x86/bugs: more BHI
Subsystems (6)
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerv5 cover x86/bugs: more BHI
Patch 1 fixes some objtool warnings and enables noreturn-related optimizations for direct-called syscall handlers.
Patches 2 and 3 add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' which is useful for mitigating BHI in cloud host environments.
v5:
- dropped syscall hardening patch for now
- dropped "Fix CPU mitigation defaults for !x86" in favor of Sean's fix
- patch 1 fixes (Paul)
Josh Poimboeuf (3):
x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 84 ++----------------- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 ++- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 +- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 ++-- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 ++- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 +++- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 + 12 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerPATCH v5 1/3 x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.
Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations __noreturn.
Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation
--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6 -4
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); - +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { #include <asm/syscalls_32.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs); -long ia32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6 -3
@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -20,10 +24,9 @@ const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x64_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5 -2
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_x32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3 -3
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # The abi is always "i386" for this file. # 0 i386 restart_syscall sys_restart_syscall -1 i386 exit sys_exit +1 i386 exit sys_exit - noreturn 2 i386 fork sys_fork 3 i386 read sys_read 4 i386 write sys_write
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ 249 i386 io_cancel sys_io_cancel 250 i386 fadvise64 sys_ia32_fadvise64 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim) -252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group +252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 253 i386 lookup_dcookie 254 i386 epoll_create sys_epoll_create 255 i386 epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3 -3
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls #
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ 57 common fork sys_fork 58 common vfork sys_vfork 59 64 execve sys_execve -60 common exit sys_exit +60 common exit sys_exit - noreturn 61 common wait4 sys_wait4 62 common kill sys_kill 63 common uname sys_newuname
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ 228 common clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime 229 common clock_getres sys_clock_getres 230 common clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep -231 common exit_group sys_exit_group +231 common exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 232 common epoll_wait sys_epoll_wait 233 common epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl 234 common tgkill sys_tgkill
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6 -4
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -22,15 +26,13 @@#define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall#define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT (nr, native, compat) __SYSCALL(nr, native) +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> };
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7 -4
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -18,14 +22,13 @@#define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall#define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL +#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> };
scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16 -2
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { - while read nr abi name native compat ; do + while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2
@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { nxt=$((nxt + 1)) done - if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then + unset compat + fi + + if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then + if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then + echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column" + exit 1 + fi + if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)" + else + echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)" + fi + elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)" elif [ -n "$native" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"
tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4 -0
@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@* Yes, this is unfortunate. A better solution is in the works. */ NORETURN(__fortify_panic) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(__kunit_abort) NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit) NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic) NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail) NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed) NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead) NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error) NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerPATCH v5 2/3 x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
In reply to Josh PoimboeufDuplicating the documentation of all the Spectre kernel cmdline options in two separate files is unwieldy and error-prone. Instead just add a reference to kernel-parameters.txt from spectre.rst.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 84 ++----------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +9 -75
@@ -592,85 +592,19 @@ Spectre variant 2 Mitigation control on the kernel command line --------------------------------------------- -Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the -kernel command line. +In general the kernel selects reasonable default mitigations for the +current CPU. + +Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel +command line with the following options: nospectre_v1 - - [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 - (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are - possible in the system. - nospectre_v2 + spectre_v2={option} + spectre_v2_user={option} + spectre_bhi={option} - [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 - (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may - allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent - to spectre_v2=off. - - - spectre_v2= - - [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 - (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. - The default operation protects the kernel from - user space attacks. - - on - unconditionally enable, implies - spectre_v2_user=on - off - unconditionally disable, implies - spectre_v2_user=off - auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is - vulnerable - - Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a - mitigation method at run time according to the - CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the - CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option, - and the compiler with which the kernel was built. - - Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation - against user space to user space task attacks. - - Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and - the user space protections. - - Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: - - retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence - retpoline,generic Retpolines - retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch - retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs Enhanced/Auto IBRS - eibrs,retpoline Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE - ibrs use IBRS to protect kernel - - Not specifying this option is equivalent to - spectre_v2=auto. - - In general the kernel by default selects - reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To - disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with - spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations - cannot be disabled. - - spectre_bhi= - - [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection - (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment - of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as - needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. - -For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt Mitigation selection guide --------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerPATCH v5 3/3 x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh PoimboeufIn cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")
with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -3
@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation - as needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. This protects the kernel from + both syscalls and VMs. + vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation + available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit + ONLY. On such systems, the host kernel is + protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but + may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks. + off - Disable the mitigation. spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -5
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)enum bhi_mitigations {BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ,BHI_MITIGATION_ON , +BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY , }; static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; + else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) { +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + } -/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n" );setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); }static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 8 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
Quoted 7 lines
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!
Thanx, Paul
Quoted 284 lines
Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6
-4@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); - +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but @@ -28,11 +31,10 @@const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { #include <asm/syscalls_32.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs); -long ia32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6
-3@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but @@ -20,10 +24,9 @@ const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x64_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5
-2@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_x32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3
-3@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # The abi is always "i386" for this file. # 0 i386 restart_syscall sys_restart_syscall -1 i386 exit sys_exit +1 i386 exit sys_exit - noreturn 2 i386 fork sys_fork 3 i386 read sys_read 4 i386 write sys_write@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ 249 i386 io_cancel sys_io_cancel 250 i386 fadvise64 sys_ia32_fadvise64 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim) -252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group +252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 253 i386 lookup_dcookie 254 i386 epoll_create sys_epoll_create 255 i386 epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctlarch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3
-3@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls #@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ 57 common fork sys_fork 58 common vfork sys_vfork 59 64 execve sys_execve -60 common exit sys_exit +60 common exit sys_exit - noreturn 61 common wait4 sys_wait4 62 common kill sys_kill 63 common uname sys_newuname@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ 228 common clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime 229 common clock_getres sys_clock_getres 230 common clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep -231 common exit_group sys_exit_group +231 common exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 232 common epoll_wait sys_epoll_wait 233 common epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl 234 common tgkill sys_tgkillarch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6
-4@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table. @@ -22,15 +26,13 @@#define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall#define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT (nr, native, compat) __SYSCALL(nr, native) +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> };arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7
-4@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table. @@ -18,14 +22,13 @@#define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall#define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL +#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> };scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16
-2@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { - while read nr abi name native compat ; do + while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { nxt=$((nxt + 1)) done - if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then + unset compat + fi + + if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then + if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then + echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column" + exit 1 + fi + if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)" + else + echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)" + fi + elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)" elif [ -n "$native" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4
-0@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@* Yes, this is unfortunate. A better solution is in the works. */ NORETURN(__fortify_panic) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(__kunit_abort) NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit) NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic) NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail) NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed) NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead) NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error) NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
Quoted 8 lines
36d4fe147c87("x86/bugs: RemoveCONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTOand spectre_bhi=auto")with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
Requested-by Maksim Davydov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>---
Does the KConfig option need to be updated to support this as well? Other than that,
Quoted 76 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9
-3@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation - as needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. This protects the kernel from + both syscalls and VMs. + vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation + available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit + ONLY. On such systems, the host kernel is + protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but + may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks. + off - Disable the mitigation. spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11
-5@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)enum bhi_mitigations {BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ,BHI_MITIGATION_ON , +BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY , }; static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; + else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) { +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + } -/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n" );setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); }static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void )
Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
In reply to Josh PoimboeufI love the idea here, but
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst Spectre variant 2 · line 605
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +3
-0nospectre_v2 + spectre_v2={option} + spectre_v2_user={option} + spectre_bhi={option}
this comes out as just a single line when I run make htmldocs.
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Daniel SneddonQuoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon
Quoted 8 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
36d4fe147c87("x86/bugs: RemoveCONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTOand spectre_bhi=auto")
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
Requested-by Maksim Davydov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>---
Does the KConfig option need to be updated to support this as well?
In general we don't provide a config option for every possible mitigation cmdline option. If someone requests it we could add it later.
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>
Thanks!
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
In reply to Daniel SneddonQuoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon
I love the idea here, but
Review
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-0nospectre_v2 + spectre_v2={option} + spectre_v2_user={option} + spectre_bhi={option}this comes out as just a single line when I run make htmldocs.
Thanks, the below turns it into a bulleted list:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +5 -5
@@ -598,11 +598,11 @@ current CPU. Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel command line with the following options: - nospectre_v1 - nospectre_v2 - spectre_v2={option} - spectre_v2_user={option} - spectre_bhi={option} + - nospectre_v1 + - nospectre_v2 + - spectre_v2={option} + - spectre_v2_user={option} + - spectre_bhi={option} For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Daniel Sneddon
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
Quoted 24 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon
I love the idea here, but
Review
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-0nospectre_v2 + spectre_v2={option} + spectre_v2_user={option} + spectre_bhi={option}this comes out as just a single line when I run make htmldocs.
Thanks, the below turns it into a bulleted list:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +0
-3@@ -598,11 +598,11 @@ current CPU. Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel command line with the following options: - nospectre_v1 - nospectre_v2 - spectre_v2={option}
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst current CPU. · line 608
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +5
-2- spectre_v2_user={option} - spectre_bhi={option} + - nospectre_v1 + - nospectre_v2 + - spectre_v2={option} + - spectre_v2_user={option} + - spectre_bhi={option} For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Looks good.
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 71 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
Requested-by Maksim Davydov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9
-3@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation - as needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. This protects the kernel from + both syscalls and VMs. + vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation + available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit + ONLY. On such systems, the host kernel is + protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but + may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks. + off - Disable the mitigation. spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4
-0@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)enum bhi_mitigations {BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ,BHI_MITIGATION_ON , +BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY , }; static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; + else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) · line 1676
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5
-3return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) { +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + }
nit: How about setting CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT unconditionally, then afterwards checking if MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY is set and if yes simply return, that way you don't duplicate the setup of the VMEXIT code
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-2-/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n" );setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); }static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void )
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
Quoted 12 lines · Nikolay Borisov
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-3@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) {
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) · line 1676
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4
-0+pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + }nit: How about setting
CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXITunconditionally, then afterwards checking ifMITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLYis set and if yes simply return, that way you don't duplicate the setup of the VMEXIT code
I think the duplication actually makes it more readable. In both cases it puts the setting of the features together along with the corresponding pr_info().
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Nikolay Borisov
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
Quoted 22 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 12 lines · Nikolay Borisov
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-3@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) {Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) · line 1676
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4
-0+pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + }nit: How about setting
CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXITunconditionally, then afterwards checking ifMITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLYis set and if yes simply return, that way you don't duplicate the setup of the VMEXIT code
Quoted 3 lines
I think the duplication actually makes it more readable. In both cases it puts the setting of the features together along with the corresponding
pr_info().
Right, my suggestion also meant that setting + pr info will be together, unconditional and if MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY is set we return early, without setting X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP. In any case it's a minor remark, feel free to ignore.
Quoted 1 line
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh PoimboeufHi!
What is the current status of the series?
Quoted 90 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
Requested-by Maksim Davydov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9
-3@@ -6072,9 +6072,15 @@ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation - as needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. This protects the kernel from + both syscalls and VMs. + vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation + available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit + ONLY. On such systems, the host kernel is + protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but + may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks. + off - Disable the mitigation. spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11
-5@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)enum bhi_mitigations {BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ,BHI_MITIGATION_ON , +BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY , }; static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; + else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) { +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + } -/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n" );setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); }static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void )
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Maksim Davydov
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
Quoted 2 lines · Maksim Davydov
Hi!
What is the current status of the series?
Looks like it didn't make the merge window. I can post a new version of the series next week (with the minor documentation fix in patch 2).
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 19 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Sneddon
Quoted 8 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
Requested-by Maksim Davydov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>---
Does the KConfig option need to be updated to support this as well?
Quoted 8 lines
In general we don't provide a config option for every possible mitigation cmdline option. If someone requests it we could add it later.
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>Thanks!
I think it will be useful for us to have appropriate Kconfig option. Could you please add it to the next version?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Maksim Davydov
Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 48 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +5
-2@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); - +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c line 34
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +1
-1@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@ const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL
nit: Am I blind or all the __SYSCALL lines have an extra whitespace?
<snip>
Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Paul E. McKenneyQuoted 12 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 11 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotation
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!
And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?
Thanx, Paul
Quoted 284 lines
Quoted 284 lines
Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6
-4@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); - +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but @@ -28,11 +31,10 @@const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { #include <asm/syscalls_32.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs); -long ia32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6
-3@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but @@ -20,10 +24,9 @@ const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x64_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5
-2@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_x32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3
-3@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # The abi is always "i386" for this file. # 0 i386 restart_syscall sys_restart_syscall -1 i386 exit sys_exit +1 i386 exit sys_exit - noreturn 2 i386 fork sys_fork 3 i386 read sys_read 4 i386 write sys_write@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ 249 i386 io_cancel sys_io_cancel 250 i386 fadvise64 sys_ia32_fadvise64 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim) -252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group +252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 253 i386 lookup_dcookie 254 i386 epoll_create sys_epoll_create 255 i386 epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctlarch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3
-3@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls #@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ 57 common fork sys_fork 58 common vfork sys_vfork 59 64 execve sys_execve -60 common exit sys_exit +60 common exit sys_exit - noreturn 61 common wait4 sys_wait4 62 common kill sys_kill 63 common uname sys_newuname@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ 228 common clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime 229 common clock_getres sys_clock_getres 230 common clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep -231 common exit_group sys_exit_group +231 common exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 232 common epoll_wait sys_epoll_wait 233 common epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl 234 common tgkill sys_tgkillarch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6
-4@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table. @@ -22,15 +26,13 @@#define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall#define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT (nr, native, compat) __SYSCALL(nr, native) +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> };arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7
-4@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table. @@ -18,14 +22,13 @@#define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall#define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL +#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> };scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16
-2@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { - while read nr abi name native compat ; do + while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { nxt=$((nxt + 1)) done - if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then + unset compat + fi + + if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then + if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then + echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column" + exit 1 + fi + if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)" + else + echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)" + fi + elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)" elif [ -n "$native" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4
-0@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@* Yes, this is unfortunate. A better solution is in the works. */ NORETURN(__fortify_panic) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(__kunit_abort) NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit) NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic) NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail) NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed) NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead) NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error) NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Nikolay BorisovQuoted 57 lines · Nikolay Borisov
Quoted 46 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +5
-2@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); - +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c line 34
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +1
-1@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@ const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALLnit: Am I blind or all the
__SYSCALLlines have an extra whitespace?
Quoted 1 line
<snip>
That was a small readability tweak to make '__SYSCALL' vertically aligned:
#define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); #define __SYSCALL_NORETURN(nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); #include <asm/syscalls_32.h>
#undef __SYSCALL
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Paul E. McKenneyQuoted 18 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 17 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 15 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!
And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?
Sorry for my slowness! I'm traveling this week but let me repost this (with your Tested-by) and grab somebody to merge it.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Maksim DavydovQuoted 2 lines · Maksim Davydov
I think it will be useful for us to have appropriate
Kconfigoption. Could you please add it to the next version?
That should probably be a separate patch, something like the below?
arch/x86/Kconfig +33 -4
@@ -2642,17 +2642,46 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS stored in floating point, vector and integer registers. See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst> -config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI - bool "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)" +choice + prompt "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)" depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL - default y + default MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON help Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer indirect branches. + + The compile-time default can be set to on, vmexit, or off, + corresponding to the "spectre_bhi=" cmdline defaults described in + Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst. The cmdline + options can be used to override this compile-time default. + See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst> -endif +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON + bool "on" + help + Enable the HW or SW mitigation as needed. This protects the kernel + from both syscalls and VMs. Equivalent to the spectre_bhi=on cmdline + option. + +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_VMEXIT + bool "vmexit" + help + On systems which don't have the HW mitigation available, enable the + SW mitigation on vmexit ONLY. On such systems, the host kernel is + protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but may still be vulnerable + to syscall attacks. Equivalent to the spectre_bhi=vmexit cmdline + option. + +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_OFF + bool "off" + help + Disable the mitigation. Equivalent to the spectre_bhi=off cmdline + option. +endchoice + +endif # CPU_MITIGATIONS config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES def_bool y
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +7 -2
@@ -1628,8 +1628,13 @@ enum bhi_mitigations { BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY, }; -static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation__ro_after_init = -IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI ) ?BHI_MITIGATION_ON :BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON +static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation__ro_after_init =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; +#elif CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_VMEXIT +static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation__ro_after_init =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT ; +#else +static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation__ro_after_init =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; +#endif static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline (char *str) {
Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 19 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 18 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 17 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 15 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!
And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?
Sorry for my slowness! I'm traveling this week but let me repost this (with your Tested-by) and grab somebody to merge it.
No worries, and thank you!
Thanx, Paul
Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 19 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 18 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 17 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 15 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking those exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Just reaffirming my Tested-by, and thank you!
And just following up, given that I do not yet see this in -next. Any chance of this making the upcoming merge window?
Sorry for my slowness! I'm traveling this week but let me repost this (with your Tested-by) and grab somebody to merge it.
Hi Josh,
I have another BHI related patch which has been reviewed:
[PATCH v2] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/T/#rd3e9a5aadc18931f777b9a9e9c71f1efb178b7ef
Any chance it can be merged as well?
Thanks,
alex.