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x86/bugs: more BHI

PATCH Superseded Josh Poimboeuf 6 participants 23 messages May 7, 2024 – Jun 27, 2024

Subsystems (6)

v5 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

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Josh Poimboeuf

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v5 cover x86/bugs: more BHI

Patch 1 fixes some objtool warnings and enables noreturn-related optimizations for direct-called syscall handlers.

Patches 2 and 3 add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' which is useful for mitigating BHI in cloud host environments.

v5:
- dropped syscall hardening patch for now
- dropped "Fix CPU mitigation defaults for !x86" in favor of Sean's fix
- patch 1 fixes (Paul)

Josh Poimboeuf (3):
x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 84 ++-----------------
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 12 ++-
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c                   | 10 ++-
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c                   |  9 +-
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c                  |  7 +-
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl        |  6 +-
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl        |  6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 16 ++--
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c               | 10 ++-
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c               | 11 ++-
 scripts/syscalltbl.sh                         | 18 +++-
 tools/objtool/noreturns.h                     |  4 +
 12 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/3 x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

---
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c            | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c            |  9 ++++++---
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c           |  7 +++++--
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c        | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c        | 11 +++++++----
 scripts/syscalltbl.sh                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 tools/objtool/noreturns.h              |  4 ++++
 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6 -4
index c2235bae17ef..8cc9950d7104 100644
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@
 #endif
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
-
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 /*
  * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
 };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 #endif
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs);
-
 long ia32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6 -3
index 33b3f09e6f15..ba8354424860 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 /*
  * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -20,10 +24,9 @@
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
 };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs);
-
 long x64_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5 -2
index 03de4a932131..fb77908f44f3 100644
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_x32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs);
-
 long x32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3 -3
index 5f8591ce7f25..9e9a908cd50d 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors
 #
 # The format is:
-# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point>
+# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]]
 #
 # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for
 # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 # The abi is always "i386" for this file.
 #
 0	i386	restart_syscall		sys_restart_syscall
-1	i386	exit			sys_exit
+1	i386	exit			sys_exit			-			noreturn
 2	i386	fork			sys_fork
 3	i386	read			sys_read
 4	i386	write			sys_write
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@
 249	i386	io_cancel		sys_io_cancel
 250	i386	fadvise64		sys_ia32_fadvise64
 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim)
-252	i386	exit_group		sys_exit_group
+252	i386	exit_group		sys_exit_group			-			noreturn
 253	i386	lookup_dcookie
 254	i386	epoll_create		sys_epoll_create
 255	i386	epoll_ctl		sys_epoll_ctl
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3 -3
index 7e8d46f4147f..5ea7387c1aa1 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors
 #
 # The format is:
-# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point>
+# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]]
 #
 # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls
 #
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
 57	common	fork			sys_fork
 58	common	vfork			sys_vfork
 59	64	execve			sys_execve
-60	common	exit			sys_exit
+60	common	exit			sys_exit			-			noreturn
 61	common	wait4			sys_wait4
 62	common	kill			sys_kill
 63	common	uname			sys_newuname
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
 228	common	clock_gettime		sys_clock_gettime
 229	common	clock_getres		sys_clock_getres
 230	common	clock_nanosleep		sys_clock_nanosleep
-231	common	exit_group		sys_exit_group
+231	common	exit_group		sys_exit_group			-			noreturn
 232	common	epoll_wait		sys_epoll_wait
 233	common	epoll_ctl		sys_epoll_ctl
 234	common	tgkill			sys_tgkill
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6 -4
index 89df5d89d664..51655133eee3 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
+extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
 /*
  * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64
  * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -22,15 +26,13 @@
 #define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall
 
 #define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT(nr, native, compat)	__SYSCALL(nr, native)
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
-#undef __SYSCALL
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) sym,
-
-extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
-
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
 };
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7 -4
index b0b4cfd2308c..943d414f2109 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
+extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
 /*
  * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64
  * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -18,14 +22,13 @@
 #define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall
 #define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall
 
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
+
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
-#undef __SYSCALL
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) sym,
-
-extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
-
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
 };
scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16 -2
index 6abe143889ef..6a903b87a7c2 100755
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0
 
 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | {
 
-	while read nr abi name native compat ; do
+	while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do
 
 		if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then
 			echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2
@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | {
 			nxt=$((nxt + 1))
 		done
 
-		if [ -n "$compat" ]; then
+		if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then
+			unset compat
+		fi
+
+		if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then
+			if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then
+				echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column"
+				exit 1
+			fi
+			if [ -n "$compat" ]; then
+				echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)"
+			else
+				echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)"
+			fi
+		elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then
 			echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)"
 		elif [ -n "$native" ]; then
 			echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"
tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4 -0
index 7ebf29c91184..1e8141ef1b15 100644
@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@
  * Yes, this is unfortunate.  A better solution is in the works.
  */
 NORETURN(__fortify_panic)
+NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit)
+NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group)
 NORETURN(__kunit_abort)
 NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit)
 NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic)
 NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail)
 NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed)
 NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable)
+NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit)
+NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group)
 NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead)
 NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error)
 NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

Quoted 8 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

Quoted 7 lines

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

Fixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")

Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!

Thanx, Paul

Quoted 284 lines
---
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c            | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c            |  9 ++++++---
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c           |  7 +++++--
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c        | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c        | 11 +++++++----
 scripts/syscalltbl.sh                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 tools/objtool/noreturns.h              |  4 ++++
 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6 -4
index c2235bae17ef..8cc9950d7104 100644
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@
 #endif
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
-
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 /*
  * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
 };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 #endif
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs);
-
 long ia32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6 -3
index 33b3f09e6f15..ba8354424860 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 /*
  * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -20,10 +24,9 @@
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
 };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs);
-
 long x64_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5 -2
index 03de4a932131..fb77908f44f3 100644
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_x32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs);
-
 long x32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3 -3
index 5f8591ce7f25..9e9a908cd50d 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors
 #
 # The format is:
-# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point>
+# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]]
 #
 # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for
 # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 # The abi is always "i386" for this file.
 #
 0	i386	restart_syscall		sys_restart_syscall
-1	i386	exit			sys_exit
+1	i386	exit			sys_exit			-			noreturn
 2	i386	fork			sys_fork
 3	i386	read			sys_read
 4	i386	write			sys_write
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@
 249	i386	io_cancel		sys_io_cancel
 250	i386	fadvise64		sys_ia32_fadvise64
 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim)
-252	i386	exit_group		sys_exit_group
+252	i386	exit_group		sys_exit_group			-			noreturn
 253	i386	lookup_dcookie
 254	i386	epoll_create		sys_epoll_create
 255	i386	epoll_ctl		sys_epoll_ctl
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3 -3
index 7e8d46f4147f..5ea7387c1aa1 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors
 #
 # The format is:
-# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point>
+# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]]
 #
 # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls
 #
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
 57	common	fork			sys_fork
 58	common	vfork			sys_vfork
 59	64	execve			sys_execve
-60	common	exit			sys_exit
+60	common	exit			sys_exit			-			noreturn
 61	common	wait4			sys_wait4
 62	common	kill			sys_kill
 63	common	uname			sys_newuname
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
 228	common	clock_gettime		sys_clock_gettime
 229	common	clock_getres		sys_clock_getres
 230	common	clock_nanosleep		sys_clock_nanosleep
-231	common	exit_group		sys_exit_group
+231	common	exit_group		sys_exit_group			-			noreturn
 232	common	epoll_wait		sys_epoll_wait
 233	common	epoll_ctl		sys_epoll_ctl
 234	common	tgkill			sys_tgkill
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6 -4
index 89df5d89d664..51655133eee3 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
+extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
 /*
  * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64
  * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -22,15 +26,13 @@
 #define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall
 
 #define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT(nr, native, compat)	__SYSCALL(nr, native)
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
-#undef __SYSCALL
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) sym,
-
-extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
-
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
 };
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7 -4
index b0b4cfd2308c..943d414f2109 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
+extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
 /*
  * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64
  * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -18,14 +22,13 @@
 #define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall
 #define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall
 
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
+
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
-#undef __SYSCALL
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) sym,
-
-extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
-
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
 };
scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16 -2
index 6abe143889ef..6a903b87a7c2 100755
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0
 
 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | {
 
-	while read nr abi name native compat ; do
+	while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do
 
 		if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then
 			echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2
@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | {
 			nxt=$((nxt + 1))
 		done
 
-		if [ -n "$compat" ]; then
+		if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then
+			unset compat
+		fi
+
+		if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then
+			if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then
+				echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column"
+				exit 1
+			fi
+			if [ -n "$compat" ]; then
+				echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)"
+			else
+				echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)"
+			fi
+		elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then
 			echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)"
 		elif [ -n "$native" ]; then
 			echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"
tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4 -0
index 7ebf29c91184..1e8141ef1b15 100644
@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@
  * Yes, this is unfortunate.  A better solution is in the works.
  */
 NORETURN(__fortify_panic)
+NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit)
+NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group)
 NORETURN(__kunit_abort)
 NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit)
 NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic)
 NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail)
 NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed)
 NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable)
+NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit)
+NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group)
 NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead)
 NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error)
 NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

Quoted 12 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 11 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")

Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!

And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?

Thanx, Paul

Quoted 284 lines
Quoted 284 lines
---
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c            | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c            |  9 ++++++---
 arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c           |  7 +++++--
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c        | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c        | 11 +++++++----
 scripts/syscalltbl.sh                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 tools/objtool/noreturns.h              |  4 ++++
 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6 -4
index c2235bae17ef..8cc9950d7104 100644
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@
 #endif
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
-
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 /*
  * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
 };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 #endif
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs);
-
 long ia32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6 -3
index 33b3f09e6f15..ba8354424860 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 /*
  * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -20,10 +24,9 @@
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
 };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs);
-
 long x64_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5 -2
index 03de4a932131..fb77908f44f3 100644
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
 #include <asm/syscalls_x32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs);
-
 long x32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr)
 {
 	switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3 -3
index 5f8591ce7f25..9e9a908cd50d 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors
 #
 # The format is:
-# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point>
+# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]]
 #
 # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for
 # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 # The abi is always "i386" for this file.
 #
 0	i386	restart_syscall		sys_restart_syscall
-1	i386	exit			sys_exit
+1	i386	exit			sys_exit			-			noreturn
 2	i386	fork			sys_fork
 3	i386	read			sys_read
 4	i386	write			sys_write
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@
 249	i386	io_cancel		sys_io_cancel
 250	i386	fadvise64		sys_ia32_fadvise64
 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim)
-252	i386	exit_group		sys_exit_group
+252	i386	exit_group		sys_exit_group			-			noreturn
 253	i386	lookup_dcookie
 254	i386	epoll_create		sys_epoll_create
 255	i386	epoll_ctl		sys_epoll_ctl
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3 -3
index 7e8d46f4147f..5ea7387c1aa1 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors
 #
 # The format is:
-# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point>
+# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]]
 #
 # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls
 #
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
 57	common	fork			sys_fork
 58	common	vfork			sys_vfork
 59	64	execve			sys_execve
-60	common	exit			sys_exit
+60	common	exit			sys_exit			-			noreturn
 61	common	wait4			sys_wait4
 62	common	kill			sys_kill
 63	common	uname			sys_newuname
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
 228	common	clock_gettime		sys_clock_gettime
 229	common	clock_getres		sys_clock_getres
 230	common	clock_nanosleep		sys_clock_nanosleep
-231	common	exit_group		sys_exit_group
+231	common	exit_group		sys_exit_group			-			noreturn
 232	common	epoll_wait		sys_epoll_wait
 233	common	epoll_ctl		sys_epoll_ctl
 234	common	tgkill			sys_tgkill
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6 -4
index 89df5d89d664..51655133eee3 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
+extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
 /*
  * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64
  * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -22,15 +26,13 @@
 #define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall
 
 #define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT(nr, native, compat)	__SYSCALL(nr, native)
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
-#undef __SYSCALL
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) sym,
-
-extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
-
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
 };
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7 -4
index b0b4cfd2308c..943d414f2109 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 
+extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long,
+				      unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
 /*
  * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64
  * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -18,14 +22,13 @@
 #define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall
 #define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall
 
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
+
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
+#undef  __SYSCALL
 
-#undef __SYSCALL
 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) sym,
-
-extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
-
 const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {
 #include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
 };
scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16 -2
index 6abe143889ef..6a903b87a7c2 100755
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0
 
 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | {
 
-	while read nr abi name native compat ; do
+	while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do
 
 		if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then
 			echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2
@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | {
 			nxt=$((nxt + 1))
 		done
 
-		if [ -n "$compat" ]; then
+		if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then
+			unset compat
+		fi
+
+		if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then
+			if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then
+				echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column"
+				exit 1
+			fi
+			if [ -n "$compat" ]; then
+				echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)"
+			else
+				echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)"
+			fi
+		elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then
 			echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)"
 		elif [ -n "$native" ]; then
 			echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"
tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4 -0
index 7ebf29c91184..1e8141ef1b15 100644
@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@
  * Yes, this is unfortunate.  A better solution is in the works.
  */
 NORETURN(__fortify_panic)
+NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit)
+NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group)
 NORETURN(__kunit_abort)
 NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit)
 NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic)
 NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail)
 NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed)
 NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable)
+NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit)
+NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group)
 NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead)
 NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error)
 NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

Quoted 18 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 17 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 15 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

Fixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!

And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?

Sorry for my slowness! I'm traveling this week but let me repost this (with your Tested-by) and grab somebody to merge it.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

Quoted 19 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 18 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 17 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 15 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

Fixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!

And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?

Sorry for my slowness! I'm traveling this week but let me repost this (with your Tested-by) and grab somebody to merge it.

No worries, and thank you!

Thanx, Paul

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 19 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 18 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 17 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 15 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

Fixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!

And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?

Sorry for my slowness! I'm traveling this week but let me repost this (with your Tested-by) and grab somebody to merge it.

Hi Josh,

I have another BHI related patch which has been reviewed:

[PATCH v2] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/T/#rd3e9a5aadc18931f777b9a9e9c71f1efb178b7ef

Any chance it can be merged as well?

Thanks,

alex.

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 48 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

---
  arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c            | 10 ++++++----
  arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c            |  9 ++++++---
  arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c           |  7 +++++--
  arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |  6 +++---
  arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |  6 +++---
  arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c        | 10 ++++++----
  arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c        | 11 +++++++----
  scripts/syscalltbl.sh                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
  tools/objtool/noreturns.h              |  4 ++++
  9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +5 -2
index c2235bae17ef..8cc9950d7104 100644
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@
  #endif
 
  #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
-
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
  #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
 
  /*
   * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but

arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c line 34

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +1 -1
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@
  const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
  #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
  };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL

nit: Am I blind or all the __SYSCALL lines have an extra whitespace?

<snip>

author maintainer
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn

Quoted 57 lines · Nikolay Borisov
Quoted 46 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.

Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.

Fixes the following warnings:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation

---
  arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c            | 10 ++++++----
  arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c            |  9 ++++++---
  arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c           |  7 +++++--
  arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |  6 +++---
  arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |  6 +++---
  arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c        | 10 ++++++----
  arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c        | 11 +++++++----
  scripts/syscalltbl.sh                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
  tools/objtool/noreturns.h              |  4 ++++
  9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +5 -2
index c2235bae17ef..8cc9950d7104 100644
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@
  #endif
  #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
-
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);
  #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL
+
+#undef  __SYSCALL_NORETURN
+#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL
  /*
   * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but

arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c line 34

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +1 -1
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@
  const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {
  #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
  };
-#undef __SYSCALL
+#undef  __SYSCALL

nit: Am I blind or all the __SYSCALL lines have an extra whitespace?

Quoted 1 line

<snip>

That was a small readability tweak to make '__SYSCALL' vertically aligned:

#define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); #define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
#undef __SYSCALL

Signature · 1 line
Josh
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/3 x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Duplicating the documentation of all the Spectre kernel cmdline options in two separate files is unwieldy and error-prone. Instead just add a reference to kernel-parameters.txt from spectre.rst.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 84 ++-----------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +9 -75
index 25a04cda4c2c..f9797ab6b38f 100644
@@ -592,85 +592,19 @@ Spectre variant 2
 Mitigation control on the kernel command line
 ---------------------------------------------
 
-Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
-kernel command line.
+In general the kernel selects reasonable default mitigations for the
+current CPU.
+
+Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel
+command line with the following options:
 
 	nospectre_v1
-
-		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
-		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
-		possible in the system.
-
 	nospectre_v2
+	spectre_v2={option}
+	spectre_v2_user={option}
+	spectre_bhi={option}
 
-		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
-		(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
-		allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
-		to spectre_v2=off.
-
-
-        spectre_v2=
-
-		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
-		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
-		The default operation protects the kernel from
-		user space attacks.
-
-		on
-			unconditionally enable, implies
-			spectre_v2_user=on
-		off
-			unconditionally disable, implies
-		        spectre_v2_user=off
-		auto
-			kernel detects whether your CPU model is
-		        vulnerable
-
-		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
-		mitigation method at run time according to the
-		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
-		CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
-		and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
-
-		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
-		against user space to user space task attacks.
-
-		Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
-		the user space protections.
-
-		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
-
-                retpoline               auto pick between generic,lfence
-                retpoline,generic       Retpolines
-                retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
-                retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
-                eibrs                   Enhanced/Auto IBRS
-                eibrs,retpoline         Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
-                eibrs,lfence            Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
-                ibrs                    use IBRS to protect kernel
-
-		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
-		spectre_v2=auto.
-
-		In general the kernel by default selects
-		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
-		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
-		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
-		cannot be disabled.
-
-	spectre_bhi=
-
-		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
-		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
-		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
-
-		on
-			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
-			needed.
-		off
-			Disable the mitigation.
-
-For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions

I love the idea here, but

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst Spectre variant 2 · line 605

Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +3 -0
 	nospectre_v2
+	spectre_v2={option}
+	spectre_v2_user={option}
+	spectre_bhi={option}

this comes out as just a single line when I run make htmldocs.

author maintainer
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions

Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon

I love the idea here, but

Review

Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +3 -0
 	nospectre_v2
+	spectre_v2={option}
+	spectre_v2_user={option}
+	spectre_bhi={option}

this comes out as just a single line when I run make htmldocs.

Thanks, the below turns it into a bulleted list:

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +5 -5
index f9797ab6b38f..132e0bc6007e 100644
@@ -598,11 +598,11 @@ current CPU.
 Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel
 command line with the following options:
 
-	nospectre_v1
-	nospectre_v2
-	spectre_v2={option}
-	spectre_v2_user={option}
-	spectre_bhi={option}
+	- nospectre_v1
+	- nospectre_v2
+	- spectre_v2={option}
+	- spectre_v2_user={option}
+	- spectre_bhi={option}
 
 For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
Reviewed-by
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions

Quoted 24 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon

I love the idea here, but

Review

Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +3 -0
 	nospectre_v2
+	spectre_v2={option}
+	spectre_v2_user={option}
+	spectre_bhi={option}

this comes out as just a single line when I run make htmldocs.

Thanks, the below turns it into a bulleted list:

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +0 -3
index f9797ab6b38f..132e0bc6007e 100644
@@ -598,11 +598,11 @@ current CPU.
 Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel
 command line with the following options:
 
-	nospectre_v1
-	nospectre_v2
-	spectre_v2={option}

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst current CPU. · line 608

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +5 -2
-	spectre_v2_user={option}
-	spectre_bhi={option}
+	- nospectre_v1
+	- nospectre_v2
+	- spectre_v2={option}
+	- spectre_v2_user={option}
+	- spectre_bhi={option}
 
 For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 

Looks good.

author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/3 x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:

36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 16 +++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -3
index 213d0719e2b7..9c1f63f04502 100644
@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@
 			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
 			clearing sequence.
 
-			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
-			       as needed.
-			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+			on     - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+				 needed.  This protects the kernel from
+				 both syscalls and VMs.
+			vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation
+				 available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit
+				 ONLY.  On such systems, the host kernel is
+				 protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but
+				 may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks.
+			off    - Disable the mitigation.
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -5
index ab18185894df..6974c8c9792d 100644
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)
 enum bhi_mitigations {
 	BHI_MITIGATION_OFF,
 	BHI_MITIGATION_ON,
+	BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
 };
 
 static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
 	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit"))
+		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
 	else
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
 
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 			return;
 	}
 
+	/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
 	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
 		return;
 
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
 		return;
 
-	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY) {
+		pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+		return;
+	}
 
-	/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */
+	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n");
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n");
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
 }
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Reviewed-by on v5 3/3
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:

Quoted 8 lines

36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.

---

Does the KConfig option need to be updated to support this as well? Other than that,

Quoted 76 lines
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 16 +++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -3
index 213d0719e2b7..9c1f63f04502 100644
@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@
 			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
 			clearing sequence.
 
-			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
-			       as needed.
-			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+			on     - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+				 needed.  This protects the kernel from
+				 both syscalls and VMs.
+			vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation
+				 available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit
+				 ONLY.  On such systems, the host kernel is
+				 protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but
+				 may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks.
+			off    - Disable the mitigation.
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -5
index ab18185894df..6974c8c9792d 100644
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)
 enum bhi_mitigations {
 	BHI_MITIGATION_OFF,
 	BHI_MITIGATION_ON,
+	BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
 };
 
 static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
 	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit"))
+		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
 	else
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
 
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 			return;
 	}
 
+	/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
 	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
 		return;
 
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
 		return;
 
-	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY) {
+		pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+		return;
+	}
 
-	/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */
+	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n");
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n");
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
 }
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon
Quoted 8 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:

36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.

---

Does the KConfig option need to be updated to support this as well?

In general we don't provide a config option for every possible mitigation cmdline option. If someone requests it we could add it later.

Quoted 1 line

Thanks!

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

Quoted 19 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon
Quoted 8 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:

   36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.

---

Does the KConfig option need to be updated to support this as well?

Quoted 8 lines

In general we don't provide a config option for every possible mitigation cmdline option. If someone requests it we could add it later.

Quoted 1 line

Thanks!

I think it will be useful for us to have appropriate Kconfig option. Could you please add it to the next version?

Signature · 2 lines
Best regards,
Maksim Davydov
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

Quoted 2 lines · Maksim Davydov

I think it will be useful for us to have appropriate Kconfig option. Could you please add it to the next version?

That should probably be a separate patch, something like the below?

arch/x86/Kconfig +33 -4
index 1d7122a1883e..ab1ea701bc42 100644
@@ -2642,17 +2642,46 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS
 	  stored in floating point, vector and integer registers.
 	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst>
 
-config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
-	bool "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)"
+choice
+	prompt "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
-	default y
+	default MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON
 	help
 	  Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks
 	  where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer
 	  indirect branches.
+
+	  The compile-time default can be set to on, vmexit, or off,
+	  corresponding to the "spectre_bhi=" cmdline defaults described in
+	  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst.  The cmdline
+	  options can be used to override this compile-time default.
+
 	  See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
 
-endif
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON
+	bool "on"
+	help
+	  Enable the HW or SW mitigation as needed.  This protects the kernel
+	  from both syscalls and VMs.  Equivalent to the spectre_bhi=on cmdline
+	  option.
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_VMEXIT
+	bool "vmexit"
+	help
+	  On systems which don't have the HW mitigation available, enable the
+	  SW mitigation on vmexit ONLY.  On such systems, the host kernel is
+	  protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but may still be vulnerable
+	  to syscall attacks.  Equivalent to the spectre_bhi=vmexit cmdline
+	  option.
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_OFF
+	bool "off"
+	help
+	  Disable the mitigation.  Equivalent to the spectre_bhi=off cmdline
+	  option.
+endchoice
+
+endif # CPU_MITIGATIONS
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
 	def_bool y
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +7 -2
index 94bcf29df465..d415f24b7169 100644
@@ -1628,8 +1628,13 @@ enum bhi_mitigations {
 	BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
 };
 
-static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON
+static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
+#elif CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_VMEXIT
+static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init = BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT;
+#else
+static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+#endif
 
 static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 {
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 71 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:

   36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.

---
  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++---
  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 16 +++++++++++-----
  2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -3
index 213d0719e2b7..9c1f63f04502 100644
@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@
  			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
  			clearing sequence.
 
-			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
-			       as needed.
-			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+			on     - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+				 needed.  This protects the kernel from
+				 both syscalls and VMs.
+			vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation
+				 available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit
+				 ONLY.  On such systems, the host kernel is
+				 protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but
+				 may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks.
+			off    - Disable the mitigation.
 
  	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
  			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -0
index ab18185894df..6974c8c9792d 100644
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)
  enum bhi_mitigations {
  	BHI_MITIGATION_OFF,
  	BHI_MITIGATION_ON,
+	BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
  };
 
  static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
  		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
  	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
  		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit"))
+		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
  	else
  		pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
 
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
  			return;
  	}
 
+	/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
  	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
  		return;
 
  	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) · line 1676

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5 -3
  		return;
 
-	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY) {
+		pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+		return;
+	}

nit: How about setting CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT unconditionally, then afterwards checking if MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY is set and if yes simply return, that way you don't duplicate the setup of the VMEXIT code

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -2
-	/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */
+	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n");
  	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n");
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
  }
 
  static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

Quoted 12 lines · Nikolay Borisov
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -3
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
  			return;
  	}
+	/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
  	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
  		return;
  	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
  		return;
-	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY) {
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) · line 1676

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -0
+		pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+		return;
+	}

nit: How about setting CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT unconditionally, then afterwards checking if MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY is set and if yes simply return, that way you don't duplicate the setup of the VMEXIT code

I think the duplication actually makes it more readable. In both cases it puts the setting of the features together along with the corresponding pr_info().

Signature · 1 line
Josh
Reviewed-by
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

Quoted 22 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 12 lines · Nikolay Borisov
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -3
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
   			return;
   	}
+	/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
   	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
   		return;
   	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
   		return;
-	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY) {
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) · line 1676

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -0
+		pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+		return;
+	}

nit: How about setting CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT unconditionally, then afterwards checking if MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY is set and if yes simply return, that way you don't duplicate the setup of the VMEXIT code

Quoted 3 lines

I think the duplication actually makes it more readable. In both cases it puts the setting of the features together along with the corresponding pr_info().

Right, my suggestion also meant that setting + pr info will be together, unconditional and if MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY is set we return early, without setting X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP. In any case it's a minor remark, feel free to ignore.

Quoted 1 line
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Hi!
What is the current status of the series?

Quoted 90 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:

   36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.

---
  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++---
  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 16 +++++++++++-----
  2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -3
index 213d0719e2b7..9c1f63f04502 100644
@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@
  			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
  			clearing sequence.
 
-			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
-			       as needed.
-			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+			on     - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+				 needed.  This protects the kernel from
+				 both syscalls and VMs.
+			vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation
+				 available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit
+				 ONLY.  On such systems, the host kernel is
+				 protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but
+				 may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks.
+			off    - Disable the mitigation.
 
  	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
  			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -5
index ab18185894df..6974c8c9792d 100644
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)
  enum bhi_mitigations {
  	BHI_MITIGATION_OFF,
  	BHI_MITIGATION_ON,
+	BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
  };
 
  static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
  		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
  	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
  		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit"))
+		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
  	else
  		pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
 
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
  			return;
  	}
 
+	/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
  	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
  		return;
 
  	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
  		return;
 
-	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY) {
+		pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+		return;
+	}
 
-	/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */
+	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n");
  	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n");
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
  }
 
  static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards,
Maksim Davydov
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option

Quoted 2 lines · Maksim Davydov

Hi!
What is the current status of the series?

Looks like it didn't make the merge window. I can post a new version of the series next week (with the minor documentation fix in patch 2).

Signature · 1 line
Josh