selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs
PATCH v3 1/1 selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs
This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch - the addition to selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().
This patch introduces the functionfs_seclabel policycap to maintain existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.
Changes since v1:
- Add functionfs_seclabel policycap
- Move new functionality to the end of existing lists
Changes since v2:
- Sending as separate patches
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++-- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -2
@@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"rootfs" ) || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel () && (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))); + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"functionfs" )); }static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt (struct super_block *sb)
@@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"binder" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"bpf" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" ) || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs")) + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"securityfs" ) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"))) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM ,POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD ,POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD , +POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL , __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {"netlink_xperm" ,"netif_wildcard" ,"genfs_seclabel_wildcard" , + "functionfs_seclabel", };/* clang-format on */
security/selinux/include/security.h +6 -0
@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel (void ) +{ +return READ_ONCE ( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL ]); +} +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
Quoted 15 lines · Neill Kapron
This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch - the addition to
selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().
Quoted 4 lines
This patch introduces the
functionfs_seclabelpolicycap to maintain existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.Signed-off-by Neill Kapron <[email protected]>
As before, don't rely on the policy capability bit remaining stable until Paul merges this patch.
Also, not worth re-spinning IMHO but the changelog below normally goes after the "---" before
the diffstat so that it doesn't get included in the commit message since no one cares about
the in-submission changes once the patch is merged.
Quoted 84 lines
Changes since v1:
- Addfunctionfs_seclabelpolicycap
- Move new functionality to the end of existing listsChanges since v2:
- Sending as separate patches--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++-- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-2@@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"rootfs" ) || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel () && (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))); + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"functionfs" )); }static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt (struct super_block *sb)@@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"binder" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"bpf" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" ) || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs")) + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"securityfs" ) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"))) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM ,POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD ,POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD , +POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL , __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +1
-0@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {"netlink_xperm" ,"netif_wildcard" ,"genfs_seclabel_wildcard" , + "functionfs_seclabel", };/* clang-format on */ security/selinux/include/security.h +6
-1@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel (void ) +{ +return READ_ONCE ( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL ]); +} +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state { --2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
As before, don't rely on the policy capability bit remaining stable until Paul merges this patch.
Also, not worth re-spinning IMHO but the changelog below normally goes after the "---" before
the diffstat so that it doesn't get included in the commit message since no one cares about
the in-submission changes once the patch is merged.
Thanks, I appreciate your guidance on this!
Neill
Quoted 27 lines · On Aug 28, 2025 Neill Kapron <[email protected]> wrote:
This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch - the addition to
selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().This patch introduces the
functionfs_seclabelpolicycap to maintain existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.Signed-off-by Neill Kapron <[email protected]>Changes since v1:
- Addfunctionfs_seclabelpolicycap
- Move new functionality to the end of existing listsChanges since v2:
- Sending as separate patches
Quoted 7 lines
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++-- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Merged into selinux/dev, thanks!
--
paul-moore.com
Quoted 3 lines · Paul Moore
Merged into selinux/dev, thanks!
My appologies, I introduced a logic bug between v1 and v2, and have sent a patch which fixes it [1].
Thanks,
Neill