x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
PATCH v3 1/1 x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The idx can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array.
Signed-off-by Dianzhang Chen <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +7 -2
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@#include <linux/user.h> #include <linux/regset.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, struct user_desc __user *u_info) {struct user_desc info; +int index;if (idx ==-1 &&get_user (idx, &u_info->entry_number))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,if (idx <GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx >GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX )return -EINVAL ; -fill_user_desc (&info, idx, - &p->thread.tls_array[idx -GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN ]); + index = idx -GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN ; + index =array_index_nospec (index, +GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX -GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN +1 ); + +fill_user_desc (&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);if (copy_to_user (u_info, &info,sizeof (info)))return -EFAULT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
tip-bot for Dianzhang Chen
merge botx86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
Commit-ID: 993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b Author: Dianzhang Chen <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 12:50:30 +0800 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> CommitDate: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 23:48:04 +0200
x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The index can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access the p->thread.tls_array.
Signed-off-by Dianzhang Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +7 -2
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@#include <linux/user.h> #include <linux/regset.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, struct user_desc __user *u_info) {struct user_desc info; +int index;if (idx ==-1 &&get_user (idx, &u_info->entry_number))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,if (idx <GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx >GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX )return -EINVAL ; -fill_user_desc (&info, idx, - &p->thread.tls_array[idx -GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN ]); + index = idx -GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN ; + index =array_index_nospec (index, +GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX -GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN +1 ); + +fill_user_desc (&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);if (copy_to_user (u_info, &info,sizeof (info)))return -EFAULT ;