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selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs

PATCH Superseded Neill Kapron 2 participants 5 messages Aug 27, 2025 – Aug 28, 2025 SELinux security module

v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs

This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new functionfs endpoints are created.

This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.

It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch - the addition to selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().

This patch introduces the functionfs_seclabel policycap to maintain existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.

Changes since v1:
- Add functionfs_seclabel policycap
- Move new functionality to the end of existing lists

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                   | 8 ++++++--
 security/selinux/include/policycap.h       | 1 +
 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 +
 security/selinux/include/security.h        | 6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -2
index e474cd7398ef..333bb6cba25e 100644
@@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
 		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
 		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
-		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
+		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))) ||
+		(selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() &&
+		 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"));
 }
 
 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
-	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs") ||
+	    (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() &&
+	     strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs")))
 		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
 
 	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1 -0
index 7405154e6c42..135a969f873c 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL,
 	__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +1 -0
index d8962fcf2ff9..ff8882887651 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
 	"netlink_xperm",
 	"netif_wildcard",
 	"genfs_seclabel_wildcard",
+	"functionfs_seclabel",
 };
 /* clang-format on */
 
security/selinux/include/security.h +6 -0
index 7f19972f7922..0f954a40d3fc 100644
@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void)
 		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]);
 }
 
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]);
+}
+
 struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
 
 struct selinux_load_state {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 libsepol: Support functionfs_seclabel policycap

This adds the necessary userspace pieces to support the functionfs_seclabel policycap which enables per-file labels in functionfs and the ability for userspace to apply the labels.

With the policycap disabled, legacy behaviors are maintained and per-file labeling is disallowed.

---
 libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h | 1 +
 libsepol/src/polcaps.c                    | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h +1 -0
index 0835ea21..bbaebf1a 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL,
 	__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
libsepol/src/polcaps.c +1 -0
index 7ac0ae7c..83eb6143 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const char * const polcap_names[POLICYDB_CAP_MAX + 1] = {
 	[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]			= "netlink_xperm",
 	[POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD]			= "netif_wildcard",
 	[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD]		= "genfs_seclabel_wildcard",
+	[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]		= "functionfs_seclabel",
 };
 
 int sepol_polcap_getnum(const char *name)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] libsepol: Support functionfs_seclabel policycap

Quoted 9 lines · Neill Kapron

This adds the necessary userspace pieces to support the functionfs_seclabel policycap which enables per-file labels in functionfs and the ability for userspace to apply the labels.

With the policycap disabled, legacy behaviors are maintained and per-file labeling is disallowed.

Just a note for other SELinux userspace maintainers: we need to de-conflict the currently pending 3 kernel patches each trying to claim the next available policy capability bit so don't merge any of the libsepol patches until that gets resolved please.

Quoted 32 lines
---
 libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h | 1 +
 libsepol/src/polcaps.c                    | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h +1 -0
index 0835ea21..bbaebf1a 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ enum {
        POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM,
        POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD,
        POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD,
+       POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL,
        __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
libsepol/src/polcaps.c +1 -1
index 7ac0ae7c..83eb6143 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const char * const polcap_names[POLICYDB_CAP_MAX + 1] = {
        [POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]                    = "netlink_xperm",
        [POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD]                   = "netif_wildcard",
        [POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD]          = "genfs_seclabel_wildcard",
+       [POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]              = "functionfs_seclabel",
 };
 
 int sepol_polcap_getnum(const char *name)
--

2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog

maintainer Acked-by on v2 1/2
#3 lore raw
In reply to Neill Kapron
Quoted 15 lines · Neill Kapron

This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new functionfs endpoints are created.

This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.

It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch - the addition to selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().

Quoted 8 lines

This patch introduces the functionfs_seclabel policycap to maintain existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.

Changes since v1:
- Add functionfs_seclabel policycap
- Move new functionality to the end of existing lists

This isn't actually a multi-patch series for the kernel, so don't use the patch 1/2, patch 2/2 notation since that confuses b4 (it tries to pull in the 2nd patch for libsepol and unsurprisingly that won't apply to the kernel). Not sure that warrants re-posting (defer to Paul). The patch itself looks fine to me but we now have 3 pending patches each of which is trying to claim the next available policy capability bit, so we'll ultimately need to de-conflict for upstream merge. Otherwise, you can add my:

Quoted 77 lines
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                   | 8 ++++++--
 security/selinux/include/policycap.h       | 1 +
 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 +
 security/selinux/include/security.h        | 6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -2
index e474cd7398ef..333bb6cba25e 100644
@@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
                !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
                (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
                 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
-                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
+                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))) ||
+               (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() &&
+                !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"));
 }
 
 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
            !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
            !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
            !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
-           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
+           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs") ||
+           (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() &&
+            strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs")))
                sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
 
        if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1 -0
index 7405154e6c42..135a969f873c 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {
        POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM,
        POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD,
        POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD,
+       POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL,
        __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +1 -0
index d8962fcf2ff9..ff8882887651 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
        "netlink_xperm",
        "netif_wildcard",
        "genfs_seclabel_wildcard",
+       "functionfs_seclabel",
 };
 /* clang-format on */
 
security/selinux/include/security.h +6 -1
index 7f19972f7922..0f954a40d3fc 100644
@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void)
                selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]);
 }
 
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel(void)
+{
+       return READ_ONCE(
+               selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]);
+}
+
 struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
 
 struct selinux_load_state {
--

2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog

#4 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley

This isn't actually a multi-patch series for the kernel, so don't use the patch 1/2, patch 2/2 notation since that confuses b4 (it tries to pull in the 2nd patch for libsepol and unsurprisingly that won't apply to the kernel). Not sure that warrants re-posting (defer to Paul).

Whoops, I will send separate patches as v3.

Thanks,
Neill