fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference - CVE-2009-3547
PATCH 1/1 fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference - CVE-2009-3547
We've been applying this patch since the fix was discovered but i just realized yesterday when building a new kernel that the Xen kernel does not have this fix applied yet.
I also have verified that this exploit works to gain root access on the current http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg branch
Signature · 14 lines
Shaun Retian Chief Technical Officer Network Data Center Host, Inc. http://www.ndchost.com -- PATCH -- From ad3960243e55320d74195fb85c975e0a8cc4466c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Earl Chew <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 15:55:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference This patch fixes a null pointer exception in pipe_rdwr_open() which generates the stack trace:
Quoted 6 lines
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028 RIP: [<ffffffff802899a5>] pipe_rdwr_open+0x35/0x70 [<ffffffff8028125c>] __dentry_open+0x13c/0x230 [<ffffffff8028143d>] do_filp_open+0x2d/0x40 [<ffffffff802814aa>] do_sys_open+0x5a/0x100 [<ffffffff8021faf3>] sysenter_do_call+0x1b/0x67
The failure mode is triggered by an attempt to open an anonymous pipe via /proc/pid/fd/* as exemplified by this script:
=============================================================
while : ; do
{ echo y ; sleep 1 ; } | { while read ; do echo z$REPLY; done ; } & PID=$!
OUT=$(ps -efl | grep 'sleep 1' | grep -v grep |
{ read PID REST ; echo $PID; } )
OUT="${OUT%% *}"
DELAY=$((RANDOM * 1000 / 32768))
usleep $((DELAY * 1000 + RANDOM % 1000 ))
echo n > /proc/$OUT/fd/1 # Trigger defect
done
=============================================================
Note that the failure window is quite small and I could only reliably reproduce the defect by inserting a small delay in pipe_rdwr_open(). For example:
static int
pipe_rdwr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
msleep(100);
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);Although the defect was observed in pipe_rdwr_open(), I think it makes sense to replicate the change through all the pipe_*_open() functions.
The core of the change is to verify that inode->i_pipe has not been released before attempting to manipulate it. If inode->i_pipe is no longer present, return ENOENT to indicate so.
The comment about potentially using atomic_t for i_pipe->readers and i_pipe->writers has also been removed because it is no longer relevant in this context. The inode->i_mutex lock must be used so that inode->i_pipe can be dealt with correctly.
--- fs/pipe.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/pipe.c +30 -11
@@ -777,36 +777,55 @@ pipe_rdwr_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)static int pipe_read_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) { -/* We could have perhaps used atomic_t, but this and friends -below are the only places. So it doesn't seem worthwhile. */ +int ret = -ENOENT ; +mutex_lock (&inode->i_mutex); - inode->i_pipe->readers++; + +if (inode->i_pipe) { + ret =0 ; + inode->i_pipe->readers++; + } +mutex_unlock (&inode->i_mutex); -return 0 ; +return ret; }static int pipe_write_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) { +int ret = -ENOENT ; +mutex_lock (&inode->i_mutex); - inode->i_pipe->writers++; + +if (inode->i_pipe) { + ret =0 ; + inode->i_pipe->writers++; + } +mutex_unlock (&inode->i_mutex); -return 0 ; +return ret; }static int pipe_rdwr_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) { +int ret = -ENOENT ; +mutex_lock (&inode->i_mutex); -if (filp->f_mode &FMODE_READ ) - inode->i_pipe->readers++; -if (filp->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE ) - inode->i_pipe->writers++; + +if (inode->i_pipe) { + ret =0 ; +if (filp->f_mode &FMODE_READ ) + inode->i_pipe->readers++; +if (filp->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE ) + inode->i_pipe->writers++; + } +mutex_unlock (&inode->i_mutex); -return 0 ; +return ret; }/*
--
1.7.3.2
Quoted 6 lines · Shaun Reitan
We've been applying this patch since the fix was discovered but i just realized yesterday when building a new kernel that the Xen kernel does not have this fix applied yet.
I also have verified that this exploit works to gain root access on the current http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg branch
It has to be said, very clearly, that our 2.6.18 tree is only really of use now as a repository of Xen patches for vendors to pull into their own, *properly maintained and secured* kernels. We are very interested in fixing Xen-related security issues in our 2.6.18 tree (precisely because others use it as a repository of good Xen patches). We are less interested in general kernel fixes, although of course as a matter of good form we will consider a security fix such as you propose. However, the patch you supplied does not apply to the 2.6.18 tree.
Thanks,
Keir
Quoted 18 lines · Keir Fraser
Quoted 6 lines · Shaun Reitan
We've been applying this patch since the fix was discovered but i just realized yesterday when building a new kernel that the Xen kernel does not have this fix applied yet.
I also have verified that this exploit works to gain root access on the current http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg branch
It has to be said, very clearly, that our 2.6.18 tree is only really of use now as a repository of Xen patches for vendors to pull into their own, *properly maintained and secured* kernels. We are very interested in fixing Xen-related security issues in our 2.6.18 tree (precisely because others use it as a repository of good Xen patches). We are less interested in general kernel fixes, although of course as a matter of good form we will consider a security fix such as you propose. However, the patch you supplied does not apply to the 2.6.18 tree.
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks,
Keir
I see, good to know, thanks!
Signature · 4 lines
Shaun Retian Chief Technical Officer Network Data Center Host, Inc. http://www.ndchost.com