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fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference - CVE-2009-3547

PATCH In review Shaun Reitan 2 participants 3 messages Nov 22, 2010 VFS

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PATCH 1/1 fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference - CVE-2009-3547

We've been applying this patch since the fix was discovered but i just realized yesterday when building a new kernel that the Xen kernel does not have this fix applied yet.

I also have verified that this exploit works to gain root access on the current http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg branch

Signature · 14 lines
Shaun Retian
Chief Technical Officer
Network Data Center Host, Inc.
http://www.ndchost.com

-- PATCH --

From ad3960243e55320d74195fb85c975e0a8cc4466c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Earl Chew <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 15:55:41 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference

This patch fixes a null pointer exception in pipe_rdwr_open() which
generates the stack trace:
Quoted 6 lines
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028 RIP:
 [<ffffffff802899a5>] pipe_rdwr_open+0x35/0x70
 [<ffffffff8028125c>] __dentry_open+0x13c/0x230
 [<ffffffff8028143d>] do_filp_open+0x2d/0x40
 [<ffffffff802814aa>] do_sys_open+0x5a/0x100
 [<ffffffff8021faf3>] sysenter_do_call+0x1b/0x67

The failure mode is triggered by an attempt to open an anonymous pipe via /proc/pid/fd/* as exemplified by this script:

=============================================================
while : ; do
{ echo y ; sleep 1 ; } | { while read ; do echo z$REPLY; done ; } & PID=$!
OUT=$(ps -efl | grep 'sleep 1' | grep -v grep |
{ read PID REST ; echo $PID; } )
OUT="${OUT%% *}"
DELAY=$((RANDOM * 1000 / 32768))
usleep $((DELAY * 1000 + RANDOM % 1000 ))
echo n > /proc/$OUT/fd/1 # Trigger defect
done
=============================================================

Note that the failure window is quite small and I could only reliably reproduce the defect by inserting a small delay in pipe_rdwr_open(). For example:

static int
pipe_rdwr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)

 {
       msleep(100);
       mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);

Although the defect was observed in pipe_rdwr_open(), I think it makes sense to replicate the change through all the pipe_*_open() functions.

The core of the change is to verify that inode->i_pipe has not been released before attempting to manipulate it. If inode->i_pipe is no longer present, return ENOENT to indicate so.

The comment about potentially using atomic_t for i_pipe->readers and i_pipe->writers has also been removed because it is no longer relevant in this context. The inode->i_mutex lock must be used so that inode->i_pipe can be dealt with correctly.

---
 fs/pipe.c |   41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/pipe.c +30 -11
index 52c4151..ae17d02 100644
@@ -777,36 +777,55 @@ pipe_rdwr_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 static int
 pipe_read_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-       /* We could have perhaps used atomic_t, but this and friends
-          below are the only places.  So it doesn't seem worthwhile.  */
+       int ret = -ENOENT;
+
        mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-       inode->i_pipe->readers++;
+
+       if (inode->i_pipe) {
+               ret = 0;
+               inode->i_pipe->readers++;
+       }
+
        mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
-       return 0;
+       return ret;
 }
 
 static int
 pipe_write_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+       int ret = -ENOENT;
+
        mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-       inode->i_pipe->writers++;
+
+       if (inode->i_pipe) {
+               ret = 0;
+               inode->i_pipe->writers++;
+       }
+
        mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
-       return 0;
+       return ret;
 }
 
 static int
 pipe_rdwr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+       int ret = -ENOENT;
+
        mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-       if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
-               inode->i_pipe->readers++;
-       if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
-               inode->i_pipe->writers++;
+
+       if (inode->i_pipe) {
+               ret = 0;
+               if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+                       inode->i_pipe->readers++;
+               if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+                       inode->i_pipe->writers++;
+       }
+
        mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
-       return 0;
+       return ret;
 }
 
 /*

--
1.7.3.2

#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Shaun Reitan

We've been applying this patch since the fix was discovered but i just realized yesterday when building a new kernel that the Xen kernel does not have this fix applied yet.

I also have verified that this exploit works to gain root access on the current http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg branch

It has to be said, very clearly, that our 2.6.18 tree is only really of use now as a repository of Xen patches for vendors to pull into their own, *properly maintained and secured* kernels. We are very interested in fixing Xen-related security issues in our 2.6.18 tree (precisely because others use it as a repository of good Xen patches). We are less interested in general kernel fixes, although of course as a matter of good form we will consider a security fix such as you propose. However, the patch you supplied does not apply to the 2.6.18 tree.

Thanks,
Keir

#2 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Keir Fraser
Quoted 6 lines · Shaun Reitan

We've been applying this patch since the fix was discovered but i just realized yesterday when building a new kernel that the Xen kernel does not have this fix applied yet.

I also have verified that this exploit works to gain root access on the current http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg branch

It has to be said, very clearly, that our 2.6.18 tree is only really of use now as a repository of Xen patches for vendors to pull into their own, *properly maintained and secured* kernels. We are very interested in fixing Xen-related security issues in our 2.6.18 tree (precisely because others use it as a repository of good Xen patches). We are less interested in general kernel fixes, although of course as a matter of good form we will consider a security fix such as you propose. However, the patch you supplied does not apply to the 2.6.18 tree.

Quoted 2 lines

Thanks,
Keir

I see, good to know, thanks!

Signature · 4 lines
Shaun Retian
Chief Technical Officer
Network Data Center Host, Inc.
http://www.ndchost.com