Patch review
v2 cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Monday, July 28
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/2091
The following changes since commit 24c0ab18045920bb5c1e965c0ea6d176fd6de234:
oe-debuginfod: add option for data storage (2025-07-16 14:09:39 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut
Alexander Kanavin (1):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.43 -> 4.0.44
Archana Polampalli (1):
openssl: CVE-2024-41996
Deepesh Varatharajan (2):
binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7545
glibc: stable 2.39 branch updates
Hitendra Prajapati (1):
libpam: fix CVE-2025-6020
Jinfeng Wang (1):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.48 -> 4.0.49
Peter Marko (2):
orc: set CVE_PRODUCT
openssl: patch CVE-2025-27587
Richard Purdie (1):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.46 -> 4.0.47
Roland Kovacs (2):
libxml2: fix CVE-2025-49795
sqlite3: fix CVE-2025-6965
Vijay Anusuri (1):
xserver-xorg: upgrade 21.1.6 -> 21.1.18
Wang Mingyu (3):
mtools: upgrade 4.0.44 -> 4.0.45
mtools: upgrade 4.0.45 -> 4.0.46
mtools: upgrade 4.0.47 -> 4.0.48
Yash Shinde (1):
binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7546
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch | 44 +
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch | 1918 +++++++++++++++++
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch | 129 ++
.../openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb | 3 +
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc | 2 +-
.../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch | 92 +
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 +
.../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc | 2 +
.../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch | 39 +
.../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch | 58 +
.../mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch | 19 +-
.../mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch | 7 +-
.../mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch | 19 +-
.../{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb} | 2 +-
meta/recipes-devtools/orc/orc_0.4.40.bb | 3 +
.../libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch | 101 +
.../libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch | 750 +++++++
.../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch | 1128 ++++++++++
.../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch | 187 ++
.../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch | 35 +
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb | 5 +
...org_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb} | 2 +-
.../sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch | 112 +
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb | 1 +
24 files changed, 4636 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb} (93%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch
rename meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/{xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb} (92%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patchSignature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 1/16 libxml2: fix CVE-2025-49795
From: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]>
A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability was found in libxml2 when processing XPath XML expressions. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a malicious XML input to libxml2, leading to a denial of service.
--- .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch | 92 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49795.patch new file +92 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From 19e0a3ed092085a4d6689397d4f08cf5d86267af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Mann <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 12:11:30 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Schematron: Fix null pointer dereference leading to DoS + +(CVE-2025-49795) + +Fixes #932 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/c24909ba2601848825b49a60f988222da3019667] +CVE: CVE-2025-49795 + +(cherry picked from commit c24909ba2601848825b49a60f988222da3019667) +Signed-off-by: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]> +--- + result/schematron/zvon16_0 | 6 ++++++ + result/schematron/zvon16_0.err | 5 +++++ + schematron.c | 5 +++++ + test/schematron/zvon16.sct | 7 +++++++ + test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml | 5 +++++ + 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 result/schematron/zvon16_0 + create mode 100644 result/schematron/zvon16_0.err + create mode 100644 test/schematron/zvon16.sct + create mode 100644 test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml + +diff --git a/result/schematron/zvon16_0 b/result/schematron/zvon16_0 +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..768cf6f5 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/schematron/zvon16_0 +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++<?xml version="1.0"?> ++<library> ++ <book title="Test Book" id="bk101"> ++ <author>Test Author</author> ++ </book> ++</library> +diff --git a/result/schematron/zvon16_0.err b/result/schematron/zvon16_0.err +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..a4fab4c8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/result/schematron/zvon16_0.err +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++Pattern: TestPattern ++xmlXPathCompOpEval: function falae not found ++XPath error : Unregistered function ++/library/book line 2: Book ++./test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml fails to validate +diff --git a/schematron.c b/schematron.c +index a8259201..86c63e64 100644 +--- a/schematron.c ++++ b/schematron.c +@@ -1481,6 +1481,11 @@ xmlSchematronFormatReport(xmlSchematronValidCtxtPtr ctxt, + select = xmlGetNoNsProp(child, BAD_CAST "select"); + comp = xmlXPathCtxtCompile(ctxt->xctxt, select); + eval = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp, ctxt->xctxt); ++ if (eval == NULL) { ++ xmlXPathFreeCompExpr(comp); ++ xmlFree(select); ++ return ret; ++ } + + switch (eval->type) { + case XPATH_NODESET: { +diff --git a/test/schematron/zvon16.sct b/test/schematron/zvon16.sct +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..f03848aa +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/schematron/zvon16.sct +@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ ++<sch:schema xmlns:sch="http://purl.oclc.org/dsdl/schematron"> ++ <sch:pattern id="TestPattern"> ++ <sch:rule context="book"> ++ <sch:report test="not(@available)">Book <sch:value-of select="falae()"/> test</sch:report> ++ </sch:rule> ++ </sch:pattern> ++</sch:schema> +diff --git a/test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml b/test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..551e2d65 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/schematron/zvon16_0.xml +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++<library> ++ <book title="Test Book" id="bk101"> ++ <author>Test Author</author> ++ </book> ++</library> +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.12.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20130923.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt file://CVE-2025-32415.patch \ file://CVE-2025-6021.patch \ file://CVE-2025-49794-CVE-2025-49796.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-49795.patch \ " SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "c3d8c0c34aa39098f66576fe51969db12a5100b956233dc56506f7a8679be995"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 2/16 binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7546
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yash Shinde <[email protected]>
Report corrupted group section instead of trying to recover.
CVE: CVE-2025-7546
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=41461010eb7c79fee7a9d5f6209accdaac66cc6b]
PR 33050 [https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=33050]
--- .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc | 1 + .../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch | 58 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.42.inc +1 -0
@@ -53,5 +53,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://CVE-2025-1179.patch \ file://0022-CVE-2025-5245.patch \ file://0022-CVE-2025-5244.patch \ + file://0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch new file +58 -0
58 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 3/16 binutils: Fix CVE-2025-7545
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>
objcopy: Don't extend the output section size
Since the output section contents are copied from the input, don't extend the output section size beyond the input section size.
Backport a patch from upstream to fix CVE-2025-7545
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=08c3cbe5926e4d355b5cb70bbec2b1eeb40c2944]
--- .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc | 1 + .../binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.42.inc +1 -0
@@ -54,5 +54,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://0022-CVE-2025-5245.patch \ file://0022-CVE-2025-5244.patch \ file://0023-CVE-2025-7546.patch \ + file://0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2025-7545.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 06:36:56 +0800 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h08c3cbe5926e4d355b5cb70bbec2b1eeb40c2944] +CVE: CVE-2025-7545 + +Since the output section contents are copied from the input, don't +extend the output section size beyond the input section size. + + PR binutils/33049 + * objcopy.c (copy_section): Don't extend the output section + size beyond the input section size. + +Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]> + +diff --git a/binutils/objcopy.c b/binutils/objcopy.c +index a85d2620..18cd1bfd 100644 +--- a/binutils/objcopy.c ++++ b/binutils/objcopy.c +@@ -4547,6 +4547,7 @@ copy_section (bfd *ibfd, sec_ptr isection, void *obfdarg) + char *to = (char *) memhunk; + char *end = (char *) memhunk + size; + int i; ++ bfd_size_type memhunk_size = size; + + /* If the section address is not exactly divisible by the interleave, + then we must bias the from address. If the copy_byte is less than +@@ -4566,6 +4567,11 @@ copy_section (bfd *ibfd, sec_ptr isection, void *obfdarg) + } + + size = (size + interleave - 1 - copy_byte) / interleave * copy_width; ++ ++ /* Don't extend the output section size. */ ++ if (size > memhunk_size) ++ size = memhunk_size; ++ + osection->lma /= interleave; + if (copy_byte < extra) + osection->lma++;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 4/16 sqlite3: fix CVE-2025-6965
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]>
There exists a vulnerability in SQLite versions before 3.50.2 where the number of aggregate terms could exceed the number of columns available. This could lead to a memory corruption issue.
--- .../sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch | 112 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2025-6965.patch new file +112 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From a91c0d55011d06858726d4783fd16ed8ec71e793 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: drh <> +Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2025 19:02:21 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Raise an error right away if the number of aggregate terms in + a query exceeds the maximum number of columns. + +FossilOrigin-Name: 5508b56fd24016c13981ec280ecdd833007c9d8dd595edb295b984c2b487b5c8 + +CVE: CVE-2025-6965 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/c52e9d97d485a3eb168e3f8f3674a7bc4b419703] +Signed-off-by: Roland Kovacs <[email protected]> +--- + sqlite3.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c +index 1ee8de4a85..5c7c126076 100644 +--- a/sqlite3.c ++++ b/sqlite3.c +@@ -15000,6 +15000,14 @@ typedef INT16_TYPE LogEst; + #define LARGEST_UINT64 (0xffffffff|(((u64)0xffffffff)<<32)) + #define SMALLEST_INT64 (((i64)-1) - LARGEST_INT64) + ++/* ++** Macro SMXV(n) return the maximum value that can be held in variable n, ++** assuming n is a signed integer type. UMXV(n) is similar for unsigned ++** integer types. ++*/ ++#define SMXV(n) ((((i64)1)<<(sizeof(n)*8-1))-1) ++#define UMXV(n) ((((i64)1)<<(sizeof(n)*8))-1) ++ + /* + ** Round up a number to the next larger multiple of 8. This is used + ** to force 8-byte alignment on 64-bit architectures. +@@ -18785,7 +18793,7 @@ struct AggInfo { + ** from source tables rather than from accumulators */ + u8 useSortingIdx; /* In direct mode, reference the sorting index rather + ** than the source table */ +- u16 nSortingColumn; /* Number of columns in the sorting index */ ++ u32 nSortingColumn; /* Number of columns in the sorting index */ + int sortingIdx; /* Cursor number of the sorting index */ + int sortingIdxPTab; /* Cursor number of pseudo-table */ + int iFirstReg; /* First register in range for aCol[] and aFunc[] */ +@@ -18794,8 +18802,8 @@ struct AggInfo { + Table *pTab; /* Source table */ + Expr *pCExpr; /* The original expression */ + int iTable; /* Cursor number of the source table */ +- i16 iColumn; /* Column number within the source table */ +- i16 iSorterColumn; /* Column number in the sorting index */ ++ int iColumn; /* Column number within the source table */ ++ int iSorterColumn; /* Column number in the sorting index */ + } *aCol; + int nColumn; /* Number of used entries in aCol[] */ + int nAccumulator; /* Number of columns that show through to the output. +@@ -115162,7 +115170,9 @@ static void findOrCreateAggInfoColumn( + ){ + struct AggInfo_col *pCol; + int k; ++ int mxTerm = pParse->db->aLimit[SQLITE_LIMIT_COLUMN]; + ++ assert( mxTerm <= SMXV(i16) ); + assert( pAggInfo->iFirstReg==0 ); + pCol = pAggInfo->aCol; + for(k=0; k<pAggInfo->nColumn; k++, pCol++){ +@@ -115180,6 +115190,10 @@ static void findOrCreateAggInfoColumn( + assert( pParse->db->mallocFailed ); + return; + } ++ if( k>mxTerm ){ ++ sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "more than %d aggregate terms", mxTerm); ++ k = mxTerm; ++ } + pCol = &pAggInfo->aCol[k]; + assert( ExprUseYTab(pExpr) ); + pCol->pTab = pExpr->y.pTab; +@@ -115213,6 +115227,7 @@ fix_up_expr: + if( pExpr->op==TK_COLUMN ){ + pExpr->op = TK_AGG_COLUMN; + } ++ assert( k <= SMXV(pExpr->iAgg) ); + pExpr->iAgg = (i16)k; + } + +@@ -115297,13 +115312,19 @@ static int analyzeAggregate(Walker *pWalker, Expr *pExpr){ + ** function that is already in the pAggInfo structure + */ + struct AggInfo_func *pItem = pAggInfo->aFunc; ++ int mxTerm = pParse->db->aLimit[SQLITE_LIMIT_COLUMN]; ++ assert( mxTerm <= SMXV(i16) ); + for(i=0; i<pAggInfo->nFunc; i++, pItem++){ + if( NEVER(pItem->pFExpr==pExpr) ) break; + if( sqlite3ExprCompare(0, pItem->pFExpr, pExpr, -1)==0 ){ + break; + } + } +- if( i>=pAggInfo->nFunc ){ ++ if( i>mxTerm ){ ++ sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "more than %d aggregate terms", mxTerm); ++ i = mxTerm; ++ assert( i<pAggInfo->nFunc ); ++ }else if( i>=pAggInfo->nFunc ){ + /* pExpr is original. Make a new entry in pAggInfo->aFunc[] + */ + u8 enc = ENC(pParse->db); +@@ -115357,6 +115378,7 @@ static int analyzeAggregate(Walker *pWalker, Expr *pExpr){ + */ + assert( !ExprHasProperty(pExpr, EP_TokenOnly|EP_Reduced) ); + ExprSetVVAProperty(pExpr, EP_NoReduce); ++ assert( i <= SMXV(pExpr->iAgg) ); + pExpr->iAgg = (i16)i; + pExpr->pAggInfo = pAggInfo; + return WRC_Prune;
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb +1 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://sqlite3.h;endline=11;md5=786d3dc581eff03f4fd9e4a77ed0 SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2024/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-3277.patch \ file://CVE-2025-29088.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-6965.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b2809ca53124c19c60f42bf627736eae011afdcc205bb48270a5ee9a38191531"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 5/16 orc: set CVE_PRODUCT
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
There are new CVEs reported for this recipe which are not for this componene, but for a component with same name from apache.
sqlite> select vendor, product, id, count(*) from products where product like 'orc' group by vendor, product, id;
apache|orc|CVE-2018-8015|1 apache|orc|CVE-2025-47436|4
gstreamer|orc|CVE-2024-40897|1
--- meta/recipes-devtools/orc/orc_0.4.40.bb | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/orc/orc_0.4.40.bb +3 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3fc2bee78dfb7c41fd9605061fc69138db7df007eae2f669a1f56e8bac inherit meson pkgconfig gtk-doc +# distinguish from apache:orc +CVE_PRODUCT = "gstreamer:orc" + GTKDOC_MESON_OPTION = "gtk_doc" GTKDOC_MESON_ENABLE_FLAG = "enabled" GTKDOC_MESON_DISABLE_FLAG = "disabled"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 6/16 openssl: CVE-2024-41996
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
As discussed in [1], this commit fixes CVE-2024-41996. Although openssl project does not consider this a vulnerability, it got CVE number assigned so it deserves attention.
[1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25088
--- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch new file +44 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From e70e34d857d4003199bcb5d3b52ca8102ccc1b98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 17:54:14 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] dh_kmgmt.c: Avoid expensive public key validation for known + safe-prime groups +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The partial validation is fully sufficient to check the key validity. + +Thanks to Szilárd Pfeiffer for reporting the issue. + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25088) + +CVE: CVE-2024-41996 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e70e34d857d4003199bcb5d3b52ca8102ccc1b98] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c | 8 +++++--- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c +index 82c3093b12..ebdce76710 100644 +--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c ++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c +@@ -387,9 +387,11 @@ static int dh_validate_public(const DH *dh, int checktype) + if (pub_key == NULL) + return 0; + +- /* The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2 */ +- if (checktype == OSSL_KEYMGMT_VALIDATE_QUICK_CHECK +- && ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh)) ++ /* ++ * The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2 ++ * but for that case it is also fully sufficient to check the key validity. ++ */ ++ if (ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh)) + return ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(dh, pub_key, &res); + + return DH_check_pub_key_ex(dh, pub_key);
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ file://0001-Added-handshake-history-reporting-when-test-fails.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 7/16 openssl: patch CVE-2025-27587
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick commits for Minerva fix between 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 release.
Update to 3.2.5 is blocked due to problem with python ptest errors, so use patch instead of upgrade for now.
--- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch | 1918 +++++++++++++++++ .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch | 129 ++ .../openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 2049 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-1.patch new file +1918 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,1918 @@ +From 14ac0f0e4e1f36793d09b41ffd5e482575289ab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Danny Tsen <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 13:48:01 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix Minerva timing side-channel signal for P-384 curve on PPC + +1. bn_ppc.c: Used bn_mul_mont_int() instead of bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6() + for Montgomery multiplication. +2. ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl: + - Re-wrote p384_felem_mul and p384_felem_square for easier maintenance with + minumum perl wrapper. + - Implemented p384_felem_reduce, p384_felem_mul_reduce and p384_felem_square_reduce. + - Implemented p384_felem_diff64, felem_diff_128_64 and felem_diff128 in assembly. +3. ecp_nistp384.c: + - Added wrapper function for p384_felem_mul_reduce and p384_felem_square_reduce. + +Signed-off-by: Danny Tsen <[email protected]> + +Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26709) + +(cherry picked from commit 85cabd94958303859b1551364a609d4ff40b67a5) + +CVE: CVE-2025-27587 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/14ac0f0e4e1f36793d09b41ffd5e482575289ab2] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c | 3 + + crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl | 1724 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- + crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c | 28 +- + 3 files changed, 1504 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c +index 1e9421bee2..29293bad55 100644 +--- a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c ++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c +@@ -41,12 +41,15 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, + */ + + #if defined(_ARCH_PPC64) && !defined(__ILP32__) ++ /* Minerva side-channel fix danny */ ++# if defined(USE_FIXED_N6) + if (num == 6) { + if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300) + return bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); + else + return bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); + } ++# endif + #endif + + return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); +diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl +index 28f4168e52..b663bddfc6 100755 +--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl ++++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl +@@ -7,13 +7,15 @@ + # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + # + # ==================================================================== +-# Written by Rohan McLure <[email protected]> for the OpenSSL +-# project. ++# Written by Danny Tsen <[email protected]> # for the OpenSSL project. ++# ++# Copyright 2025- IBM Corp. + # ==================================================================== + # +-# p384 lower-level primitives for PPC64 using vector instructions. ++# p384 lower-level primitives for PPC64. + # + ++ + use strict; + use warnings; + +@@ -21,7 +23,7 @@ my $flavour = shift; + my $output = ""; + while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} + if (!$output) { +- $output = "-"; ++ $output = "-"; + } + + my ($xlate, $dir); +@@ -35,271 +37,1495 @@ open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; + + my $code = ""; + +-my ($sp, $outp, $savelr, $savesp) = ("r1", "r3", "r10", "r12"); +- +-my $vzero = "v32"; +- +-sub startproc($) +-{ +- my ($name) = @_; +- +- $code.=<<___; +- .globl ${name} +- .align 5 +-${name}: +- +-___ +-} +- +-sub endproc($) +-{ +- my ($name) = @_; +- +- $code.=<<___; +- blr +- .size ${name},.-${name} +- +-___ +-} +- +-sub load_vrs($$) +-{ +- my ($pointer, $reg_list) = @_; +- +- for (my $i = 0; $i <= 6; $i++) { +- my $offset = $i * 8; +- $code.=<<___; +- lxsd $reg_list->[$i],$offset($pointer) +-___ +- } +- +- $code.=<<___; +- +-___ +-} +- +-sub store_vrs($$) +-{ +- my ($pointer, $reg_list) = @_; +- +- for (my $i = 0; $i <= 12; $i++) { +- my $offset = $i * 16; +- $code.=<<___; +- stxv $reg_list->[$i],$offset($pointer) +-___ +- } +- +- $code.=<<___; +- +-___ +-} +- + $code.=<<___; +-.machine "any" ++.machine "any" + .text + +-___ ++.globl p384_felem_mul ++.type p384_felem_mul,\@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem_mul: + +-{ +- # mul/square common +- my ($t1, $t2, $t3, $t4) = ("v33", "v34", "v42", "v43"); +- my ($zero, $one) = ("r8", "r9"); +- my $out = "v51"; ++ stdu 1, -176(1) ++ mflr 0 ++ std 14, 56(1) ++ std 15, 64(1) ++ std 16, 72(1) ++ std 17, 80(1) ++ std 18, 88(1) ++ std 19, 96(1) ++ std 20, 104(1) ++ std 21, 112(1) ++ std 22, 120(1) + +- { +- # +- # p384_felem_mul +- # ++ bl _p384_felem_mul_core + +- my ($in1p, $in2p) = ("r4", "r5"); +- my @in1 = map("v$_",(44..50)); +- my @in2 = map("v$_",(35..41)); ++ mtlr 0 ++ ld 14, 56(1) ++ ld 15, 64(1) ++ ld 16, 72(1) ++ ld 17, 80(1) ++ ld 18, 88(1) ++ ld 19, 96(1) ++ ld 20, 104(1) ++ ld 21, 112(1) ++ ld 22, 120(1) ++ addi 1, 1, 176 ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_mul,.-p384_felem_mul + +- startproc("p384_felem_mul"); ++.globl p384_felem_square ++.type p384_felem_square,\@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem_square: + +- $code.=<<___; +- vspltisw $vzero,0 ++ stdu 1, -176(1) ++ mflr 0 ++ std 14, 56(1) ++ std 15, 64(1) ++ std 16, 72(1) ++ std 17, 80(1) + +-___ ++ bl _p384_felem_square_core + +- load_vrs($in1p, \@in1); +- load_vrs($in2p, \@in2); +- +- $code.=<<___; +- vmsumudm $out,$in1[0],$in2[0],$vzero +- stxv $out,0($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[0],$in1[1],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- stxv $out,16($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in1[2],$in2[0],$out +- stxv $out,32($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t3,$in1[2],$in1[3],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t4,$in2[3],$in2[2],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t2,$out +- stxv $out,48($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[4],$in2[3],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t4,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out +- vmsumudm $out,$in1[4],$in2[0],$out +- stxv $out,64($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[5],$in2[4],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t4,$in2[3],$in2[2],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out +- xxpermdi $t4,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$out +- stxv $out,80($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[0],$in1[1],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[6],$in2[5],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t4,$in2[4],$in2[3],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$out +- vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[0],$out +- stxv $out,96($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[1],$in1[2],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t2,$in2[6],$in2[5],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t3,$in1[3],$in1[4],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out +- xxpermdi $t3,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[5],$in1[6],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t3,$out +- stxv $out,112($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[2],$in1[3],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t3,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out +- vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[2],$out +- stxv $out,128($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[3],$in1[4],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- xxpermdi $t1,$in1[5],$in1[6],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$out +- stxv $out,144($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[4],$out +- stxv $out,160($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- stxv $out,176($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[6],$vzero +- stxv $out,192($outp) +-___ ++ mtlr 0 ++ ld 14, 56(1) ++ ld 15, 64(1) ++ ld 16, 72(1) ++ ld 17, 80(1) ++ addi 1, 1, 176 ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_square,.-p384_felem_square + +- endproc("p384_felem_mul"); +- } ++# ++# Felem mul core function - ++# r3, r4 and r5 need to pre-loaded. ++# ++.type _p384_felem_mul_core,\@function ++.align 4 ++_p384_felem_mul_core: + +- { +- # +- # p384_felem_square +- # ++ ld 6,0(4) ++ ld 14,0(5) ++ ld 7,8(4) ++ ld 15,8(5) ++ ld 8,16(4) ++ ld 16,16(5) ++ ld 9,24(4) ++ ld 17,24(5) ++ ld 10,32(4) ++ ld 18,32(5) ++ ld 11,40(4) ++ ld 19,40(5) ++ ld 12,48(4) ++ ld 20,48(5) + +- my ($inp) = ("r4"); +- my @in = map("v$_",(44..50)); +- my @inx2 = map("v$_",(35..41)); ++ # out0 ++ mulld 21, 14, 6 ++ mulhdu 22, 14, 6 ++ std 21, 0(3) ++ std 22, 8(3) + +- startproc("p384_felem_square"); ++ vxor 0, 0, 0 + +- $code.=<<___; +- vspltisw $vzero,0 ++ # out1 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 14, 6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 7, 15 ++ vmsumudm 1, 13, 14, 0 + +-___ ++ # out2 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 15, 6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 7, 16 ++ mtvsrdd 32+17, 0, 8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+18, 0, 14 ++ vmsumudm 19, 15, 16, 0 ++ vmsumudm 2, 17, 18, 19 + +- load_vrs($inp, \@in); ++ # out3 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 16, 6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 7, 17 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 14, 8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 9, 15 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 3, 15, 16, 19 + +- $code.=<<___; +- li $zero,0 +- li $one,1 +- mtvsrdd $t1,$one,$zero +-___ ++ # out4 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 17, 6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 7, 18 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 15, 8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 9, 16 ++ mtvsrdd 32+17, 0, 10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+18, 0, 14 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 4, 15, 16, 19 ++ vmsumudm 4, 17, 18, 4 + +- for (my $i = 0; $i <= 6; $i++) { +- $code.=<<___; +- vsld $inx2[$i],$in[$i],$t1 +-___ +- } +- +- $code.=<<___; +- vmsumudm $out,$in[0],$in[0],$vzero +- stxv $out,0($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$in[0],$inx2[1],$vzero +- stxv $out,16($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$in[0],$inx2[2],$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in[1],$in[1],$out +- stxv $out,32($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in[0],$in[1],0b00 +- xxpermdi $t2,$inx2[3],$inx2[2],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- stxv $out,48($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t4,$inx2[4],$inx2[3],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in[2],$in[2],$out +- stxv $out,64($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t2,$inx2[5],$inx2[4],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in[2],$inx2[3],$out +- stxv $out,80($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t2,$inx2[6],$inx2[5],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in[2],$inx2[4],$out +- vmsumudm $out,$in[3],$in[3],$out +- stxv $out,96($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t3,$in[1],$in[2],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in[3],$inx2[4],$out +- stxv $out,112($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in[2],$in[3],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in[4],$in[4],$out +- stxv $out,128($outp) +- +- xxpermdi $t1,$in[3],$in[4],0b00 +- vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero +- stxv $out,144($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$in[4],$inx2[6],$vzero +- vmsumudm $out,$in[5],$in[5],$out +- stxv $out,160($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$in[5],$inx2[6],$vzero +- stxv $out,176($outp) +- +- vmsumudm $out,$in[6],$in[6],$vzero +- stxv $out,192($outp) +-___ ++ # out5 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 18, 6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 7, 19 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 16, 8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 9, 17 ++ mtvsrdd 32+17, 14, 10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+18, 11, 15 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 5, 15, 16, 19 ++ vmsumudm 5, 17, 18, 5 ++ ++ stxv 32+1, 16(3) ++ stxv 32+2, 32(3) ++ stxv 32+3, 48(3) ++ stxv 32+4, 64(3) ++ stxv 32+5, 80(3) ++ ++ # out6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 19, 6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 7, 20 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 17, 8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 9, 18 ++ mtvsrdd 32+17, 15, 10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+18, 11, 16 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 6, 15, 16, 19 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 0, 12 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 0, 14 ++ vmsumudm 19, 17, 18, 6 ++ vmsumudm 6, 13, 14, 19 ++ ++ # out7 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 19, 7 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 8, 20 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 17, 9 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 10, 18 ++ mtvsrdd 32+17, 15, 11 ++ mtvsrdd 32+18, 12, 16 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 7, 15, 16, 19 ++ vmsumudm 7, 17, 18, 7 ++ ++ # out8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 19, 8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 9, 20 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 17, 10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 11, 18 ++ mtvsrdd 32+17, 0, 12 ++ mtvsrdd 32+18, 0, 16 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 8, 15, 16, 19 ++ vmsumudm 8, 17, 18, 8 ++ ++ # out9 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 19, 9 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 10, 20 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 17, 11 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 12, 18 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 9, 15, 16, 19 ++ ++ # out10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 19, 10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 11, 20 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 0, 12 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 0, 18 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 10, 15, 16, 19 ++ ++ # out11 ++ mtvsrdd 32+17, 19, 11 ++ mtvsrdd 32+18, 12, 20 ++ vmsumudm 11, 17, 18, 0 ++ ++ stxv 32+6, 96(3) ++ stxv 32+7, 112(3) ++ stxv 32+8, 128(3) ++ stxv 32+9, 144(3) ++ stxv 32+10, 160(3) ++ stxv 32+11, 176(3) ++ ++ # out12 ++ mulld 21, 20, 12 ++ mulhdu 22, 20, 12 # out12 ++ ++ std 21, 192(3) ++ std 22, 200(3) ++ ++ blr ++.size _p384_felem_mul_core,.-_p384_felem_mul_core ++ ++# ++# Felem square core function - ++# r3 and r4 need to pre-loaded. ++# ++.type _p384_felem_square_core,\@function ++.align 4 ++_p384_felem_square_core: ++ ++ ld 6, 0(4) ++ ld 7, 8(4) ++ ld 8, 16(4) ++ ld 9, 24(4) ++ ld 10, 32(4) ++ ld 11, 40(4) ++ ld 12, 48(4) ++ ++ vxor 0, 0, 0 ++ ++ # out0 ++ mulld 14, 6, 6 ++ mulhdu 15, 6, 6 ++ std 14, 0(3) ++ std 15, 8(3) ++ ++ # out1 ++ add 14, 6, 6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 0, 14 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 0, 7 ++ vmsumudm 1, 13, 14, 0 ++ ++ # out2 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 7, 14 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 7, 8 ++ vmsumudm 2, 15, 16, 0 ++ ++ # out3 ++ add 15, 7, 7 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 8, 14 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 15, 9 ++ vmsumudm 3, 13, 14, 0 ++ ++ # out4 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 9, 14 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 15, 10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 0, 8 ++ vmsumudm 4, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 4, 15, 15, 4 ++ ++ # out5 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 10, 14 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 15, 11 ++ add 16, 8, 8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 0, 16 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 0, 9 ++ vmsumudm 5, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 5, 15, 16, 5 ++ ++ stxv 32+1, 16(3) ++ stxv 32+2, 32(3) ++ stxv 32+3, 48(3) ++ stxv 32+4, 64(3) ++ ++ # out6 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 11, 14 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 15, 12 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 9, 16 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 9, 10 ++ stxv 32+5, 80(3) ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 6, 15, 16, 19 ++ ++ # out7 ++ add 17, 9, 9 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 11, 15 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 16, 12 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 0, 17 ++ mtvsrdd 32+16, 0, 10 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 7, 15, 16, 19 ++ ++ # out8 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 11, 16 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 17, 12 ++ mtvsrdd 32+15, 0, 10 ++ vmsumudm 19, 13, 14, 0 ++ vmsumudm 8, 15, 15, 19 ++ ++ # out9 ++ add 14, 10, 10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 11, 17 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 14, 12 ++ vmsumudm 9, 13, 14, 0 ++ ++ # out10 ++ mtvsrdd 32+13, 11, 14 ++ mtvsrdd 32+14, 11, 12 ++ vmsumudm 10, 13, 14, 0 ++ ++ stxv 32+6, 96(3) ++ stxv 32+7, 112(3) ++ ++ # out11 ++ #add 14, 11, 11 ++ #mtvsrdd 32+13, 0, 14 ++ #mtvsrdd 32+14, 0, 12 ++ #vmsumudm 11, 13, 14, 0 ++ ++ mulld 6, 12, 11 ++ mulhdu 7, 12, 11 ++ addc 8, 6, 6 ++ adde 9, 7, 7 ++ ++ stxv 32+8, 128(3) ++ stxv 32+9, 144(3) ++ stxv 32+10, 160(3) ++ #stxv 32+11, 176(3) ++ ++ # out12 ++ mulld 14, 12, 12 ++ mulhdu 15, 12, 12 ++ ++ std 8, 176(3) ++ std 9, 184(3) ++ std 14, 192(3) ++ std 15, 200(3) ++ ++ blr ++.size _p384_felem_square_core,.-_p384_felem_square_core ++ ++# ++# widefelem (128 bits) * 8 ++# ++.macro F128_X_8 _off1 _off2 ++ ld 9,\\_off1(3) ++ ld 8,\\_off2(3) ++ srdi 10,9,61 ++ rldimi 10,8,3,0 ++ sldi 9,9,3 ++ std 9,\\_off1(3) ++ std 10,\\_off2(3) ++.endm ++ ++.globl p384_felem128_mul_by_8 ++.type p384_felem128_mul_by_8, \@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem128_mul_by_8: ++ ++ F128_X_8 0, 8 ++ ++ F128_X_8 16, 24 ++ ++ F128_X_8 32, 40 ++ ++ F128_X_8 48, 56 ++ ++ F128_X_8 64, 72 ++ ++ F128_X_8 80, 88 ++ ++ F128_X_8 96, 104 ++ ++ F128_X_8 112, 120 ++ ++ F128_X_8 128, 136 ++ ++ F128_X_8 144, 152 ++ ++ F128_X_8 160, 168 ++ ++ F128_X_8 176, 184 ++ ++ F128_X_8 192, 200 ++ ++ blr ++.size p384_felem128_mul_by_8,.-p384_felem128_mul_by_8 ++ ++# ++# widefelem (128 bits) * 2 ++# ++.macro F128_X_2 _off1 _off2 ++ ld 9,\\_off1(3) ++ ld 8,\\_off2(3) ++ srdi 10,9,63 ++ rldimi 10,8,1,0 ++ sldi 9,9,1 ++ std 9,\\_off1(3) ++ std 10,\\_off2(3) ++.endm ++ ++.globl p384_felem128_mul_by_2 ++.type p384_felem128_mul_by_2, \@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem128_mul_by_2: ++ ++ F128_X_2 0, 8 ++ ++ F128_X_2 16, 24 ++ ++ F128_X_2 32, 40 ++ ++ F128_X_2 48, 56 ++ ++ F128_X_2 64, 72 ++ ++ F128_X_2 80, 88 ++ ++ F128_X_2 96, 104 ++ ++ F128_X_2 112, 120 ++ ++ F128_X_2 128, 136 ++ ++ F128_X_2 144, 152 ++ ++ F128_X_2 160, 168 ++ ++ F128_X_2 176, 184 ++ ++ F128_X_2 192, 200 ++ ++ blr ++.size p384_felem128_mul_by_2,.-p384_felem128_mul_by_2 ++ ++.globl p384_felem_diff128 ++.type p384_felem_diff128, \@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem_diff128: ++ ++ addis 5, 2, .LConst_two127\@toc\@ha ++ addi 5, 5, .LConst_two127\@toc\@l ++ ++ ld 10, 0(3) ++ ld 8, 8(3) ++ li 9, 0 ++ addc 10, 10, 9 ++ li 7, -1 ++ rldicr 7, 7, 0, 0 # two127 ++ adde 8, 8, 7 ++ ld 11, 0(4) ++ ld 12, 8(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 10 ++ subfe 12, 12, 8 ++ std 11, 0(3) # out0 ++ std 12, 8(3) ++ ++ # two127m71 = (r10, r9) ++ ld 8, 16(3) ++ ld 7, 24(3) ++ ld 10, 24(5) # two127m71 ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 16(4) ++ ld 12, 24(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 16(3) # out1 ++ std 12, 24(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 32(3) ++ ld 7, 40(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 32(4) ++ ld 12, 40(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 32(3) # out2 ++ std 12, 40(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 48(3) ++ ld 7, 56(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 48(4) ++ ld 12, 56(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 48(3) # out3 ++ std 12, 56(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 64(3) ++ ld 7, 72(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 64(4) ++ ld 12, 72(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 64(3) # out4 ++ std 12, 72(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 80(3) ++ ld 7, 88(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 80(4) ++ ld 12, 88(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 80(3) # out5 ++ std 12, 88(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 96(3) ++ ld 7, 104(3) ++ ld 6, 40(5) # two127p111m79m71 ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 6 ++ ld 11, 96(4) ++ ld 12, 104(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 96(3) # out6 ++ std 12, 104(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 112(3) ++ ld 7, 120(3) ++ ld 6, 56(5) # two127m119m71 ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 6 ++ ld 11, 112(4) ++ ld 12, 120(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 112(3) # out7 ++ std 12, 120(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 128(3) ++ ld 7, 136(3) ++ ld 6, 72(5) # two127m95m71 ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 6 ++ ld 11, 128(4) ++ ld 12, 136(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 128(3) # out8 ++ std 12, 136(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 144(3) ++ ld 7, 152(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 144(4) ++ ld 12, 152(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 144(3) # out9 ++ std 12, 152(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 160(3) ++ ld 7, 168(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 160(4) ++ ld 12, 168(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 160(3) # out10 ++ std 12, 168(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 176(3) ++ ld 7, 184(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 176(4) ++ ld 12, 184(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 176(3) # out11 ++ std 12, 184(3) ++ ++ ld 8, 192(3) ++ ld 7, 200(3) ++ addc 8, 8, 9 ++ adde 7, 7, 10 ++ ld 11, 192(4) ++ ld 12, 200(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 8 ++ subfe 12, 12, 7 ++ std 11, 192(3) # out12 ++ std 12, 200(3) ++ ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_diff128,.-p384_felem_diff128 ++ ++.data ++.align 4 ++.LConst_two127: ++#two127 ++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x80000000 ++#two127m71 ++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xffffff80, 0x7fffffff ++#two127p111m79m71 ++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xffff7f80, 0x80007fff ++#two127m119m71 ++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xffffff80, 0x7f7fffff ++#two127m95m71 ++.long 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x7fffff80, 0x7fffffff ++ ++.text ++ ++.globl p384_felem_diff_128_64 ++.type p384_felem_diff_128_64, \@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem_diff_128_64: ++ addis 5, 2, .LConst_128_two64\@toc\@ha ++ addi 5, 5, .LConst_128_two64\@toc\@l ++ ++ ld 9, 0(3) ++ ld 10, 8(3) ++ ld 8, 48(5) # two64p48m16 ++ li 7, 0 ++ addc 9, 9, 8 ++ li 6, 1 ++ adde 10, 10, 6 ++ ld 11, 0(4) ++ subfc 8, 11, 9 ++ subfe 12, 7, 10 ++ std 8, 0(3) # out0 ++ std 12, 8(3) ++ ++ ld 9, 16(3) ++ ld 10, 24(3) ++ ld 8, 0(5) # two64m56m8 ++ addc 9, 9, 8 ++ addze 10, 10 ++ ld 11, 8(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 9 ++ subfe 12, 7, 10 ++ std 11, 16(3) # out1 ++ std 12, 24(3) ++ ++ ld 9, 32(3) ++ ld 10, 40(3) ++ ld 8, 16(5) # two64m32m8 ++ addc 9, 9, 8 ++ addze 10, 10 ++ ld 11, 16(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 9 ++ subfe 12, 7, 10 ++ std 11, 32(3) # out2 ++ std 12, 40(3) ++ ++ ld 10, 48(3) ++ ld 8, 56(3) ++ #ld 9, 32(5) # two64m8 ++ li 9, -256 # two64m8 ++ addc 10, 10, 9 ++ addze 8, 8 ++ ld 11, 24(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 10 ++ subfe 12, 7, 8 ++ std 11, 48(3) # out3 ++ std 12, 56(3) ++ ++ ld 10, 64(3) ++ ld 8, 72(3) ++ addc 10, 10, 9 ++ addze 8, 8 ++ ld 11, 32(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 10 ++ subfe 12, 7, 8 ++ std 11, 64(3) # out4 ++ std 12, 72(3) ++ ++ ld 10, 80(3) ++ ld 8, 88(3) ++ addc 10, 10, 9 ++ addze 8, 8 ++ ld 11, 40(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 10 ++ subfe 12, 7, 8 ++ std 11, 80(3) # out5 ++ std 12, 88(3) ++ ++ ld 10, 96(3) ++ ld 8, 104(3) ++ addc 10, 10, 9 ++ addze 9, 8 ++ ld 11, 48(4) ++ subfc 11, 11, 10 ++ subfe 12, 7, 9 ++ std 11, 96(3) # out6 ++ std 12, 104(3) ++ ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_diff_128_64,.-p384_felem_diff_128_64 ++ ++.data ++.align 4 ++.LConst_128_two64: ++#two64m56m8 ++.long 0xffffff00, 0xfeffffff, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 ++#two64m32m8 ++.long 0xffffff00, 0xfffffffe, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 ++#two64m8 ++.long 0xffffff00, 0xffffffff, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 ++#two64p48m16 ++.long 0xffff0000, 0x0000ffff, 0x00000001, 0x00000000 ++ ++.LConst_two60: ++#two60m52m4 ++.long 0xfffffff0, 0x0fefffff, 0x0, 0x0 ++#two60p44m12 ++.long 0xfffff000, 0x10000fff, 0x0, 0x0 ++#two60m28m4 ++.long 0xeffffff0, 0x0fffffff, 0x0, 0x0 ++#two60m4 ++.long 0xfffffff0, 0x0fffffff, 0x0, 0x0 ++ ++.text ++# ++# static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in) ++# ++.globl p384_felem_diff64 ++.type p384_felem_diff64, \@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem_diff64: ++ addis 5, 2, .LConst_two60\@toc\@ha ++ addi 5, 5, .LConst_two60\@toc\@l ++ ++ ld 9, 0(3) ++ ld 8, 16(5) # two60p44m12 ++ li 7, 0 ++ add 9, 9, 8 ++ ld 11, 0(4) ++ subf 8, 11, 9 ++ std 8, 0(3) # out0 ++ ++ ld 9, 8(3) ++ ld 8, 0(5) # two60m52m4 ++ add 9, 9, 8 ++ ld 11, 8(4) ++ subf 11, 11, 9 ++ std 11, 8(3) # out1 ++ ++ ld 9, 16(3) ++ ld 8, 32(5) # two60m28m4 ++ add 9, 9, 8 ++ ld 11, 16(4) ++ subf 11, 11, 9 ++ std 11, 16(3) # out2 ++ ++ ld 10, 24(3) ++ ld 9, 48(5) # two60m4 ++ add 10, 10, 9 ++ ld 12, 24(4) ++ subf 12, 12, 10 ++ std 12, 24(3) # out3 ++ ++ ld 10, 32(3) ++ add 10, 10, 9 ++ ld 11, 32(4) ++ subf 11, 11, 10 ++ std 11, 32(3) # out4 ++ ++ ld 10, 40(3) ++ add 10, 10, 9 ++ ld 12, 40(4) ++ subf 12, 12, 10 ++ std 12, 40(3) # out5 + +- endproc("p384_felem_square"); +- } +-} ++ ld 10, 48(3) ++ add 10, 10, 9 ++ ld 11, 48(4) ++ subf 11, 11, 10 ++ std 11, 48(3) # out6 ++ ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_diff64,.-p384_felem_diff64 ++ ++.text ++# ++# Shift 128 bits right <nbits> ++# ++.macro SHR o_h o_l in_h in_l nbits ++ srdi \\o_l, \\in_l, \\nbits # shift lower right <nbits> ++ rldimi \\o_l, \\in_h, 64-\\nbits, 0 # insert <64-nbits> from hi ++ srdi \\o_h, \\in_h, \\nbits # shift higher right <nbits> ++.endm ++ ++# ++# static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in) ++# ++.global p384_felem_reduce ++.type p384_felem_reduce,\@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem_reduce: ++ ++ stdu 1, -208(1) ++ mflr 0 ++ std 14, 56(1) ++ std 15, 64(1) ++ std 16, 72(1) ++ std 17, 80(1) ++ std 18, 88(1) ++ std 19, 96(1) ++ std 20, 104(1) ++ std 21, 112(1) ++ std 22, 120(1) ++ std 23, 128(1) ++ std 24, 136(1) ++ std 25, 144(1) ++ std 26, 152(1) ++ std 27, 160(1) ++ std 28, 168(1) ++ std 29, 176(1) ++ std 30, 184(1) ++ std 31, 192(1) ++ ++ bl _p384_felem_reduce_core ++ ++ mtlr 0 ++ ld 14, 56(1) ++ ld 15, 64(1) ++ ld 16, 72(1) ++ ld 17, 80(1) ++ ld 18, 88(1) ++ ld 19, 96(1) ++ ld 20, 104(1) ++ ld 21, 112(1) ++ ld 22, 120(1) ++ ld 23, 128(1) ++ ld 24, 136(1) ++ ld 25, 144(1) ++ ld 26, 152(1) ++ ld 27, 160(1) ++ ld 28, 168(1) ++ ld 29, 176(1) ++ ld 30, 184(1) ++ ld 31, 192(1) ++ addi 1, 1, 208 ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_reduce,.-p384_felem_reduce ++ ++# ++# Felem reduction core function - ++# r3 and r4 need to pre-loaded. ++# ++.type _p384_felem_reduce_core,\@function ++.align 4 ++_p384_felem_reduce_core: ++ addis 12, 2, .LConst\@toc\@ha ++ addi 12, 12, .LConst\@toc\@l ++ ++ # load constat p ++ ld 11, 8(12) # hi - two124m68 ++ ++ # acc[6] = in[6] + two124m68; ++ ld 26, 96(4) # in[6].l ++ ld 27, 96+8(4) # in[6].h ++ add 27, 27, 11 ++ ++ # acc[5] = in[5] + two124m68; ++ ld 24, 80(4) # in[5].l ++ ld 25, 80+8(4) # in[5].h ++ add 25, 25, 11 ++ ++ # acc[4] = in[4] + two124m68; ++ ld 22, 64(4) # in[4].l ++ ld 23, 64+8(4) # in[4].h ++ add 23, 23, 11 ++ ++ # acc[3] = in[3] + two124m68; ++ ld 20, 48(4) # in[3].l ++ ld 21, 48+8(4) # in[3].h ++ add 21, 21, 11 ++ ++ ld 11, 48+8(12) # hi - two124m92m68 ++ ++ # acc[2] = in[2] + two124m92m68; ++ ld 18, 32(4) # in[2].l ++ ld 19, 32+8(4) # in[2].h ++ add 19, 19, 11 ++ ++ ld 11, 16+8(12) # high - two124m116m68 ++ ++ # acc[1] = in[1] + two124m116m68; ++ ld 16, 16(4) # in[1].l ++ ld 17, 16+8(4) # in[1].h ++ add 17, 17, 11 ++ ++ ld 11, 32+8(12) # high - two124p108m76 ++ ++ # acc[0] = in[0] + two124p108m76; ++ ld 14, 0(4) # in[0].l ++ ld 15, 0+8(4) # in[0].h ++ add 15, 15, 11 ++ ++ # compute mask ++ li 7, -1 ++ ++ # Eliminate in[12] ++ ++ # acc[8] += in[12] >> 32; ++ ld 5, 192(4) # in[12].l ++ ld 6, 192+8(4) # in[12].h ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32 ++ ld 30, 128(4) # in[8].l ++ ld 31, 136(4) # in[8].h ++ addc 30, 30, 10 ++ adde 31, 31, 9 ++ ++ # acc[7] += (in[12] & 0xffffffff) << 24; ++ srdi 11, 7, 32 # 0xffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 24 # << 24 ++ ld 28, 112(4) # in[7].l ++ ld 29, 120(4) # in[7].h ++ addc 28, 28, 11 ++ addze 29, 29 ++ ++ # acc[7] += in[12] >> 8; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8 ++ addc 28, 28, 10 ++ adde 29, 29, 9 ++ ++ # acc[6] += (in[12] & 0xff) << 48; ++ andi. 11, 5, 0xff ++ sldi 11, 11, 48 ++ addc 26, 26, 11 ++ addze 27, 27 ++ ++ # acc[6] -= in[12] >> 16; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16 ++ subfc 26, 10, 26 ++ subfe 27, 9, 27 ++ ++ # acc[5] -= (in[12] & 0xffff) << 40; ++ srdi 11, 7, 48 # 0xffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 40 # << 40 ++ li 9, 0 ++ subfc 24, 11, 24 ++ subfe 25, 9, 25 ++ ++ # acc[6] += in[12] >> 48; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48 ++ addc 26, 26, 10 ++ adde 27, 27, 9 ++ ++ # acc[5] += (in[12] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8; ++ srdi 11, 7, 16 # 0xffffffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 8 # << 8 ++ addc 24, 24, 11 ++ addze 25, 25 ++ ++ # Eliminate in[11] ++ ++ # acc[7] += in[11] >> 32; ++ ld 5, 176(4) # in[11].l ++ ld 6, 176+8(4) # in[11].h ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32 ++ addc 28, 28, 10 ++ adde 29, 29, 9 ++ ++ # acc[6] += (in[11] & 0xffffffff) << 24; ++ srdi 11, 7, 32 # 0xffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 24 # << 24 ++ addc 26, 26, 11 ++ addze 27, 27 ++ ++ # acc[6] += in[11] >> 8; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8 ++ addc 26, 26, 10 ++ adde 27, 27, 9 ++ ++ # acc[5] += (in[11] & 0xff) << 48; ++ andi. 11, 5, 0xff ++ sldi 11, 11, 48 ++ addc 24, 24, 11 ++ addze 25, 25 ++ ++ # acc[5] -= in[11] >> 16; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16 ++ subfc 24, 10, 24 ++ subfe 25, 9, 25 ++ ++ # acc[4] -= (in[11] & 0xffff) << 40; ++ srdi 11, 7, 48 # 0xffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 40 # << 40 ++ li 9, 0 ++ subfc 22, 11, 22 ++ subfe 23, 9, 23 ++ ++ # acc[5] += in[11] >> 48; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48 ++ addc 24, 24, 10 ++ adde 25, 25, 9 ++ ++ # acc[4] += (in[11] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8; ++ srdi 11, 7, 16 # 0xffffffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 8 # << 8 ++ addc 22, 22, 11 ++ addze 23, 23 ++ ++ # Eliminate in[10] ++ ++ # acc[6] += in[10] >> 32; ++ ld 5, 160(4) # in[10].l ++ ld 6, 160+8(4) # in[10].h ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32 ++ addc 26, 26, 10 ++ adde 27, 27, 9 ++ ++ # acc[5] += (in[10] & 0xffffffff) << 24; ++ srdi 11, 7, 32 # 0xffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 24 # << 24 ++ addc 24, 24, 11 ++ addze 25, 25 ++ ++ # acc[5] += in[10] >> 8; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8 ++ addc 24, 24, 10 ++ adde 25, 25, 9 ++ ++ # acc[4] += (in[10] & 0xff) << 48; ++ andi. 11, 5, 0xff ++ sldi 11, 11, 48 ++ addc 22, 22, 11 ++ addze 23, 23 ++ ++ # acc[4] -= in[10] >> 16; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16 ++ subfc 22, 10, 22 ++ subfe 23, 9, 23 ++ ++ # acc[3] -= (in[10] & 0xffff) << 40; ++ srdi 11, 7, 48 # 0xffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 40 # << 40 ++ li 9, 0 ++ subfc 20, 11, 20 ++ subfe 21, 9, 21 ++ ++ # acc[4] += in[10] >> 48; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48 ++ addc 22, 22, 10 ++ adde 23, 23, 9 ++ ++ # acc[3] += (in[10] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8; ++ srdi 11, 7, 16 # 0xffffffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 8 # << 8 ++ addc 20, 20, 11 ++ addze 21, 21 ++ ++ # Eliminate in[9] ++ ++ # acc[5] += in[9] >> 32; ++ ld 5, 144(4) # in[9].l ++ ld 6, 144+8(4) # in[9].h ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32 ++ addc 24, 24, 10 ++ adde 25, 25, 9 ++ ++ # acc[4] += (in[9] & 0xffffffff) << 24; ++ srdi 11, 7, 32 # 0xffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 24 # << 24 ++ addc 22, 22, 11 ++ addze 23, 23 ++ ++ # acc[4] += in[9] >> 8; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8 ++ addc 22, 22, 10 ++ adde 23, 23, 9 ++ ++ # acc[3] += (in[9] & 0xff) << 48; ++ andi. 11, 5, 0xff ++ sldi 11, 11, 48 ++ addc 20, 20, 11 ++ addze 21, 21 ++ ++ # acc[3] -= in[9] >> 16; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16 ++ subfc 20, 10, 20 ++ subfe 21, 9, 21 ++ ++ # acc[2] -= (in[9] & 0xffff) << 40; ++ srdi 11, 7, 48 # 0xffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 40 # << 40 ++ li 9, 0 ++ subfc 18, 11, 18 ++ subfe 19, 9, 19 ++ ++ # acc[3] += in[9] >> 48; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48 ++ addc 20, 20, 10 ++ adde 21, 21, 9 ++ ++ # acc[2] += (in[9] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8; ++ srdi 11, 7, 16 # 0xffffffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 8 # << 8 ++ addc 18, 18, 11 ++ addze 19, 19 ++ ++ # Eliminate acc[8] ++ ++ # acc[4] += acc[8] >> 32; ++ mr 5, 30 # acc[8].l ++ mr 6, 31 # acc[8].h ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32 ++ addc 22, 22, 10 ++ adde 23, 23, 9 ++ ++ # acc[3] += (acc[8] & 0xffffffff) << 24; ++ srdi 11, 7, 32 # 0xffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 24 # << 24 ++ addc 20, 20, 11 ++ addze 21, 21 ++ ++ # acc[3] += acc[8] >> 8; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8 ++ addc 20, 20, 10 ++ adde 21, 21, 9 ++ ++ # acc[2] += (acc[8] & 0xff) << 48; ++ andi. 11, 5, 0xff ++ sldi 11, 11, 48 ++ addc 18, 18, 11 ++ addze 19, 19 ++ ++ # acc[2] -= acc[8] >> 16; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16 ++ subfc 18, 10, 18 ++ subfe 19, 9, 19 ++ ++ # acc[1] -= (acc[8] & 0xffff) << 40; ++ srdi 11, 7, 48 # 0xffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 40 # << 40 ++ li 9, 0 ++ subfc 16, 11, 16 ++ subfe 17, 9, 17 ++ ++ #acc[2] += acc[8] >> 48; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48 ++ addc 18, 18, 10 ++ adde 19, 19, 9 ++ ++ # acc[1] += (acc[8] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8; ++ srdi 11, 7, 16 # 0xffffffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 8 # << 8 ++ addc 16, 16, 11 ++ addze 17, 17 ++ ++ # Eliminate acc[7] ++ ++ # acc[3] += acc[7] >> 32; ++ mr 5, 28 # acc[7].l ++ mr 6, 29 # acc[7].h ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 32 ++ addc 20, 20, 10 ++ adde 21, 21, 9 ++ ++ # acc[2] += (acc[7] & 0xffffffff) << 24; ++ srdi 11, 7, 32 # 0xffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 24 # << 24 ++ addc 18, 18, 11 ++ addze 19, 19 ++ ++ # acc[2] += acc[7] >> 8; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 8 ++ addc 18, 18, 10 ++ adde 19, 19, 9 ++ ++ # acc[1] += (acc[7] & 0xff) << 48; ++ andi. 11, 5, 0xff ++ sldi 11, 11, 48 ++ addc 16, 16, 11 ++ addze 17, 17 ++ ++ # acc[1] -= acc[7] >> 16; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 16 ++ subfc 16, 10, 16 ++ subfe 17, 9, 17 ++ ++ # acc[0] -= (acc[7] & 0xffff) << 40; ++ srdi 11, 7, 48 # 0xffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 40 # << 40 ++ li 9, 0 ++ subfc 14, 11, 14 ++ subfe 15, 9, 15 ++ ++ # acc[1] += acc[7] >> 48; ++ SHR 9, 10, 6, 5, 48 ++ addc 16, 16, 10 ++ adde 17, 17, 9 ++ ++ # acc[0] += (acc[7] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8; ++ srdi 11, 7, 16 # 0xffffffffffff ++ and 11, 11, 5 ++ sldi 11, 11, 8 # << 8 ++ addc 14, 14, 11 ++ addze 15, 15 ++ ++ # ++ # Carry 4 -> 5 -> 6 ++ # ++ # acc[5] += acc[4] >> 56; ++ # acc[4] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ SHR 9, 10, 23, 22, 56 ++ addc 24, 24, 10 ++ adde 25, 25, 9 ++ srdi 11, 7, 8 # 0x00ffffffffffffff ++ and 22, 22, 11 ++ li 23, 0 ++ ++ # acc[6] += acc[5] >> 56; ++ # acc[5] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ SHR 9, 10, 25, 24, 56 ++ addc 26, 26, 10 ++ adde 27, 27, 9 ++ and 24, 24, 11 ++ li 25, 0 ++ ++ # [3]: Eliminate high bits of acc[6] */ ++ # temp = acc[6] >> 48; ++ # acc[6] &= 0x0000ffffffffffff; ++ SHR 31, 30, 27, 26, 48 # temp = acc[6] >> 48 ++ srdi 11, 7, 16 # 0x0000ffffffffffff ++ and 26, 26, 11 ++ li 27, 0 ++ ++ # temp < 2^80 ++ # acc[3] += temp >> 40; ++ SHR 9, 10, 31, 30, 40 ++ addc 20, 20, 10 ++ adde 21, 21, 9 ++ ++ # acc[2] += (temp & 0xffffffffff) << 16; ++ srdi 11, 7, 24 # 0xffffffffff ++ and 10, 30, 11 ++ sldi 10, 10, 16 ++ addc 18, 18, 10 ++ addze 19, 19 ++ ++ # acc[2] += temp >> 16; ++ SHR 9, 10, 31, 30, 16 ++ addc 18, 18, 10 ++ adde 19, 19, 9 ++ ++ # acc[1] += (temp & 0xffff) << 40; ++ srdi 11, 7, 48 # 0xffff ++ and 10, 30, 11 ++ sldi 10, 10, 40 ++ addc 16, 16, 10 ++ addze 17, 17 ++ ++ # acc[1] -= temp >> 24; ++ SHR 9, 10, 31, 30, 24 ++ subfc 16, 10, 16 ++ subfe 17, 9, 17 ++ ++ # acc[0] -= (temp & 0xffffff) << 32; ++ srdi 11, 7, 40 # 0xffffff ++ and 10, 30, 11 ++ sldi 10, 10, 32 ++ li 9, 0 ++ subfc 14, 10, 14 ++ subfe 15, 9, 15 ++ ++ # acc[0] += temp; ++ addc 14, 14, 30 ++ adde 15, 15, 31 ++ ++ # Carry 0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 -> 5 -> 6 ++ # ++ # acc[1] += acc[0] >> 56; /* acc[1] < acc_old[1] + 2^72 */ ++ SHR 9, 10, 15, 14, 56 ++ addc 16, 16, 10 ++ adde 17, 17, 9 ++ ++ # acc[0] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ srdi 11, 7, 8 # 0x00ffffffffffffff ++ and 14, 14, 11 ++ li 15, 0 ++ ++ # acc[2] += acc[1] >> 56; /* acc[2] < acc_old[2] + 2^72 + 2^16 */ ++ SHR 9, 10, 17, 16, 56 ++ addc 18, 18, 10 ++ adde 19, 19, 9 ++ ++ # acc[1] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ and 16, 16, 11 ++ li 17, 0 ++ ++ # acc[3] += acc[2] >> 56; /* acc[3] < acc_old[3] + 2^72 + 2^16 */ ++ SHR 9, 10, 19, 18, 56 ++ addc 20, 20, 10 ++ adde 21, 21, 9 ++ ++ # acc[2] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ and 18, 18, 11 ++ li 19, 0 ++ ++ # acc[4] += acc[3] >> 56; ++ SHR 9, 10, 21, 20, 56 ++ addc 22, 22, 10 ++ adde 23, 23, 9 ++ ++ # acc[3] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ and 20, 20, 11 ++ li 21, 0 ++ ++ # acc[5] += acc[4] >> 56; ++ SHR 9, 10, 23, 22, 56 ++ addc 24, 24, 10 ++ adde 25, 25, 9 ++ ++ # acc[4] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ and 22, 22, 11 ++ ++ # acc[6] += acc[5] >> 56; ++ SHR 9, 10, 25, 24, 56 ++ addc 26, 26, 10 ++ adde 27, 27, 9 ++ ++ # acc[5] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; ++ and 24, 24, 11 ++ ++ std 14, 0(3) ++ std 16, 8(3) ++ std 18, 16(3) ++ std 20, 24(3) ++ std 22, 32(3) ++ std 24, 40(3) ++ std 26, 48(3) ++ blr ++.size _p384_felem_reduce_core,.-_p384_felem_reduce_core ++ ++.data ++.align 4 ++.LConst: ++# two124m68: ++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffffff0, 0xfffffff ++# two124m116m68: ++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffffff0, 0xfefffff ++#two124p108m76: ++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffff000, 0x10000fff ++#two124m92m68: ++.long 0x0, 0x0, 0xeffffff0, 0xfffffff ++ ++.text ++ ++# ++# void p384_felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in) ++# ++.global p384_felem_square_reduce ++.type p384_felem_square_reduce,\@function ++.align 4 ++p384_felem_square_reduce: ++ stdu 1, -512(1) ++ mflr 0 ++ std 14, 56(1) ++ std 15, 64(1) ++ std 16, 72(1) ++ std 17, 80(1) ++ std 18, 88(1) ++ std 19, 96(1) ++ std 20, 104(1) ++ std 21, 112(1) ++ std 22, 120(1) ++ std 23, 128(1) ++ std 24, 136(1) ++ std 25, 144(1) ++ std 26, 152(1) ++ std 27, 160(1) ++ std 28, 168(1) ++ std 29, 176(1) ++ std 30, 184(1) ++ std 31, 192(1) ++ ++ std 3, 496(1) ++ addi 3, 1, 208 ++ bl _p384_felem_square_core ++ ++ mr 4, 3 ++ ld 3, 496(1) ++ bl _p384_felem_reduce_core ++ ++ ld 14, 56(1) ++ ld 15, 64(1) ++ ld 16, 72(1) ++ ld 17, 80(1) ++ ld 18, 88(1) ++ ld 19, 96(1) ++ ld 20, 104(1) ++ ld 21, 112(1) ++ ld 22, 120(1) ++ ld 23, 128(1) ++ ld 24, 136(1) ++ ld 25, 144(1) ++ ld 26, 152(1) ++ ld 27, 160(1) ++ ld 28, 168(1) ++ ld 29, 176(1) ++ ld 30, 184(1) ++ ld 31, 192(1) ++ addi 1, 1, 512 ++ mtlr 0 ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_square_reduce,.-p384_felem_square_reduce ++ ++# ++# void p384_felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) ++# ++.global p384_felem_mul_reduce ++.type p384_felem_mul_reduce,\@function ++.align 5 ++p384_felem_mul_reduce: ++ stdu 1, -512(1) ++ mflr 0 ++ std 14, 56(1) ++ std 15, 64(1) ++ std 16, 72(1) ++ std 17, 80(1) ++ std 18, 88(1) ++ std 19, 96(1) ++ std 20, 104(1) ++ std 21, 112(1) ++ std 22, 120(1) ++ std 23, 128(1) ++ std 24, 136(1) ++ std 25, 144(1) ++ std 26, 152(1) ++ std 27, 160(1) ++ std 28, 168(1) ++ std 29, 176(1) ++ std 30, 184(1) ++ std 31, 192(1) ++ ++ std 3, 496(1) ++ addi 3, 1, 208 ++ bl _p384_felem_mul_core ++ ++ mr 4, 3 ++ ld 3, 496(1) ++ bl _p384_felem_reduce_core ++ ++ ld 14, 56(1) ++ ld 15, 64(1) ++ ld 16, 72(1) ++ ld 17, 80(1) ++ ld 18, 88(1) ++ ld 19, 96(1) ++ ld 20, 104(1) ++ ld 21, 112(1) ++ ld 22, 120(1) ++ ld 23, 128(1) ++ ld 24, 136(1) ++ ld 25, 144(1) ++ ld 26, 152(1) ++ ld 27, 160(1) ++ ld 28, 168(1) ++ ld 29, 176(1) ++ ld 30, 184(1) ++ ld 31, 192(1) ++ addi 1, 1, 512 ++ mtlr 0 ++ blr ++.size p384_felem_mul_reduce,.-p384_felem_mul_reduce ++___ + + $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; + print $code; +diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c +index 3fd7a40020..e0b5786bc1 100644 +--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c ++++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c +@@ -252,6 +252,16 @@ static void felem_neg(felem out, const felem in) + out[6] = two60m4 - in[6]; + } + ++#if defined(ECP_NISTP384_ASM) ++void p384_felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in); ++void p384_felem_diff128(widefelem out, const widefelem in); ++void p384_felem_diff_128_64(widefelem out, const felem in); ++ ++# define felem_diff64 p384_felem_diff64 ++# define felem_diff128 p384_felem_diff128 ++# define felem_diff_128_64 p384_felem_diff_128_64 ++ ++#else + /*- + * felem_diff64 subtracts |in| from |out| + * On entry: +@@ -369,6 +379,7 @@ static void felem_diff128(widefelem out, const widefelem in) + for (i = 0; i < 2*NLIMBS-1; i++) + out[i] -= in[i]; + } ++#endif /* ECP_NISTP384_ASM */ + + static void felem_square_ref(widefelem out, const felem in) + { +@@ -503,7 +514,7 @@ static void felem_mul_ref(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) + * [3]: Y = 2^48 (acc[6] >> 48) + * (Where a | b | c | d = (2^56)^3 a + (2^56)^2 b + (2^56) c + d) + */ +-static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in) ++static void felem_reduce_ref(felem out, const widefelem in) + { + /* + * In order to prevent underflow, we add a multiple of p before subtracting. +@@ -682,8 +693,11 @@ static void (*felem_square_p)(widefelem out, const felem in) = + static void (*felem_mul_p)(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) = + felem_mul_wrapper; + ++static void (*felem_reduce_p)(felem out, const widefelem in) = felem_reduce_ref; ++ + void p384_felem_square(widefelem out, const felem in); + void p384_felem_mul(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2); ++void p384_felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in); + + # if defined(_ARCH_PPC64) + # include "crypto/ppc_arch.h" +@@ -695,6 +709,7 @@ static void felem_select(void) + if ((OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300) && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC)) { + felem_square_p = p384_felem_square; + felem_mul_p = p384_felem_mul; ++ felem_reduce_p = p384_felem_reduce; + + return; + } +@@ -703,6 +718,7 @@ static void felem_select(void) + /* Default */ + felem_square_p = felem_square_ref; + felem_mul_p = felem_mul_ref; ++ felem_reduce_p = p384_felem_reduce; + } + + static void felem_square_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in) +@@ -719,10 +735,17 @@ static void felem_mul_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) + + # define felem_square felem_square_p + # define felem_mul felem_mul_p ++# define felem_reduce felem_reduce_p ++ ++void p384_felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in); ++void p384_felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2); ++ ++# define felem_square_reduce p384_felem_square_reduce ++# define felem_mul_reduce p384_felem_mul_reduce + #else + # define felem_square felem_square_ref + # define felem_mul felem_mul_ref +-#endif ++# define felem_reduce felem_reduce_ref + + static ossl_inline void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in) + { +@@ -739,6 +762,7 @@ static ossl_inline void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem + felem_mul(tmp, in1, in2); + felem_reduce(out, tmp); + } ++#endif + + /*- + * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1}
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2025-27587-2.patch new file +129 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.2.4.bb +2 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ file://0001-Added-handshake-history-reporting-when-test-fails.patch \ file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-27587-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-27587-2.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 8/16 libpam: fix CVE-2025-6020
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1 && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773
--- .../libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch | 101 ++ .../libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch | 750 +++++++++++ .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch | 1128 +++++++++++++++++ .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch | 187 +++ .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch | 35 + meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb | 5 + 6 files changed, 2206 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch new file +101 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +From 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 08:00:00 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_inline: introduce pam_asprintf(), pam_snprintf(), and + pam_sprintf() + +pam_asprintf() is essentially asprintf() with the following semantic +difference: it returns the string itself instead of its length. + +pam_snprintf() is essentially snprintf() with the following semantic +difference: it returns -1 in case of truncation. + +pam_sprintf() is essentially snprintf() but with a check that the buffer +is an array, and with an automatically calculated buffer size. + +Use of these helpers would make error checking simpler. + +(cherry picked from commit 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc) +Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h | 6 ++++++ + libpam/include/pam_inline.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h +index 0a6e32d..af05428 100644 +--- a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h ++++ b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h +@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ + # define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_ALIGNED(arg) /* empty */ + #endif + ++#if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 0) ++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC __attribute__((__malloc__)) ++#else ++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC /* empty */ ++#endif ++ + #if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(4, 6) + # define DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push"); \ +diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h +index 7721c0b..ec0497c 100644 +--- a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h ++++ b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h +@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ + #define PAM_INLINE_H + + #include "pam_cc_compat.h" ++#include <stdarg.h> ++#include <stdio.h> + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <string.h> + #include <unistd.h> +@@ -126,6 +128,40 @@ pam_drop_response(struct pam_response *reply, int replies) + } + + ++static inline char * PAM_FORMAT((printf, 1, 2)) PAM_NONNULL((1)) PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC ++pam_asprintf(const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ char *res; ++ va_list ap; ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ rc = vasprintf(&res, fmt, ap); ++ va_end(ap); ++ ++ return rc < 0 ? NULL : res; ++} ++ ++static inline int PAM_FORMAT((printf, 3, 4)) PAM_NONNULL((3)) ++pam_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ va_list ap; ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ rc = vsnprintf(str, size, fmt, ap); ++ va_end(ap); ++ ++ if (rc < 0 || (unsigned int) rc >= size) ++ return -1; ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++#define pam_sprintf(str_, fmt_, ...) \ ++ pam_snprintf((str_), sizeof(str_) + PAM_MUST_BE_ARRAY(str_), (fmt_), \ ++ ##__VA_ARGS__) ++ ++ + static inline int + pam_read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords) + { +-- +2.49.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch new file +750 -0
750 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch new file +1128 -0
1,128 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch new file +187 -0
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meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 08:00:00 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: secure_opendir: do not look at the group + ownership + +When the directory is not group-writable, the group ownership does +not matter, and when it is group-writable, there should not be any +exceptions for the root group as there is no guarantee that the root +group does not include non-root users. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773] +CVE: CVE-2025-6020 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 3 +-- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +index 4c8153b..791dd07 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +@@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ static int secure_opendir(const char *path, int opm, mode_t mode, + if (dfd_next == -1) + goto error; + } else if (st.st_uid != 0 +- || (st.st_gid != 0 && (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP)) +- || (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) { ++ || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))) { + /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */ + flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + } +-- +2.49.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb +5 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2024-22365.patch \ file://CVE-2024-10041-1.patch \ file://CVE-2024-10041-2.patch \ + file://0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch \ + file://0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-6020-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-6020-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-6020-03.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7ac4b50feee004a9fa88f1dfd2d2fa738a82896763050cd773b3c54b0a818283"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 9/16 glibc: stable 2.39 branch updates
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>
$ git log --oneline 06a70769fd0b2e1f2a3085ad50ab620282bd77b3..cff1042cceec3502269947e96cf7023451af22f3 cff1042cce Fix error reporting (false negatives) in SGID tests 1924d341c0 support: Pick group in support_capture_subprogram_self_sgid if UID == 0
Testing Results:
Before After Diff
PASS 5074 5082 +8 XPASS 4 4 0 FAIL 121 116 -5 XFAIL 16 16 0 UNSUPPORTED 157 154 -3
cff1042cce Fix error reporting (false negatives) in SGID tests
Improved SGID test handling by unifying error reporting and using secure temporary directories. Replaced non-standard exit codes and fixed premature exits to avoid masking failures. These changes reduced false negatives, increasing overall test pass rates
UNSUPPORTED tests changes
-UNSUPPORTED: stdlib/tst-secure-getenv
-UNSUPPORTED: elf/tst-env-setuid-static
-UNSUPPORTED: elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables
FAILed tests changes
-FAIL: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-cross-malloc-check -FAIL: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-malloc-check -FAIL: malloc/tst-dynarray
-FAIL: malloc/tst-dynarray-mem
-FAIL: resolv/tst-resolv-aliases
PASSed tests changes
+PASS: stdlib/tst-secure-getenv
+PASS: elf/tst-env-setuid-static
+PASS: elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables
+PASS: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-cross-malloc-check +PASS: malloc/tst-aligned-alloc-random-thread-malloc-check +PASS: malloc/tst-dynarray
+PASS: malloc/tst-dynarray-mem
+PASS: resolv/tst-resolv-aliases
--- meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.39/master" PV = "2.39+git" -SRCREV_glibc ?= "06a70769fd0b2e1f2a3085ad50ab620282bd77b3" +SRCREV_glibc ?= "cff1042cceec3502269947e96cf7023451af22f3" SRCREV_localedef ?= "fab74f31b3811df543e24b6de47efdf45b538abc" GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git;protocol=https"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 10/16 xserver-xorg: upgrade 21.1.6 -> 21.1.18
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
xorg-server 21.1.17
This release contains the fixes for the issues reported in today's security
advisory: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg/2025-June/062055.html
* CVE-2025-49175
* CVE-2025-49176
* CVE-2025-49177
* CVE-2025-49178
* CVE-2025-49179
* CVE-2025-49180
Additionally, this release includes a fix for CVE-2022-49737 which was issued after the fix was merged back in 2022 and several other various fixes.
Ref: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2025-June/003609.html
xorg-server 21.1.18
This release contains an additional fix for CVE-2025-49176 from June 17 security advisory: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg/2025-June/062055.html
Ref: https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2025-June/003612.html
---
.../{xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/{xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb => xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb} (92%)meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb renamed from meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.16.bb +1 -1
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ require xserver-xorg.inc SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.patch \ file://0001-Avoid-duplicate-definitions-of-IOPortBase.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b14a116d2d805debc5b5b2aac505a279e69b217dae2fae2dfcb62400471a9970" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c878d1930d87725d4a5bf498c24f4be8130d5b2646a9fd0f2994deff90116352" # These extensions are now integrated into the server, so declare the migration # path for in-place upgrades.
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 11/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.43 -> 4.0.44
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>
(From OE-Core rev: dd8c333576d7ebb8abab3a62b3451439519a0caa)
---
.../mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch | 19 +++++++++++++------
.../mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch | 7 +++----
.../mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch | 11 +++++------
.../{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.44.bb} | 2 +-
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.43.bb => mtools_4.0.44.bb} (93%)meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +13 -6
@@ -1,12 +1,19 @@ -Undefine UNUSED macros with clang +From c72d075cb0c3a65ef17621c7ed1ffac35ca3b68e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Khem Raj <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang Upstream-Status: Pending Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]> -Index: mtools-4.0.18/sysincludes.h -=================================================================== ---- mtools-4.0.18.orig/sysincludes.h -+++ mtools-4.0.18/sysincludes.h -@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ typedef void *caddr_t; +--- + sysincludes.h | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/sysincludes.h b/sysincludes.h +index e16ab45..8d285d4 100644 +--- a/sysincludes.h ++++ b/sysincludes.h +@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ typedef void *caddr_t; #if defined __GNUC__ && defined __STDC__ /* gcc -traditional doesn't have PACKED, UNUSED and NORETURN */ # define PACKED __attribute__ ((packed))
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch +3 -4
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 2ef9b371a5cc44e730143e694d71665831fac216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0953b744b0257e26c170fb6d6b4c0f6210e4ae43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]> Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2017 14:55:52 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs.
@@ -6,16 +6,15 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs. Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [native] Signed-off-by: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]> - --- config.c | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/config.c b/config.c -index 2f6a297..3181ed7 100644 +index 358282b..8ebafb4 100644 --- a/config.c +++ b/config.c -@@ -844,14 +844,6 @@ void read_config(void) +@@ -868,14 +868,6 @@ void read_config(void) memcpy(devices, const_devices, nr_const_devices*sizeof(struct device));
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch +5 -6
@@ -1,17 +1,16 @@ -From 3cf56b36db78679273f61ba78fbbf7f3fab52f68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 184b76e9742ff89f90a066edb0f46b4a150351cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcin Juszkiewicz <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 08:35:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [licensing] - --- Makefile.in | 11 ++++++----- configure.in | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in -index 616d59f..85b5b1d 100644 +index 5db50d7..92ad461 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ USERCFLAGS =
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ index 616d59f..85b5b1d 100644 # do not edit below this line -@@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ dvi: mtools.dvi +@@ -185,7 +186,7 @@ dvi: mtools.dvi ps: mtools.ps %.ps: %.dvi
@@ -40,10 +39,10 @@ index 616d59f..85b5b1d 100644 pdf: mtools.pdf %.pdf: %.texi sysconfdir.texi diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in -index 5ff75c1..c0f7440 100644 +index 1de916e..fd6cb08 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in -@@ -35,6 +35,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_SYSTEM +@@ -32,6 +32,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET AC_C_CONST AC_C_INLINE
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.44.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.43.bb +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\ glibc-gconv-ibm866 \ glibc-gconv-ibm869 \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "541e179665dc4e272b9602f2074243591a157da89cc47064da8c5829dbd2b339" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "37dc4df022533c3d4b2ec1c78973c27c7e8b585374c2d46ab64c6a3db31eddb8" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 12/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.44 -> 4.0.45
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>
Changelog:
============
- Fixed iconv descriptor leak
- Fixed size of error message buffer
(From OE-Core rev: cc1975888ffdc58655e80d3d14450cf68ee0f719)
---
.../mtools/{mtools_4.0.44.bb => mtools_4.0.45.bb} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.44.bb => mtools_4.0.45.bb} (93%)meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.45.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.44.bb +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\ glibc-gconv-ibm866 \ glibc-gconv-ibm869 \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "37dc4df022533c3d4b2ec1c78973c27c7e8b585374c2d46ab64c6a3db31eddb8" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0b008a96bd0efe0e542fa4383d469af66bc4a93394990b103730a8160a67d618" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 13/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.45 -> 4.0.46
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>
clang_UNUSED.patch
mtools-makeinfo.patch
refreshed for 4.0.46
Changelog:
=============
- iconv buffer overflow fixes
- removed references to mread and mwrite (obsolete subcommands from mcopy)
- documented mdoctorfat, and addressed 2 bugs/oversights
- removed references to obsolete mread and mwrite
- portability fixes (dietlibc and MacOS X) & simplification
(From OE-Core rev: f5a5b2372669d8be4ae3f19ed6892264ea3999d0)
---
.../mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch | 6 +++---
.../mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch | 16 ++++++++--------
.../{mtools_4.0.45.bb => mtools_4.0.46.bb} | 2 +-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.45.bb => mtools_4.0.46.bb} (93%)meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +3 -3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From c72d075cb0c3a65ef17621c7ed1ffac35ca3b68e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 6654edfb1eee416b58bcb6490658f80071a353c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sysincludes.h b/sysincludes.h -index e16ab45..8d285d4 100644 +index 6b322ff..48daecd 100644 --- a/sysincludes.h +++ b/sysincludes.h -@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ typedef void *caddr_t; +@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ ac_cv_func_setpgrp_void=yes ../mtools/configure --build=i386-linux-gnu --host=i3 #if defined __GNUC__ && defined __STDC__ /* gcc -traditional doesn't have PACKED, UNUSED and NORETURN */ # define PACKED __attribute__ ((packed))
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch +8 -8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 184b76e9742ff89f90a066edb0f46b4a150351cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From fd1e84c66852c2c906ee292aad942b4bfbd9e306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcin Juszkiewicz <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 08:35:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [licensing] --- Makefile.in | 11 ++++++----- - configure.in | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + configure.ac | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in -index 5db50d7..92ad461 100644 +index 7b305b0..70c8c74 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ USERCFLAGS =
@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ index 5db50d7..92ad461 100644 pdf: mtools.pdf %.pdf: %.texi sysconfdir.texi -diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in -index 1de916e..fd6cb08 100644 ---- a/configure.in -+++ b/configure.in -@@ -32,6 +32,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index de108a8..0fd9ef0 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -33,6 +33,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET AC_C_CONST AC_C_INLINE
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.46.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.45.bb +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\ glibc-gconv-ibm866 \ glibc-gconv-ibm869 \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0b008a96bd0efe0e542fa4383d469af66bc4a93394990b103730a8160a67d618" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9aad8dd859f88fb7787924ec47590192d3abf7bad6c840509c854290d6bc16c0" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 14/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.46 -> 4.0.47
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
(From OE-Core rev: 14ef270cc003646e6ca97ff3405507f2b9e92736)
---
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch | 2 +-
.../mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch | 4 ++--
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch | 6 +++---
.../mtools/{mtools_4.0.46.bb => mtools_4.0.47.bb} | 2 +-
4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.46.bb => mtools_4.0.47.bb} (93%)meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +1 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 6654edfb1eee416b58bcb6490658f80071a353c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From d8e9cf472f49c8dbb3b0855145974d199a83e8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch +2 -2
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 0953b744b0257e26c170fb6d6b4c0f6210e4ae43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 4e51cf33fc34e8e82661b9bc3ab13858a2ffe43d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]> Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2017 14:55:52 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs.
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]> 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/config.c b/config.c -index 358282b..8ebafb4 100644 +index 436c94b..794f098 100644 --- a/config.c +++ b/config.c @@ -868,14 +868,6 @@ void read_config(void)
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/mtools-makeinfo.patch +3 -3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From fd1e84c66852c2c906ee292aad942b4bfbd9e306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From b517158e8ffc6a665506007b20708d6c2589cec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcin Juszkiewicz <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 08:35:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] mtools: imported from OE
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ index 7b305b0..70c8c74 100644 pdf: mtools.pdf %.pdf: %.texi sysconfdir.texi diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index de108a8..0fd9ef0 100644 +index 37f0d00..c93cfb5 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac -@@ -33,6 +33,33 @@ AC_CANONICAL_TARGET +@@ -36,6 +36,33 @@ AC_PATH_PROG(INSTALL_INFO, install-info, "") AC_C_CONST AC_C_INLINE
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.47.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.46.bb +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\ glibc-gconv-ibm866 \ glibc-gconv-ibm869 \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9aad8dd859f88fb7787924ec47590192d3abf7bad6c840509c854290d6bc16c0" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "31aa06078cc3f50591b95e71a909c56dd179d87e9cbdc07bf435e595bd7cc7ff" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 15/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.47 -> 4.0.48
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>
clang_UNUSED.patch
disable-hardcoded-configs.patch
refreshed for 4.0.48
(From OE-Core rev: 1d5aee7e67cd614073a15b47b832375428865260)
---
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch | 6 +++---
.../mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch | 6 +++---
.../mtools/{mtools_4.0.47.bb => mtools_4.0.48.bb} | 2 +-
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.47.bb => mtools_4.0.48.bb} (93%)meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/clang_UNUSED.patch +3 -3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From d8e9cf472f49c8dbb3b0855145974d199a83e8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 6914c6e15cd15daf1dae81458e5346958c9d5449 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 11:55:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Undefine UNUSED macros with clang
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sysincludes.h b/sysincludes.h -index 6b322ff..48daecd 100644 +index 272b316..49ee5ae 100644 --- a/sysincludes.h +++ b/sysincludes.h -@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ ac_cv_func_setpgrp_void=yes ../mtools/configure --build=i386-linux-gnu --host=i3 +@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ ac_cv_func_setpgrp_void=yes ../mtools/configure --build=i386-linux-gnu --host=i3 #if defined __GNUC__ && defined __STDC__ /* gcc -traditional doesn't have PACKED, UNUSED and NORETURN */ # define PACKED __attribute__ ((packed))
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools/disable-hardcoded-configs.patch +3 -3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 4e51cf33fc34e8e82661b9bc3ab13858a2ffe43d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 16969d42ec6514883bcee87cc89b3e7864481d7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]> Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2017 14:55:52 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Disabled reading host configs.
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Ed Bartosh <[email protected]> 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/config.c b/config.c -index 436c94b..794f098 100644 +index 2433457..3972150 100644 --- a/config.c +++ b/config.c -@@ -868,14 +868,6 @@ void read_config(void) +@@ -849,14 +849,6 @@ void read_config(void) memcpy(devices, const_devices, nr_const_devices*sizeof(struct device));
meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.48.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.47.bb +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\ glibc-gconv-ibm866 \ glibc-gconv-ibm869 \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "31aa06078cc3f50591b95e71a909c56dd179d87e9cbdc07bf435e595bd7cc7ff" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "03c29aac8735dd7154a989fbc29eaf2b506121ae1c3a35cd0bf2a02e94d271a9" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 16/16 mtools: upgrade 4.0.48 -> 4.0.49
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Jinfeng Wang <[email protected]>
New version includes check for overlong file names, see [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/info-mtools/2025-06/msg00005.html
(From OE-Core rev: 044c2bceefcc12262cb2421e8f1da5f6c2ed9f72)
---
.../mtools/{mtools_4.0.48.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/{mtools_4.0.48.bb => mtools_4.0.49.bb} (93%)meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.49.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/mtools/mtools_4.0.48.bb +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:libc-glibc = "\ glibc-gconv-ibm866 \ glibc-gconv-ibm869 \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "03c29aac8735dd7154a989fbc29eaf2b506121ae1c3a35cd0bf2a02e94d271a9" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6fe5193583d6e7c59da75e63d7234f76c0b07caf33b103894f46f66a871ffc9f" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/mtools/mtools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://mtools-makeinfo.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap V2 08/16] libpam: fix CVE-2025-6020
In reply to Steve SakomanThis seems to introduce:
../../../Linux-PAM-1.5.3/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c:326:11:
error: call to undeclared function 'dirname'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
326 | parent = dirname(buf);
| ^../../../Linux-PAM-1.5.3/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c:326:9:
error: incompatible integer to pointer conversion assigning to 'char *' from 'int' [-Wint-conversion]
326 | parent = dirname(buf);
| ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~because pam_namespace.h wasn't updated to include libgen.h as in the original commit
https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e#diff-05f443e6acbe32a148a45648148739bf6f02f13acc5c20c6037bf933223d4d77
will send a fix later.
Quoted 2,280 lines · Steve Sakoman via lists.openembedded.org
From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1 && https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773
Signed-off-by Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steve Sakoman <[email protected]>--- .../libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch | 101 ++ .../libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch | 750 +++++++++++ .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch | 1128 +++++++++++++++++ .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch | 187 +++ .../pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch | 35 + meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb | 5 + 6 files changed, 2206 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patchmeta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch new file +101
-0@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +From 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 08:00:00 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_inline: introduce pam_asprintf(), pam_snprintf(), and + pam_sprintf() + +pam_asprintf() is essentially asprintf() with the following semantic +difference: it returns the string itself instead of its length. + +pam_snprintf() is essentially snprintf() with the following semantic +difference: it returns -1 in case of truncation. + +pam_sprintf() is essentially snprintf() but with a check that the buffer +is an array, and with an automatically calculated buffer size. + +Use of these helpers would make error checking simpler. + +(cherry picked from commit 10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc) +Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/10b80543807e3fc5af5f8bcfd8bb6e219bb3cecc] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h | 6 ++++++ + libpam/include/pam_inline.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h +index 0a6e32d..af05428 100644 +--- a/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h ++++ b/libpam/include/pam_cc_compat.h +@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ + # define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_ALIGNED(arg) /* empty */ + #endif + ++#if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 0) ++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC __attribute__((__malloc__)) ++#else ++# define PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC /* empty */ ++#endif ++ + #if PAM_GNUC_PREREQ(4, 6) + # define DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push"); \ +diff --git a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h +index 7721c0b..ec0497c 100644 +--- a/libpam/include/pam_inline.h ++++ b/libpam/include/pam_inline.h +@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ + #define PAM_INLINE_H + + #include "pam_cc_compat.h" ++#include <stdarg.h> ++#include <stdio.h> + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <string.h> + #include <unistd.h> +@@ -126,6 +128,40 @@ pam_drop_response(struct pam_response *reply, int replies) + } + + ++static inline char * PAM_FORMAT((printf, 1, 2)) PAM_NONNULL((1)) PAM_ATTRIBUTE_MALLOC ++pam_asprintf(const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ char *res; ++ va_list ap; ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ rc = vasprintf(&res, fmt, ap); ++ va_end(ap); ++ ++ return rc < 0 ? NULL : res; ++} ++ ++static inline int PAM_FORMAT((printf, 3, 4)) PAM_NONNULL((3)) ++pam_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ va_list ap; ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ rc = vsnprintf(str, size, fmt, ap); ++ va_end(ap); ++ ++ if (rc < 0 || (unsigned int) rc >= size) ++ return -1; ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++#define pam_sprintf(str_, fmt_, ...) \ ++ pam_snprintf((str_), sizeof(str_) + PAM_MUST_BE_ARRAY(str_), (fmt_), \ ++ ##__VA_ARGS__) ++ ++ + static inline int + pam_read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords) + { +-- +2.49.0 +meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch new file +750
-0@@ -0,0 +1,750 @@ +From df1dab1a1a7900650ad4be157fea1a002048cc49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 14:37:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH ] pam-namespace-rebase + +Refresh the pam-namespace. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/a8b4dce7b53d73de372e150028c970ee0a2a2e97] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 444 +++++++++++++------------- + modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h | 7 +- + 2 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +index b026861..166bfce 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ + #include "pam_namespace.h" + #include "argv_parse.h" + +-/* --- evaluting all files in VENDORDIR/security/namespace.d and /etc/security/namespace.d --- */ ++/* --- evaluating all files in VENDORDIR/security/namespace.d and /etc/security/namespace.d --- */ + static const char *base_name(const char *path) + { + const char *base = strrchr(path, '/'); +@@ -55,6 +55,155 @@ compare_filename(const void *a, const void *b) + base_name(* (char * const *) b)); + } + ++static void close_fds_pre_exec(struct instance_data *idata) ++{ ++ if (pam_modutil_sanitize_helper_fds(idata->pamh, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD, ++ PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD) < 0) { ++ _exit(1); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void ++strip_trailing_slashes(char *str) ++{ ++ char *p = str + strlen(str); ++ ++ while (--p > str && *p == '/') ++ *p = '\0'; ++} ++ ++static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata) ++{ ++ struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs; ++ char tmpbuf[64]; ++ ++ while (dir != NULL) { ++ if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) { ++ return 0; ++ } ++ dir = dir->next; ++ } ++ ++ if (pam_sprintf(tmpbuf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ dir = calloc(1, sizeof(*dir)); ++ ++ if (dir == NULL) { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ dir->dir = strdup(path); ++ ++ if (dir->dir == NULL) { ++ free(dir); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_INFO, ++ "Protect mount of %s over itself", path); ++ } ++ ++ if (mount(tmpbuf, tmpbuf, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) { ++ int save_errno = errno; ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "Protect mount of %s failed: %m", tmpbuf); ++ free(dir->dir); ++ free(dir); ++ errno = save_errno; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ dir->next = idata->protect_dirs; ++ idata->protect_dirs = dir; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir, ++ struct instance_data *idata) ++{ ++ char *p = strdup(path); ++ char *d; ++ char *dir = p; ++ int dfd = AT_FDCWD; ++ int dfd_next; ++ int save_errno; ++ int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY; ++ int rv = -1; ++ struct stat st; ++ ++ if (p == NULL) { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (*dir == '/') { ++ dfd = open("/", flags); ++ if (dfd == -1) { ++ goto error; ++ } ++ dir++; /* assume / is safe */ ++ } ++ ++ while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) { ++ *d = '\0'; ++ dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags); ++ if (dfd_next == -1) { ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ if (dfd != AT_FDCWD) ++ close(dfd); ++ dfd = dfd_next; ++ ++ if (fstat(dfd, &st) != 0) { ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) { ++ /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */ ++ if (protect_mount(dfd, p, idata) == -1) ++ goto error; ++ } else if (st.st_uid != 0 || st.st_gid != 0 || ++ (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) { ++ /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */ ++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ } ++ ++ *d = '/'; ++ dir = d + 1; ++ } ++ ++ rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); ++ ++ if (rv == -1) { ++ if (!do_mkdir || mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) != 0) { ++ goto error; ++ } ++ rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); ++ } ++ ++ if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) { ++ /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */ ++ if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) { ++ save_errno = errno; ++ close(rv); ++ rv = -1; ++ errno = save_errno; ++ } ++ } ++ ++error: ++ save_errno = errno; ++ free(p); ++ if (dfd != AT_FDCWD && dfd >= 0) ++ close(dfd); ++ errno = save_errno; ++ ++ return rv; ++} ++ + /* Evaluating a list of files which have to be parsed in the right order: + * + * - If etc/security/namespace.d/@[email protected] exists, then +@@ -129,6 +278,7 @@ static char **read_namespace_dir(struct instance_data *idata) + return file_list; + } + ++ + /* + * Adds an entry for a polyinstantiated directory to the linked list of + * polyinstantiated directories. It is called from process_line() while +@@ -198,7 +348,7 @@ static void cleanup_protect_data(pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED , void *data, int err + unprotect_dirs(data); + } + +-static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *var_names[], const char *var_values[]) ++static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *const var_names[], const char *var_values[]) + { + const char *src = orig; + char *dst; +@@ -209,7 +359,7 @@ static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *var_names[], const c + if (*src == '$') { + int i; + for (i = 0; var_names[i]; i++) { +- int namelen = strlen(var_names[i]); ++ size_t namelen = strlen(var_names[i]); + if (strncmp(var_names[i], src+1, namelen) == 0) { + dstlen += strlen(var_values[i]) - 1; /* $ */ + src += namelen; +@@ -227,7 +377,7 @@ static char *expand_variables(const char *orig, const char *var_names[], const c + if (c == '$') { + int i; + for (i = 0; var_names[i]; i++) { +- int namelen = strlen(var_names[i]); ++ size_t namelen = strlen(var_names[i]); + if (strncmp(var_names[i], src+1, namelen) == 0) { + dst = stpcpy(dst, var_values[i]); + --dst; +@@ -311,8 +461,7 @@ static int parse_iscript_params(char *params, struct polydir_s *poly) + + if (*params != '\0') { + if (*params != '/') { /* path is relative to NAMESPACE_D_DIR */ +- if (asprintf(&poly->init_script, "%s%s", NAMESPACE_D_DIR, params) == -1) +- return -1; ++ poly->init_script = pam_asprintf("%s%s", NAMESPACE_D_DIR, params); + } else { + poly->init_script = strdup(params); + } +@@ -394,9 +543,9 @@ static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly, + { + enum polymethod pm; + char *sptr = NULL; +- static const char *method_names[] = { "user", "context", "level", "tmpdir", ++ static const char *const method_names[] = { "user", "context", "level", "tmpdir", + "tmpfs", NULL }; +- static const char *flag_names[] = { "create", "noinit", "iscript", ++ static const char *const flag_names[] = { "create", "noinit", "iscript", + "shared", "mntopts", NULL }; + static const unsigned int flag_values[] = { POLYDIR_CREATE, POLYDIR_NOINIT, + POLYDIR_ISCRIPT, POLYDIR_SHARED, POLYDIR_MNTOPTS }; +@@ -421,7 +570,7 @@ static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly, + + while ((flag=strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr)) != NULL) { + for (i = 0; flag_names[i]; i++) { +- int namelen = strlen(flag_names[i]); ++ size_t namelen = strlen(flag_names[i]); + + if (strncmp(flag, flag_names[i], namelen) == 0) { + poly->flags |= flag_values[i]; +@@ -467,27 +616,27 @@ static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly, + * of the namespace configuration file. It skips over comments and incomplete + * or malformed lines. It processes a valid line with information on + * polyinstantiating a directory by populating appropriate fields of a +- * polyinstatiated directory structure and then calling add_polydir_entry to ++ * polyinstantiated directory structure and then calling add_polydir_entry to + * add that entry to the linked list of polyinstantiated directories. + */ + static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + struct instance_data *idata) + { + char *dir = NULL, *instance_prefix = NULL, *rdir = NULL; ++ const char *config_dir, *config_instance_prefix; + char *method, *uids; + char *tptr; + struct polydir_s *poly; + int retval = 0; + char **config_options = NULL; +- static const char *var_names[] = {"HOME", "USER", NULL}; ++ static const char *const var_names[] = {"HOME", "USER", NULL}; + const char *var_values[] = {home, idata->user}; + const char *rvar_values[] = {rhome, idata->ruser}; +- int len; + + /* + * skip the leading white space + */ +- while (*line && isspace(*line)) ++ while (*line && isspace((unsigned char)*line)) + line++; + + /* +@@ -523,22 +672,19 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + goto erralloc; + } + +- dir = config_options[0]; +- if (dir == NULL) { ++ config_dir = config_options[0]; ++ if (config_dir == NULL) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid line missing polydir"); + goto skipping; + } +- instance_prefix = config_options[1]; +- if (instance_prefix == NULL) { ++ config_instance_prefix = config_options[1]; ++ if (config_instance_prefix == NULL) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid line missing instance_prefix"); +- instance_prefix = NULL; + goto skipping; + } + method = config_options[2]; + if (method == NULL) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid line missing method"); +- instance_prefix = NULL; +- dir = NULL; + goto skipping; + } + +@@ -553,19 +699,16 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + /* + * Expand $HOME and $USER in poly dir and instance dir prefix + */ +- if ((rdir=expand_variables(dir, var_names, rvar_values)) == NULL) { +- instance_prefix = NULL; +- dir = NULL; ++ if ((rdir = expand_variables(config_dir, var_names, rvar_values)) == NULL) { + goto erralloc; + } + +- if ((dir=expand_variables(dir, var_names, var_values)) == NULL) { +- instance_prefix = NULL; ++ if ((dir = expand_variables(config_dir, var_names, var_values)) == NULL) { + goto erralloc; + } + +- if ((instance_prefix=expand_variables(instance_prefix, var_names, var_values)) +- == NULL) { ++ if ((instance_prefix = expand_variables(config_instance_prefix, ++ var_names, var_values)) == NULL) { + goto erralloc; + } + +@@ -575,15 +718,8 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Expanded instance prefix: '%s'", instance_prefix); + } + +- len = strlen(dir); +- if (len > 0 && dir[len-1] == '/') { +- dir[len-1] = '\0'; +- } +- +- len = strlen(rdir); +- if (len > 0 && rdir[len-1] == '/') { +- rdir[len-1] = '\0'; +- } ++ strip_trailing_slashes(dir); ++ strip_trailing_slashes(rdir); + + if (dir[0] == '\0' || rdir[0] == '\0') { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid polydir"); +@@ -594,26 +730,19 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + * Populate polyinstantiated directory structure with appropriate + * pathnames and the method with which to polyinstantiate. + */ +- if (strlen(dir) >= sizeof(poly->dir) +- || strlen(rdir) >= sizeof(poly->rdir) +- || strlen(instance_prefix) >= sizeof(poly->instance_prefix)) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long"); +- goto skipping; +- } +- strcpy(poly->dir, dir); +- strcpy(poly->rdir, rdir); +- strcpy(poly->instance_prefix, instance_prefix); +- + if (parse_method(method, poly, idata) != 0) { + goto skipping; + } + +- if (poly->method == TMPDIR) { +- if (sizeof(poly->instance_prefix) - strlen(poly->instance_prefix) < 7) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long"); +- goto skipping; +- } +- strcat(poly->instance_prefix, "XXXXXX"); ++#define COPY_STR(dst, src, apd) \ ++ pam_sprintf((dst), "%s%s", (src), (apd)) ++ ++ if (COPY_STR(poly->dir, dir, "") < 0 ++ || COPY_STR(poly->rdir, rdir, "") < 0 ++ || COPY_STR(poly->instance_prefix, instance_prefix, ++ poly->method == TMPDIR ? "XXXXXX" : "") < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long"); ++ goto skipping; + } + + /* +@@ -637,7 +766,7 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + if (uids) { + uid_t *uidptr; + const char *ustr, *sstr; +- int count, i; ++ size_t count, i; + + if (*uids == '~') { + poly->flags |= POLYDIR_EXCLUSIVE; +@@ -646,8 +775,13 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + for (count = 0, ustr = sstr = uids; sstr; ustr = sstr + 1, count++) + sstr = strchr(ustr, ','); + ++ if (count > UINT_MAX || count > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(uid_t)) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Too many uids encountered in configuration"); ++ goto skipping; ++ } ++ + poly->num_uids = count; +- poly->uid = (uid_t *) malloc(count * sizeof (uid_t)); ++ poly->uid = malloc(count * sizeof (uid_t)); + uidptr = poly->uid; + if (uidptr == NULL) { + goto erralloc; +@@ -996,6 +1130,7 @@ static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, + return rc; + } + /* Should never get here */ ++ freecon(scon); + return PAM_SUCCESS; + } + #endif +@@ -1057,10 +1192,8 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, + + switch (pm) { + case USER: +- if (asprintf(i_name, "%s", idata->user) < 0) { +- *i_name = NULL; ++ if ((*i_name = strdup(idata->user)) == NULL) + goto fail; +- } + break; + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +@@ -1070,17 +1203,12 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error translating directory context"); + goto fail; + } +- if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED) { +- if (asprintf(i_name, "%s", rawcon) < 0) { +- *i_name = NULL; +- goto fail; +- } +- } else { +- if (asprintf(i_name, "%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user) < 0) { +- *i_name = NULL; +- goto fail; +- } +- } ++ if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED) ++ *i_name = strdup(rawcon); ++ else ++ *i_name = pam_asprintf("%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user); ++ if (*i_name == NULL) ++ goto fail; + break; + + #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ +@@ -1110,11 +1238,12 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, + *i_name = hash; + hash = NULL; + } else { +- char *newname; +- if (asprintf(&newname, "%.*s_%s", NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN-1-(int)strlen(hash), +- *i_name, hash) < 0) { ++ char *newname = ++ pam_asprintf("%.*s_%s", ++ NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN - 1 - (int)strlen(hash), ++ *i_name, hash); ++ if (newname == NULL) + goto fail; +- } + free(*i_name); + *i_name = newname; + } +@@ -1139,137 +1268,6 @@ fail: + return rc; + } + +-static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata) +-{ +- struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs; +- char tmpbuf[64]; +- +- while (dir != NULL) { +- if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) { +- return 0; +- } +- dir = dir->next; +- } +- +- dir = calloc(1, sizeof(*dir)); +- +- if (dir == NULL) { +- return -1; +- } +- +- dir->dir = strdup(path); +- +- if (dir->dir == NULL) { +- free(dir); +- return -1; +- } +- +- snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd); +- +- if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_INFO, +- "Protect mount of %s over itself", path); +- } +- +- if (mount(tmpbuf, tmpbuf, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) { +- int save_errno = errno; +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "Protect mount of %s failed: %m", tmpbuf); +- free(dir->dir); +- free(dir); +- errno = save_errno; +- return -1; +- } +- +- dir->next = idata->protect_dirs; +- idata->protect_dirs = dir; +- +- return 0; +-} +- +-static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir, +- struct instance_data *idata) +-{ +- char *p = strdup(path); +- char *d; +- char *dir = p; +- int dfd = AT_FDCWD; +- int dfd_next; +- int save_errno; +- int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY; +- int rv = -1; +- struct stat st; +- +- if (p == NULL) { +- goto error; +- } +- +- if (*dir == '/') { +- dfd = open("/", flags); +- if (dfd == -1) { +- goto error; +- } +- dir++; /* assume / is safe */ +- } +- +- while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) { +- *d = '\0'; +- dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags); +- if (dfd_next == -1) { +- goto error; +- } +- +- if (dfd != AT_FDCWD) +- close(dfd); +- dfd = dfd_next; +- +- if (fstat(dfd, &st) != 0) { +- goto error; +- } +- +- if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) { +- /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */ +- if (protect_mount(dfd, p, idata) == -1) +- goto error; +- } else if (st.st_uid != 0 || st.st_gid != 0 || +- (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) { +- /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */ +- flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; +- } +- +- *d = '/'; +- dir = d + 1; +- } +- +- rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); +- +- if (rv == -1) { +- if (!do_mkdir || mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) != 0) { +- goto error; +- } +- rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); +- } +- +- if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) { +- /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */ +- if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) { +- save_errno = errno; +- close(rv); +- rv = -1; +- errno = save_errno; +- } +- } +- +-error: +- save_errno = errno; +- free(p); +- if (dfd != AT_FDCWD && dfd >= 0) +- close(dfd); +- errno = save_errno; +- +- return rv; +-} +- + static int check_inst_parent(char *ipath, struct instance_data *idata) + { + struct stat instpbuf; +@@ -1281,13 +1279,12 @@ static int check_inst_parent(char *ipath, struct instance_data *idata) + * admin explicitly instructs to ignore the instance parent + * mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument). + */ +- inst_parent = (char *) malloc(strlen(ipath)+1); ++ inst_parent = strdup(ipath); + if (!inst_parent) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_CRIT, "Error allocating pathname string"); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + +- strcpy(inst_parent, ipath); + trailing_slash = strrchr(inst_parent, '/'); + if (trailing_slash) + *trailing_slash = '\0'; +@@ -1371,9 +1368,10 @@ static int inst_init(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *ipath, + if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) { + /* ignore failures, they don't matter */ + } ++ close_fds_pre_exec(idata); + +- if (execle(init_script, init_script, +- polyptr->dir, ipath, newdir?"1":"0", idata->user, NULL, envp) < 0) ++ execle(init_script, init_script, ++ polyptr->dir, ipath, newdir?"1":"0", idata->user, NULL, envp); + _exit(1); + } else if (pid > 0) { + while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) && +@@ -1424,7 +1422,9 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + if (idata->flags & PAMNS_SELINUX_ENABLED) { +- getfscreatecon_raw(&oldcon_raw); ++ if (getfscreatecon_raw(&oldcon_raw) != 0) ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, ++ "Error retrieving fs create context: %m"); + + label_handle = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0); + if (!label_handle) { +@@ -1453,6 +1453,9 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + if (rc == -1) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, + "Error creating directory %s: %m", dir); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ freecon(oldcon_raw); ++#endif + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + +@@ -1640,16 +1643,14 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + + retval = protect_dir(polyptr->dir, 0, 0, idata); + +- if (retval < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m", +- polyptr->dir); +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- } +- + if (retval < 0) { +- if ((polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE) && +- create_polydir(polyptr, idata) != PAM_SUCCESS) +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; ++ if (errno != ENOENT || !(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE)) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m", ++ polyptr->dir); ++ return PAM_SESSION_ERR; ++ } ++ if (create_polydir(polyptr, idata) != PAM_SUCCESS) ++ return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } else { + close(retval); + } +@@ -1698,7 +1699,7 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + #endif + } + +- if (asprintf(&inst_dir, "%s%s", polyptr->instance_prefix, instname) < 0) ++ if ((inst_dir = pam_asprintf("%s%s", polyptr->instance_prefix, instname)) == NULL) + goto error_out; + + if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) +@@ -1810,8 +1811,9 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata) + _exit(1); + } + #endif +- if (execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instance_prefix, NULL, envp) < 0) +- _exit(1); ++ close_fds_pre_exec(idata); ++ execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instance_prefix, NULL, envp); ++ _exit(1); + } else if (pid > 0) { + while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) && + (errno == EINTR)); +@@ -1826,7 +1828,7 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata) + } + } else if (pid < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "Cannot fork to run namespace init script, %m"); ++ "Cannot fork to cleanup temporary directory, %m"); + rc = PAM_SESSION_ERR; + goto out; + } +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h +index a991b4c..180e042 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h +@@ -44,21 +44,16 @@ + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <errno.h> + #include <syslog.h> +-#include <dlfcn.h> +-#include <stdarg.h> + #include <pwd.h> + #include <grp.h> + #include <limits.h> + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/stat.h> +-#include <sys/resource.h> + #include <sys/mount.h> + #include <sys/wait.h> +-#include <libgen.h> + #include <fcntl.h> + #include <sched.h> + #include <glob.h> +-#include <locale.h> + #include "security/pam_modules.h" + #include "security/pam_modutil.h" + #include "security/pam_ext.h" +@@ -114,7 +109,7 @@ + #define PAMNS_MOUNT_PRIVATE 0x00080000 /* Make the polydir mounts private */ + + /* polydir flags */ +-#define POLYDIR_EXCLUSIVE 0x00000001 /* polyinstatiate exclusively for override uids */ ++#define POLYDIR_EXCLUSIVE 0x00000001 /* polyinstantiate exclusively for override uids */ + #define POLYDIR_CREATE 0x00000002 /* create the polydir */ + #define POLYDIR_NOINIT 0x00000004 /* no init script */ + #define POLYDIR_SHARED 0x00000008 /* share context/level instances among users */ +-- +2.49.0 +meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-01.patch new file +1128
-0@@ -0,0 +1,1128 @@ +From 475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 14:37:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: fix potential privilege escalation + +Existing protection provided by protect_dir() and protect_mount() were +bind mounting on themselves all directories part of the to-be-secured +paths. However, this works *only* against attacks executed by processes +in the same mount namespace as the one the mountpoint was created in. +Therefore, a user with an out-of-mount-namespace access, or multiple +users colluding, could exploit multiple race conditions, and, for +instance, elevate their privileges to root. + +This commit keeps the existing protection as a defense in depth +measure, and to keep the existing behavior of the module. However, +it converts all the needed function calls to operate on file +descriptors instead of absolute paths to protect against race +conditions globally. + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/475bd60c552b98c7eddb3270b0b4196847c0072e] +CVE: CVE-2025-6020 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 637 ++++++++++++++++++-------- + modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h | 10 + + 2 files changed, 457 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +index 166bfce..9d993d4 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ + #include "pam_namespace.h" + #include "argv_parse.h" + ++#define MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE 64 ++ + /* --- evaluating all files in VENDORDIR/security/namespace.d and /etc/security/namespace.d --- */ + static const char *base_name(const char *path) + { +@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ strip_trailing_slashes(char *str) + static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata) + { + struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs; +- char tmpbuf[64]; ++ char tmpbuf[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE]; + + while (dir != NULL) { + if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) { +@@ -121,56 +123,107 @@ static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata) + return 0; + } + +-static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir, ++/* ++ * Returns a fd to the given absolute path, acquired securely. This means: ++ * - iterating on each segment of the path, ++ * - not following user symlinks, ++ * - using race-free operations. ++ * ++ * Takes a bit mask to specify the operation mode: ++ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT: call protect_mount() on each unsafe segment of path ++ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR: create last segment of path if does not exist ++ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD: open the directory with O_RDONLY instead of O_PATH, ++ * allowing more operations to be done with the returned fd ++ * ++ * Be aware that using SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT: ++ * - will modify some external state (global structure...) and should not be ++ * called in cleanup code paths. See wrapper secure_opendir_stateless() ++ * - need a non-NULL idata to call protect_mount() ++ */ ++static int secure_opendir(const char *path, int opm, mode_t mode, + struct instance_data *idata) + { +- char *p = strdup(path); ++ char *p; + char *d; +- char *dir = p; +- int dfd = AT_FDCWD; ++ char *dir; ++ int dfd = -1; + int dfd_next; + int save_errno; +- int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY; ++ int flags = O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC; + int rv = -1; + struct stat st; + +- if (p == NULL) { ++ if (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD) ++ flags |= O_RDONLY; ++ else ++ flags |= O_PATH; ++ ++ /* Check for args consistency */ ++ if ((opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT) && idata == NULL) + return -1; +- } + +- if (*dir == '/') { +- dfd = open("/", flags); +- if (dfd == -1) { +- goto error; +- } +- dir++; /* assume / is safe */ ++ /* Accept only absolute paths */ ++ if (*path != '/') ++ return -1; ++ ++ dir = p = strdup(path); ++ if (p == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* Assume '/' is safe */ ++ dfd = open("/", flags); ++ if (dfd == -1) ++ goto error; ++ ++ /* Needed to not loop too far and call openat() on NULL */ ++ strip_trailing_slashes(p); ++ ++ dir++; ++ ++ /* In case path is '/' */ ++ if (*dir == '\0') { ++ free(p); ++ return dfd; + } + + while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) { + *d = '\0'; ++ + dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags); +- if (dfd_next == -1) { ++ if (dfd_next == -1) + goto error; +- } +- +- if (dfd != AT_FDCWD) +- close(dfd); +- dfd = dfd_next; + +- if (fstat(dfd, &st) != 0) { ++ if (fstat(dfd_next, &st) != 0) { ++ close(dfd_next); + goto error; + } + +- if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) { ++ if ((flags & O_NOFOLLOW) && (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT)) { + /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */ +- if (protect_mount(dfd, p, idata) == -1) ++ if (protect_mount(dfd_next, p, idata) == -1) { ++ close(dfd_next); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ /* ++ * Reopen the directory to obtain a new descriptor ++ * after protect_mount(), this is necessary in cases ++ * when another directory is going to be mounted over ++ * the given path. ++ */ ++ close(dfd_next); ++ dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags); ++ if (dfd_next == -1) + goto error; +- } else if (st.st_uid != 0 || st.st_gid != 0 || +- (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) { ++ } else if (st.st_uid != 0 ++ || (st.st_gid != 0 && (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP)) ++ || (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) { + /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */ + flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + } + ++ close(dfd); ++ dfd = dfd_next; ++ + *d = '/'; + dir = d + 1; + } +@@ -178,13 +231,14 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir, + rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); + + if (rv == -1) { +- if (!do_mkdir || mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) != 0) { ++ if ((opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR) && mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) == 0) ++ rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); ++ ++ if (rv == -1) + goto error; +- } +- rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); + } + +- if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) { ++ if ((flags & O_NOFOLLOW) && (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT)) { + /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */ + if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) { + save_errno = errno; +@@ -192,18 +246,95 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir, + rv = -1; + errno = save_errno; + } ++ /* ++ * Reopen the directory to obtain a new descriptor after ++ * protect_mount(), this is necessary in cases when another ++ * directory is going to be mounted over the given path. ++ */ ++ close(rv); ++ rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags); + } + + error: + save_errno = errno; + free(p); +- if (dfd != AT_FDCWD && dfd >= 0) ++ if (dfd >= 0) + close(dfd); + errno = save_errno; + + return rv; + } + ++/* ++ * Returns a fd to the given path, acquired securely. ++ * It can be called in all situations, including in cleanup code paths, as ++ * it does not modify external state (no access to global structures...). ++ */ ++static int secure_opendir_stateless(const char *path) ++{ ++ return secure_opendir(path, 0, 0, NULL); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Umount securely the given path, even if the directories along ++ * the path are under user control. It should protect against ++ * symlinks attacks and race conditions. ++ */ ++static int secure_umount(const char *path) ++{ ++ int save_errno; ++ int rv = -1; ++ int dfd = -1; ++ char s_path[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE]; ++ ++ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(path); ++ if (dfd == -1) ++ return rv; ++ ++ if (pam_sprintf(s_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd) < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ /* ++ * We still have a fd open to path itself, ++ * so we need to do a lazy umount. ++ */ ++ rv = umount2(s_path, MNT_DETACH); ++ ++error: ++ save_errno = errno; ++ close(dfd); ++ errno = save_errno; ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Rmdir the given path securely, protecting against symlinks attacks ++ * and race conditions. ++ * This function is currently called only in cleanup code paths where ++ * any errors returned are not handled, so do not handle them either. ++ * Basically, try to rmdir the path on a best-effort basis. ++ */ ++static void secure_try_rmdir(const char *path) ++{ ++ int dfd; ++ char *buf; ++ char *parent; ++ ++ buf = strdup(path); ++ if (buf == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ parent = dirname(buf); ++ ++ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(parent); ++ if (dfd >= 0) { ++ unlinkat(dfd, base_name(path), AT_REMOVEDIR); ++ close(dfd); ++ } ++ ++ free(buf); ++} ++ + /* Evaluating a list of files which have to be parsed in the right order: + * + * - If etc/security/namespace.d/@[email protected] exists, then +@@ -330,7 +461,7 @@ static void unprotect_dirs(struct protect_dir_s *dir) + struct protect_dir_s *next; + + while (dir != NULL) { +- umount(dir->dir); ++ secure_umount(dir->dir); + free(dir->dir); + next = dir->next; + free(dir); +@@ -734,13 +865,9 @@ static int process_line(char *line, const char *home, const char *rhome, + goto skipping; + } + +-#define COPY_STR(dst, src, apd) \ +- pam_sprintf((dst), "%s%s", (src), (apd)) +- +- if (COPY_STR(poly->dir, dir, "") < 0 +- || COPY_STR(poly->rdir, rdir, "") < 0 +- || COPY_STR(poly->instance_prefix, instance_prefix, +- poly->method == TMPDIR ? "XXXXXX" : "") < 0) { ++ if (pam_sprintf(poly->dir, "%s", dir) < 0 ++ || pam_sprintf(poly->rdir, "%s", rdir) < 0 ++ || pam_sprintf(poly->instance_prefix, "%s", instance_prefix) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long"); + goto skipping; + } +@@ -1023,6 +1150,23 @@ static char *md5hash(const char *instname, struct instance_data *idata) + } + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++static char *secure_getfilecon(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *dir) ++{ ++ char *ctx = NULL; ++ int dfd = secure_opendir(dir, SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD, 0, NULL); ++ if (dfd < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error getting fd to %s: %m", dir); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (fgetfilecon(dfd, &ctx) < 0) ++ ctx = NULL; ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "Error getting poly dir context for %s: %m", dir); ++ close(dfd); ++ return ctx; ++} ++ + static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, + char **i_context, char **origcon, + struct instance_data *idata) +@@ -1034,12 +1178,9 @@ static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, + /* + * Get the security context of the directory to polyinstantiate. + */ +- rc = getfilecon(polyptr->dir, origcon); +- if (rc < 0 || *origcon == NULL) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "Error getting poly dir context, %m"); ++ *origcon = secure_getfilecon(idata->pamh, polyptr->dir); ++ if (*origcon == NULL) + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- } + + if (polyptr->method == USER) return PAM_SUCCESS; + +@@ -1136,29 +1277,52 @@ static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, + #endif + + /* +- * poly_name returns the name of the polyinstantiated instance directory ++ * From the instance differentiation string, set in the polyptr structure: ++ * - the absolute path to the instance dir, ++ * - the absolute path to the previous dir (parent), ++ * - the instance name (may be different than the instance differentiation string) ++ */ ++static int set_polydir_paths(struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *inst_differentiation) ++{ ++ char *tmp; ++ ++ if (pam_sprintf(polyptr->instance_absolute, "%s%s", ++ polyptr->instance_prefix, inst_differentiation) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ polyptr->instname = strrchr(polyptr->instance_absolute, '/') + 1; ++ ++ if (pam_sprintf(polyptr->instance_parent, "%s", polyptr->instance_absolute) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ tmp = strrchr(polyptr->instance_parent, '/') + 1; ++ *tmp = '\0'; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Set the name of the polyinstantiated instance directory + * based on the method used for polyinstantiation (user, context or level) + * In addition, the function also returns the security contexts of the + * original directory to polyinstantiate and the polyinstantiated instance + * directory. + */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +-static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, +- char **i_context, char **origcon, +- struct instance_data *idata) ++static int poly_name(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_context, ++ char **origcon, struct instance_data *idata) + #else +-static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, +- struct instance_data *idata) ++static int poly_name(struct polydir_s *polyptr, struct instance_data *idata) + #endif + { + int rc; ++ char *inst_differentiation = NULL; + char *hash = NULL; + enum polymethod pm; + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + char *rawcon = NULL; + #endif + +- *i_name = NULL; + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + *i_context = NULL; + *origcon = NULL; +@@ -1192,7 +1356,7 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, + + switch (pm) { + case USER: +- if ((*i_name = strdup(idata->user)) == NULL) ++ if ((inst_differentiation = strdup(idata->user)) == NULL) + goto fail; + break; + +@@ -1204,20 +1368,24 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, + goto fail; + } + if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED) +- *i_name = strdup(rawcon); ++ inst_differentiation = strdup(rawcon); + else +- *i_name = pam_asprintf("%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user); +- if (*i_name == NULL) ++ inst_differentiation = pam_asprintf("%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user); ++ if (inst_differentiation == NULL) + goto fail; + break; + + #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ + + case TMPDIR: ++ if ((inst_differentiation = strdup("XXXXXX")) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ goto success; ++ + case TMPFS: +- if ((*i_name=strdup("")) == NULL) ++ if ((inst_differentiation=strdup("")) == NULL) + goto fail; +- return PAM_SUCCESS; ++ goto success; + + default: + if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) +@@ -1226,32 +1394,37 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name, + } + + if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "poly_name %s", *i_name); ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "poly_name %s", inst_differentiation); + +- if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) || strlen(*i_name) > NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN) { +- hash = md5hash(*i_name, idata); ++ if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) || strlen(inst_differentiation) > NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN) { ++ hash = md5hash(inst_differentiation, idata); + if (hash == NULL) { + goto fail; + } + if (idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) { +- free(*i_name); +- *i_name = hash; ++ free(inst_differentiation); ++ inst_differentiation = hash; + hash = NULL; + } else { + char *newname = + pam_asprintf("%.*s_%s", + NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN - 1 - (int)strlen(hash), +- *i_name, hash); ++ inst_differentiation, hash); + if (newname == NULL) + goto fail; +- free(*i_name); +- *i_name = newname; ++ free(inst_differentiation); ++ inst_differentiation = newname; + } + } +- rc = PAM_SUCCESS; + ++success: ++ if (set_polydir_paths(polyptr, inst_differentiation) == -1) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ rc = PAM_SUCCESS; + fail: + free(hash); ++ free(inst_differentiation); + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + freecon(rawcon); + #endif +@@ -1262,55 +1435,35 @@ fail: + freecon(*origcon); + *origcon = NULL; + #endif +- free(*i_name); +- *i_name = NULL; + } + return rc; + } + +-static int check_inst_parent(char *ipath, struct instance_data *idata) ++static int check_inst_parent(int dfd, struct instance_data *idata) + { + struct stat instpbuf; +- char *inst_parent, *trailing_slash; +- int dfd; ++ + /* +- * stat the instance parent path to make sure it exists +- * and is a directory. Check that its mode is 000 (unless the +- * admin explicitly instructs to ignore the instance parent +- * mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument). ++ * Stat the instance parent directory to make sure it's writable by ++ * root only (unless the admin explicitly instructs to ignore the ++ * instance parent mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument). + */ +- inst_parent = strdup(ipath); +- if (!inst_parent) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_CRIT, "Error allocating pathname string"); +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- } + +- trailing_slash = strrchr(inst_parent, '/'); +- if (trailing_slash) +- *trailing_slash = '\0'; +- +- dfd = protect_dir(inst_parent, 0, 1, idata); ++ if (idata->flags & PAMNS_IGN_INST_PARENT_MODE) ++ return PAM_SUCCESS; + +- if (dfd == -1 || fstat(dfd, &instpbuf) < 0) { ++ if (fstat(dfd, &instpbuf) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "Error creating or accessing instance parent %s, %m", inst_parent); +- if (dfd != -1) +- close(dfd); +- free(inst_parent); ++ "Error accessing instance parent, %m"); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + +- if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_IGN_INST_PARENT_MODE) == 0) { +- if ((instpbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) || instpbuf.st_uid != 0) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Mode of inst parent %s not 000 or owner not root", +- inst_parent); +- close(dfd); +- free(inst_parent); +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- } ++ if ((instpbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) || instpbuf.st_uid != 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "Mode of inst parent not 000 or owner not root"); ++ return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } +- close(dfd); +- free(inst_parent); ++ + return PAM_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -1449,14 +1602,16 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + } + #endif + +- rc = protect_dir(dir, mode, 1, idata); ++ rc = secure_opendir(dir, ++ SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT | SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR | SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD, ++ mode, idata); + if (rc == -1) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, + "Error creating directory %s: %m", dir); + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + freecon(oldcon_raw); + #endif +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; ++ return -1; + } + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +@@ -1477,9 +1632,9 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, + "Error changing mode of directory %s: %m", dir); + close(rc); +- umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */ +- rmdir(dir); +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; ++ secure_umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */ ++ secure_try_rmdir(dir); ++ return -1; + } + } + +@@ -1497,41 +1652,37 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, + "Unable to change owner on directory %s: %m", dir); + close(rc); +- umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */ +- rmdir(dir); +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; ++ secure_umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */ ++ secure_try_rmdir(dir); ++ return -1; + } + +- close(rc); +- + if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, + "Polydir owner %u group %u", uid, gid); + +- return PAM_SUCCESS; ++ return rc; + } + + /* +- * Create polyinstantiated instance directory (ipath). ++ * Create polyinstantiated instance directory. ++ * To protect against races, changes are done on a fd to the parent of the ++ * instance directory (dfd_iparent) and a relative path (polyptr->instname). ++ * The absolute path (polyptr->instance_absolute) is only updated when creating ++ * a tmpdir and used for logging purposes. + */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +-static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *statbuf, +- const char *icontext, const char *ocontext, +- struct instance_data *idata) ++static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, int dfd_iparent, ++ struct stat *statbuf, const char *icontext, const char *ocontext, ++ struct instance_data *idata) + #else +-static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *statbuf, +- struct instance_data *idata) ++static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, int dfd_iparent, ++ struct stat *statbuf, struct instance_data *idata) + #endif + { + struct stat newstatbuf; + int fd; + +- /* +- * Check to make sure instance parent is valid. +- */ +- if (check_inst_parent(ipath, idata)) +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- + /* + * Create instance directory and set its security context to the context + * returned by the security policy. Set its mode and ownership +@@ -1540,29 +1691,39 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat * + */ + + if (polyptr->method == TMPDIR) { +- if (mkdtemp(polyptr->instance_prefix) == NULL) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error creating temporary instance %s, %m", +- polyptr->instance_prefix); +- polyptr->method = NONE; /* do not clean up! */ +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- } +- /* copy the actual directory name to ipath */ +- strcpy(ipath, polyptr->instance_prefix); +- } else if (mkdir(ipath, S_IRUSR) < 0) { ++ char s_path[PATH_MAX]; ++ /* ++ * Create the template for mkdtemp() as a magic link based on ++ * our existing fd to avoid symlink attacks and races. ++ */ ++ if (pam_sprintf(s_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname) < 0 ++ || mkdtemp(s_path) == NULL) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "Error creating temporary instance dir %s, %m", ++ polyptr->instance_absolute); ++ polyptr->method = NONE; /* do not clean up! */ ++ return PAM_SESSION_ERR; ++ } ++ ++ /* Copy the actual directory name to polyptr->instname */ ++ strcpy(polyptr->instname, base_name(s_path)); ++ } else if (mkdirat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, S_IRUSR) < 0) { + if (errno == EEXIST) + return PAM_IGNORE; + else { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error creating %s, %m", +- ipath); ++ polyptr->instance_absolute); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + } + +- /* Open a descriptor to it to prevent races */ +- fd = open(ipath, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); ++ /* Open a descriptor to prevent races, based on our existing fd. */ ++ fd = openat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, ++ O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s, %m", ipath); +- rmdir(ipath); ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s, %m", ++ polyptr->instance_absolute); ++ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +@@ -1572,17 +1733,19 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat * + if (icontext) { + if (fsetfilecon(fd, icontext) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "Error setting context of %s to %s", ipath, icontext); ++ "Error setting context of %s to %s", ++ polyptr->instance_absolute, icontext); + close(fd); +- rmdir(ipath); ++ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + } else { + if (fsetfilecon(fd, ocontext) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "Error setting context of %s to %s", ipath, ocontext); ++ "Error setting context of %s to %s", ++ polyptr->instance_absolute, ocontext); + close(fd); +- rmdir(ipath); ++ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + } +@@ -1590,9 +1753,9 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat * + #endif + if (fstat(fd, &newstatbuf) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s, %m", +- ipath); ++ polyptr->instance_absolute); + close(fd); +- rmdir(ipath); ++ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + if (newstatbuf.st_uid != statbuf->st_uid || +@@ -1600,17 +1763,17 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat * + if (fchown(fd, statbuf->st_uid, statbuf->st_gid) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, + "Error changing owner for %s, %m", +- ipath); ++ polyptr->instance_absolute); + close(fd); +- rmdir(ipath); ++ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + } + if (fchmod(fd, statbuf->st_mode & 07777) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error changing mode for %s, %m", +- ipath); ++ polyptr->instance_absolute); + close(fd); +- rmdir(ipath); ++ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } + close(fd); +@@ -1629,9 +1792,12 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + struct instance_data *idata) + { + int retval; ++ int dfd_iparent = -1; ++ int dfd_ipath = -1; ++ int dfd_pptrdir = -1; + int newdir = 1; +- char *inst_dir = NULL; +- char *instname = NULL; ++ char s_ipath[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE]; ++ char s_pptrdir[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE]; + struct stat statbuf; + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + char *instcontext = NULL, *origcontext = NULL; +@@ -1641,37 +1807,48 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, + "Set namespace for directory %s", polyptr->dir); + +- retval = protect_dir(polyptr->dir, 0, 0, idata); ++ dfd_pptrdir = secure_opendir(polyptr->dir, SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT, 0, idata); + +- if (retval < 0) { ++ if (dfd_pptrdir < 0) { + if (errno != ENOENT || !(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE)) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m", + polyptr->dir); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; + } +- if (create_polydir(polyptr, idata) != PAM_SUCCESS) ++ dfd_pptrdir = create_polydir(polyptr, idata); ++ if (dfd_pptrdir < 0) + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- } else { +- close(retval); + } + + if (polyptr->method == TMPFS) { +- if (mount("tmpfs", polyptr->dir, "tmpfs", polyptr->mount_flags, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting tmpfs on %s, %m", +- polyptr->dir); +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +- } ++ /* ++ * There is no function mount() that operate on a fd, so instead, we ++ * get the magic link corresponding to the fd and give it to mount(). ++ * This protects against potential races exploitable by an unpriv user. ++ */ ++ if (pam_sprintf(s_pptrdir, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_pptrdir) < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_pptrdir"); ++ goto error_out; ++ } + +- if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT) +- return PAM_SUCCESS; ++ if (mount("tmpfs", s_pptrdir, "tmpfs", polyptr->mount_flags, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting tmpfs on %s, %m", ++ polyptr->dir); ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ ++ if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT) { ++ retval = PAM_SUCCESS; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } + +- return inst_init(polyptr, "tmpfs", idata, 1); ++ retval = inst_init(polyptr, "tmpfs", idata, 1); ++ goto cleanup; + } + +- if (stat(polyptr->dir, &statbuf) < 0) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s: %m", +- polyptr->dir); +- return PAM_SESSION_ERR; ++ if (fstat(dfd_pptrdir, &statbuf) < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s: %m", polyptr->dir); ++ goto error_out; + } + + /* +@@ -1680,15 +1857,16 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + * security policy. + */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instname, &instcontext, +- &origcontext, idata); ++ retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instcontext, &origcontext, idata); + #else +- retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instname, idata); ++ retval = poly_name(polyptr, idata); + #endif + + if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { +- if (retval != PAM_IGNORE) ++ if (retval != PAM_IGNORE) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error getting instance name"); ++ goto error_out; ++ } + goto cleanup; + } else { + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +@@ -1699,22 +1877,33 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + #endif + } + +- if ((inst_dir = pam_asprintf("%s%s", polyptr->instance_prefix, instname)) == NULL) +- goto error_out; +- +- if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "instance_dir %s", +- inst_dir); ++ /* ++ * Gets a fd in a secure manner (we may be operating on a path under ++ * user control), and check it's compliant. ++ * Then, we should *always* operate on *this* fd and a relative path ++ * to be protected against race conditions. ++ */ ++ dfd_iparent = secure_opendir(polyptr->instance_parent, ++ SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT | SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR, 0, idata); ++ if (dfd_iparent == -1) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "polyptr->instance_parent %s access error", ++ polyptr->instance_parent); ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ if (check_inst_parent(dfd_iparent, idata)) { ++ goto error_out; ++ } + + /* + * Create instance directory with appropriate security + * contexts, owner, group and mode bits. + */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- retval = create_instance(polyptr, inst_dir, &statbuf, instcontext, +- origcontext, idata); ++ retval = create_instance(polyptr, dfd_iparent, &statbuf, instcontext, ++ origcontext, idata); + #else +- retval = create_instance(polyptr, inst_dir, &statbuf, idata); ++ retval = create_instance(polyptr, dfd_iparent, &statbuf, idata); + #endif + + if (retval == PAM_IGNORE) { +@@ -1726,19 +1915,48 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr, + goto error_out; + } + ++ /* ++ * Instead of getting a new secure fd, we reuse the fd opened on directory ++ * polyptr->instance_parent to ensure we are working on the same dir as ++ * previously, and thus ensure that previous checks (e.g. check_inst_parent()) ++ * are still relevant. ++ */ ++ dfd_ipath = openat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, ++ O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC); ++ if (dfd_ipath == -1) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error openat on %s, %m", ++ polyptr->instname); ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ ++ if (pam_sprintf(s_ipath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_ipath) < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_ipath"); ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ ++ if (pam_sprintf(s_pptrdir, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_pptrdir) < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_pptrdir"); ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ + /* + * Bind mount instance directory on top of the polyinstantiated + * directory to provide an instance of polyinstantiated directory + * based on polyinstantiated method. ++ * ++ * Operates on magic links created from two fd obtained securely ++ * to protect against race conditions and symlink attacks. Indeed, ++ * the source and destination can be in a user controled path. + */ +- if (mount(inst_dir, polyptr->dir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) { +- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting %s on %s, %m", +- inst_dir, polyptr->dir); ++ if(mount(s_ipath, s_pptrdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "Error mounting %s on %s (%s on %s), %m", ++ s_ipath, s_pptrdir, polyptr->instance_absolute, polyptr->dir); + goto error_out; + } + + if (!(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT)) +- retval = inst_init(polyptr, inst_dir, idata, newdir); ++ retval = inst_init(polyptr, polyptr->instance_absolute, idata, newdir); + + goto cleanup; + +@@ -1750,8 +1968,12 @@ error_out: + retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR; + + cleanup: +- free(inst_dir); +- free(instname); ++ if (dfd_iparent != -1) ++ close(dfd_iparent); ++ if (dfd_ipath != -1) ++ close(dfd_ipath); ++ if (dfd_pptrdir != -1) ++ close(dfd_pptrdir); + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + freecon(instcontext); + freecon(origcontext); +@@ -1790,6 +2012,7 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata) + { + struct polydir_s *pptr; + pid_t rc, pid; ++ int dfd = -1; + struct sigaction newsa, oldsa; + int status; + +@@ -1801,7 +2024,17 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata) + } + + for (pptr = idata->polydirs_ptr; pptr; pptr = pptr->next) { +- if (pptr->method == TMPDIR && access(pptr->instance_prefix, F_OK) == 0) { ++ if (pptr->method == TMPDIR) { ++ ++ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(pptr->instance_parent); ++ if (dfd == -1) ++ continue; ++ ++ if (faccessat(dfd, pptr->instname, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) { ++ close(dfd); ++ continue; ++ } ++ + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + static char *envp[] = { NULL }; +@@ -1811,10 +2044,21 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata) + _exit(1); + } + #endif ++ if (fchdir(dfd) == -1) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Failed fchdir to %s: %m", ++ pptr->instance_absolute); ++ _exit(1); ++ } ++ + close_fds_pre_exec(idata); +- execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instance_prefix, NULL, envp); ++ ++ execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instname, NULL, envp); + _exit(1); + } else if (pid > 0) { ++ ++ if (dfd != -1) ++ close(dfd); ++ + while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) && + (errno == EINTR)); + if (rc == (pid_t)-1) { +@@ -1827,6 +2071,10 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instance_data *idata) + "Error removing %s", pptr->instance_prefix); + } + } else if (pid < 0) { ++ ++ if (dfd != -1) ++ close(dfd); ++ + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, + "Cannot fork to cleanup temporary directory, %m"); + rc = PAM_SESSION_ERR; +@@ -1850,6 +2098,7 @@ out: + static int setup_namespace(struct instance_data *idata, enum unmnt_op unmnt) + { + int retval = 0, need_poly = 0, changing_dir = 0; ++ int dfd = -1; + char *cptr, *fptr, poly_parent[PATH_MAX]; + struct polydir_s *pptr; + +@@ -1965,13 +2214,21 @@ static int setup_namespace(struct instance_data *idata, enum unmnt_op unmnt) + strcpy(poly_parent, "/"); + else if (cptr) + *cptr = '\0'; +- if (chdir(poly_parent) < 0) { ++ ++ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(poly_parent); ++ if (dfd == -1) { ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "Failed opening %s to fchdir: %m", poly_parent); ++ } ++ else if (fchdir(dfd) == -1) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "Can't chdir to %s, %m", poly_parent); ++ "Failed fchdir to %s: %m", poly_parent); + } ++ if (dfd != -1) ++ close(dfd); + } + +- if (umount(pptr->rdir) < 0) { ++ if (secure_umount(pptr->rdir) < 0) { + int saved_errno = errno; + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Unmount of %s failed, %m", + pptr->rdir); +@@ -2041,7 +2298,7 @@ static int orig_namespace(struct instance_data *idata) + "Unmounting instance dir for user %d & dir %s", + idata->uid, pptr->dir); + +- if (umount(pptr->dir) < 0) { ++ if (secure_umount(pptr->dir) < 0) { + pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Unmount of %s failed, %m", + pptr->dir); + return PAM_SESSION_ERR; +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h +index 180e042..721d39a 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h +@@ -121,6 +121,13 @@ + #define NAMESPACE_POLYDIR_DATA "pam_namespace:polydir_data" + #define NAMESPACE_PROTECT_DATA "pam_namespace:protect_data" + ++/* ++ * Operation mode for function secure_opendir() ++ */ ++#define SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT 0x00000001 ++#define SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR 0x00000002 ++#define SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD 0x00000004 ++ + /* + * Polyinstantiation method options, based on user, security context + * or both +@@ -158,6 +165,9 @@ struct polydir_s { + char dir[PATH_MAX]; /* directory to polyinstantiate */ + char rdir[PATH_MAX]; /* directory to unmount (based on RUSER) */ + char instance_prefix[PATH_MAX]; /* prefix for instance dir path name */ ++ char instance_absolute[PATH_MAX]; /* absolute path to the instance dir (instance_parent + instname) */ ++ char instance_parent[PATH_MAX]; /* parent dir of the instance dir */ ++ char *instname; /* last segment of the path to the instance dir */ + enum polymethod method; /* method used to polyinstantiate */ + unsigned int num_uids; /* number of override uids */ + uid_t *uid; /* list of override uids */ +-- +2.49.0 +meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-02.patch new file +187
-0@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +From 592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 14:37:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: add flags to indicate path safety + +Add two flags in the script to indicate if the paths to the polydir +and the instance directories are safe (root owned and writable by +root only). + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Bal-Petre <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/592d84e1265d04c3104acee815a503856db503a1] +CVE: CVE-2025-6020 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init | 56 ++++++++++++------- + modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init +index d9053a1..8782178 100755 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init +@@ -1,25 +1,43 @@ + #!/bin/sh +-# It receives polydir path as $1, the instance path as $2, +-# a flag whether the instance dir was newly created (0 - no, 1 - yes) in $3, +-# and user name in $4. ++# It receives as arguments: ++# - $1 polydir path (see WARNING below) ++# - $2 instance path (see WARNING below) ++# - $3 flag whether the instance dir was newly created (0 - no, 1 - yes) ++# - $4 user name ++# - $5 flag whether the polydir path ($1) is safe (0 - unsafe, 1 -safe) ++# - $6 flag whether the instance path ($2) is safe (0 - unsafe, 1 - safe) ++# ++# WARNING: This script is invoked with full root privileges. Accessing ++# the polydir ($1) and the instance ($2) directories in this context may be ++# extremely dangerous as those can be under user control. The flags $5 and $6 ++# are provided to let you know if all the segments part of the path (except the ++# last one) are owned by root and are writable by root only. If the path does ++# not meet these criteria, you expose yourself to possible symlink attacks when ++# accessing these path. ++# However, even if the path components are safe, the content of the ++# directories may still be owned/writable by a user, so care must be taken! + # + # The following section will copy the contents of /etc/skel if this is a + # newly created home directory. +-if [ "$3" = 1 ]; then +- # This line will fix the labeling on all newly created directories +- [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon "$1" +- user="$4" +- passwd=$(getent passwd "$user") +- homedir=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f6 -d":") +- if [ "$1" = "$homedir" ]; then +- gid=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f4 -d":") +- cp -rT /etc/skel "$homedir" +- chown -R "$user":"$gid" "$homedir" +- mask=$(awk '/^UMASK/{gsub("#.*$", "", $2); print $2; exit}' /etc/login.defs) +- mode=$(printf "%o" $((0777 & ~mask))) +- chmod ${mode:-700} "$homedir" +- [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon -R "$homedir" +- fi +-fi + ++# Executes only if the polydir path is safe ++if [ "$5" = 1 ]; then ++ ++ if [ "$3" = 1 ]; then ++ # This line will fix the labeling on all newly created directories ++ [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon "$1" ++ user="$4" ++ passwd=$(getent passwd "$user") ++ homedir=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f6 -d":") ++ if [ "$1" = "$homedir" ]; then ++ gid=$(echo "$passwd" | cut -f4 -d":") ++ cp -rT /etc/skel "$homedir" ++ chown -R "$user":"$gid" "$homedir" ++ mask=$(sed -E -n 's/^UMASK[[:space:]]+([^#[:space:]]+).*/\1/p' /etc/login.defs) ++ mode=$(printf "%o" $((0777 & ~mask))) ++ chmod ${mode:-700} "$homedir" ++ [ -x /sbin/restorecon ] && /sbin/restorecon -R "$homedir" ++ fi ++ fi ++fi + exit 0 +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +index 9d993d4..4c8153b 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +@@ -1467,6 +1467,79 @@ static int check_inst_parent(int dfd, struct instance_data *idata) + return PAM_SUCCESS; + } + ++/* ++ * Check for a given absolute path that all segments except the last one are: ++ * 1. a directory owned by root and not writable by group or others ++ * 2. a symlink owned by root and referencing a directory respecting 1. ++ * Returns 0 if safe, -1 is unsafe. ++ * If the path is not accessible (does not exist, hidden under a mount...), ++ * returns -1 (unsafe). ++ */ ++static int check_safe_path(const char *path, struct instance_data *idata) ++{ ++ char *p = strdup(path); ++ char *d; ++ char *dir = p; ++ struct stat st; ++ ++ if (p == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* Check path is absolute */ ++ if (p[0] != '/') ++ goto error; ++ ++ strip_trailing_slashes(p); ++ ++ /* Last segment of the path may be owned by the user */ ++ if ((d = strrchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) ++ *d = '\0'; ++ ++ while ((d=strrchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) { ++ ++ /* Do not follow symlinks */ ++ if (lstat(dir, &st) != 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) { ++ if (st.st_uid != 0) { ++ if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, ++ "Path deemed unsafe: Symlink %s should be owned by root", dir); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ /* Follow symlinks */ ++ if (stat(dir, &st) != 0) ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { ++ if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, ++ "Path deemed unsafe: %s is expected to be a directory", dir); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ if (st.st_uid != 0 || ++ ((st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) && !(st.st_mode & S_ISVTX))) { ++ if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) ++ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, ++ "Path deemed unsafe: %s should be owned by root, and not be writable by group or others", dir); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ *d = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ free(p); ++ return 0; ++ ++error: ++ free(p); ++ return -1; ++} ++ + /* + * Check to see if there is a namespace initialization script in + * the /etc/security directory. If such a script exists +@@ -1524,7 +1597,11 @@ static int inst_init(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *ipath, + close_fds_pre_exec(idata); + + execle(init_script, init_script, +- polyptr->dir, ipath, newdir?"1":"0", idata->user, NULL, envp); ++ polyptr->dir, ipath, ++ newdir ? "1":"0", idata->user, ++ (check_safe_path(polyptr->dir, idata) == -1) ? "0":"1", ++ (check_safe_path(ipath, idata) == -1) ? "0":"1", ++ NULL, envp); + _exit(1); + } else if (pid > 0) { + while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) && +-- +2.49.0 +meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2025-6020-03.patch new file +35
-0@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 08:00:00 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: secure_opendir: do not look at the group + ownership + +When the directory is not group-writable, the group ownership does +not matter, and when it is group-writable, there should not be any +exceptions for the root group as there is no guarantee that the root +group does not include non-root users. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/976c20079358d133514568fc7fd95c02df8b5773] +CVE: CVE-2025-6020 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 3 +-- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +index 4c8153b..791dd07 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c ++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c +@@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ static int secure_opendir(const char *path, int opm, mode_t mode, + if (dfd_next == -1) + goto error; + } else if (st.st_uid != 0 +- || (st.st_gid != 0 && (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP)) +- || (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) { ++ || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))) { + /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */ + flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + } +-- +2.49.0 +meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.3.bb +5
-1@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2024-22365.patch \ file://CVE-2024-10041-1.patch \ file://CVE-2024-10041-2.patch \ + file://0001-pam-inline-pam-asprintf.patch \ + file://0002-pam-namespace-rebase.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-6020-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-6020-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-6020-03.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7ac4b50feee004a9fa88f1dfd2d2fa738a82896763050cd773b3c54b0a818283" --2.43.0
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