    $t4,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t4,$out
+-    stxv        $out,80($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[0],$in1[1],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[6],$in2[5],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t4,$in2[4],$in2[3],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$out
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in1[6],$in2[0],$out
+-    stxv        $out,96($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[1],$in1[2],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$in2[6],$in2[5],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t3,$in1[3],$in1[4],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+-    xxpermdi    $t3,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[5],$in1[6],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t3,$out
+-    stxv        $out,112($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[2],$in1[3],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t3,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in1[6],$in2[2],$out
+-    stxv        $out,128($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[3],$in1[4],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in1[5],$in1[6],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t4,$out
+-    stxv        $out,144($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in1[6],$in2[4],$out
+-    stxv        $out,160($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,176($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in1[6],$in2[6],$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,192($outp)
+-___
++	mtlr	0
++	ld	14, 56(1)
++	ld	15, 64(1)
++	ld	16, 72(1)
++	ld	17, 80(1)
++	addi	1, 1, 176
++	blr
++.size   p384_felem_square,.-p384_felem_square
+ 
+-        endproc("p384_felem_mul");
+-    }
++#
++# Felem mul core function -
++# r3, r4 and r5 need to pre-loaded.
++#
++.type   _p384_felem_mul_core,\@function
++.align	4
++_p384_felem_mul_core:
+ 
+-    {
+-        #
+-        # p384_felem_square
+-        #
++	ld	6,0(4)
++	ld	14,0(5)
++	ld	7,8(4)
++	ld	15,8(5)
++	ld	8,16(4)
++	ld	16,16(5)
++	ld	9,24(4)
++	ld	17,24(5)
++	ld	10,32(4)
++	ld	18,32(5)
++	ld	11,40(4)
++	ld	19,40(5)
++	ld	12,48(4)
++	ld	20,48(5)
+ 
+-        my ($inp) = ("r4");
+-        my @in = map("v$_",(44..50));
+-        my @inx2 = map("v$_",(35..41));
++	# out0
++	mulld	21, 14, 6
++	mulhdu	22, 14, 6
++	std	21, 0(3)
++	std	22, 8(3)
+ 
+-        startproc("p384_felem_square");
++	vxor	0, 0, 0
+ 
+-        $code.=<<___;
+-    vspltisw    $vzero,0
++	# out1
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 14, 6
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 7, 15
++	vmsumudm 1, 13, 14, 0
+ 
+-___
++	# out2
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 15, 6
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 7, 16
++	mtvsrdd	32+17, 0, 8
++	mtvsrdd	32+18, 0, 14
++	vmsumudm 19, 15, 16, 0
++	vmsumudm 2, 17, 18, 19
+ 
+-        load_vrs($inp, \@in);
++	# out3
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 16, 6
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 7, 17
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 14, 8
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 9, 15
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 3, 15, 16, 19
+ 
+-        $code.=<<___;
+-    li        $zero,0
+-    li        $one,1
+-    mtvsrdd        $t1,$one,$zero
+-___
++	# out4
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 17, 6
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 7, 18
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 15, 8
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 9, 16
++	mtvsrdd	32+17, 0, 10
++	mtvsrdd	32+18, 0, 14
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 4, 15, 16, 19
++	vmsumudm 4, 17, 18, 4
+ 
+-        for (my $i = 0; $i <= 6; $i++) {
+-            $code.=<<___;
+-    vsld        $inx2[$i],$in[$i],$t1
+-___
+-        }
+-
+-        $code.=<<___;
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[0],$in[0],$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,0($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[0],$inx2[1],$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,16($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[0],$inx2[2],$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[1],$in[1],$out
+-    stxv        $out,32($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in[0],$in[1],0b00
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$inx2[3],$inx2[2],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,48($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t4,$inx2[4],$inx2[3],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t4,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[2],$in[2],$out
+-    stxv        $out,64($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$inx2[5],$inx2[4],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[2],$inx2[3],$out
+-    stxv        $out,80($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t2,$inx2[6],$inx2[5],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[2],$inx2[4],$out
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[3],$in[3],$out
+-    stxv        $out,96($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t3,$in[1],$in[2],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t3,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[3],$inx2[4],$out
+-    stxv        $out,112($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in[2],$in[3],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[4],$in[4],$out
+-    stxv        $out,128($outp)
+-
+-    xxpermdi    $t1,$in[3],$in[4],0b00
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,144($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[4],$inx2[6],$vzero
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[5],$in[5],$out
+-    stxv        $out,160($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[5],$inx2[6],$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,176($outp)
+-
+-    vmsumudm    $out,$in[6],$in[6],$vzero
+-    stxv        $out,192($outp)
+-___
++	# out5
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 18, 6
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 7, 19
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 16, 8
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 9, 17
++	mtvsrdd	32+17, 14, 10
++	mtvsrdd	32+18, 11, 15
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 5, 15, 16, 19
++	vmsumudm 5, 17, 18, 5
++
++	stxv	32+1, 16(3)
++	stxv	32+2, 32(3)
++	stxv	32+3, 48(3)
++	stxv	32+4, 64(3)
++	stxv	32+5, 80(3)
++
++	# out6
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 19, 6
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 7, 20
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 17, 8
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 9, 18
++	mtvsrdd	32+17, 15, 10
++	mtvsrdd	32+18, 11, 16
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 6, 15, 16, 19
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 0, 12
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 0, 14
++	vmsumudm 19, 17, 18, 6
++	vmsumudm 6, 13, 14, 19
++
++	# out7
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 19, 7
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 8, 20
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 17, 9
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 10, 18
++	mtvsrdd	32+17, 15, 11
++	mtvsrdd	32+18, 12, 16
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 7, 15, 16, 19
++	vmsumudm 7, 17, 18, 7
++
++	# out8
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 19, 8
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 9, 20
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 17, 10
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 11, 18
++	mtvsrdd	32+17, 0, 12
++	mtvsrdd	32+18, 0, 16
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 8, 15, 16, 19
++	vmsumudm 8, 17, 18, 8
++
++	# out9
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 19, 9
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 10, 20
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 17, 11
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 12, 18
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 9, 15, 16, 19
++
++	# out10
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 19, 10
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 11, 20
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 0, 12
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 0, 18
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 10, 15, 16, 19
++
++	# out11
++	mtvsrdd	32+17, 19, 11
++	mtvsrdd	32+18, 12, 20
++	vmsumudm 11, 17, 18, 0
++
++	stxv	32+6, 96(3)
++	stxv	32+7, 112(3)
++	stxv	32+8, 128(3)
++	stxv	32+9, 144(3)
++	stxv	32+10, 160(3)
++	stxv	32+11, 176(3)
++
++	# out12
++	mulld	21, 20, 12
++	mulhdu	22, 20, 12	# out12
++
++	std	21, 192(3)
++	std	22, 200(3)
++
++	blr
++.size   _p384_felem_mul_core,.-_p384_felem_mul_core
++
++#
++# Felem square core function -
++# r3 and r4 need to pre-loaded.
++#
++.type   _p384_felem_square_core,\@function
++.align	4
++_p384_felem_square_core:
++
++	ld	6, 0(4)
++	ld	7, 8(4)
++	ld	8, 16(4)
++	ld	9, 24(4)
++	ld	10, 32(4)
++	ld	11, 40(4)
++	ld	12, 48(4)
++
++	vxor	0, 0, 0
++
++	# out0
++	mulld	14, 6, 6
++	mulhdu	15, 6, 6
++	std	14, 0(3)
++	std	15, 8(3)
++
++	# out1
++	add	14, 6, 6
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 0, 14
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 0, 7
++	vmsumudm 1, 13, 14, 0
++
++	# out2
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 7, 14
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 7, 8
++	vmsumudm 2, 15, 16, 0
++
++	# out3
++	add	15, 7, 7
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 8, 14
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 15, 9
++	vmsumudm 3, 13, 14, 0
++
++	# out4
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 9, 14
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 15, 10
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 0, 8
++	vmsumudm 4, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 4, 15, 15, 4
++
++	# out5
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 10, 14
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 15, 11
++	add	16, 8, 8
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 0, 16
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 0, 9
++	vmsumudm 5, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 5, 15, 16, 5
++
++	stxv	32+1, 16(3)
++	stxv	32+2, 32(3)
++	stxv	32+3, 48(3)
++	stxv	32+4, 64(3)
++
++	# out6
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 11, 14
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 15, 12
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 9, 16
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 9, 10
++	stxv	32+5, 80(3)
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 6, 15, 16, 19
++
++	# out7
++	add	17, 9, 9
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 11, 15
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 16, 12
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 0, 17
++	mtvsrdd	32+16, 0, 10
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 7, 15, 16, 19
++
++	# out8
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 11, 16
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 17, 12
++	mtvsrdd	32+15, 0, 10
++	vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0
++	vmsumudm 8, 15, 15, 19
++
++	# out9
++	add	14, 10, 10
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 11, 17
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 14, 12
++	vmsumudm 9, 13, 14, 0
++
++	# out10
++	mtvsrdd	32+13, 11, 14
++	mtvsrdd	32+14, 11, 12
++	vmsumudm 10, 13, 14, 0
++
++	stxv	32+6, 96(3)
++	stxv	32+7, 112(3)
++
++	# out11
++	#add	14, 11, 11
++	#mtvsrdd	32+13, 0, 14
++	#mtvsrdd	32+14, 0, 12
++	#vmsumudm 11, 13, 14, 0
++
++	mulld	6, 12, 11
++	mulhdu	7, 12, 11
++	addc	8, 6, 6
++	adde	9, 7, 7
++
++	stxv	32+8, 128(3)
++	stxv	32+9, 144(3)
++	stxv	32+10, 160(3)
++	#stxv	32+11, 176(3)
++
++	# out12
++	mulld	14, 12, 12
++	mulhdu	15, 12, 12
++
++	std	8, 176(3)
++	std	9, 184(3)
++	std	14, 192(3)
++	std	15, 200(3)
++
++	blr
++.size   _p384_felem_square_core,.-_p384_felem_square_core
++
++#
++# widefelem (128 bits) * 8
++#
++.macro F128_X_8 _off1 _off2
++	ld	9,\\_off1(3)
++	ld	8,\\_off2(3)
++	srdi	10,9,61
++	rldimi	10,8,3,0
++	sldi	9,9,3
++	std	9,\\_off1(3)
++	std	10,\\_off2(3)
++.endm
++
++.globl p384_felem128_mul_by_8
++.type	p384_felem128_mul_by_8, \@function
++.align 4
++p384_felem128_mul_by_8:
++
++	F128_X_8 0, 8
++
++	F128_X_8 16, 24
++
++	F128_X_8 32, 40
++
++	F128_X_8 48, 56
++
++	F128_X_8 64, 72
++
++	F128_X_8 80, 88
++
++	F128_X_8 96, 104
++
++	F128_X_8 112, 120
++
++	F128_X_8 128, 136
++
++	F128_X_8 144, 152
++
++	F128_X_8 160, 168
++
++	F128_X_8 176, 184
++
++	F128_X_8 192, 200
++
++	blr
++.size	p384_felem128_mul_by_8,.-p384_felem128_mul_by_8
++
++#
++# widefelem (128 bits) * 2
++#
++.macro F128_X_2 _off1 _off2
++	ld	9,\\_off1(3)
++	ld	8,\\_off2(3)
++	srdi	10,9,63
++	rldimi	10,8,1,0
++	sldi	9,9,1
++	std	9,\\_off1(3)
++	std	10,\\_off2(3)
++.endm
++
++.globl p384_felem128_mul_by_2
++.type	p384_felem128_mul_by_2, \@function
++.align 4
++p384_felem128_mul_by_2:
++
++	F128_X_2 0, 8
++
++	F128_X_2 16, 24
++
++	F128_X_2 32, 40
++
++	F128_X_2 48, 56
++
++	F128_X_2 64, 72
++
++	F128_X_2 80, 88
++
++	F128_X_2 96, 104
++
++	F128_X_2 112, 120
++
++	F128_X_2 128, 136
++
++	F128_X_2 144, 152
++
++	F128_X_2 160, 168
++
++	F128_X_2 176, 184
++
++	F128_X_2 192, 200
++
++	blr
++.size	p384_felem128_mul_by_2,.-p384_felem128_mul_by_2
++
++.globl p384_felem_diff128
++.type	p384_felem_diff128, \@function
++.align 4
++p384_felem_diff128:
++
++	addis   5, 2, .LConst_two127\@toc\@ha
++	addi    5, 5, .LConst_two127\@toc\@l
++
++	ld	10, 0(3)
++	ld	8, 8(3)
++	li	9, 0
++	addc	10, 10, 9
++	li	7, -1
++	rldicr	7, 7, 0, 0	# two127
++	adde	8, 8, 7
++	ld	11, 0(4)
++	ld	12, 8(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 10
++	subfe	12, 12, 8
++	std	11, 0(3)	# out0
++	std	12, 8(3)
++
++	# two127m71 = (r10, r9)
++	ld	8, 16(3)
++	ld	7, 24(3)
++	ld	10, 24(5)	# two127m71
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 16(4)
++	ld	12, 24(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 16(3)	# out1
++	std	12, 24(3)
++
++	ld	8, 32(3)
++	ld	7, 40(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 32(4)
++	ld	12, 40(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 32(3)	# out2
++	std	12, 40(3)
++
++	ld	8, 48(3)
++	ld	7, 56(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 48(4)
++	ld	12, 56(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 48(3)	# out3
++	std	12, 56(3)
++
++	ld	8, 64(3)
++	ld	7, 72(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 64(4)
++	ld	12, 72(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 64(3)	# out4
++	std	12, 72(3)
++
++	ld	8, 80(3)
++	ld	7, 88(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 80(4)
++	ld	12, 88(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 80(3)	# out5
++	std	12, 88(3)
++
++	ld	8, 96(3)
++	ld	7, 104(3)
++	ld	6, 40(5)	# two127p111m79m71
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 6
++	ld	11, 96(4)
++	ld	12, 104(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 96(3)	# out6
++	std	12, 104(3)
++
++	ld	8, 112(3)
++	ld	7, 120(3)
++	ld	6, 56(5)	# two127m119m71
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 6
++	ld	11, 112(4)
++	ld	12, 120(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 112(3)	# out7
++	std	12, 120(3)
++
++	ld	8, 128(3)
++	ld	7, 136(3)
++	ld	6, 72(5)	# two127m95m71
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 6
++	ld	11, 128(4)
++	ld	12, 136(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 128(3)	# out8
++	std	12, 136(3)
++
++	ld	8, 144(3)
++	ld	7, 152(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 144(4)
++	ld	12, 152(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 144(3)	# out9
++	std	12, 152(3)
++
++	ld	8, 160(3)
++	ld	7, 168(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 160(4)
++	ld	12, 168(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 160(3)	# out10
++	std	12, 168(3)
++
++	ld	8, 176(3)
++	ld	7, 184(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 176(4)
++	ld	12, 184(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 176(3)	# out11
++	std	12, 184(3)
++
++	ld	8, 192(3)
++	ld	7, 200(3)
++	addc	8, 8, 9
++	adde	7, 7, 10
++	ld	11, 192(4)
++	ld	12, 200(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 8
++	subfe	12, 12, 7
++	std	11, 192(3)	# out12
++	std	12, 200(3)
++
++	blr
++.size	p384_felem_diff128,.-p384_felem_diff128
++
++.data
++.align 4
++.LConst_two127:
++#two127
++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x80000000
++#two127m71
++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xffffff80, 0x7fffffff
++#two127p111m79m71
++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xffff7f80, 0x80007fff
++#two127m119m71
++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xffffff80, 0x7f7fffff
++#two127m95m71
++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x7fffff80, 0x7fffffff
++
++.text
++
++.globl p384_felem_diff_128_64
++.type	p384_felem_diff_128_64, \@function
++.align 4
++p384_felem_diff_128_64:
++	addis   5, 2, .LConst_128_two64\@toc\@ha
++	addi    5, 5, .LConst_128_two64\@toc\@l
++
++	ld	9, 0(3)
++	ld	10, 8(3)
++	ld	8, 48(5)	# two64p48m16
++	li	7, 0
++	addc	9, 9, 8
++	li	6, 1
++	adde	10, 10, 6
++	ld	11, 0(4)
++	subfc	8, 11, 9
++	subfe	12, 7, 10
++	std	8, 0(3)		# out0
++	std	12, 8(3)
++
++	ld	9, 16(3)
++	ld	10, 24(3)
++	ld	8, 0(5)		# two64m56m8
++	addc	9, 9, 8
++	addze	10, 10
++	ld	11, 8(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 9
++	subfe	12, 7, 10
++	std	11, 16(3)	# out1
++	std	12, 24(3)
++
++	ld	9, 32(3)
++	ld	10, 40(3)
++	ld	8, 16(5)	# two64m32m8
++	addc	9, 9, 8
++	addze	10, 10
++	ld	11, 16(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 9
++	subfe	12, 7, 10
++	std	11, 32(3)	# out2
++	std	12, 40(3)
++
++	ld	10, 48(3)
++	ld	8, 56(3)
++	#ld	9, 32(5)	# two64m8
++	li	9, -256		# two64m8
++	addc	10, 10, 9
++	addze	8, 8
++	ld	11, 24(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 10
++	subfe	12, 7, 8
++	std	11, 48(3)	# out3
++	std	12, 56(3)
++
++	ld	10, 64(3)
++	ld	8, 72(3)
++	addc	10, 10, 9
++	addze	8, 8
++	ld	11, 32(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 10
++	subfe	12, 7, 8
++	std	11, 64(3)	# out4
++	std	12, 72(3)
++
++	ld	10, 80(3)
++	ld	8, 88(3)
++	addc	10, 10, 9
++	addze	8, 8
++	ld	11, 40(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 10
++	subfe	12, 7, 8
++	std	11, 80(3)	# out5
++	std	12, 88(3)
++
++	ld	10, 96(3)
++	ld	8, 104(3)
++	addc	10, 10, 9
++	addze	9, 8
++	ld	11, 48(4)
++	subfc	11, 11, 10
++	subfe	12, 7, 9
++	std	11, 96(3)	# out6
++	std	12, 104(3)
++
++	blr
++.size	p384_felem_diff_128_64,.-p384_felem_diff_128_64
++
++.data
++.align 4
++.LConst_128_two64:
++#two64m56m8
++.long 0xffffff00, 0xfeffffff, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
++#two64m32m8
++.long 0xffffff00, 0xfffffffe, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
++#two64m8
++.long 0xffffff00, 0xffffffff, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
++#two64p48m16
++.long 0xffff0000, 0x0000ffff, 0x00000001, 0x00000000
++
++.LConst_two60:
++#two60m52m4
++.long 0xfffffff0, 0x0fefffff, 0x0, 0x0
++#two60p44m12
++.long 0xfffff000, 0x10000fff, 0x0, 0x0
++#two60m28m4
++.long 0xeffffff0, 0x0fffffff, 0x0, 0x0
++#two60m4
++.long 0xfffffff0, 0x0fffffff, 0x0, 0x0
++
++.text
++#
++# static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in)
++#
++.globl p384_felem_diff64
++.type	p384_felem_diff64, \@function
++.align 4
++p384_felem_diff64:
++	addis   5, 2, .LConst_two60\@toc\@ha
++	addi    5, 5, .LConst_two60\@toc\@l
++
++	ld	9, 0(3)
++	ld	8, 16(5)	# two60p44m12
++	li	7, 0
++	add	9, 9, 8
++	ld	11, 0(4)
++	subf	8, 11, 9
++	std	8, 0(3)		# out0
++
++	ld	9, 8(3)
++	ld	8, 0(5)		# two60m52m4
++	add	9, 9, 8
++	ld	11, 8(4)
++	subf	11, 11, 9
++	std	11, 8(3)	# out1
++
++	ld	9, 16(3)
++	ld	8, 32(5)	# two60m28m4
++	add	9, 9, 8
++	ld	11, 16(4)
++	subf	11, 11, 9
++	std	11, 16(3)	# out2
++
++	ld	10, 24(3)
++	ld	9, 48(5)	# two60m4
++	add	10, 10, 9
++	ld	12, 24(4)
++	subf	12, 12, 10
++	std	12, 24(3)	# out3
++
++	ld	10, 32(3)
++	add	10, 10, 9
++	ld	11, 32(4)
++	subf	11, 11, 10
++	std	11, 32(3)	# out4
++
++	ld	10, 40(3)
++	add	10, 10, 9
++	ld	12, 40(4)
++	subf	12, 12, 10
++	std	12, 40(3)	# out5
+ 
+-        endproc("p384_felem_square");
+-    }
+-}
++	ld	10, 48(3)
++	add	10, 10, 9
++	ld	11, 48(4)
++	subf	11, 11, 10
++	std	11, 48(3)	# out6
++
++	blr
++.size	p384_felem_diff64,.-p384_felem_diff64
++
++.text
++#
++# Shift 128 bits right <nbits>
++#
++.macro SHR o_h o_l in_h in_l nbits
++	srdi	\\o_l, \\in_l, \\nbits		# shift lower right <nbits>
++	rldimi	\\o_l, \\in_h, 64-\\nbits, 0	# insert <64-nbits> from hi
++	srdi	\\o_h, \\in_h, \\nbits		# shift higher right <nbits>
++.endm
++
++#
++# static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
++#
++.global p384_felem_reduce
++.type   p384_felem_reduce,\@function
++.align 4
++p384_felem_reduce:
++
++	stdu    1, -208(1)
++	mflr	0
++	std     14, 56(1)
++	std     15, 64(1)
++	std     16, 72(1)
++	std     17, 80(1)
++	std     18, 88(1)
++	std     19, 96(1)
++	std     20, 104(1)
++	std     21, 112(1)
++	std     22, 120(1)
++	std     23, 128(1)
++	std     24, 136(1)
++	std     25, 144(1)
++	std     26, 152(1)
++	std     27, 160(1)
++	std     28, 168(1)
++	std     29, 176(1)
++	std     30, 184(1)
++	std     31, 192(1)
++
++	bl	_p384_felem_reduce_core
++
++	mtlr	0
++	ld     14, 56(1)
++	ld     15, 64(1)
++	ld     16, 72(1)
++	ld     17, 80(1)
++	ld     18, 88(1)
++	ld     19, 96(1)
++	ld     20, 104(1)
++	ld     21, 112(1)
++	ld     22, 120(1)
++	ld     23, 128(1)
++	ld     24, 136(1)
++	ld     25, 144(1)
++	ld     26, 152(1)
++	ld     27, 160(1)
++	ld     28, 168(1)
++	ld     29, 176(1)
++	ld     30, 184(1)
++	ld     31, 192(1)
++	addi	1, 1, 208
++	blr
++.size   p384_felem_reduce,.-p384_felem_reduce
++
++#
++# Felem reduction core function -
++# r3 and r4 need to pre-loaded.
++#
++.type   _p384_felem_reduce_core,\@function
++.align 4
++_p384_felem_reduce_core:
++	addis   12, 2, .LConst\@toc\@ha
++	addi    12, 12, .LConst\@toc\@l
++
++	# load constat p
++	ld	11, 8(12)	# hi - two124m68
++
++	# acc[6] = in[6] + two124m68;
++	ld	26, 96(4)	# in[6].l
++	ld	27, 96+8(4)	# in[6].h
++	add	27, 27, 11
++
++	# acc[5] = in[5] + two124m68;
++	ld	24, 80(4)	# in[5].l
++	ld	25, 80+8(4)	# in[5].h
++	add	25, 25, 11
++
++	# acc[4] = in[4] + two124m68;
++	ld	22, 64(4)	# in[4].l
++	ld	23, 64+8(4)	# in[4].h
++	add	23, 23, 11
++
++	# acc[3] = in[3] + two124m68;
++	ld	20, 48(4)	# in[3].l
++	ld	21, 48+8(4)	# in[3].h
++	add	21, 21, 11
++
++	ld	11, 48+8(12)	# hi - two124m92m68
++
++	# acc[2] = in[2] + two124m92m68;
++	ld	18, 32(4)	# in[2].l
++	ld	19, 32+8(4)	# in[2].h
++	add	19, 19, 11
++
++	ld	11, 16+8(12)	# high - two124m116m68
++
++	# acc[1] = in[1] + two124m116m68;
++	ld	16, 16(4)	# in[1].l
++	ld	17, 16+8(4)	# in[1].h
++	add	17, 17, 11
++
++	ld	11, 32+8(12)	# high - two124p108m76
++
++	# acc[0] = in[0] + two124p108m76;
++	ld	14, 0(4)	# in[0].l
++	ld	15, 0+8(4)	# in[0].h
++	add	15, 15, 11
++
++	# compute mask
++	li	7, -1
++
++	# Eliminate in[12]
++
++	# acc[8] += in[12] >> 32;
++	ld	5, 192(4)	# in[12].l
++	ld	6, 192+8(4)	# in[12].h
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32
++	ld	30, 128(4)	# in[8].l
++	ld	31, 136(4)	# in[8].h
++	addc	30, 30, 10
++	adde	31, 31, 9
++
++	# acc[7] += (in[12] & 0xffffffff) << 24;
++	srdi	11, 7, 32	# 0xffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 24	# << 24
++	ld	28, 112(4)	# in[7].l
++	ld	29, 120(4)	# in[7].h
++	addc	28, 28, 11
++	addze	29, 29
++
++	# acc[7] += in[12] >> 8;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8
++	addc	28, 28, 10
++	adde	29, 29, 9
++
++	# acc[6] += (in[12] & 0xff) << 48;
++	andi.	11, 5, 0xff
++	sldi	11, 11, 48
++	addc	26, 26, 11
++	addze	27, 27
++
++	# acc[6] -= in[12] >> 16;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16
++	subfc	26, 10, 26
++	subfe	27, 9, 27
++
++	# acc[5] -= (in[12] & 0xffff) << 40;
++	srdi	11, 7, 48	# 0xffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 40	# << 40
++	li	9, 0
++	subfc	24, 11, 24
++	subfe	25, 9, 25
++
++	# acc[6] += in[12] >> 48;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48
++	addc	26, 26, 10
++	adde	27, 27, 9
++
++	# acc[5] += (in[12] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
++	srdi	11, 7, 16	# 0xffffffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 8	# << 8
++	addc	24, 24, 11
++	addze	25, 25
++
++	# Eliminate in[11]
++
++	# acc[7] += in[11] >> 32;
++	ld	5, 176(4)	# in[11].l
++	ld	6, 176+8(4)	# in[11].h
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32
++	addc	28, 28, 10
++	adde	29, 29, 9
++
++	# acc[6] += (in[11] & 0xffffffff) << 24;
++	srdi	11, 7, 32	# 0xffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 24	# << 24
++	addc	26, 26, 11
++	addze	27, 27
++
++	# acc[6] += in[11] >> 8;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8
++	addc	26, 26, 10
++	adde	27, 27, 9
++
++	# acc[5] += (in[11] & 0xff) << 48;
++	andi.	11, 5, 0xff
++	sldi	11, 11, 48
++	addc	24, 24, 11
++	addze	25, 25
++
++	# acc[5] -= in[11] >> 16;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16
++	subfc	24, 10, 24
++	subfe	25, 9, 25
++
++	# acc[4] -= (in[11] & 0xffff) << 40;
++	srdi	11, 7, 48	# 0xffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 40	# << 40
++	li	9, 0
++	subfc	22, 11, 22
++	subfe	23, 9, 23
++
++	# acc[5] += in[11] >> 48;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48
++	addc	24, 24, 10
++	adde	25, 25, 9
++
++	# acc[4] += (in[11] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
++	srdi	11, 7, 16	# 0xffffffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 8	# << 8
++	addc	22, 22, 11
++	addze	23, 23
++
++	# Eliminate in[10]
++
++	# acc[6] += in[10] >> 32;
++	ld	5, 160(4)	# in[10].l
++	ld	6, 160+8(4)	# in[10].h
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32
++	addc	26, 26, 10
++	adde	27, 27, 9
++
++	# acc[5] += (in[10] & 0xffffffff) << 24;
++	srdi	11, 7, 32	# 0xffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 24	# << 24
++	addc	24, 24, 11
++	addze	25, 25
++
++	# acc[5] += in[10] >> 8;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8
++	addc	24, 24, 10
++	adde	25, 25, 9
++
++	# acc[4] += (in[10] & 0xff) << 48;
++	andi.	11, 5, 0xff
++	sldi	11, 11, 48
++	addc	22, 22, 11
++	addze	23, 23
++
++	# acc[4] -= in[10] >> 16;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16
++	subfc	22, 10, 22
++	subfe	23, 9, 23
++
++	# acc[3] -= (in[10] & 0xffff) << 40;
++	srdi	11, 7, 48	# 0xffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 40	# << 40
++	li	9, 0
++	subfc	20, 11, 20
++	subfe	21, 9, 21
++
++	# acc[4] += in[10] >> 48;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48
++	addc	22, 22, 10
++	adde	23, 23, 9
++
++	# acc[3] += (in[10] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
++	srdi	11, 7, 16	# 0xffffffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 8	# << 8
++	addc	20, 20, 11
++	addze	21, 21
++
++	# Eliminate in[9]
++
++	# acc[5] += in[9] >> 32;
++	ld	5, 144(4)	# in[9].l
++	ld	6, 144+8(4)	# in[9].h
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32
++	addc	24, 24, 10
++	adde	25, 25, 9
++
++	# acc[4] += (in[9] & 0xffffffff) << 24;
++	srdi	11, 7, 32	# 0xffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 24	# << 24
++	addc	22, 22, 11
++	addze	23, 23
++
++	# acc[4] += in[9] >> 8;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8
++	addc	22, 22, 10
++	adde	23, 23, 9
++
++	# acc[3] += (in[9] & 0xff) << 48;
++	andi.	11, 5, 0xff
++	sldi	11, 11, 48
++	addc	20, 20, 11
++	addze	21, 21
++
++	# acc[3] -= in[9] >> 16;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16
++	subfc	20, 10, 20
++	subfe	21, 9, 21
++
++	# acc[2] -= (in[9] & 0xffff) << 40;
++	srdi	11, 7, 48	# 0xffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 40	# << 40
++	li	9, 0
++	subfc	18, 11, 18
++	subfe	19, 9, 19
++
++	# acc[3] += in[9] >> 48;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48
++	addc	20, 20, 10
++	adde	21, 21, 9
++
++	# acc[2] += (in[9] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
++	srdi	11, 7, 16	# 0xffffffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 8	# << 8
++	addc	18, 18, 11
++	addze	19, 19
++
++	# Eliminate acc[8]
++
++	# acc[4] += acc[8] >> 32;
++	mr	5, 30		# acc[8].l
++	mr	6, 31		# acc[8].h
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32
++	addc	22, 22, 10
++	adde	23, 23, 9
++
++	# acc[3] += (acc[8] & 0xffffffff) << 24;
++	srdi	11, 7, 32	# 0xffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 24	# << 24
++	addc	20, 20, 11
++	addze	21, 21
++
++	# acc[3] += acc[8] >> 8;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8
++	addc	20, 20, 10
++	adde	21, 21, 9
++
++	# acc[2] += (acc[8] & 0xff) << 48;
++	andi.	11, 5, 0xff
++	sldi	11, 11, 48
++	addc	18, 18, 11
++	addze	19, 19
++
++	# acc[2] -= acc[8] >> 16;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16
++	subfc	18, 10, 18
++	subfe	19, 9, 19
++
++	# acc[1] -= (acc[8] & 0xffff) << 40;
++	srdi	11, 7, 48	# 0xffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 40	# << 40
++	li	9, 0
++	subfc	16, 11, 16
++	subfe	17, 9, 17
++
++	#acc[2] += acc[8] >> 48;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48
++	addc	18, 18, 10
++	adde	19, 19, 9
++
++	# acc[1] += (acc[8] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
++	srdi	11, 7, 16	# 0xffffffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 8	# << 8
++	addc	16, 16, 11
++	addze	17, 17
++
++	# Eliminate acc[7]
++
++	# acc[3] += acc[7] >> 32;
++	mr	5, 28		# acc[7].l
++	mr	6, 29		# acc[7].h
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32
++	addc	20, 20, 10
++	adde	21, 21, 9
++
++	# acc[2] += (acc[7] & 0xffffffff) << 24;
++	srdi	11, 7, 32	# 0xffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 24	# << 24
++	addc	18, 18, 11
++	addze	19, 19
++
++	# acc[2] += acc[7] >> 8;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8
++	addc	18, 18, 10
++	adde	19, 19, 9
++
++	# acc[1] += (acc[7] & 0xff) << 48;
++	andi.	11, 5, 0xff
++	sldi	11, 11, 48
++	addc	16, 16, 11
++	addze	17, 17
++
++	# acc[1] -= acc[7] >> 16;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16
++	subfc	16, 10, 16
++	subfe	17, 9, 17
++
++	# acc[0] -= (acc[7] & 0xffff) << 40;
++	srdi	11, 7, 48	# 0xffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 40	# << 40
++	li	9, 0
++	subfc	14, 11, 14
++	subfe	15, 9, 15
++
++	# acc[1] += acc[7] >> 48;
++	SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48
++	addc	16, 16, 10
++	adde	17, 17, 9
++
++	# acc[0] += (acc[7] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
++	srdi	11, 7, 16	# 0xffffffffffff
++	and	11, 11, 5
++	sldi	11, 11, 8	# << 8
++	addc	14, 14, 11
++	addze	15, 15
++
++	#
++	# Carry 4 -> 5 -> 6
++	#
++	# acc[5] += acc[4] >> 56;
++	# acc[4] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	SHR 9, 10, 23, 22, 56
++	addc	24, 24, 10
++	adde	25, 25, 9
++	srdi	11, 7, 8	# 0x00ffffffffffffff
++	and	22, 22, 11
++	li	23, 0
++
++	# acc[6] += acc[5] >> 56;
++	# acc[5] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	SHR 9, 10, 25, 24, 56
++	addc	26, 26, 10
++	adde	27, 27, 9
++	and	24, 24, 11
++	li	25, 0
++
++	# [3]: Eliminate high bits of acc[6] */
++	# temp = acc[6] >> 48;
++	# acc[6] &= 0x0000ffffffffffff;
++	SHR 31, 30, 27, 26, 48	# temp = acc[6] >> 48
++	srdi	11, 7, 16	# 0x0000ffffffffffff
++	and	26, 26, 11
++	li	27, 0
++
++	# temp < 2^80
++	# acc[3] += temp >> 40;
++	SHR 9, 10, 31, 30, 40
++	addc	20, 20, 10
++	adde	21, 21, 9
++
++	# acc[2] += (temp & 0xffffffffff) << 16;
++	srdi	11, 7, 24	# 0xffffffffff
++	and	10, 30, 11
++	sldi	10, 10, 16
++	addc	18, 18, 10
++	addze	19, 19
++
++	# acc[2] += temp >> 16;
++	SHR 9, 10, 31, 30, 16
++	addc	18, 18, 10
++	adde	19, 19, 9
++
++	# acc[1] += (temp & 0xffff) << 40;
++	srdi	11, 7, 48	# 0xffff
++	and	10, 30, 11
++	sldi	10, 10, 40
++	addc	16, 16, 10
++	addze	17, 17
++
++	# acc[1] -= temp >> 24;
++	SHR 9, 10, 31, 30, 24
++	subfc	16, 10, 16
++	subfe	17, 9, 17
++
++	# acc[0] -= (temp & 0xffffff) << 32;
++	srdi	11, 7, 40	# 0xffffff
++	and	10, 30, 11
++	sldi	10, 10, 32
++	li	9, 0
++	subfc	14, 10, 14
++	subfe	15, 9, 15
++
++	# acc[0] += temp;
++	addc	14, 14, 30
++	adde	15, 15, 31
++
++	# Carry 0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 -> 5 -> 6
++	#
++	# acc[1] += acc[0] >> 56;   /* acc[1] < acc_old[1] + 2^72 */
++	SHR 9, 10, 15, 14, 56
++	addc	16, 16, 10
++	adde	17, 17, 9
++
++	# acc[0] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	srdi	11, 7, 8	# 0x00ffffffffffffff
++	and	14, 14, 11
++	li	15, 0
++
++	# acc[2] += acc[1] >> 56;   /* acc[2] < acc_old[2] + 2^72 + 2^16 */
++	SHR 9, 10, 17, 16, 56
++	addc	18, 18, 10
++	adde	19, 19, 9
++
++	# acc[1] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	and	16, 16, 11
++	li	17, 0
++
++	# acc[3] += acc[2] >> 56;   /* acc[3] < acc_old[3] + 2^72 + 2^16 */
++	SHR 9, 10, 19, 18, 56
++	addc	20, 20, 10
++	adde	21, 21, 9
++
++	# acc[2] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	and	18, 18, 11
++	li	19, 0
++
++	# acc[4] += acc[3] >> 56;
++	SHR 9, 10, 21, 20, 56
++	addc	22, 22, 10
++	adde	23, 23, 9
++
++	# acc[3] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	and	20, 20, 11
++	li	21, 0
++
++	# acc[5] += acc[4] >> 56;
++	SHR 9, 10, 23, 22, 56
++	addc	24, 24, 10
++	adde	25, 25, 9
++
++	# acc[4] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	and	22, 22, 11
++
++	# acc[6] += acc[5] >> 56;
++	SHR 9, 10, 25, 24, 56
++	addc	26, 26, 10
++	adde	27, 27, 9
++
++	# acc[5] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
++	and	24, 24, 11
++
++	std	14, 0(3)
++	std	16, 8(3)
++	std	18, 16(3)
++	std	20, 24(3)
++	std	22, 32(3)
++	std	24, 40(3)
++	std	26, 48(3)
++	blr
++.size   _p384_felem_reduce_core,.-_p384_felem_reduce_core
++
++.data
++.align 4
++.LConst:
++# two124m68:
++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffffff0, 0xfffffff
++# two124m116m68:
++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffffff0, 0xfefffff
++#two124p108m76:
++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffff000, 0x10000fff
++#two124m92m68:
++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xeffffff0, 0xfffffff
++
++.text
++
++#
++# void p384_felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)
++#
++.global p384_felem_square_reduce
++.type   p384_felem_square_reduce,\@function
++.align 4
++p384_felem_square_reduce:
++	stdu    1, -512(1)
++	mflr	0
++	std     14, 56(1)
++	std     15, 64(1)
++	std     16, 72(1)
++	std     17, 80(1)
++	std     18, 88(1)
++	std     19, 96(1)
++	std     20, 104(1)
++	std     21, 112(1)
++	std     22, 120(1)
++	std     23, 128(1)
++	std     24, 136(1)
++	std     25, 144(1)
++	std     26, 152(1)
++	std     27, 160(1)
++	std     28, 168(1)
++	std     29, 176(1)
++	std     30, 184(1)
++	std     31, 192(1)
++
++	std	3, 496(1)
++	addi	3, 1, 208
++	bl _p384_felem_square_core
++
++	mr	4, 3
++	ld	3, 496(1)
++	bl _p384_felem_reduce_core
++
++	ld     14, 56(1)
++	ld     15, 64(1)
++	ld     16, 72(1)
++	ld     17, 80(1)
++	ld     18, 88(1)
++	ld     19, 96(1)
++	ld     20, 104(1)
++	ld     21, 112(1)
++	ld     22, 120(1)
++	ld     23, 128(1)
++	ld     24, 136(1)
++	ld     25, 144(1)
++	ld     26, 152(1)
++	ld     27, 160(1)
++	ld     28, 168(1)
++	ld     29, 176(1)
++	ld     30, 184(1)
++	ld     31, 192(1)
++	addi	1, 1, 512
++	mtlr	0
++	blr
++.size   p384_felem_square_reduce,.-p384_felem_square_reduce
++
++#
++# void p384_felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
++#
++.global p384_felem_mul_reduce
++.type   p384_felem_mul_reduce,\@function
++.align 5
++p384_felem_mul_reduce:
++	stdu    1, -512(1)
++	mflr	0
++	std     14, 56(1)
++	std     15, 64(1)
++	std     16, 72(1)
++	std     17, 80(1)
++	std     18, 88(1)
++	std     19, 96(1)
++	std     20, 104(1)
++	std     21, 112(1)
++	std     22, 120(1)
++	std     23, 128(1)
++	std     24, 136(1)
++	std     25, 144(1)
++	std     26, 152(1)
++	std     27, 160(1)
++	std     28, 168(1)
++	std     29, 176(1)
++	std     30, 184(1)
++	std     31, 192(1)
++
++	std	3, 496(1)
++	addi	3, 1, 208
++	bl _p384_felem_mul_core
++
++	mr	4, 3
++	ld	3, 496(1)
++	bl _p384_felem_reduce_core
++
++	ld     14, 56(1)
++	ld     15, 64(1)
++	ld     16, 72(1)
++	ld     17, 80(1)
++	ld     18, 88(1)
++	ld     19, 96(1)
++	ld     20, 104(1)
++	ld     21, 112(1)
++	ld     22, 120(1)
++	ld     23, 128(1)
++	ld     24, 136(1)
++	ld     25, 144(1)
++	ld     26, 152(1)
++	ld     27, 160(1)
++	ld     28, 168(1)
++	ld     29, 176(1)
++	ld     30, 184(1)
++	ld     31, 192(1)
++	addi	1, 1, 512
++	mtlr	0
++	blr
++.size   p384_felem_mul_reduce,.-p384_felem_mul_reduce
++___
+ 
+ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+ print $code;
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
+index 3fd7a40020..e0b5786bc1 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
+@@ -252,6 +252,16 @@ static void felem_neg(felem out, const felem in)
+     out[6] = two60m4 - in[6];
+ }
+ 
++#if defined(ECP_NISTP384_ASM)
++void p384_felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in);
++void p384_felem_diff128(widefelem out, const widefelem in);
++void p384_felem_diff_128_64(widefelem out, const felem in);
++
++# define felem_diff64           p384_felem_diff64
++# define felem_diff128          p384_felem_diff128
++# define felem_diff_128_64      p384_felem_diff_128_64
++
++#else
+ /*-
+  * felem_diff64 subtracts |in| from |out|
+  * On entry:
+@@ -369,6 +379,7 @@ static void felem_diff128(widefelem out, const widefelem in)
+     for (i = 0; i < 2*NLIMBS-1; i++)
+         out[i] -= in[i];
+ }
++#endif /* ECP_NISTP384_ASM */
+ 
+ static void felem_square_ref(widefelem out, const felem in)
+ {
+@@ -503,7 +514,7 @@ static void felem_mul_ref(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+  * [3]: Y = 2^48 (acc[6] >> 48)
+  * (Where a | b | c | d = (2^56)^3 a + (2^56)^2 b + (2^56) c + d)
+  */
+-static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
++static void felem_reduce_ref(felem out, const widefelem in)
+ {
+     /*
+      * In order to prevent underflow, we add a multiple of p before subtracting.
+@@ -682,8 +693,11 @@ static void (*felem_square_p)(widefelem out, const felem in) =
+ static void (*felem_mul_p)(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) =
+     felem_mul_wrapper;
+ 
++static void (*felem_reduce_p)(felem out, const widefelem in) = felem_reduce_ref;
++
+ void p384_felem_square(widefelem out, const felem in);
+ void p384_felem_mul(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
++void p384_felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in);
+ 
+ # if defined(_ARCH_PPC64)
+ #  include "crypto/ppc_arch.h"
+@@ -695,6 +709,7 @@ static void felem_select(void)
+     if ((OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300) && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC)) {
+         felem_square_p = p384_felem_square;
+         felem_mul_p = p384_felem_mul;
++        felem_reduce_p = p384_felem_reduce;
+ 
+         return;
+     }
+@@ -703,6 +718,7 @@ static void felem_select(void)
+     /* Default */
+     felem_square_p = felem_square_ref;
+     felem_mul_p = felem_mul_ref;
++    felem_reduce_p = p384_felem_reduce;
+ }
+ 
+ static void felem_square_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in)
+@@ -719,10 +735,17 @@ static void felem_mul_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+ 
+ # define felem_square felem_square_p
+ # define felem_mul felem_mul_p
++# define felem_reduce felem_reduce_p
++
++void p384_felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in);
++void p384_felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
++
++# define felem_square_reduce p384_felem_square_reduce
++# define felem_mul_reduce p384_felem_mul_reduce
+ #else
+ # define felem_square felem_square_ref
+ # define felem_mul felem_mul_ref
+-#endif
++# define felem_reduce felem_reduce_ref
+ 
+ static ossl_inline void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)
+ {
+@@ -739,6 +762,7 @@ static ossl_inline void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem
+     felem_mul(tmp, in1, in2);
+     felem_reduce(out, tmp);
+ }
++#endif
+ 
+ /*-
+  * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1}
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch new file +129 -0

129 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb +2 -0
index d6bf32d989..fd98b32007 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
            file://0001-Added-handshake-history-reporting-when-test-fails.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-27587-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-27587-2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH v2 8/16 libpam: fix CVE-2025-6020

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1 && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773

---
 .../libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch |  101 ++
 .../libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch    |  750 +++++++++++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch         | 1128 +++++++++++++++++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch         |  187 +++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch         |   35 +
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb     |    5 +
 6 files changed, 2206 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch new file +101 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d1a0223df
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 08:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_inline: introduce pam_asprintf(), pam_snprintf(), and
+ pam_sprintf()
+
+pam_asprintf() is essentially asprintf() with the following semantic
+difference: it returns the string itself instead of its length.
+
+pam_snprintf() is essentially snprintf() with the following semantic
+difference: it returns -1 in case of truncation.
+
+pam_sprintf() is essentially snprintf() but with a check that the buffer
+is an array, and with an automatically calculated buffer size.
+
+Use of these helpers would make error checking simpler.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc)
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h |  6 ++++++
+ libpam/include/pam_inline.h    | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h
+index 0a6e32d..af05428 100644
+--- a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h
++++ b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h
+@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
+ # define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_ALIGNED(arg)	/* empty */
+ #endif
+ 
++#if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 0)
++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC		__attribute__((__malloc__))
++#else
++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC		/* empty */
++#endif
++
+ #if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(4, 6)
+ # define DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL					\
+ 	_Pragma("GCC diagnostic push");					\
+diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h
+index 7721c0b..ec0497c 100644
+--- a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h
++++ b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h
+@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
+ #define PAM_INLINE_H
+ 
+ #include "pam_cc_compat.h"
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+@@ -126,6 +128,40 @@ pam_drop_response(struct pam_response *reply, int replies)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static inline char * PAM_FORMAT((printf, 1, 2)) PAM_NONNULL((1)) PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC
++pam_asprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++	int rc;
++	char *res;
++	va_list ap;
++
++	va_start(ap, fmt);
++	rc = vasprintf(&res, fmt, ap);
++	va_end(ap);
++
++	return rc < 0 ? NULL : res;
++}
++
++static inline int PAM_FORMAT((printf, 3, 4)) PAM_NONNULL((3))
++pam_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++	int rc;
++	va_list ap;
++
++	va_start(ap, fmt);
++	rc = vsnprintf(str, size, fmt, ap);
++	va_end(ap);
++
++	if (rc < 0 || (unsigned int) rc >= size)
++		return -1;
++	return rc;
++}
++
++#define pam_sprintf(str_, fmt_, ...)						\
++	pam_snprintf((str_), sizeof(str_) + PAM_MUST_BE_ARRAY(str_), (fmt_),	\
++		     ##__VA_ARGS__)
++
++
+ static inline int
+ pam_read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
+ {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch new file +750 -0

750 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch new file +1128 -0

1,128 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch new file +187 -0

187 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..238bef47ec
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 08:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: secure_opendir: do not look at the group
+ ownership
+
+When the directory is not group-writable, the group ownership does
+not matter, and when it is group-writable, there should not be any
+exceptions for the root group as there is no guarantee that the root
+group does not include non-root users.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773]
+CVE: CVE-2025-6020
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index 4c8153b..791dd07 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ static int secure_opendir(const char *path, int opm, mode_t mode,
+ 			if (dfd_next == -1)
+ 				goto error;
+ 		} else if (st.st_uid != 0
+-		           || (st.st_gid != 0 && (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP))
+-		           || (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
++		           || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))) {
+ 			/* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */
+ 			flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ 		}
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb +5 -0
index 714cdb6552..815085cc82 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2024-22365.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-10041-1.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-10041-2.patch \
+           file://0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch \
+           file://0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6020-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6020-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6020-03.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7ac4b50feee004a9fa88f1dfd2d2fa738a82896763050cd773b3c54b0a818283"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#9 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][scarthgap V2 08/16] libpam: fix CVE-2025-6020

This seems to introduce:

../../../Linux-PAM-1.5.3/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c:326:11:
error: call to undeclared function 'dirname'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
326 | parent = dirname(buf);
| ^
../../../Linux-PAM-1.5.3/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c:326:9:
error: incompatible integer to pointer conversion assigning to 'char *' from 'int' [-Wint-conversion]

  326 |         parent = dirname(buf);
      |                ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~

because pam_namespace.h wasn't updated to include libgen.h as in the original commit
https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e#diff-05f443e6acbe32a148a45648148739bf6f02f13acc5c20c6037bf933223d4d77

will send a fix later.

Quoted 2,280 lines · Steve Sakoman via lists.openembedded.org

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1 && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773

---
 .../libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch |  101 ++
 .../libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch    |  750 +++++++++++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch         | 1128 +++++++++++++++++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch         |  187 +++
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch         |   35 +
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb     |    5 +
 6 files changed, 2206 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch new file +101 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d1a0223df
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 08:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_inline: introduce pam_asprintf(), pam_snprintf(), and
+ pam_sprintf()
+
+pam_asprintf() is essentially asprintf() with the following semantic
+difference: it returns the string itself instead of its length.
+
+pam_snprintf() is essentially snprintf() with the following semantic
+difference: it returns -1 in case of truncation.
+
+pam_sprintf() is essentially snprintf() but with a check that the buffer
+is an array, and with an automatically calculated buffer size.
+
+Use of these helpers would make error checking simpler.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc)
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h |  6 ++++++
+ libpam/include/pam_inline.h    | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h
+index 0a6e32d..af05428 100644
+--- a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h
++++ b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h
+@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
+ # define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_ALIGNED(arg)   /* empty */
+ #endif
+
++#if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 0)
++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC         __attribute__((__malloc__))
++#else
++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC         /* empty */
++#endif
++
+ #if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(4, 6)
+ # define DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL                                   \
+       _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push");                                 \
+diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h
+index 7721c0b..ec0497c 100644
+--- a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h
++++ b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h
+@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
+ #define PAM_INLINE_H
+
+ #include "pam_cc_compat.h"
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+@@ -126,6 +128,40 @@ pam_drop_response(struct pam_response *reply, int replies)
+ }
+
+
++static inline char * PAM_FORMAT((printf, 1, 2)) PAM_NONNULL((1)) PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC
++pam_asprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++      int rc;
++      char *res;
++      va_list ap;
++
++      va_start(ap, fmt);
++      rc = vasprintf(&res, fmt, ap);
++      va_end(ap);
++
++      return rc < 0 ? NULL : res;
++}
++
++static inline int PAM_FORMAT((printf, 3, 4)) PAM_NONNULL((3))
++pam_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++      int rc;
++      va_list ap;
++
++      va_start(ap, fmt);
++      rc = vsnprintf(str, size, fmt, ap);
++      va_end(ap);
++
++      if (rc < 0 || (unsigned int) rc >= size)
++              return -1;
++      return rc;
++}
++
++#define pam_sprintf(str_, fmt_, ...)                                          \
++      pam_snprintf((str_), sizeof(str_) + PAM_MUST_BE_ARRAY(str_), (fmt_),    \
++                   ##__VA_ARGS__)
++
++
+ static inline int
+ pam_read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
+ {
+--
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch new file +750 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff5a8a4946
@@ -0,0 +1,750 @@
+From df1dab1a1a7900650ad4be157fea1a002048cc49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 14:37:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH ] pam-namespace-rebase
+
+Refresh the pam-namespace.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/a8b4dce7b53d73de372e150028c970ee0a2a2e97]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 444 +++++++++++++-------------
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h |   7 +-
+ 2 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index b026861..166bfce 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
+ #include "pam_namespace.h"
+ #include "argv_parse.h"
+
+-/* --- evaluting all files in VENDORDIR/security/namespace.d and /etc/security/namespace.d --- */
++/* --- evaluating all files in VENDORDIR/security/namespace.d and /etc/security/namespace.d --- */
+ static const char *base_name(const char *path)
+ {
+     const char *base = strrchr(path, '/');
+@@ -55,6 +55,155 @@ compare_filename(const void *a, const void *b)
+                     base_name(* (char * const *) b));
+ }
+
++static void close_fds_pre_exec(struct instance_data *idata)
++{
++      if (pam_modutil_sanitize_helper_fds(idata->pamh, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD,
++                      PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD) < 0) {
++              _exit(1);
++      }
++}
++
++static void
++strip_trailing_slashes(char *str)
++{
++      char *p = str + strlen(str);
++
++      while (--p > str && *p == '/')
++              *p = '\0';
++}
++
++static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata)
++{
++      struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs;
++      char tmpbuf[64];
++
++      while (dir != NULL) {
++              if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) {
++                      return 0;
++              }
++              dir = dir->next;
++      }
++
++      if (pam_sprintf(tmpbuf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd) < 0)
++              return -1;
++
++      dir = calloc(1, sizeof(*dir));
++
++      if (dir == NULL) {
++              return -1;
++      }
++
++      dir->dir = strdup(path);
++
++      if (dir->dir == NULL) {
++              free(dir);
++              return -1;
++      }
++
++      if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) {
++              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_INFO,
++                      "Protect mount of %s over itself", path);
++      }
++
++      if (mount(tmpbuf, tmpbuf, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) {
++              int save_errno = errno;
++              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
++                      "Protect mount of %s failed: %m", tmpbuf);
++              free(dir->dir);
++              free(dir);
++              errno = save_errno;
++              return -1;
++      }
++
++      dir->next = idata->protect_dirs;
++      idata->protect_dirs = dir;
++
++      return 0;
++}
++
++static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
++      struct instance_data *idata)
++{
++      char *p = strdup(path);
++      char *d;
++      char *dir = p;
++      int dfd = AT_FDCWD;
++      int dfd_next;
++      int save_errno;
++      int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY;
++      int rv = -1;
++      struct stat st;
++
++      if (p == NULL) {
++              return -1;
++      }
++
++      if (*dir == '/') {
++              dfd = open("/", flags);
++              if (dfd == -1) {
++                      goto error;
++              }
++              dir++;  /* assume / is safe */
++      }
++
++      while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) {
++              *d = '\0';
++              dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
++              if (dfd_next == -1) {
++                      goto error;
++              }
++
++              if (dfd != AT_FDCWD)
++                      close(dfd);
++              dfd = dfd_next;
++
++              if (fstat(dfd, &st) != 0) {
++                      goto error;
++              }
++
++              if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
++                      /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
++                      if (protect_mount(dfd, p, idata) == -1)
++                              goto error;
++              } else if (st.st_uid != 0 || st.st_gid != 0 ||
++                      (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
++                      /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */
++                      flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++              }
++
++              *d = '/';
++              dir = d + 1;
++      }
++
++      rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
++
++      if (rv == -1) {
++              if (!do_mkdir || mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) != 0) {
++                      goto error;
++              }
++              rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
++      }
++
++      if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
++              /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
++              if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) {
++                      save_errno = errno;
++                      close(rv);
++                      rv = -1;
++                      errno = save_errno;
++              }
++      }
++
++error:
++      save_errno = errno;
++      free(p);
++      if (dfd != AT_FDCWD && dfd >= 0)
++              close(dfd);
++      errno = save_errno;
++
++      return rv;
++}
++
+ /* Evaluating a list of files which have to be parsed in the right order:
+  *
+  * - If etc/security/namespace.d/@[email protected] exists, then
+@@ -129,6 +278,7 @@ static char **read_namespace_dir(struct instance_data *idata)
+       return file_list;
+ }
+
++
+ /*
+  * Adds an entry for a polyinstantiated directory to the linked list of
+  * polyinstantiated directories. It is called from process_line() while
+@@ -198,7 +348,7 @@ static void cleanup_protect_data(pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED , void *data, int err
+       unprotect_dirs(data);
+ }
+
+-static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *var_names[], const char *var_values[])
++static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *const var_names[], const char *var_values[])
+ {
+       const char *src = orig;
+       char *dst;
+@@ -209,7 +359,7 @@ static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *var_names[], const c
+               if (*src == '$') {
+                       int i;
+                       for (i = 0; var_names[i]; i++) {
+-                              int namelen = strlen(var_names[i]);
++                              size_t namelen = strlen(var_names[i]);
+                               if (strncmp(var_names[i], src+1, namelen) == 0) {
+                                       dstlen += strlen(var_values[i]) - 1; /* $ */
+                                       src += namelen;
+@@ -227,7 +377,7 @@ static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *var_names[], const c
+               if (c == '$') {
+                       int i;
+                       for (i = 0; var_names[i]; i++) {
+-                              int namelen = strlen(var_names[i]);
++                              size_t namelen = strlen(var_names[i]);
+                               if (strncmp(var_names[i], src+1, namelen) == 0) {
+                                       dst = stpcpy(dst, var_values[i]);
+                                       --dst;
+@@ -311,8 +461,7 @@ static int parse_iscript_params(char *params, struct polydir_s *poly)
+
+     if (*params != '\0') {
+       if (*params != '/') { /* path is relative to NAMESPACE_D_DIR */
+-              if (asprintf(&poly->init_script, "%s%s", NAMESPACE_D_DIR, params) == -1)
+-                      return -1;
++              poly->init_script = pam_asprintf("%s%s", NAMESPACE_D_DIR, params);
+       } else {
+               poly->init_script = strdup(params);
+       }
+@@ -394,9 +543,9 @@ static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly,
+ {
+     enum polymethod pm;
+     char *sptr = NULL;
+-    static const char *method_names[] = { "user", "context", "level", "tmpdir",
++    static const char *const method_names[] = { "user", "context", "level", "tmpdir",
+       "tmpfs", NULL };
+-    static const char *flag_names[] = { "create", "noinit", "iscript",
++    static const char *const flag_names[] = { "create", "noinit", "iscript",
+       "shared", "mntopts", NULL };
+     static const unsigned int flag_values[] = { POLYDIR_CREATE, POLYDIR_NOINIT,
+       POLYDIR_ISCRIPT, POLYDIR_SHARED, POLYDIR_MNTOPTS };
+@@ -421,7 +570,7 @@ static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly,
+
+     while ((flag=strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr)) != NULL) {
+       for (i = 0; flag_names[i]; i++) {
+-              int namelen = strlen(flag_names[i]);
++              size_t namelen = strlen(flag_names[i]);
+
+               if (strncmp(flag, flag_names[i], namelen) == 0) {
+                       poly->flags |= flag_values[i];
+@@ -467,27 +616,27 @@ static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly,
+  * of the namespace configuration file. It skips over comments and incomplete
+  * or malformed lines. It processes a valid line with information on
+  * polyinstantiating a directory by populating appropriate fields of a
+- * polyinstatiated directory structure and then calling add_polydir_entry to
++ * polyinstantiated directory structure and then calling add_polydir_entry to
+  * add that entry to the linked list of polyinstantiated directories.
+  */
+ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+                       struct instance_data *idata)
+ {
+     char *dir = NULL, *instance_prefix = NULL, *rdir = NULL;
++    const char *config_dir, *config_instance_prefix;
+     char *method, *uids;
+     char *tptr;
+     struct polydir_s *poly;
+     int retval = 0;
+     char **config_options = NULL;
+-    static const char *var_names[] = {"HOME", "USER", NULL};
++    static const char *const var_names[] = {"HOME", "USER", NULL};
+     const char *var_values[] = {home, idata->user};
+     const char *rvar_values[] = {rhome, idata->ruser};
+-    int len;
+
+     /*
+      * skip the leading white space
+      */
+-    while (*line && isspace(*line))
++    while (*line && isspace((unsigned char)*line))
+         line++;
+
+     /*
+@@ -523,22 +672,19 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+         goto erralloc;
+     }
+
+-    dir = config_options[0];
+-    if (dir == NULL) {
++    config_dir = config_options[0];
++    if (config_dir == NULL) {
+         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid line missing polydir");
+         goto skipping;
+     }
+-    instance_prefix = config_options[1];
+-    if (instance_prefix == NULL) {
++    config_instance_prefix = config_options[1];
++    if (config_instance_prefix == NULL) {
+         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid line missing instance_prefix");
+-        instance_prefix = NULL;
+         goto skipping;
+     }
+     method = config_options[2];
+     if (method == NULL) {
+         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid line missing method");
+-        instance_prefix = NULL;
+-        dir = NULL;
+         goto skipping;
+     }
+
+@@ -553,19 +699,16 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+     /*
+      * Expand $HOME and $USER in poly dir and instance dir prefix
+      */
+-    if ((rdir=expand_variables(dir, var_names, rvar_values)) == NULL) {
+-          instance_prefix = NULL;
+-          dir = NULL;
++    if ((rdir = expand_variables(config_dir, var_names, rvar_values)) == NULL) {
+           goto erralloc;
+     }
+
+-    if ((dir=expand_variables(dir, var_names, var_values)) == NULL) {
+-          instance_prefix = NULL;
++    if ((dir = expand_variables(config_dir, var_names, var_values)) == NULL) {
+           goto erralloc;
+     }
+
+-    if ((instance_prefix=expand_variables(instance_prefix, var_names, var_values))
+-          == NULL) {
++    if ((instance_prefix = expand_variables(config_instance_prefix,
++                                          var_names, var_values)) == NULL) {
+           goto erralloc;
+     }
+
+@@ -575,15 +718,8 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+           pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Expanded instance prefix: '%s'", instance_prefix);
+     }
+
+-    len = strlen(dir);
+-    if (len > 0 && dir[len-1] == '/') {
+-          dir[len-1] = '\0';
+-    }
+-
+-    len = strlen(rdir);
+-    if (len > 0 && rdir[len-1] == '/') {
+-          rdir[len-1] = '\0';
+-    }
++    strip_trailing_slashes(dir);
++    strip_trailing_slashes(rdir);
+
+     if (dir[0] == '\0' || rdir[0] == '\0') {
+           pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid polydir");
+@@ -594,26 +730,19 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+      * Populate polyinstantiated directory structure with appropriate
+      * pathnames and the method with which to polyinstantiate.
+      */
+-    if (strlen(dir) >= sizeof(poly->dir)
+-        || strlen(rdir) >= sizeof(poly->rdir)
+-      || strlen(instance_prefix) >= sizeof(poly->instance_prefix)) {
+-      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long");
+-      goto skipping;
+-    }
+-    strcpy(poly->dir, dir);
+-    strcpy(poly->rdir, rdir);
+-    strcpy(poly->instance_prefix, instance_prefix);
+-
+     if (parse_method(method, poly, idata) != 0) {
+           goto skipping;
+     }
+
+-    if (poly->method == TMPDIR) {
+-      if (sizeof(poly->instance_prefix) - strlen(poly->instance_prefix) < 7) {
+-              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long");
+-              goto skipping;
+-      }
+-      strcat(poly->instance_prefix, "XXXXXX");
++#define COPY_STR(dst, src, apd)                                \
++      pam_sprintf((dst), "%s%s", (src), (apd))
++
++    if (COPY_STR(poly->dir, dir, "") < 0
++      || COPY_STR(poly->rdir, rdir, "") < 0
++      || COPY_STR(poly->instance_prefix, instance_prefix,
++                  poly->method == TMPDIR ? "XXXXXX" : "") < 0) {
++      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long");
++      goto skipping;
+     }
+
+     /*
+@@ -637,7 +766,7 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+     if (uids) {
+         uid_t *uidptr;
+         const char *ustr, *sstr;
+-        int count, i;
++        size_t count, i;
+
+       if (*uids == '~') {
+               poly->flags |= POLYDIR_EXCLUSIVE;
+@@ -646,8 +775,13 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+         for (count = 0, ustr = sstr = uids; sstr; ustr = sstr + 1, count++)
+            sstr = strchr(ustr, ',');
+
++        if (count > UINT_MAX || count > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(uid_t)) {
++            pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Too many uids encountered in configuration");
++            goto skipping;
++        }
++
+         poly->num_uids = count;
+-        poly->uid = (uid_t *) malloc(count * sizeof (uid_t));
++        poly->uid = malloc(count * sizeof (uid_t));
+         uidptr = poly->uid;
+         if (uidptr == NULL) {
+             goto erralloc;
+@@ -996,6 +1130,7 @@ static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+               return rc;
+       }
+       /* Should never get here */
++      freecon(scon);
+       return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -1057,10 +1192,8 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+
+     switch (pm) {
+         case USER:
+-          if (asprintf(i_name, "%s", idata->user) < 0) {
+-              *i_name = NULL;
++          if ((*i_name = strdup(idata->user)) == NULL)
+               goto fail;
+-          }
+           break;
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+@@ -1070,17 +1203,12 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+               pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error translating directory context");
+               goto fail;
+           }
+-          if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED) {
+-              if (asprintf(i_name, "%s", rawcon) < 0) {
+-                      *i_name = NULL;
+-                      goto fail;
+-              }
+-          } else {
+-              if (asprintf(i_name, "%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user) < 0) {
+-                      *i_name = NULL;
+-                      goto fail;
+-              }
+-          }
++          if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED)
++              *i_name = strdup(rawcon);
++          else
++              *i_name = pam_asprintf("%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user);
++          if (*i_name == NULL)
++              goto fail;
+           break;
+
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -1110,11 +1238,12 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+           *i_name = hash;
+           hash = NULL;
+         } else {
+-          char *newname;
+-          if (asprintf(&newname, "%.*s_%s", NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN-1-(int)strlen(hash),
+-              *i_name, hash) < 0) {
++          char *newname =
++              pam_asprintf("%.*s_%s",
++                           NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN - 1 - (int)strlen(hash),
++                           *i_name, hash);
++          if (newname == NULL)
+               goto fail;
+-          }
+           free(*i_name);
+           *i_name = newname;
+         }
+@@ -1139,137 +1268,6 @@ fail:
+     return rc;
+ }
+
+-static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata)
+-{
+-      struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs;
+-      char tmpbuf[64];
+-
+-      while (dir != NULL) {
+-              if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) {
+-                      return 0;
+-              }
+-              dir = dir->next;
+-      }
+-
+-      dir = calloc(1, sizeof(*dir));
+-
+-      if (dir == NULL) {
+-              return -1;
+-      }
+-
+-      dir->dir = strdup(path);
+-
+-      if (dir->dir == NULL) {
+-              free(dir);
+-              return -1;
+-      }
+-
+-      snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd);
+-
+-      if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) {
+-              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_INFO,
+-                      "Protect mount of %s over itself", path);
+-      }
+-
+-      if (mount(tmpbuf, tmpbuf, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) {
+-              int save_errno = errno;
+-              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-                      "Protect mount of %s failed: %m", tmpbuf);
+-              free(dir->dir);
+-              free(dir);
+-              errno = save_errno;
+-              return -1;
+-      }
+-
+-      dir->next = idata->protect_dirs;
+-      idata->protect_dirs = dir;
+-
+-      return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
+-      struct instance_data *idata)
+-{
+-      char *p = strdup(path);
+-      char *d;
+-      char *dir = p;
+-      int dfd = AT_FDCWD;
+-      int dfd_next;
+-      int save_errno;
+-      int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY;
+-      int rv = -1;
+-      struct stat st;
+-
+-      if (p == NULL) {
+-              goto error;
+-      }
+-
+-      if (*dir == '/') {
+-              dfd = open("/", flags);
+-              if (dfd == -1) {
+-                      goto error;
+-              }
+-              dir++;  /* assume / is safe */
+-      }
+-
+-      while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) {
+-              *d = '\0';
+-              dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+-              if (dfd_next == -1) {
+-                      goto error;
+-              }
+-
+-              if (dfd != AT_FDCWD)
+-                      close(dfd);
+-              dfd = dfd_next;
+-
+-              if (fstat(dfd, &st) != 0) {
+-                      goto error;
+-              }
+-
+-              if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
+-                      /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+-                      if (protect_mount(dfd, p, idata) == -1)
+-                              goto error;
+-              } else if (st.st_uid != 0 || st.st_gid != 0 ||
+-                      (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
+-                      /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */
+-                      flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+-              }
+-
+-              *d = '/';
+-              dir = d + 1;
+-      }
+-
+-      rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+-
+-      if (rv == -1) {
+-              if (!do_mkdir || mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) != 0) {
+-                      goto error;
+-              }
+-              rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+-      }
+-
+-      if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
+-              /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+-              if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) {
+-                      save_errno = errno;
+-                      close(rv);
+-                      rv = -1;
+-                      errno = save_errno;
+-              }
+-      }
+-
+-error:
+-      save_errno = errno;
+-      free(p);
+-      if (dfd != AT_FDCWD && dfd >= 0)
+-              close(dfd);
+-      errno = save_errno;
+-
+-      return rv;
+-}
+-
+ static int check_inst_parent(char *ipath, struct instance_data *idata)
+ {
+       struct stat instpbuf;
+@@ -1281,13 +1279,12 @@ static int check_inst_parent(char *ipath, struct instance_data *idata)
+        * admin explicitly instructs to ignore the instance parent
+        * mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument).
+        */
+-      inst_parent = (char *) malloc(strlen(ipath)+1);
++      inst_parent = strdup(ipath);
+       if (!inst_parent) {
+               pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_CRIT, "Error allocating pathname string");
+               return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+       }
+
+-      strcpy(inst_parent, ipath);
+       trailing_slash = strrchr(inst_parent, '/');
+       if (trailing_slash)
+               *trailing_slash = '\0';
+@@ -1371,9 +1368,10 @@ static int inst_init(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *ipath,
+                               if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) {
+                                       /* ignore failures, they don't matter */
+                               }
++                              close_fds_pre_exec(idata);
+
+-                              if (execle(init_script, init_script,
+-                                      polyptr->dir, ipath, newdir?"1":"0", idata->user, NULL, envp) < 0)
++                              execle(init_script, init_script,
++                                      polyptr->dir, ipath, newdir?"1":"0", idata->user, NULL, envp);
+                                       _exit(1);
+                       } else if (pid > 0) {
+                               while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) &&
+@@ -1424,7 +1422,9 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+     if (idata->flags & PAMNS_SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+-      getfscreatecon_raw(&oldcon_raw);
++      if (getfscreatecon_raw(&oldcon_raw) != 0)
++          pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
++                     "Error retrieving fs create context: %m");
+
+       label_handle = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
+       if (!label_handle) {
+@@ -1453,6 +1453,9 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+     if (rc == -1) {
+             pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+                        "Error creating directory %s: %m", dir);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++            freecon(oldcon_raw);
++#endif
+             return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+     }
+
+@@ -1640,16 +1643,14 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+
+     retval = protect_dir(polyptr->dir, 0, 0, idata);
+
+-    if (retval < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+-      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m",
+-              polyptr->dir);
+-      return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-    }
+-
+     if (retval < 0) {
+-      if ((polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE) &&
+-              create_polydir(polyptr, idata) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+-              return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
++        if (errno != ENOENT || !(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE)) {
++            pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m",
++                    polyptr->dir);
++            return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
++        }
++        if (create_polydir(polyptr, idata) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++            return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+     } else {
+       close(retval);
+     }
+@@ -1698,7 +1699,7 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+ #endif
+     }
+
+-    if (asprintf(&inst_dir, "%s%s", polyptr->instance_prefix, instname) < 0)
++    if ((inst_dir = pam_asprintf("%s%s", polyptr->instance_prefix, instname)) == NULL)
+       goto error_out;
+
+     if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
+@@ -1810,8 +1811,9 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata)
+                       _exit(1);
+               }
+ #endif
+-              if (execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instance_prefix, NULL, envp) < 0)
+-                      _exit(1);
++              close_fds_pre_exec(idata);
++              execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instance_prefix, NULL, envp);
++              _exit(1);
+           } else if (pid > 0) {
+               while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) &&
+                   (errno == EINTR));
+@@ -1826,7 +1828,7 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata)
+               }
+           } else if (pid < 0) {
+               pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-                      "Cannot fork to run namespace init script, %m");
++                      "Cannot fork to cleanup temporary directory, %m");
+               rc = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+               goto out;
+           }
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
+index a991b4c..180e042 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
+@@ -44,21 +44,16 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+-#include <dlfcn.h>
+-#include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+-#include <sys/resource.h>
+ #include <sys/mount.h>
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
+-#include <libgen.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <sched.h>
+ #include <glob.h>
+-#include <locale.h>
+ #include "security/pam_modules.h"
+ #include "security/pam_modutil.h"
+ #include "security/pam_ext.h"
+@@ -114,7 +109,7 @@
+ #define PAMNS_MOUNT_PRIVATE   0x00080000 /* Make the polydir mounts private */
+
+ /* polydir flags */
+-#define POLYDIR_EXCLUSIVE     0x00000001 /* polyinstatiate exclusively for override uids */
++#define POLYDIR_EXCLUSIVE     0x00000001 /* polyinstantiate exclusively for override uids */
+ #define POLYDIR_CREATE        0x00000002 /* create the polydir */
+ #define POLYDIR_NOINIT        0x00000004 /* no init script */
+ #define POLYDIR_SHARED        0x00000008 /* share context/level instances among users */
+--
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch new file +1128 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff0331aa38
@@ -0,0 +1,1128 @@
+From 475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 14:37:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: fix potential privilege escalation
+
+Existing protection provided by protect_dir() and protect_mount() were
+bind mounting on themselves all directories part of the to-be-secured
+paths. However, this works *only* against attacks executed by processes
+in the same mount namespace as the one the mountpoint was created in.
+Therefore, a user with an out-of-mount-namespace access, or multiple
+users colluding, could exploit multiple race conditions, and, for
+instance, elevate their privileges to root.
+
+This commit keeps the existing protection as a defense in depth
+measure, and to keep the existing behavior of the module. However,
+it converts all the needed function calls to operate on file
+descriptors instead of absolute paths to protect against race
+conditions globally.
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e]
+CVE: CVE-2025-6020
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 637 ++++++++++++++++++--------
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h |  10 +
+ 2 files changed, 457 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index 166bfce..9d993d4 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
+ #include "pam_namespace.h"
+ #include "argv_parse.h"
+
++#define MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE 64
++
+ /* --- evaluating all files in VENDORDIR/security/namespace.d and /etc/security/namespace.d --- */
+ static const char *base_name(const char *path)
+ {
+@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ strip_trailing_slashes(char *str)
+ static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata)
+ {
+       struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs;
+-      char tmpbuf[64];
++      char tmpbuf[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
+
+       while (dir != NULL) {
+               if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) {
+@@ -121,56 +123,107 @@ static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata)
+       return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
++/*
++ * Returns a fd to the given absolute path, acquired securely. This means:
++ * - iterating on each segment of the path,
++ * - not following user symlinks,
++ * - using race-free operations.
++ *
++ * Takes a bit mask to specify the operation mode:
++ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT: call protect_mount() on each unsafe segment of path
++ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR: create last segment of path if does not exist
++ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD: open the directory with O_RDONLY instead of O_PATH,
++ *     allowing more operations to be done with the returned fd
++ *
++ * Be aware that using SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT:
++ * - will modify some external state (global structure...) and should not be
++ *   called in cleanup code paths. See wrapper secure_opendir_stateless()
++ * - need a non-NULL idata to call protect_mount()
++ */
++static int secure_opendir(const char *path, int opm, mode_t mode,
+       struct instance_data *idata)
+ {
+-      char *p = strdup(path);
++      char *p;
+       char *d;
+-      char *dir = p;
+-      int dfd = AT_FDCWD;
++      char *dir;
++      int dfd = -1;
+       int dfd_next;
+       int save_errno;
+-      int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY;
++      int flags = O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC;
+       int rv = -1;
+       struct stat st;
+
+-      if (p == NULL) {
++      if (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD)
++              flags |= O_RDONLY;
++      else
++              flags |= O_PATH;
++
++      /* Check for args consistency */
++      if ((opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT) && idata == NULL)
+               return -1;
+-      }
+
+-      if (*dir == '/') {
+-              dfd = open("/", flags);
+-              if (dfd == -1) {
+-                      goto error;
+-              }
+-              dir++;  /* assume / is safe */
++      /* Accept only absolute paths */
++      if (*path != '/')
++              return -1;
++
++      dir = p = strdup(path);
++      if (p == NULL)
++              return -1;
++
++      /* Assume '/' is safe */
++      dfd = open("/", flags);
++      if (dfd == -1)
++              goto error;
++
++      /* Needed to not loop too far and call openat() on NULL */
++      strip_trailing_slashes(p);
++
++      dir++;
++
++      /* In case path is '/' */
++      if (*dir == '\0') {
++              free(p);
++              return dfd;
+       }
+
+       while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) {
+               *d = '\0';
++
+               dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+-              if (dfd_next == -1) {
++              if (dfd_next == -1)
+                       goto error;
+-              }
+-
+-              if (dfd != AT_FDCWD)
+-                      close(dfd);
+-              dfd = dfd_next;
+
+-              if (fstat(dfd, &st) != 0) {
++              if (fstat(dfd_next, &st) != 0) {
++                      close(dfd_next);
+                       goto error;
+               }
+
+-              if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
++              if ((flags & O_NOFOLLOW) && (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT)) {
+                       /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+-                      if (protect_mount(dfd, p, idata) == -1)
++                      if (protect_mount(dfd_next, p, idata) == -1) {
++                              close(dfd_next);
++                              goto error;
++                      }
++                      /*
++                       * Reopen the directory to obtain a new descriptor
++                       * after protect_mount(), this is necessary in cases
++                       * when another directory is going to be mounted over
++                       * the given path.
++                       */
++                      close(dfd_next);
++                      dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
++                      if (dfd_next == -1)
+                               goto error;
+-              } else if (st.st_uid != 0 || st.st_gid != 0 ||
+-                      (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
++              } else if (st.st_uid != 0
++                         || (st.st_gid != 0 && (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP))
++                         || (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
+                       /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */
+                       flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+               }
+
++              close(dfd);
++              dfd = dfd_next;
++
+               *d = '/';
+               dir = d + 1;
+       }
+@@ -178,13 +231,14 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
+       rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+
+       if (rv == -1) {
+-              if (!do_mkdir || mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) != 0) {
++              if ((opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR) && mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) == 0)
++                      rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
++
++              if (rv == -1)
+                       goto error;
+-              }
+-              rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+       }
+
+-      if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
++      if ((flags & O_NOFOLLOW) && (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT)) {
+               /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+               if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) {
+                       save_errno = errno;
+@@ -192,18 +246,95 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
+                       rv = -1;
+                       errno = save_errno;
+               }
++              /*
++               * Reopen the directory to obtain a new descriptor after
++               * protect_mount(), this is necessary in cases when another
++               * directory is going to be mounted over the given path.
++               */
++              close(rv);
++              rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+       }
+
+ error:
+       save_errno = errno;
+       free(p);
+-      if (dfd != AT_FDCWD && dfd >= 0)
++      if (dfd >= 0)
+               close(dfd);
+       errno = save_errno;
+
+       return rv;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Returns a fd to the given path, acquired securely.
++ * It can be called in all situations, including in cleanup code paths, as
++ * it does not modify external state (no access to global structures...).
++ */
++static int secure_opendir_stateless(const char *path)
++{
++      return secure_opendir(path, 0, 0, NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Umount securely the given path, even if the directories along
++ * the path are under user control. It should protect against
++ * symlinks attacks and race conditions.
++ */
++static int secure_umount(const char *path)
++{
++      int save_errno;
++      int rv = -1;
++      int dfd = -1;
++      char s_path[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
++
++      dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(path);
++      if (dfd == -1)
++              return rv;
++
++      if (pam_sprintf(s_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd) < 0)
++              goto error;
++
++      /*
++      * We still have a fd open to path itself,
++      * so we need to do a lazy umount.
++      */
++      rv = umount2(s_path, MNT_DETACH);
++
++error:
++      save_errno = errno;
++      close(dfd);
++      errno = save_errno;
++      return rv;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Rmdir the given path securely, protecting against symlinks attacks
++ * and race conditions.
++ * This function is currently called only in cleanup code paths where
++ * any errors returned are not handled, so do not handle them either.
++ * Basically, try to rmdir the path on a best-effort basis.
++ */
++static void secure_try_rmdir(const char *path)
++{
++      int dfd;
++      char *buf;
++      char *parent;
++
++      buf = strdup(path);
++      if (buf == NULL)
++              return;
++
++      parent = dirname(buf);
++
++      dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(parent);
++      if (dfd >= 0) {
++              unlinkat(dfd, base_name(path), AT_REMOVEDIR);
++              close(dfd);
++      }
++
++      free(buf);
++}
++
+ /* Evaluating a list of files which have to be parsed in the right order:
+  *
+  * - If etc/security/namespace.d/@[email protected] exists, then
+@@ -330,7 +461,7 @@ static void unprotect_dirs(struct protect_dir_s *dir)
+       struct protect_dir_s *next;
+
+       while (dir != NULL) {
+-              umount(dir->dir);
++              secure_umount(dir->dir);
+               free(dir->dir);
+               next = dir->next;
+               free(dir);
+@@ -734,13 +865,9 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome,
+           goto skipping;
+     }
+
+-#define COPY_STR(dst, src, apd)                                \
+-      pam_sprintf((dst), "%s%s", (src), (apd))
+-
+-    if (COPY_STR(poly->dir, dir, "") < 0
+-      || COPY_STR(poly->rdir, rdir, "") < 0
+-      || COPY_STR(poly->instance_prefix, instance_prefix,
+-                  poly->method == TMPDIR ? "XXXXXX" : "") < 0) {
++    if (pam_sprintf(poly->dir, "%s", dir) < 0
++      || pam_sprintf(poly->rdir, "%s", rdir) < 0
++      || pam_sprintf(poly->instance_prefix, "%s", instance_prefix) < 0) {
+       pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long");
+       goto skipping;
+     }
+@@ -1023,6 +1150,23 @@ static char *md5hash(const char *instname, struct instance_data *idata)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++static char *secure_getfilecon(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *dir)
++{
++      char *ctx = NULL;
++      int dfd = secure_opendir(dir, SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD, 0, NULL);
++      if (dfd < 0) {
++              pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error getting fd to %s: %m", dir);
++              return NULL;
++      }
++      if (fgetfilecon(dfd, &ctx) < 0)
++              ctx = NULL;
++      if (ctx == NULL)
++              pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
++                         "Error getting poly dir context for %s: %m", dir);
++      close(dfd);
++      return ctx;
++}
++
+ static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+               char **i_context, char **origcon,
+               struct instance_data *idata)
+@@ -1034,12 +1178,9 @@ static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+       /*
+        * Get the security context of the directory to polyinstantiate.
+        */
+-      rc = getfilecon(polyptr->dir, origcon);
+-      if (rc < 0 || *origcon == NULL) {
+-              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-                              "Error getting poly dir context, %m");
++      *origcon = secure_getfilecon(idata->pamh, polyptr->dir);
++      if (*origcon == NULL)
+               return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-      }
+
+       if (polyptr->method == USER) return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+@@ -1136,29 +1277,52 @@ static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+ #endif
+
+ /*
+- * poly_name returns the name of the polyinstantiated instance directory
++ * From the instance differentiation string, set in the polyptr structure:
++ * - the absolute path to the instance dir,
++ * - the absolute path to the previous dir (parent),
++ * - the instance name (may be different than the instance differentiation string)
++ */
++static int set_polydir_paths(struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *inst_differentiation)
++{
++      char *tmp;
++
++      if (pam_sprintf(polyptr->instance_absolute, "%s%s",
++                      polyptr->instance_prefix, inst_differentiation) < 0)
++              return -1;
++
++      polyptr->instname = strrchr(polyptr->instance_absolute, '/') + 1;
++
++      if (pam_sprintf(polyptr->instance_parent, "%s", polyptr->instance_absolute) < 0)
++              return -1;
++
++      tmp = strrchr(polyptr->instance_parent, '/') + 1;
++      *tmp = '\0';
++
++      return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Set the name of the polyinstantiated instance directory
+  * based on the method used for polyinstantiation (user, context or level)
+  * In addition, the function also returns the security contexts of the
+  * original directory to polyinstantiate and the polyinstantiated instance
+  * directory.
+  */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+-      char **i_context, char **origcon,
+-        struct instance_data *idata)
++static int poly_name(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_context,
++        char **origcon, struct instance_data *idata)
+ #else
+-static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+-      struct instance_data *idata)
++static int poly_name(struct polydir_s *polyptr, struct instance_data *idata)
+ #endif
+ {
+     int rc;
++    char *inst_differentiation = NULL;
+     char *hash = NULL;
+     enum polymethod pm;
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+     char *rawcon = NULL;
+ #endif
+
+-    *i_name = NULL;
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+     *i_context = NULL;
+     *origcon = NULL;
+@@ -1192,7 +1356,7 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+
+     switch (pm) {
+         case USER:
+-          if ((*i_name = strdup(idata->user)) == NULL)
++          if ((inst_differentiation = strdup(idata->user)) == NULL)
+               goto fail;
+           break;
+
+@@ -1204,20 +1368,24 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+               goto fail;
+           }
+           if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED)
+-              *i_name = strdup(rawcon);
++              inst_differentiation = strdup(rawcon);
+           else
+-              *i_name = pam_asprintf("%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user);
+-          if (*i_name == NULL)
++              inst_differentiation = pam_asprintf("%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user);
++          if (inst_differentiation == NULL)
+               goto fail;
+           break;
+
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+       case TMPDIR:
++          if ((inst_differentiation = strdup("XXXXXX")) == NULL)
++              goto fail;
++          goto success;
++
+       case TMPFS:
+-          if ((*i_name=strdup("")) == NULL)
++          if ((inst_differentiation=strdup("")) == NULL)
+               goto fail;
+-          return PAM_SUCCESS;
++          goto success;
+
+       default:
+           if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
+@@ -1226,32 +1394,37 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
+     }
+
+     if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
+-        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "poly_name %s", *i_name);
++        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "poly_name %s", inst_differentiation);
+
+-    if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) || strlen(*i_name) > NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN) {
+-        hash = md5hash(*i_name, idata);
++    if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) || strlen(inst_differentiation) > NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN) {
++        hash = md5hash(inst_differentiation, idata);
+         if (hash == NULL) {
+           goto fail;
+         }
+         if (idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) {
+-          free(*i_name);
+-          *i_name = hash;
++          free(inst_differentiation);
++          inst_differentiation = hash;
+           hash = NULL;
+         } else {
+           char *newname =
+               pam_asprintf("%.*s_%s",
+                            NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN - 1 - (int)strlen(hash),
+-                           *i_name, hash);
++                           inst_differentiation, hash);
+           if (newname == NULL)
+               goto fail;
+-          free(*i_name);
+-          *i_name = newname;
++          free(inst_differentiation);
++          inst_differentiation = newname;
+         }
+     }
+-    rc = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
++success:
++    if (set_polydir_paths(polyptr, inst_differentiation) == -1)
++        goto fail;
++
++    rc = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+     free(hash);
++    free(inst_differentiation);
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+     freecon(rawcon);
+ #endif
+@@ -1262,55 +1435,35 @@ fail:
+       freecon(*origcon);
+       *origcon = NULL;
+ #endif
+-      free(*i_name);
+-      *i_name = NULL;
+     }
+     return rc;
+ }
+
+-static int check_inst_parent(char *ipath, struct instance_data *idata)
++static int check_inst_parent(int dfd, struct instance_data *idata)
+ {
+       struct stat instpbuf;
+-      char *inst_parent, *trailing_slash;
+-      int dfd;
++
+       /*
+-       * stat the instance parent path to make sure it exists
+-       * and is a directory. Check that its mode is 000 (unless the
+-       * admin explicitly instructs to ignore the instance parent
+-       * mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument).
++       * Stat the instance parent directory to make sure it's writable by
++       * root only (unless the admin explicitly instructs to ignore the
++       * instance parent mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument).
+        */
+-      inst_parent = strdup(ipath);
+-      if (!inst_parent) {
+-              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_CRIT, "Error allocating pathname string");
+-              return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-      }
+
+-      trailing_slash = strrchr(inst_parent, '/');
+-      if (trailing_slash)
+-              *trailing_slash = '\0';
+-
+-      dfd = protect_dir(inst_parent, 0, 1, idata);
++      if (idata->flags & PAMNS_IGN_INST_PARENT_MODE)
++              return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+-      if (dfd == -1 || fstat(dfd, &instpbuf) < 0) {
++      if (fstat(dfd, &instpbuf) < 0) {
+               pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-                      "Error creating or accessing instance parent %s, %m", inst_parent);
+-              if (dfd != -1)
+-                      close(dfd);
+-              free(inst_parent);
++                      "Error accessing instance parent, %m");
+               return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+       }
+
+-      if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_IGN_INST_PARENT_MODE) == 0) {
+-              if ((instpbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) || instpbuf.st_uid != 0) {
+-                      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Mode of inst parent %s not 000 or owner not root",
+-                                      inst_parent);
+-                      close(dfd);
+-                      free(inst_parent);
+-                      return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-              }
++      if ((instpbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) || instpbuf.st_uid != 0) {
++              pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
++                      "Mode of inst parent not 000 or owner not root");
++              return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+       }
+-      close(dfd);
+-      free(inst_parent);
++
+       return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+@@ -1449,14 +1602,16 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+     }
+ #endif
+
+-    rc = protect_dir(dir, mode, 1, idata);
++    rc = secure_opendir(dir,
++            SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT | SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR | SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD,
++            mode, idata);
+     if (rc == -1) {
+             pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+                        "Error creating directory %s: %m", dir);
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+             freecon(oldcon_raw);
+ #endif
+-            return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
++            return -1;
+     }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+@@ -1477,9 +1632,9 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+               pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+                          "Error changing mode of directory %s: %m", dir);
+                 close(rc);
+-                umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
+-              rmdir(dir);
+-              return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
++              secure_umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
++              secure_try_rmdir(dir);
++              return -1;
+       }
+     }
+
+@@ -1497,41 +1652,37 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+                    "Unable to change owner on directory %s: %m", dir);
+         close(rc);
+-        umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
+-      rmdir(dir);
+-      return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
++      secure_umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
++      secure_try_rmdir(dir);
++      return -1;
+     }
+
+-    close(rc);
+-
+     if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
+       pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+                  "Polydir owner %u group %u", uid, gid);
+
+-    return PAM_SUCCESS;
++    return rc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * Create polyinstantiated instance directory (ipath).
++ * Create polyinstantiated instance directory.
++ * To protect against races, changes are done on a fd to the parent of the
++ * instance directory (dfd_iparent) and a relative path (polyptr->instname).
++ * The absolute path (polyptr->instance_absolute) is only updated when creating
++ * a tmpdir and used for logging purposes.
+  */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *statbuf,
+-        const char *icontext, const char *ocontext,
+-      struct instance_data *idata)
++static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, int dfd_iparent,
++        struct stat *statbuf, const char *icontext, const char *ocontext,
++        struct instance_data *idata)
+ #else
+-static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *statbuf,
+-      struct instance_data *idata)
++static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, int dfd_iparent,
++        struct stat *statbuf, struct instance_data *idata)
+ #endif
+ {
+     struct stat newstatbuf;
+     int fd;
+
+-    /*
+-     * Check to make sure instance parent is valid.
+-     */
+-    if (check_inst_parent(ipath, idata))
+-      return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-
+     /*
+      * Create instance directory and set its security context to the context
+      * returned by the security policy. Set its mode and ownership
+@@ -1540,29 +1691,39 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *
+      */
+
+     if (polyptr->method == TMPDIR) {
+-      if (mkdtemp(polyptr->instance_prefix) == NULL) {
+-            pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error creating temporary instance %s, %m",
+-                      polyptr->instance_prefix);
+-          polyptr->method = NONE; /* do not clean up! */
+-          return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-      }
+-      /* copy the actual directory name to ipath */
+-      strcpy(ipath, polyptr->instance_prefix);
+-    } else if (mkdir(ipath, S_IRUSR) < 0) {
++        char s_path[PATH_MAX];
++        /*
++         * Create the template for mkdtemp() as a magic link based on
++         * our existing fd to avoid symlink attacks and races.
++         */
++        if (pam_sprintf(s_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname) < 0
++            || mkdtemp(s_path) == NULL) {
++            pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
++                       "Error creating temporary instance dir %s, %m",
++                       polyptr->instance_absolute);
++            polyptr->method = NONE; /* do not clean up! */
++            return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
++        }
++
++        /* Copy the actual directory name to polyptr->instname */
++        strcpy(polyptr->instname, base_name(s_path));
++    } else if (mkdirat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, S_IRUSR) < 0) {
+         if (errno == EEXIST)
+             return PAM_IGNORE;
+         else {
+             pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error creating %s, %m",
+-                      ipath);
++                       polyptr->instance_absolute);
+             return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+         }
+     }
+
+-    /* Open a descriptor to it to prevent races */
+-    fd = open(ipath, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
++    /* Open a descriptor to prevent races, based on our existing fd. */
++    fd = openat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname,
++            O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
+     if (fd < 0) {
+-      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s, %m", ipath);
+-      rmdir(ipath);
++      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s, %m",
++                polyptr->instance_absolute);
++      unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
+       return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+     }
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+@@ -1572,17 +1733,19 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *
+         if (icontext) {
+             if (fsetfilecon(fd, icontext) < 0) {
+                 pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-                      "Error setting context of %s to %s", ipath, icontext);
++                      "Error setting context of %s to %s",
++                        polyptr->instance_absolute, icontext);
+                 close(fd);
+-              rmdir(ipath);
++                unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
+                 return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+             }
+         } else {
+             if (fsetfilecon(fd, ocontext) < 0) {
+                 pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-                      "Error setting context of %s to %s", ipath, ocontext);
++                      "Error setting context of %s to %s",
++                        polyptr->instance_absolute, ocontext);
+               close(fd);
+-              rmdir(ipath);
++                unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
+                 return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+             }
+         }
+@@ -1590,9 +1753,9 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *
+ #endif
+     if (fstat(fd, &newstatbuf) < 0) {
+         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s, %m",
+-              ipath);
++              polyptr->instance_absolute);
+       close(fd);
+-      rmdir(ipath);
++        unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
+         return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+     }
+     if (newstatbuf.st_uid != statbuf->st_uid ||
+@@ -1600,17 +1763,17 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *
+         if (fchown(fd, statbuf->st_uid, statbuf->st_gid) < 0) {
+             pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+                       "Error changing owner for %s, %m",
+-                      ipath);
++                      polyptr->instance_absolute);
+           close(fd);
+-          rmdir(ipath);
++            unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
+             return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+         }
+     }
+     if (fchmod(fd, statbuf->st_mode & 07777) < 0) {
+         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error changing mode for %s, %m",
+-                      ipath);
++                      polyptr->instance_absolute);
+       close(fd);
+-      rmdir(ipath);
++        unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
+         return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+     }
+     close(fd);
+@@ -1629,9 +1792,12 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+       struct instance_data *idata)
+ {
+     int retval;
++    int dfd_iparent = -1;
++    int dfd_ipath = -1;
++    int dfd_pptrdir = -1;
+     int newdir = 1;
+-    char *inst_dir = NULL;
+-    char *instname = NULL;
++    char s_ipath[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
++    char s_pptrdir[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
+     struct stat statbuf;
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+     char *instcontext = NULL, *origcontext = NULL;
+@@ -1641,37 +1807,48 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+                "Set namespace for directory %s", polyptr->dir);
+
+-    retval = protect_dir(polyptr->dir, 0, 0, idata);
++    dfd_pptrdir = secure_opendir(polyptr->dir, SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT, 0, idata);
+
+-    if (retval < 0) {
++    if (dfd_pptrdir < 0) {
+         if (errno != ENOENT || !(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE)) {
+             pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m",
+                     polyptr->dir);
+             return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+         }
+-        if (create_polydir(polyptr, idata) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++        dfd_pptrdir = create_polydir(polyptr, idata);
++        if (dfd_pptrdir < 0)
+             return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-    } else {
+-      close(retval);
+     }
+
+     if (polyptr->method == TMPFS) {
+-      if (mount("tmpfs", polyptr->dir, "tmpfs", polyptr->mount_flags, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) {
+-          pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting tmpfs on %s, %m",
+-              polyptr->dir);
+-            return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+-      }
++        /*
++         * There is no function mount() that operate on a fd, so instead, we
++         * get the magic link corresponding to the fd and give it to mount().
++         * This protects against potential races exploitable by an unpriv user.
++         */
++        if (pam_sprintf(s_pptrdir, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_pptrdir) < 0) {
++            pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_pptrdir");
++            goto error_out;
++        }
+
+-      if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT)
+-          return PAM_SUCCESS;
++        if (mount("tmpfs", s_pptrdir, "tmpfs", polyptr->mount_flags, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) {
++            pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting tmpfs on %s, %m",
++                       polyptr->dir);
++            goto error_out;
++        }
++
++        if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT) {
++            retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
+
+-      return inst_init(polyptr, "tmpfs", idata, 1);
++        retval = inst_init(polyptr, "tmpfs", idata, 1);
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+
+-    if (stat(polyptr->dir, &statbuf) < 0) {
+-      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s: %m",
+-              polyptr->dir);
+-        return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
++    if (fstat(dfd_pptrdir, &statbuf) < 0) {
++        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s: %m", polyptr->dir);
++        goto error_out;
+     }
+
+     /*
+@@ -1680,15 +1857,16 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+      * security policy.
+      */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-    retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instname, &instcontext,
+-                      &origcontext, idata);
++    retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instcontext, &origcontext, idata);
+ #else
+-    retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instname, idata);
++    retval = poly_name(polyptr, idata);
+ #endif
+
+     if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+-      if (retval != PAM_IGNORE)
++      if (retval != PAM_IGNORE) {
+               pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error getting instance name");
++                goto error_out;
++        }
+         goto cleanup;
+     } else {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+@@ -1699,22 +1877,33 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+ #endif
+     }
+
+-    if ((inst_dir = pam_asprintf("%s%s", polyptr->instance_prefix, instname)) == NULL)
+-      goto error_out;
+-
+-    if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
+-        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "instance_dir %s",
+-              inst_dir);
++    /*
++     * Gets a fd in a secure manner (we may be operating on a path under
++     * user control), and check it's compliant.
++     * Then, we should *always* operate on *this* fd and a relative path
++     * to be protected against race conditions.
++     */
++    dfd_iparent = secure_opendir(polyptr->instance_parent,
++            SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT | SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR, 0, idata);
++    if (dfd_iparent == -1) {
++      pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
++                "polyptr->instance_parent %s access error",
++                polyptr->instance_parent);
++        goto error_out;
++    }
++    if (check_inst_parent(dfd_iparent, idata)) {
++        goto error_out;
++    }
+
+     /*
+      * Create instance directory with appropriate security
+      * contexts, owner, group and mode bits.
+      */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-    retval = create_instance(polyptr, inst_dir, &statbuf, instcontext,
+-                       origcontext, idata);
++    retval = create_instance(polyptr, dfd_iparent, &statbuf, instcontext,
++                             origcontext, idata);
+ #else
+-    retval = create_instance(polyptr, inst_dir, &statbuf, idata);
++    retval = create_instance(polyptr, dfd_iparent, &statbuf, idata);
+ #endif
+
+     if (retval == PAM_IGNORE) {
+@@ -1726,19 +1915,48 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
+         goto error_out;
+     }
+
++    /*
++     * Instead of getting a new secure fd, we reuse the fd opened on directory
++     * polyptr->instance_parent to ensure we are working on the same dir as
++     * previously, and thus ensure that previous checks (e.g. check_inst_parent())
++     * are still relevant.
++     */
++    dfd_ipath = openat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname,
++            O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++    if (dfd_ipath == -1) {
++        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error openat on %s, %m",
++                polyptr->instname);
++        goto error_out;
++    }
++
++    if (pam_sprintf(s_ipath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_ipath) < 0) {
++        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_ipath");
++        goto error_out;
++    }
++
++    if (pam_sprintf(s_pptrdir, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_pptrdir) < 0) {
++        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_pptrdir");
++        goto error_out;
++    }
++
+     /*
+      * Bind mount instance directory on top of the polyinstantiated
+      * directory to provide an instance of polyinstantiated directory
+      * based on polyinstantiated method.
++     *
++     * Operates on magic links created from two fd obtained securely
++     * to protect against race conditions and symlink attacks. Indeed,
++     * the source and destination can be in a user controled path.
+      */
+-    if (mount(inst_dir, polyptr->dir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+-        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting %s on %s, %m",
+-                   inst_dir, polyptr->dir);
++    if(mount(s_ipath, s_pptrdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
++        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
++                "Error mounting %s on %s (%s on %s), %m",
++                   s_ipath, s_pptrdir, polyptr->instance_absolute, polyptr->dir);
+         goto error_out;
+     }
+
+     if (!(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT))
+-      retval = inst_init(polyptr, inst_dir, idata, newdir);
++      retval = inst_init(polyptr, polyptr->instance_absolute, idata, newdir);
+
+     goto cleanup;
+
+@@ -1750,8 +1968,12 @@ error_out:
+     retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+
+ cleanup:
+-    free(inst_dir);
+-    free(instname);
++    if (dfd_iparent != -1)
++        close(dfd_iparent);
++    if (dfd_ipath != -1)
++        close(dfd_ipath);
++    if (dfd_pptrdir != -1)
++        close(dfd_pptrdir);
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+     freecon(instcontext);
+     freecon(origcontext);
+@@ -1790,6 +2012,7 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata)
+ {
+     struct polydir_s *pptr;
+     pid_t rc, pid;
++    int dfd = -1;
+     struct sigaction newsa, oldsa;
+     int status;
+
+@@ -1801,7 +2024,17 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata)
+     }
+
+     for (pptr = idata->polydirs_ptr; pptr; pptr = pptr->next) {
+-      if (pptr->method == TMPDIR && access(pptr->instance_prefix, F_OK) == 0) {
++      if (pptr->method == TMPDIR) {
++
++            dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(pptr->instance_parent);
++            if (dfd == -1)
++                continue;
++
++            if (faccessat(dfd, pptr->instname, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
++                close(dfd);
++                continue;
++            }
++
+           pid = fork();
+           if (pid == 0) {
+               static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+@@ -1811,10 +2044,21 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata)
+                       _exit(1);
+               }
+ #endif
++                if (fchdir(dfd) == -1) {
++                    pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Failed fchdir to %s: %m",
++                            pptr->instance_absolute);
++                    _exit(1);
++                }
++
+               close_fds_pre_exec(idata);
+-              execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instance_prefix, NULL, envp);
++
++              execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instname, NULL, envp);
+               _exit(1);
+           } else if (pid > 0) {
++
++                if (dfd != -1)
++                    close(dfd);
++
+               while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) &&
+                   (errno == EINTR));
+               if (rc == (pid_t)-1) {
+@@ -1827,6 +2071,10 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata)
+                       "Error removing %s", pptr->instance_prefix);
+               }
+           } else if (pid < 0) {
++
++                if (dfd != -1)
++                    close(dfd);
++
+               pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+                       "Cannot fork to cleanup temporary directory, %m");
+               rc = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+@@ -1850,6 +2098,7 @@ out:
+ static int setup_namespace(struct instance_data *idata, enum unmnt_op unmnt)
+ {
+     int retval = 0, need_poly = 0, changing_dir = 0;
++    int dfd = -1;
+     char *cptr, *fptr, poly_parent[PATH_MAX];
+     struct polydir_s *pptr;
+
+@@ -1965,13 +2214,21 @@ static int setup_namespace(struct instance_data *idata, enum unmnt_op unmnt)
+                       strcpy(poly_parent, "/");
+                   else if (cptr)
+                       *cptr = '\0';
+-                    if (chdir(poly_parent) < 0) {
++
++                    dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(poly_parent);
++                    if (dfd == -1) {
++                        pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
++                            "Failed opening %s to fchdir: %m", poly_parent);
++                    }
++                    else if (fchdir(dfd) == -1) {
+                         pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-                              "Can't chdir to %s, %m", poly_parent);
++                            "Failed fchdir to %s: %m", poly_parent);
+                     }
++                    if (dfd != -1)
++                        close(dfd);
+                 }
+
+-                if (umount(pptr->rdir) < 0) {
++            if (secure_umount(pptr->rdir) < 0) {
+                   int saved_errno = errno;
+                   pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Unmount of %s failed, %m",
+                       pptr->rdir);
+@@ -2041,7 +2298,7 @@ static int orig_namespace(struct instance_data *idata)
+                       "Unmounting instance dir for user %d & dir %s",
+                        idata->uid, pptr->dir);
+
+-            if (umount(pptr->dir) < 0) {
++            if (secure_umount(pptr->dir) < 0) {
+                 pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Unmount of %s failed, %m",
+                        pptr->dir);
+                 return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
+index 180e042..721d39a 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
+@@ -121,6 +121,13 @@
+ #define NAMESPACE_POLYDIR_DATA "pam_namespace:polydir_data"
+ #define NAMESPACE_PROTECT_DATA "pam_namespace:protect_data"
+
++/*
++ * Operation mode for function secure_opendir()
++ */
++#define SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT     0x00000001
++#define SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR       0x00000002
++#define SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD     0x00000004
++
+ /*
+  * Polyinstantiation method options, based on user, security context
+  * or both
+@@ -158,6 +165,9 @@ struct polydir_s {
+     char dir[PATH_MAX];               /* directory to polyinstantiate */
+     char rdir[PATH_MAX];              /* directory to unmount (based on RUSER) */
+     char instance_prefix[PATH_MAX];   /* prefix for instance dir path name */
++    char instance_absolute[PATH_MAX]; /* absolute path to the instance dir (instance_parent + instname) */
++    char instance_parent[PATH_MAX];   /* parent dir of the instance dir */
++    char *instname;                   /* last segment of the path to the instance dir */
+     enum polymethod method;           /* method used to polyinstantiate */
+     unsigned int num_uids;            /* number of override uids */
+     uid_t *uid;                               /* list of override uids */
+--
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch new file +187 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18c2a82fb4
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From 592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 14:37:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: add flags to indicate path safety
+
+Add two flags in the script to indicate if the paths to the polydir
+and the instance directories are safe (root owned and writable by
+root only).
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1]
+CVE: CVE-2025-6020
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init  | 56 ++++++++++++-------
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init
+index d9053a1..8782178 100755
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init
+@@ -1,25 +1,43 @@
+ #!/bin/sh
+-# It receives polydir path as $1, the instance path as $2,
+-# a flag whether the instance dir was newly created (0 - no, 1 - yes) in $3,
+-# and user name in $4.
++# It receives as arguments:
++# - $1 polydir path (see WARNING below)
++# - $2 instance path (see WARNING below)
++# - $3 flag whether the instance dir was newly created (0 - no, 1 - yes)
++# - $4 user name
++# - $5 flag whether the polydir path ($1) is safe (0 - unsafe, 1 -safe)
++# - $6 flag whether the instance path ($2) is safe (0 - unsafe, 1 - safe)
++#
++# WARNING: This script is invoked with full root privileges. Accessing
++# the polydir ($1) and the instance ($2) directories in this context may be
++# extremely dangerous as those can be under user control. The flags $5 and $6
++# are provided to let you know if all the segments part of the path (except the
++# last one) are owned by root and are writable by root only. If the path does
++# not meet these criteria, you expose yourself to possible symlink attacks when
++# accessing these path.
++# However, even if the path components are safe, the content of the
++# directories may still be owned/writable by a user, so care must be taken!
+ #
+ # The following section will copy the contents of /etc/skel if this is a
+ # newly created home directory.
+-if [ "$3" = 1 ]; then
+-        # This line will fix the labeling on all newly created directories
+-        [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon "$1"
+-        user="$4"
+-        passwd=$(getent passwd "$user")
+-        homedir=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f6 -d":")
+-        if [ "$1" = "$homedir" ]; then
+-                gid=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f4 -d":")
+-                cp -rT /etc/skel "$homedir"
+-                chown -R "$user":"$gid" "$homedir"
+-                mask=$(awk '/^UMASK/{gsub("#.*$", "", $2); print $2; exit}' /etc/login.defs)
+-                mode=$(printf "%o" $((0777 & ~mask)))
+-                chmod ${mode:-700} "$homedir"
+-                [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon -R "$homedir"
+-        fi
+-fi
+
++# Executes only if the polydir path is safe
++if [ "$5" = 1 ]; then
++
++    if [ "$3" = 1 ]; then
++            # This line will fix the labeling on all newly created directories
++            [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon "$1"
++            user="$4"
++            passwd=$(getent passwd "$user")
++            homedir=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f6 -d":")
++            if [ "$1" = "$homedir" ]; then
++                    gid=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f4 -d":")
++                    cp -rT /etc/skel "$homedir"
++                    chown -R "$user":"$gid" "$homedir"
++                    mask=$(sed -E -n 's/^UMASK[[:space:]]+([^#[:space:]]+).*/\1/p' /etc/login.defs)
++                    mode=$(printf "%o" $((0777 & ~mask)))
++                    chmod ${mode:-700} "$homedir"
++                    [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon -R "$homedir"
++            fi
++    fi
++fi
+ exit 0
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index 9d993d4..4c8153b 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -1467,6 +1467,79 @@ static int check_inst_parent(int dfd, struct instance_data *idata)
+       return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Check for a given absolute path that all segments except the last one are:
++ * 1. a directory owned by root and not writable by group or others
++ * 2. a symlink owned by root and referencing a directory respecting 1.
++ * Returns 0 if safe, -1 is unsafe.
++ * If the path is not accessible (does not exist, hidden under a mount...),
++ * returns -1 (unsafe).
++ */
++static int check_safe_path(const char *path, struct instance_data *idata)
++{
++    char *p = strdup(path);
++    char *d;
++    char *dir = p;
++    struct stat st;
++
++    if (p == NULL)
++        return -1;
++
++    /* Check path is absolute */
++    if (p[0] != '/')
++        goto error;
++
++    strip_trailing_slashes(p);
++
++    /* Last segment of the path may be owned by the user */
++    if ((d = strrchr(dir, '/')) != NULL)
++        *d = '\0';
++
++    while ((d=strrchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) {
++
++        /* Do not follow symlinks */
++        if (lstat(dir, &st) != 0)
++            goto error;
++
++        if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
++            if (st.st_uid != 0) {
++                if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
++                    pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
++                            "Path deemed unsafe: Symlink %s should be owned by root", dir);
++                goto error;
++            }
++
++            /* Follow symlinks */
++            if (stat(dir, &st) != 0)
++                goto error;
++        }
++
++        if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
++                if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
++                    pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
++                        "Path deemed unsafe: %s is expected to be a directory", dir);
++            goto error;
++        }
++
++        if (st.st_uid != 0 ||
++            ((st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) && !(st.st_mode & S_ISVTX))) {
++                if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
++                    pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
++                        "Path deemed unsafe: %s should be owned by root, and not be writable by group or others", dir);
++            goto error;
++        }
++
++        *d = '\0';
++    }
++
++    free(p);
++    return 0;
++
++error:
++    free(p);
++    return -1;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Check to see if there is a namespace initialization script in
+ * the /etc/security directory. If such a script exists
+@@ -1524,7 +1597,11 @@ static int inst_init(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *ipath,
+                               close_fds_pre_exec(idata);
+
+                               execle(init_script, init_script,
+-                                      polyptr->dir, ipath, newdir?"1":"0", idata->user, NULL, envp);
++                                      polyptr->dir, ipath,
++                                      newdir ? "1":"0", idata->user,
++                                      (check_safe_path(polyptr->dir, idata) == -1) ? "0":"1",
++                                      (check_safe_path(ipath, idata) == -1) ? "0":"1",
++                                      NULL, envp);
+                                       _exit(1);
+                       } else if (pid > 0) {
+                               while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) &&
+--
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..238bef47ec
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 08:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: secure_opendir: do not look at the group
+ ownership
+
+When the directory is not group-writable, the group ownership does
+not matter, and when it is group-writable, there should not be any
+exceptions for the root group as there is no guarantee that the root
+group does not include non-root users.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773]
+CVE: CVE-2025-6020
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index 4c8153b..791dd07 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ static int secure_opendir(const char *path, int opm, mode_t mode,
+                       if (dfd_next == -1)
+                               goto error;
+               } else if (st.st_uid != 0
+-                         || (st.st_gid != 0 && (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP))
+-                         || (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
++                         || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))) {
+                       /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */
+                       flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+               }
+--
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb +5 -1
index 714cdb6552..815085cc82 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2024-22365.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-10041-1.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-10041-2.patch \
+           file://0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch \
+           file://0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6020-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6020-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6020-03.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7ac4b50feee004a9fa88f1dfd2d2fa738a82896763050cd773b3c54b0a818283"
--

2.43.0

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#10 lore raw

PATCH v2 9/16 glibc: stable 2.39 branch updates

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>

$ git log --oneline 06a70769fd0b2e1f2a3085ad50ab620282bd77b3..cff1042cceec3502269947e96cf7023451af22f3
cff1042cce Fix error reporting (false negatives) in SGID tests
1924d341c0 support: Pick group in support_capture_subprogram_self_sgid if UID == 0

Testing Results:
Before After Diff

PASS          5074     5082     +8
XPASS         4        4         0
FAIL          121      116      -5
XFAIL         16       16        0
UNSUPPORTED   157      154      -3

cff1042cce Fix error reporting (false negatives) in SGID tests
Improved SGID test handling by unifying error reporting and using secure temporary directories. Replaced non-standard exit codes and fixed premature exits to avoid masking failures. These changes reduced false negatives, increasing overall test pass rates

UNSUPPORTED tests changes
-UNSUPPORTED: stdlib/tst-secure-getenv
-UNSUPPORTED: elf/tst-env-setuid-static
-UNSUPPORTED: elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables

FAILed tests changes
-FAIL: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-cross-malloc-check -FAIL: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-malloc-check -FAIL: malloc/tst-dynarray
-FAIL: malloc/tst-dynarray-mem
-FAIL: resolv/tst-resolv-aliases

PASSed tests changes
+PASS: stdlib/tst-secure-getenv
+PASS: elf/tst-env-setuid-static
+PASS: elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables
+PASS: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-cross-malloc-check +PASS: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-malloc-check +PASS: malloc/tst-dynarray
+PASS: malloc/tst-dynarray-mem
+PASS: resolv/tst-resolv-aliases

---
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc +1 -1
index 0130613936..6ee9fc7a0b 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.39/master"
 PV = "2.39+git"
-SRCREV_glibc ?= "06a70769fd0b2e1f2a3085ad50ab620282bd77b3"
+SRCREV_glibc ?= "cff1042cceec3502269947e96cf7023451af22f3"
 SRCREV_localedef ?= "fab74f31b3811df543e24b6de47efdf45b538abc"
 
 GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git;protocol=https"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#11 lore raw

PATCH v2 10/16 xserver-xorg: upgrade 21.1.6 -> 21.1.18

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

xorg-server 21.1.17
This release contains the fixes for the issues reported in today's security
advisory: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg/2025-June/062055.html

* CVE-2025-49175
* CVE-2025-49176
* CVE-2025-49177
* CVE-2025-49178
* CVE-2025-49179
* CVE-2025-49180

Additionally, this release includes a fix for CVE-2022-49737 which was issued after the fix was merged back in 2022 and several other various fixes.

Ref: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2025-June/003609.html

xorg-server 21.1.18
This release contains an additional fix for CVE-2025-49176 from June 17 security advisory: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg/2025-June/062055.html

Ref: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2025-June/003612.html

(cherry picked from commit a59b385184fb3a548dc27310fd04d64351d8dfba)
---
 .../{xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb}        | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/{xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb} (92%)
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb renamed from meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb +1 -1
similarity index 92%
rename from meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb
rename to meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb
index 38c81f2372..14c45be432 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ require xserver-xorg.inc
 SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.patch \
            file://0001-Avoid-duplicate-definitions-of-IOPortBase.patch \
            "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b14a116d2d805debc5b5b2aac505a279e69b217dae2fae2dfcb62400471a9970"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c878d1930d87725d4a5bf498c24f4be8130d5b2646a9fd0f2994deff90116352"
 
 # These extensions are now integrated into the server, so declare the migration
 # path for in-place upgrades.
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#12 lore raw

PATCH v2 11/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.43 -> 4.0.44

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>

(From OE-Core rev: dd8c333576d7ebb8abab3a62b3451439519a0caa)

---
 .../mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch          | 19 +++++++++++++------
 .../mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch    |  7 +++----
 .../mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch       | 11 +++++------
 .../{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.44.bb}    |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.44.bb} (93%)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +13 -6
index 6bb9d6a3da..20a6d1b8b3 100644
@@ -1,12 +1,19 @@
-Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
+From c72d075cb0c3a65ef17621c7ed1ffac35ca3b68e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
 
 Upstream-Status: Pending
 Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
-Index: mtools-4.0.18/sysincludes.h
-===================================================================
---- mtools-4.0.18.orig/sysincludes.h
-+++ mtools-4.0.18/sysincludes.h
-@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ typedef void *caddr_t;
+---
+ sysincludes.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sysincludes.h b/sysincludes.h
+index e16ab45..8d285d4 100644
+--- a/sysincludes.h
++++ b/sysincludes.h
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ typedef void *caddr_t;
  #if defined __GNUC__ && defined __STDC__
  /* gcc -traditional doesn't have PACKED, UNUSED and NORETURN */
  # define PACKED __attribute__ ((packed))
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch +3 -4
index 57be935487..1bed4e7614 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 2ef9b371a5cc44e730143e694d71665831fac216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0953b744b0257e26c170fb6d6b4c0f6210e4ae43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2017 14:55:52 +0300
 Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs.
@@ -6,16 +6,15 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs.
 Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [native]
 
 Signed-off-by: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]>
-
 ---
  config.c | 8 --------
  1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/config.c b/config.c
-index 2f6a297..3181ed7 100644
+index 358282b..8ebafb4 100644
 --- a/config.c
 +++ b/config.c
-@@ -844,14 +844,6 @@ void read_config(void)
+@@ -868,14 +868,6 @@ void read_config(void)
  	memcpy(devices, const_devices,
  	       nr_const_devices*sizeof(struct device));
  
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch +5 -6
index 6ae91d6cb9..3771f94c59 100644
@@ -1,17 +1,16 @@
-From 3cf56b36db78679273f61ba78fbbf7f3fab52f68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 184b76e9742ff89f90a066edb0f46b4a150351cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Marcin Juszkiewicz <[email protected]>
 Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 08:35:12 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE
 
 Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [licensing]
-
 ---
  Makefile.in  | 11 ++++++-----
  configure.in | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 616d59f..85b5b1d 100644
+index 5db50d7..92ad461 100644
 --- a/Makefile.in
 +++ b/Makefile.in
 @@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ USERCFLAGS =
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ index 616d59f..85b5b1d 100644
  
  
  # do not edit below this line
-@@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ dvi: mtools.dvi
+@@ -185,7 +186,7 @@ dvi: mtools.dvi
  
  ps: mtools.ps
  %.ps: %.dvi
@@ -40,10 +39,10 @@ index 616d59f..85b5b1d 100644
  pdf: mtools.pdf
  %.pdf: %.texi sysconfdir.texi
 diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index 5ff75c1..c0f7440 100644
+index 1de916e..fd6cb08 100644
 --- a/configure.in
 +++ b/configure.in
-@@ -35,6 +35,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_SYSTEM
+@@ -32,6 +32,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET
  AC_C_CONST
  AC_C_INLINE
  
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.44.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.43.bb +1 -1
similarity index 93%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.43.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.44.bb
index 859103979e..d8dd671be2 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\
 	glibc-gconv-ibm866 \
 	glibc-gconv-ibm869 \
 	"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "541e179665dc4e272b9602f2074243591a157da89cc47064da8c5829dbd2b339"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "37dc4df022533c3d4b2ec1c78973c27c7e8b585374c2d46ab64c6a3db31eddb8"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#13 lore raw

PATCH v2 12/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.44 -> 4.0.45

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>

Changelog:
============
- Fixed iconv descriptor leak
- Fixed size of error message buffer

(From OE-Core rev: cc1975888ffdc58655e80d3d14450cf68ee0f719)

---
 .../mtools/{mtools_4.0.44.bb => mtools_4.0.45.bb}               | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.44.bb => mtools_4.0.45.bb} (93%)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.45.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.44.bb +1 -1
similarity index 93%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.44.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.45.bb
index d8dd671be2..34040d7a0d 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\
 	glibc-gconv-ibm866 \
 	glibc-gconv-ibm869 \
 	"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "37dc4df022533c3d4b2ec1c78973c27c7e8b585374c2d46ab64c6a3db31eddb8"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0b008a96bd0efe0e542fa4383d469af66bc4a93394990b103730a8160a67d618"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#14 lore raw

PATCH v2 13/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.45 -> 4.0.46

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>

clang_UNUSED.patch
mtools-makeinfo.patch
refreshed for 4.0.46

Changelog:
=============
- iconv buffer overflow fixes
- removed references to mread and mwrite (obsolete subcommands from mcopy)
- documented mdoctorfat, and addressed 2 bugs/oversights
- removed references to obsolete mread and mwrite
- portability fixes (dietlibc and MacOS X) & simplification

(From OE-Core rev: f5a5b2372669d8be4ae3f19ed6892264ea3999d0)

---
 .../mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch             |  6 +++---
 .../mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch          | 16 ++++++++--------
 .../{mtools_4.0.45.bb => mtools_4.0.46.bb}       |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.45.bb => mtools_4.0.46.bb} (93%)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +3 -3
index 20a6d1b8b3..1420d84b86 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From c72d075cb0c3a65ef17621c7ed1ffac35ca3b68e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6654edfb1eee416b58bcb6490658f80071a353c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
 Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/sysincludes.h b/sysincludes.h
-index e16ab45..8d285d4 100644
+index 6b322ff..48daecd 100644
 --- a/sysincludes.h
 +++ b/sysincludes.h
-@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ typedef void *caddr_t;
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ ac_cv_func_setpgrp_void=yes ../mtools/configure --build=i386-linux-gnu --host=i3
  #if defined __GNUC__ && defined __STDC__
  /* gcc -traditional doesn't have PACKED, UNUSED and NORETURN */
  # define PACKED __attribute__ ((packed))
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch +8 -8
index 3771f94c59..8c80040f91 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 184b76e9742ff89f90a066edb0f46b4a150351cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From fd1e84c66852c2c906ee292aad942b4bfbd9e306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Marcin Juszkiewicz <[email protected]>
 Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 08:35:12 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE
 Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [licensing]
 ---
  Makefile.in  | 11 ++++++-----
- configure.in | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ configure.ac | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 5db50d7..92ad461 100644
+index 7b305b0..70c8c74 100644
 --- a/Makefile.in
 +++ b/Makefile.in
 @@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ USERCFLAGS =
@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ index 5db50d7..92ad461 100644
  
  pdf: mtools.pdf
  %.pdf: %.texi sysconfdir.texi
-diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index 1de916e..fd6cb08 100644
---- a/configure.in
-+++ b/configure.in
-@@ -32,6 +32,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index de108a8..0fd9ef0 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -33,6 +33,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET
  AC_C_CONST
  AC_C_INLINE
  
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.46.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.45.bb +1 -1
similarity index 93%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.45.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.46.bb
index 34040d7a0d..1173718662 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\
 	glibc-gconv-ibm866 \
 	glibc-gconv-ibm869 \
 	"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0b008a96bd0efe0e542fa4383d469af66bc4a93394990b103730a8160a67d618"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9aad8dd859f88fb7787924ec47590192d3abf7bad6c840509c854290d6bc16c0"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#15 lore raw

PATCH v2 14/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.46 -> 4.0.47

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>

(From OE-Core rev: 14ef270cc003646e6ca97ff3405507f2b9e92736)

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch      | 2 +-
 .../mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch           | 4 ++--
 meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch   | 6 +++---
 .../mtools/{mtools_4.0.46.bb => mtools_4.0.47.bb}           | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.46.bb => mtools_4.0.47.bb} (93%)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +1 -1
index 1420d84b86..2f3c452420 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 6654edfb1eee416b58bcb6490658f80071a353c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From d8e9cf472f49c8dbb3b0855145974d199a83e8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
 Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch +2 -2
index 1bed4e7614..1b3c3e003d 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 0953b744b0257e26c170fb6d6b4c0f6210e4ae43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 4e51cf33fc34e8e82661b9bc3ab13858a2ffe43d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2017 14:55:52 +0300
 Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs.
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/config.c b/config.c
-index 358282b..8ebafb4 100644
+index 436c94b..794f098 100644
 --- a/config.c
 +++ b/config.c
 @@ -868,14 +868,6 @@ void read_config(void)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch +3 -3
index 8c80040f91..fb7ba56eec 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From fd1e84c66852c2c906ee292aad942b4bfbd9e306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From b517158e8ffc6a665506007b20708d6c2589cec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Marcin Juszkiewicz <[email protected]>
 Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 08:35:12 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ index 7b305b0..70c8c74 100644
  pdf: mtools.pdf
  %.pdf: %.texi sysconfdir.texi
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index de108a8..0fd9ef0 100644
+index 37f0d00..c93cfb5 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -33,6 +33,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET
+@@ -36,6 +36,33 @@ AC_PATH_PROG(INSTALL_INFO, install-info, "")
  AC_C_CONST
  AC_C_INLINE
  
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.47.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.46.bb +1 -1
similarity index 93%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.46.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.47.bb
index 1173718662..70d6579621 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\
 	glibc-gconv-ibm866 \
 	glibc-gconv-ibm869 \
 	"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9aad8dd859f88fb7787924ec47590192d3abf7bad6c840509c854290d6bc16c0"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "31aa06078cc3f50591b95e71a909c56dd179d87e9cbdc07bf435e595bd7cc7ff"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#16 lore raw

PATCH v2 15/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.47 -> 4.0.48

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>

clang_UNUSED.patch
disable-hardcoded-configs.patch
refreshed for 4.0.48

(From OE-Core rev: 1d5aee7e67cd614073a15b47b832375428865260)

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch      | 6 +++---
 .../mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch           | 6 +++---
 .../mtools/{mtools_4.0.47.bb => mtools_4.0.48.bb}           | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.47.bb => mtools_4.0.48.bb} (93%)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +3 -3
index 2f3c452420..ddf3706f51 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From d8e9cf472f49c8dbb3b0855145974d199a83e8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6914c6e15cd15daf1dae81458e5346958c9d5449 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
 Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/sysincludes.h b/sysincludes.h
-index 6b322ff..48daecd 100644
+index 272b316..49ee5ae 100644
 --- a/sysincludes.h
 +++ b/sysincludes.h
-@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ ac_cv_func_setpgrp_void=yes ../mtools/configure --build=i386-linux-gnu --host=i3
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ ac_cv_func_setpgrp_void=yes ../mtools/configure --build=i386-linux-gnu --host=i3
  #if defined __GNUC__ && defined __STDC__
  /* gcc -traditional doesn't have PACKED, UNUSED and NORETURN */
  # define PACKED __attribute__ ((packed))
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch +3 -3
index 1b3c3e003d..63992ac547 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 4e51cf33fc34e8e82661b9bc3ab13858a2ffe43d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 16969d42ec6514883bcee87cc89b3e7864481d7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2017 14:55:52 +0300
 Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs.
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/config.c b/config.c
-index 436c94b..794f098 100644
+index 2433457..3972150 100644
 --- a/config.c
 +++ b/config.c
-@@ -868,14 +868,6 @@ void read_config(void)
+@@ -849,14 +849,6 @@ void read_config(void)
  	memcpy(devices, const_devices,
  	       nr_const_devices*sizeof(struct device));
  
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.48.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.47.bb +1 -1
similarity index 93%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.47.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.48.bb
index 70d6579621..646735f3b3 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\
 	glibc-gconv-ibm866 \
 	glibc-gconv-ibm869 \
 	"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "31aa06078cc3f50591b95e71a909c56dd179d87e9cbdc07bf435e595bd7cc7ff"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "03c29aac8735dd7154a989fbc29eaf2b506121ae1c3a35cd0bf2a02e94d271a9"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#17 lore raw

PATCH v2 16/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.48 -> 4.0.49

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Jinfeng Wang <[email protected]>

New version includes check for overlong file names, see [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/info-mtools/2025-06/msg00005.html

(From OE-Core rev: 044c2bceefcc12262cb2421e8f1da5f6c2ed9f72)

---
 .../mtools/{mtools_4.0.48.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb}               | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.48.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb} (93%)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.49.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.48.bb +1 -1
similarity index 93%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.48.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.49.bb
index 646735f3b3..294b2f37b2 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\
 	glibc-gconv-ibm866 \
 	glibc-gconv-ibm869 \
 	"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "03c29aac8735dd7154a989fbc29eaf2b506121ae1c3a35cd0bf2a02e94d271a9"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6fe5193583d6e7c59da75e63d7234f76c0b07caf33b103894f46f66a871ffc9f"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0