selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs
PATCH v2 1/2 selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs
This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch - the addition to selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().
This patch introduces the functionfs_seclabel policycap to maintain existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.
Changes since v1:
- Add functionfs_seclabel policycap
- Move new functionality to the end of existing lists
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++-- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -2
@@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"rootfs" ) || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel () && (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))); + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"functionfs" )); }static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt (struct super_block *sb)
@@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"binder" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"bpf" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" ) || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs")) + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"securityfs" ) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"))) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM ,POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD ,POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD , +POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL , __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {"netlink_xperm" ,"netif_wildcard" ,"genfs_seclabel_wildcard" , + "functionfs_seclabel", };/* clang-format on */
security/selinux/include/security.h +6 -0
@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel (void ) +{ +return READ_ONCE ( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL ]); +} +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
PATCH v2 2/2 libsepol: Support functionfs_seclabel policycap
This adds the necessary userspace pieces to support the functionfs_seclabel policycap which enables per-file labels in functionfs and the ability for userspace to apply the labels.
With the policycap disabled, legacy behaviors are maintained and per-file labeling is disallowed.
--- libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h | 1 + libsepol/src/polcaps.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM ,POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD ,POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD , +POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL , __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
libsepol/src/polcaps.c +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const char * const polcap_names[POLICYDB_CAP_MAX + 1] = { [POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM] = "netlink_xperm", [POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD] = "netif_wildcard", [POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD] = "genfs_seclabel_wildcard", + [POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL] = "functionfs_seclabel", };int sepol_polcap_getnum (const char *name)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/2] libsepol: Support functionfs_seclabel policycap
Quoted 9 lines · Neill Kapron
This adds the necessary userspace pieces to support the
functionfs_seclabelpolicycap which enables per-file labels in functionfs and the ability for userspace to apply the labels.With the policycap disabled, legacy behaviors are maintained and per-file labeling is disallowed.
Signed-off-by Neill Kapron <[email protected]>
Just a note for other SELinux userspace maintainers: we need to de-conflict the currently pending 3 kernel patches each trying to claim the next available policy capability bit so don't merge any of the libsepol patches until that gets resolved please.
Quoted 32 lines
--- libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h | 1 + libsepol/src/polcaps.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h +1
-0@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM ,POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD ,POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD , +POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL , __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)libsepol/src/polcaps.c +1
-1@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const char * const polcap_names[POLICYDB_CAP_MAX + 1] = { [POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM] = "netlink_xperm", [POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD] = "netif_wildcard", [POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD] = "genfs_seclabel_wildcard", + [POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL] = "functionfs_seclabel", };int sepol_polcap_getnum (const char *name) --2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
Quoted 15 lines · Neill Kapron
This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch - the addition to
selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().
Quoted 8 lines
This patch introduces the
functionfs_seclabelpolicycap to maintain existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.Signed-off-by Neill Kapron <[email protected]>Changes since v1:
- Addfunctionfs_seclabelpolicycap
- Move new functionality to the end of existing lists
This isn't actually a multi-patch series for the kernel, so don't use the patch 1/2, patch 2/2 notation since that confuses b4 (it tries to pull in the 2nd patch for libsepol and unsurprisingly that won't apply to the kernel). Not sure that warrants re-posting (defer to Paul). The patch itself looks fine to me but we now have 3 pending patches each of which is trying to claim the next available policy capability bit, so we'll ultimately need to de-conflict for upstream merge. Otherwise, you can add my:
Quoted 77 lines
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++-- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-2@@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"rootfs" ) || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel () && (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))); + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ))) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"functionfs" )); }static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt (struct super_block *sb)@@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"binder" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"bpf" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" ) || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs")) + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"securityfs" ) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel () && + strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"))) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM ,POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD ,POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD , +POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL , __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +1
-0@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {"netlink_xperm" ,"netif_wildcard" ,"genfs_seclabel_wildcard" , + "functionfs_seclabel", };/* clang-format on */ security/selinux/include/security.h +6
-1@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel (void ) +{ +return READ_ONCE ( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL ]); +} +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state { --2.51.0.318.gd7df087d1a-goog
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley
This isn't actually a multi-patch series for the kernel, so don't use the patch 1/2, patch 2/2 notation since that confuses b4 (it tries to pull in the 2nd patch for libsepol and unsurprisingly that won't apply to the kernel). Not sure that warrants re-posting (defer to Paul).
Whoops, I will send separate patches as v3.
Thanks,
Neill