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virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container

Stefan Hajnoczi qemu-devel virtio-fs 2 versions – In review

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  1. v2 Latest3 patches 19 repliesIn review
  2. v13 patches 20 repliesSuperseded

Changes in v2 from the cover letter

* Update virtiofsd.rst documentation on sandboxing modes
* Change syntax to -o sandbox=namespace|chroot
* Add comment explaining that unshare(CLONE_FS) has no visible side-effect while single-threaded
* xfstests and pjdfstest pass. Did not run tests on overlayfs because required xattrs do not work without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Patches in v2 No applies recorded yet

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/3virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCHtools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c+0 -10 replies
2/3virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot optiondocs/tools/virtiofsd.rst tools/virtiofsd/helper.c tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c+88 -91 reply
3/3virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an errortools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c+16 -017 replies

Reviews trailers per patch

2 of 3 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.

PatchDr. David Alan GilbertMisono Tomohiro
1/3R-b
2/3
3/3R-b

Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.

Read the v2 thread

Cover letter [PATCH v2 0/3] virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container

v2:
* Update virtiofsd.rst documentation on sandboxing modes
* Change syntax to -o sandbox=namespace|chroot
* Add comment explaining that unshare(CLONE_FS) has no visible side-effect while single-threaded
* xfstests and pjdfstest pass. Did not run tests on overlayfs because required xattrs do not work without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Mrunal and Dan: This patch series adds a sandboxing mode where virtiofsd relies on the container runtime for isolation. It only does chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), seccomp, and drops Linux capabilities. Previously it created a new mount, pid, and net namespace but cannot do this without CAP_SYS_ADMIN when run inside a container. pivot_root("path/to/shared-dir") has been replaced with chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), again because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is unavailable. The point of the chroot() is to prevent escapes from the shared directory during path traversal. Does this ring any alarm bells or does it sound sane?

Container runtimes handle namespace setup and remove privileges needed by virtiofsd to perform sandboxing. Luckily the container environment already provides most of the sandbox that virtiofsd needs for security.

Introduce a new "virtiofsd -o sandbox=chroot" option that uses chroot(2) instead of namespaces. This option allows virtiofsd to work inside a container.

Please see the individual patches for details on the changes and security implications.

Given that people are starting to attempt running virtiofsd in containers I think this should go into QEMU 5.1.

Stefan Hajnoczi (3):
virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot option
virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c    | 16 +++++++++
 tools/virtiofsd/helper.c         |  8 +++++
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst         | 32 ++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2