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virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container

PATCH In review Stefan Hajnoczi 7 participants 23 messages Jul 27, 2020 – Aug 27, 2020

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container

v2:
* Update virtiofsd.rst documentation on sandboxing modes
* Change syntax to -o sandbox=namespace|chroot
* Add comment explaining that unshare(CLONE_FS) has no visible side-effect while single-threaded
* xfstests and pjdfstest pass. Did not run tests on overlayfs because required xattrs do not work without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Mrunal and Dan: This patch series adds a sandboxing mode where virtiofsd relies on the container runtime for isolation. It only does chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), seccomp, and drops Linux capabilities. Previously it created a new mount, pid, and net namespace but cannot do this without CAP_SYS_ADMIN when run inside a container. pivot_root("path/to/shared-dir") has been replaced with chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), again because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is unavailable. The point of the chroot() is to prevent escapes from the shared directory during path traversal. Does this ring any alarm bells or does it sound sane?

Container runtimes handle namespace setup and remove privileges needed by virtiofsd to perform sandboxing. Luckily the container environment already provides most of the sandbox that virtiofsd needs for security.

Introduce a new "virtiofsd -o sandbox=chroot" option that uses chroot(2) instead of namespaces. This option allows virtiofsd to work inside a container.

Please see the individual patches for details on the changes and security implications.

Given that people are starting to attempt running virtiofsd in containers I think this should go into QEMU 5.1.

Stefan Hajnoczi (3):
virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot option
virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c    | 16 +++++++++
 tools/virtiofsd/helper.c         |  8 +++++
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst         | 32 ++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/3 virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH

virtiofsd does not need CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH because it already has the more powerful CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. Drop it from the list of capabilities.

This is important because container runtimes may not include CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH by default. This patch allows virtiofsd to reduce its capabilities when running inside a Docker container.

Note that CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH may be necessary again in the future if virtiofsd starts using open_by_handle_at(2).

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -1
index 94e0de2d2b..50a164a599 100644
@@ -2596,7 +2596,6 @@ static void setup_capabilities(char *modcaps_in)
     if (capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE,
             CAP_CHOWN,
             CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
-            CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
             CAP_FOWNER,
             CAP_FSETID,
             CAP_SETGID,
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/3 virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot option

In reply to Stefan Hajnoczi

virtiofsd cannot run in a container because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to create namespaces.

Introduce a weaker sandbox mode that is sufficient in container environments because the container runtime already sets up namespaces. Use chroot to restrict path traversal to the shared directory.

virtiofsd loses the following:

1. Mount namespace. The process chroots to the shared directory but leaves the mounts in place. Seccomp rejects mount(2)/umount(2) syscalls.

2. Pid namespace. This should be fine because virtiofsd is the only process running in the container.

3. Network namespace. This should be fine because seccomp already rejects the connect(2) syscall, but an additional layer of security is lost. Container runtime-specific network security policies can be used drop network traffic (except for the vhost-user UNIX domain socket).

---
 tools/virtiofsd/helper.c         |  8 +++++
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst         | 32 ++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
tools/virtiofsd/helper.c +8 -0
index 3105b6c23a..91dcb23664 100644
@@ -168,6 +168,14 @@ void fuse_cmdline_help(void)
            "                               enable/disable readirplus\n"
            "                               default: readdirplus except with "
            "cache=none\n"
+           "    -o sandbox=namespace|chroot\n"
+           "                               sandboxing mode:\n"
+           "                               - namespace: mount, pid, and net\n"
+           "                                 namespaces with pivot_root(2)\n"
+           "                                 into shared directory\n"
+           "                               - chroot: chroot(2) into shared\n"
+           "                                 directory (use in containers)\n"
+           "                               default: namespace\n"
            "    -o timeout=<number>        I/O timeout (seconds)\n"
            "                               default: depends on cache= option.\n"
            "    -o writeback|no_writeback  enable/disable writeback cache\n"
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +55 -2

89 lines not on this page · raw message

docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +25 -7
index 824e713491..40629f95ae 100644
@@ -17,13 +17,24 @@ This program is designed to work with QEMU's ``--device vhost-user-fs-pci``
 but should work with any virtual machine monitor (VMM) that supports
 vhost-user.  See the Examples section below.
 
-This program must be run as the root user.  Upon startup the program will
-switch into a new file system namespace with the shared directory tree as its
-root.  This prevents "file system escapes" due to symlinks and other file
-system objects that might lead to files outside the shared directory.  The
-program also sandboxes itself using seccomp(2) to prevent ptrace(2) and other
-vectors that could allow an attacker to compromise the system after gaining
-control of the virtiofsd process.
+This program must be run as the root user.  The program drops privileges where
+possible during startup although it must be able to create and access files
+with any uid/gid:
+
+* The ability to invoke syscalls is limited using seccomp(2).
+* Linux capabilities(7) are dropped.
+
+In "namespace" sandbox mode the program switches into a new file system
+namespace and invokes pivot_root(2) to make the shared directory tree its root.
+A new pid and net namespace is also created to isolate the process.
+
+In "chroot" sandbox mode the program invokes chroot(2) to make the shared
+directory tree its root. This mode is intended for container environments where
+the container runtime has already set up the namespaces and the program does
+not have permission to create namespaces itself.
+
+Both sandbox modes prevent "file system escapes" due to symlinks and other file
+system objects that might lead to files outside the shared directory.
 
 Options
 -------
@@ -72,6 +83,13 @@ Options
   * readdirplus|no_readdirplus -
     Enable/disable readdirplus.  The default is ``readdirplus``.
 
+  * sandbox=namespace|chroot -
+    Sandbox mode:
+    - namespace: Create mount, pid, and net namespaces and pivot_root(2) into
+    the shared directory.
+    - chroot: chroot(2) into shared directory (use in containers).
+    The default is "namespace".
+
   * source=PATH -
     Share host directory tree located at PATH.  This option is required.
 
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot option

Quoted 16 lines · * Stefan Hajnoczi ([email protected]) wrote:

virtiofsd cannot run in a container because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to create namespaces.

Introduce a weaker sandbox mode that is sufficient in container environments because the container runtime already sets up namespaces. Use chroot to restrict path traversal to the shared directory.

virtiofsd loses the following:

1. Mount namespace. The process chroots to the shared directory but leaves the mounts in place. Seccomp rejects mount(2)/umount(2) syscalls.

2. Pid namespace. This should be fine because virtiofsd is the only process running in the container.

Quoted 7 lines

3. Network namespace. This should be fine because seccomp already rejects the connect(2) syscall, but an additional layer of security is lost. Container runtime-specific network security policies can be used drop network traffic (except for the vhost-user UNIX domain socket).

Is there anyone with a bit more FS semantics expertise who could check this; I already surprised myself a few times reading about chroot escapes, so I'd appreciate a 2nd pair of eyes.

Dave

Quoted 176 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/helper.c         |  8 +++++
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst         | 32 ++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
tools/virtiofsd/helper.c +8 -0
index 3105b6c23a..91dcb23664 100644
@@ -168,6 +168,14 @@ void fuse_cmdline_help(void)
            "                               enable/disable readirplus\n"
            "                               default: readdirplus except with "
            "cache=none\n"
+           "    -o sandbox=namespace|chroot\n"
+           "                               sandboxing mode:\n"
+           "                               - namespace: mount, pid, and net\n"
+           "                                 namespaces with pivot_root(2)\n"
+           "                                 into shared directory\n"
+           "                               - chroot: chroot(2) into shared\n"
+           "                                 directory (use in containers)\n"
+           "                               default: namespace\n"
            "    -o timeout=<number>        I/O timeout (seconds)\n"
            "                               default: depends on cache= option.\n"
            "    -o writeback|no_writeback  enable/disable writeback cache\n"
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +55 -2
index 50a164a599..a7894c3e7c 100644
@@ -137,8 +137,14 @@ enum {
     CACHE_ALWAYS,
 };
 
+enum {
+    SANDBOX_NAMESPACE,
+    SANDBOX_CHROOT,
+};
+
 struct lo_data {
     pthread_mutex_t mutex;
+    int sandbox;
     int debug;
     int writeback;
     int flock;
@@ -162,6 +168,12 @@ struct lo_data {
 };
 
 static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
+    { "sandbox=namespace",
+      offsetof(struct lo_data, sandbox),
+      SANDBOX_NAMESPACE },
+    { "sandbox=chroot",
+      offsetof(struct lo_data, sandbox),
+      SANDBOX_CHROOT },
     { "writeback", offsetof(struct lo_data, writeback), 1 },
     { "no_writeback", offsetof(struct lo_data, writeback), 0 },
     { "source=%s", offsetof(struct lo_data, source), 0 },
@@ -2665,6 +2677,41 @@ static void setup_capabilities(char *modcaps_in)
     pthread_mutex_unlock(&cap.mutex);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Use chroot as a weaker sandbox for environments where the process is
+ * launched without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+ */
+static void setup_chroot(struct lo_data *lo)
+{
+    lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc/self/fd", O_PATH);
+    if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(\"/proc/self/fd\", O_PATH): %m\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Make the shared directory the file system root so that FUSE_OPEN
+     * (lo_open()) cannot escape the shared directory by opening a symlink.
+     *
+     * The chroot(2) syscall is later disabled by seccomp and the
+     * CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability is dropped so that tampering with the chroot
+     * is not possible.
+     *
+     * However, it's still possible to escape the chroot via lo->proc_self_fd
+     * but that requires first gaining control of the process.
+     */
+    if (chroot(lo->source) != 0) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "chroot(\"%s\"): %m\n", lo->source);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    /* Move into the chroot */
+    if (chdir("/") != 0) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "chdir(\"/\"): %m\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Lock down this process to prevent access to other processes or files outside
  * source directory.  This reduces the impact of arbitrary code execution bugs.
@@ -2672,8 +2719,13 @@ static void setup_capabilities(char *modcaps_in)
 static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se,
                           bool enable_syslog)
 {
-    setup_namespaces(lo, se);
-    setup_mounts(lo->source);
+    if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_NAMESPACE) {
+        setup_namespaces(lo, se);
+        setup_mounts(lo->source);
+    } else {
+        setup_chroot(lo);
+    }
+
     setup_seccomp(enable_syslog);
     setup_capabilities(g_strdup(lo->modcaps));
 }
@@ -2820,6 +2872,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
     struct fuse_session *se;
     struct fuse_cmdline_opts opts;
     struct lo_data lo = {
+        .sandbox = SANDBOX_NAMESPACE,
         .debug = 0,
         .writeback = 0,
         .posix_lock = 1,
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +25 -7
index 824e713491..40629f95ae 100644
@@ -17,13 +17,24 @@ This program is designed to work with QEMU's ``--device vhost-user-fs-pci``
 but should work with any virtual machine monitor (VMM) that supports
 vhost-user.  See the Examples section below.
 
-This program must be run as the root user.  Upon startup the program will
-switch into a new file system namespace with the shared directory tree as its
-root.  This prevents "file system escapes" due to symlinks and other file
-system objects that might lead to files outside the shared directory.  The
-program also sandboxes itself using seccomp(2) to prevent ptrace(2) and other
-vectors that could allow an attacker to compromise the system after gaining
-control of the virtiofsd process.
+This program must be run as the root user.  The program drops privileges where
+possible during startup although it must be able to create and access files
+with any uid/gid:
+
+* The ability to invoke syscalls is limited using seccomp(2).
+* Linux capabilities(7) are dropped.
+
+In "namespace" sandbox mode the program switches into a new file system
+namespace and invokes pivot_root(2) to make the shared directory tree its root.
+A new pid and net namespace is also created to isolate the process.
+
+In "chroot" sandbox mode the program invokes chroot(2) to make the shared
+directory tree its root. This mode is intended for container environments where
+the container runtime has already set up the namespaces and the program does
+not have permission to create namespaces itself.
+
+Both sandbox modes prevent "file system escapes" due to symlinks and other file
+system objects that might lead to files outside the shared directory.
 
 Options
 -------
@@ -72,6 +83,13 @@ Options
   * readdirplus|no_readdirplus -
     Enable/disable readdirplus.  The default is ``readdirplus``.
 
+  * sandbox=namespace|chroot -
+    Sandbox mode:
+    - namespace: Create mount, pid, and net namespaces and pivot_root(2) into
+    the shared directory.
+    - chroot: chroot(2) into shared directory (use in containers).
+    The default is "namespace".
+
   * source=PATH -
     Share host directory tree located at PATH.  This option is required.
 
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

In reply to Stefan Hajnoczi

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +16 -0
index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will need it. It's
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are known to
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall has no
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with EPERM. If "
+                "running in a container please check that the container "
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Reviewed-by Misono Tomohiro on v2 3/3
#5 lore raw

RE: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 6 lines

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Quoted 7 lines

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

So, it looks good to me.

Regards,
Misono

Quoted 36 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +16 -1
index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will need it. It's
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are known to
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall has no
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with EPERM. If "
+                "running in a container please check that the container "
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
--

2.26.2

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 16 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 9 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 3 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something which k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

Best Regards,
Roman

Quoted 50 lines

So, it looks good to me.

Regards,
Misono

Review

Quoted 8 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 953

Quoted 9 lines

index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +2 -0
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will need

it. It's

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 954

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are

known to

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 3 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +3 -0
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall

has no

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 5 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +5 -0
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with EPERM. If

"

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 963

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+                "running in a container please check that the container

"

Quoted 9 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +4 -1
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
--

2.26.2

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 29 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 16 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 9 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 3 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

Quoted 6 lines

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

But cri-o and docker containers run as root, isn't it? (or atleast have the capability to run as root). Havind said that, it will be nice to be able to run virtiofsd without root.

There are few hurdles though.

- For file creation, we switch uid/gid (seteuid/setegid) and that seems to require root. If we were to run unpriviliged, probably all files on host will have to be owned by unpriviliged user and guest visible uid/gid will have to be stored in xattrs. I think virtfs supports something similar.

I am sure there are other restrictions but this probably is the biggest one to overcome.

Quoted 3 lines

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something which k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

Or may be issue is that standard seccomp.json does not allow unshare() and hence you are forced to use a non-standar seccomp.json.

Vivek

Quoted 55 lines

Best Regards,
Roman

Quoted 50 lines

So, it looks good to me.

Regards,
Misono

Review

Quoted 8 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 953

Quoted 9 lines

index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +2 -0
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will need

it. It's

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 954

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are

known to

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 3 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +3 -0
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall

has no

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 5 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +5 -0
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with EPERM. If

"

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 963

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+                "running in a container please check that the container

"

Quoted 9 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +4 -1
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
--

2.26.2

#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 41 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 29 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 16 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 9 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 3 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

Quoted 6 lines

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

But cri-o and docker containers run as root, isn't it? (or atleast have the capability to run as root). Havind said that, it will be nice to be able to run virtiofsd without root.

Quoted 7 lines

There are few hurdles though.

- For file creation, we switch uid/gid (seteuid/setegid) and that seems to require root. If we were to run unpriviliged, probably all files on host will have to be owned by unpriviliged user and guest visible uid/gid will have to be stored in xattrs. I think virtfs supports something similar.

I think I've mentioned before, 9p virtfs supports different modes, passthrough, squashed or remapped.

passthrough should be reasonably straightforward to support in virtiofs. The guest sees all the host UID/GIDs ownership as normal, and can read any files the host user can read, but are obviously restricted to write to only the files that host user can write too. No DAC-OVERRIDE facility in essence. You'll just get EPERM, which is fine. This simple passthrough scenario would be just what's desired for a typical desktop virt use cases, where you want to share part/all of your home dir with a guest for easy file access. Personally this is the mode I'd be most interested in seeing provided for unprivileged virtiofsd usage.

squash is similar to passthrough, except the guest sees everything as owned by the same user. This can be surprising as the guest might see a file owned by them, but not be able to write to it, as on the host its actually owned by some other user. Fairly niche use case I think.

remapping would be needed for a more general purpose use cases allowing the guest to do arbitrary UID/GID changes, but on the host everything is still stored as one user and remapped somehow.

The main challenge for all the unprivileged scenarios is safety of the sandbox, to avoid risk of guests escaping to access files outside of the exported dir via symlink attacks or similar.

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 53 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 41 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 29 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 16 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 9 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 3 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

Quoted 6 lines

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

But cri-o and docker containers run as root, isn't it? (or atleast have the capability to run as root). Havind said that, it will be nice to be able to run virtiofsd without root.

Quoted 7 lines

There are few hurdles though.

- For file creation, we switch uid/gid (seteuid/setegid) and that seems to require root. If we were to run unpriviliged, probably all files on host will have to be owned by unpriviliged user and guest visible uid/gid will have to be stored in xattrs. I think virtfs supports something similar.

I think I've mentioned before, 9p virtfs supports different modes, passthrough, squashed or remapped.

Quoted 9 lines

passthrough should be reasonably straightforward to support in virtiofs. The guest sees all the host UID/GIDs ownership as normal, and can read any files the host user can read, but are obviously restricted to write to only the files that host user can write too. No DAC-OVERRIDE facility in essence. You'll just get EPERM, which is fine. This simple passthrough scenario would be just what's desired for a typical desktop virt use cases, where you want to share part/all of your home dir with a guest for easy file access. Personally this is the mode I'd be most interested in seeing provided for unprivileged virtiofsd usage.

Interesting. So passthrough will have two sub modes. priviliged and unpriviliged. As of now we support priviliged passthrough.

I guess it does make sense to look into unpriviliged passthrough and see what other operations will not be allowed.

Thanks
Vivek

Quoted 23 lines

squash is similar to passthrough, except the guest sees everything as owned by the same user. This can be surprising as the guest might see a file owned by them, but not be able to write to it, as on the host its actually owned by some other user. Fairly niche use case I think.

remapping would be needed for a more general purpose use cases allowing the guest to do arbitrary UID/GID changes, but on the host everything is still stored as one user and remapped somehow.

The main challenge for all the unprivileged scenarios is safety of the sandbox, to avoid risk of guests escaping to access files outside of the exported dir via symlink attacks or similar.

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

In reply to Vivek Goyal
Quoted 39 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 26 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 13 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 8 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 2 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

Quoted 6 lines

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

But cri-o and docker containers run as root, isn't it? (or atleast have the capability to run as root). Havind said that, it will be nice to be able to run virtiofsd without root.

There are few hurdles though.

Quoted 10 lines

- For file creation, we switch uid/gid (seteuid/setegid) and that seems to require root. If we were to run unpriviliged, probably all files on host will have to be owned by unpriviliged user and guest visible uid/gid will have to be stored in xattrs. I think virtfs supports something similar.

I am sure there are other restrictions but this probably is the biggest one to overcome.

Quoted 1 line

You should be able to run it within a user namespace with Namespaces capabilities.

Quoted 59 lines
Quoted 2 lines

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something which k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

Or may be issue is that standard seccomp.json does not allow unshare() and hence you are forced to use a non-standar seccomp.json.

Vivek

Quoted 52 lines

Best Regards,
Roman

Quoted 48 lines

So, it looks good to me.

Regards,
Misono

Review

Quoted 7 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 953

Quoted 9 lines

index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +2 -0
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will need

it. It's

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 954

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are

known to

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 3 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +3 -0
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall

has no

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 5 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +5 -0
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with EPERM. If

"

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 963

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+                "running in a container please check that the container

"

Quoted 9 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +4 -1
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
--

2.26.2

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 46 lines · Daniel Walsh
Quoted 45 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 26 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 13 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 8 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 2 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

Quoted 6 lines

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

But cri-o and docker containers run as root, isn't it? (or atleast have the capability to run as root). Havind said that, it will be nice to be able to run virtiofsd without root.

There are few hurdles though.

- For file creation, we switch uid/gid (seteuid/setegid) and that seems to require root. If we were to run unpriviliged, probably all files on host will have to be owned by unpriviliged user and guest visible uid/gid will have to be stored in xattrs. I think virtfs supports something similar.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I am sure there are other restrictions but this probably is the biggest one to overcome.

Quoted 1 line

You should be able to run it within a user namespace with Namespaces capabilities.

User namespaces has always been a one TODO item. Few challenges are how to manage uid/gid mapping for existing directories which will be shared. We will have to pick a mapping range and then chown the files accordingly. And chowning itself will require priviliges.

Now Stefan is adding support to run virtiofsd inside container. So podman should be able virtiofsd inside a user namespace (And even give CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That way we don't have to worry about setting a user namespace and select a mapping etc. But persistent data volumes will continue to be an issue with user namespace, right?

How are you dealing with it in podman. Containers running in user namespace and with volume mounts.

Vivek

Quoted 60 lines
Quoted 59 lines
Quoted 2 lines

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something which k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

Or may be issue is that standard seccomp.json does not allow unshare() and hence you are forced to use a non-standar seccomp.json.

Vivek

Quoted 52 lines

Best Regards,
Roman

Quoted 48 lines

So, it looks good to me.

Regards,
Misono

Review

Quoted 7 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 953

Quoted 9 lines

index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +2 -0
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will need

it. It's

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 954

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are

known to

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 3 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +3 -0
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall

has no

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 5 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +5 -0
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with EPERM. If

"

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se) · line 963

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+                "running in a container please check that the container

"

Quoted 9 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +4 -1
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
--

2.26.2

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

In reply to Vivek Goyal
Quoted 42 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 4 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print

an

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

error

Quoted 3 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem

can

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the

seccomp.json

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines

list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if

the

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series

(an

Quoted 3 lines

acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in

Quoted 8 lines

containers

Quoted 1 line

should work for cri-o and docker.

But cri-o and docker containers run as root, isn't it? (or atleast have the capability to run as root). Havind said that, it will be nice to be able
to run virtiofsd without root.

Yes they can run as root. I can tell you what we plan to do with the containerized virtiofsd: We run it as part of the user-owned pod (a set of containers).
One of our main goals at the moment is to run VMs in a user-owned pod without additional privileges.
So that in case the user (VM-creator/owner) enters the pod or something breaks out of the VM they are just in the unprivileged container sandbox. As part of that we try to get also rid of running containers in the user-context with the root user.

One possible scenario which I could think of as being desirable from a kubevirt perspective:
We would run the VM in one container and have an unprivileged virtiofsd container in parallel.
This container already has its own mount namespace and it is not that critical if something manages to enter this sandbox.

But we are not as far yet as getting completely rid of root right now in kubevirt, so if as a temporary step it needs root, the current proposed changes would still be very useful for us.

Best Regards,
Roman

There are few hurdles though.

Quoted 82 lines

- For file creation, we switch uid/gid (seteuid/setegid) and that seems to require root. If we were to run unpriviliged, probably all files on host will have to be owned by unpriviliged user and guest visible uid/gid will have to be stored in xattrs. I think virtfs supports something similar.

I am sure there are other restrictions but this probably is the biggest one to overcome.

Quoted 2 lines

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something

which

Quoted 1 line

k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

Or may be issue is that standard seccomp.json does not allow unshare() and hence you are forced to use a non-standar seccomp.json.

Vivek

Quoted 18 lines

Best Regards,
Roman

Quoted 13 lines

So, it looks good to me.

Regards,
Misono

Quoted 7 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Review

Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session

Quoted 4 lines

index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +0 -0
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session

*se)

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)

Quoted 5 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +2 -0
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will

need

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

it. It's

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session · line 954

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are

known to

Quoted 3 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +3 -0
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

has no

Quoted 5 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +5 -0
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with

EPERM. If

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

"

Quoted 1 line
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +1 -0
+                "running in a container please check that the

container

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines

"

Quoted 9 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +4 -1
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
--

2.26.2

#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 26 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 7 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 4 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print

an

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

error

Yes they can run as root. I can tell you what we plan to do with the containerized virtiofsd: We run it as part of the user-owned pod (a set of containers).
One of our main goals at the moment is to run VMs in a user-owned pod without additional privileges.
So that in case the user (VM-creator/owner) enters the pod or something breaks out of the VM they are just in the unprivileged container sandbox. As part of that we try to get also rid of running containers in the user-context with the root user.

One possible scenario which I could think of as being desirable from a kubevirt perspective:
We would run the VM in one container and have an unprivileged virtiofsd container in parallel.
This container already has its own mount namespace and it is not that critical if something manages to enter this sandbox.

Quoted 3 lines

But we are not as far yet as getting completely rid of root right now in kubevirt, so if as a temporary step it needs root, the current proposed changes would still be very useful for us.

What is the issue with root in user namespaces?

I remember a few years ago it was seen as a major security issue but don't remember if container runtimes were already using user namespaces back then.

I guess the goal might be simply to minimize Linux capabilities as much as possible?

virtiofsd could nominally run with an arbitrary uid/gid but it still needs the Linux capabilities that allow it to change uid/gid and override file system permission checks just like the root user. Not sure if there is any advantage to running with uid 1000 when you still have these Linux capabilities.

Stefan

#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 39 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 26 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 7 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 4 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print

an

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

error

Yes they can run as root. I can tell you what we plan to do with the containerized virtiofsd: We run it as part of the user-owned pod (a set of containers).
One of our main goals at the moment is to run VMs in a user-owned pod without additional privileges.
So that in case the user (VM-creator/owner) enters the pod or something breaks out of the VM they are just in the unprivileged container sandbox. As part of that we try to get also rid of running containers in the user-context with the root user.

One possible scenario which I could think of as being desirable from a kubevirt perspective:
We would run the VM in one container and have an unprivileged virtiofsd container in parallel.
This container already has its own mount namespace and it is not that critical if something manages to enter this sandbox.

Quoted 3 lines

But we are not as far yet as getting completely rid of root right now in kubevirt, so if as a temporary step it needs root, the current proposed changes would still be very useful for us.

What is the issue with root in user namespaces?

I remember a few years ago it was seen as a major security issue but don't remember if container runtimes were already using user namespaces back then.

I guess the goal might be simply to minimize Linux capabilities as much as possible?

Quoted 7 lines

virtiofsd could nominally run with an arbitrary uid/gid but it still needs the Linux capabilities that allow it to change uid/gid and override file system permission checks just like the root user. Not sure if there is any advantage to running with uid 1000 when you still have these Linux capabilities.

Stefan

When you run in a user namespace, virtiofsd would only have setuid/setgid over the range of UIDs mapped into the user namespace.  So if UID=0 on the host is not mapped, then the container can not create real UID=0 files on disk.

Similarly you can protect the user directories and any content by running the containers in a really high UID Mapping.

#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 48 lines · Daniel Walsh
Quoted 39 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 26 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 7 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 4 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print

an

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

error

Yes they can run as root. I can tell you what we plan to do with the containerized virtiofsd: We run it as part of the user-owned pod (a set of containers).
One of our main goals at the moment is to run VMs in a user-owned pod without additional privileges.
So that in case the user (VM-creator/owner) enters the pod or something breaks out of the VM they are just in the unprivileged container sandbox. As part of that we try to get also rid of running containers in the user-context with the root user.

One possible scenario which I could think of as being desirable from a kubevirt perspective:
We would run the VM in one container and have an unprivileged virtiofsd container in parallel.
This container already has its own mount namespace and it is not that critical if something manages to enter this sandbox.

Quoted 3 lines

But we are not as far yet as getting completely rid of root right now in kubevirt, so if as a temporary step it needs root, the current proposed changes would still be very useful for us.

What is the issue with root in user namespaces?

I remember a few years ago it was seen as a major security issue but don't remember if container runtimes were already using user namespaces back then.

I guess the goal might be simply to minimize Linux capabilities as much as possible?

Quoted 7 lines

virtiofsd could nominally run with an arbitrary uid/gid but it still needs the Linux capabilities that allow it to change uid/gid and override file system permission checks just like the root user. Not sure if there is any advantage to running with uid 1000 when you still have these Linux capabilities.

Stefan

Quoted 7 lines

When you run in a user namespace, virtiofsd would only have setuid/setgid over the range of UIDs mapped into the user namespace.  So if UID=0 on the host is not mapped, then the container can not create real UID=0 files on disk.

Similarly you can protect the user directories and any content by running the containers in a really high UID Mapping.

Roman, do user namespaces address your concerns about uid 0 in containers?

Stefan

#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 62 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 3 lines · Daniel Walsh
Quoted 2 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 1 line · Roman Mohr

On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:13 PM Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>

Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and

print

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

an

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

error

Yes they can run as root. I can tell you what we plan to do with the containerized virtiofsd: We run it as part of the user-owned pod (a

set of

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

containers).
One of our main goals at the moment is to run VMs in a user-owned pod without additional privileges.
So that in case the user (VM-creator/owner) enters the pod or

something

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

breaks out of the VM they are just in the unprivileged container

sandbox.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines

As part of that we try to get also rid of running containers in the user-context with the root user.

One possible scenario which I could think of as being desirable from a kubevirt perspective:
We would run the VM in one container and have an unprivileged virtiofsd container in parallel.
This container already has its own mount namespace and it is not that critical if something manages to enter this sandbox.

But we are not as far yet as getting completely rid of root right now

in

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

kubevirt, so if as a temporary step it needs root, the current

proposed

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

changes would still be very useful for us.

What is the issue with root in user namespaces?

I remember a few years ago it was seen as a major security issue but don't remember if container runtimes were already using user namespaces back then.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

I guess the goal might be simply to minimize Linux capabilities as much as possible?

virtiofsd could nominally run with an arbitrary uid/gid but it still needs the Linux capabilities that allow it to change uid/gid and override file system permission checks just like the root user. Not

sure

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

if there is any advantage to running with uid 1000 when you still have these Linux capabilities.

Stefan

When you run in a user namespace, virtiofsd would only have setuid/setgid over the range of UIDs mapped into the user namespace. So if UID=0 on the host is not mapped, then the container can not create real UID=0 files on disk.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Similarly you can protect the user directories and any content by running the containers in a really high UID Mapping.

Roman, do user namespaces address your concerns about uid 0 in containers?

They may eventually solve it. I would not let us hang up on this right now, since as said at least in kubevirt we can't get rid right now of root anyway.
Even if it is at some point in the future save and supported on bleeding-edge managed k8s clusters to allow ordinary users to run with uid 0, from my perspective it is right now common to restrict namespaces with PodSecurityPolicies or SecurityContexts to not allow running pods as root for normal users.
It is also common that a significant part of the community users run docker and/or run on managed k8s clusters where they can not influence if user-namespaces are enabled, if they can run pods as root, if the runtime points to a seccomp file they like or if the runtime they prefer is used.

But let me repeat again that we require root right now anyway and that we don't run the pods right now with the user privileges (but we should and we aim for that). Right now PSPs and SCCs restrict access to these pods by the users.
So for our use case, at this exact moment root is acceptable, the unshare call is a little bit more problematic.

Best Regards,
Roman

Quoted 3 lines

Stefan

#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 85 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 62 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 3 lines · Daniel Walsh
Quoted 2 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 1 line · Roman Mohr

On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:13 PM Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>

Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and

print

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

an

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

error

Yes they can run as root. I can tell you what we plan to do with the containerized virtiofsd: We run it as part of the user-owned pod (a

set of

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

containers).
One of our main goals at the moment is to run VMs in a user-owned pod without additional privileges.
So that in case the user (VM-creator/owner) enters the pod or

something

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

breaks out of the VM they are just in the unprivileged container

sandbox.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines

As part of that we try to get also rid of running containers in the user-context with the root user.

One possible scenario which I could think of as being desirable from a kubevirt perspective:
We would run the VM in one container and have an unprivileged virtiofsd container in parallel.
This container already has its own mount namespace and it is not that critical if something manages to enter this sandbox.

But we are not as far yet as getting completely rid of root right now

in

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

kubevirt, so if as a temporary step it needs root, the current

proposed

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

changes would still be very useful for us.

What is the issue with root in user namespaces?

I remember a few years ago it was seen as a major security issue but don't remember if container runtimes were already using user namespaces back then.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

I guess the goal might be simply to minimize Linux capabilities as much as possible?

virtiofsd could nominally run with an arbitrary uid/gid but it still needs the Linux capabilities that allow it to change uid/gid and override file system permission checks just like the root user. Not

sure

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

if there is any advantage to running with uid 1000 when you still have these Linux capabilities.

Stefan

When you run in a user namespace, virtiofsd would only have setuid/setgid over the range of UIDs mapped into the user namespace. So if UID=0 on the host is not mapped, then the container can not create real UID=0 files on disk.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Similarly you can protect the user directories and any content by running the containers in a really high UID Mapping.

Roman, do user namespaces address your concerns about uid 0 in containers?

They may eventually solve it. I would not let us hang up on this right now, since as said at least in kubevirt we can't get rid right now of root anyway.
Even if it is at some point in the future save and supported on bleeding-edge managed k8s clusters to allow ordinary users to run with uid 0, from my perspective it is right now common to restrict namespaces with PodSecurityPolicies or SecurityContexts to not allow running pods as root for normal users.
It is also common that a significant part of the community users run docker and/or run on managed k8s clusters where they can not influence if user-namespaces are enabled, if they can run pods as root, if the runtime points to a seccomp file they like or if the runtime they prefer is used.

Quoted 6 lines

But let me repeat again that we require root right now anyway and that we don't run the pods right now with the user privileges (but we should and we aim for that). Right now PSPs and SCCs restrict access to these pods by the users.
So for our use case, at this exact moment root is acceptable, the unshare call is a little bit more problematic.

Okay, thanks for explaining.

Stefan

#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

In reply to Roman Mohr
Quoted 29 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 16 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 9 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 3 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

Quoted 6 lines

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

Root is required to access files with any uid/gid.

Dave Gilbert is working on xattr support without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. He may be able to find a way to drop unshare (at least in containers).

Quoted 2 lines

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something which k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

There is a Moby PR to change the default seccomp.json file here but it's unclear if it will be merged:
https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/41244

Stefan

#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 38 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 26 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 13 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

Quoted 8 lines

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Quoted 2 lines

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Quoted 10 lines

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:

https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know
if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

Quoted 6 lines

In kubevirt we want to run virtiofsd in containers. We would already not have xattr support for e.g. overlayfs in the VM after this patch series (an acceptable con at least for us right now).
If we can get rid of the unshare (and potentially of needing root) that would be great. We always assume that everything which we run in containers should work for cri-o and docker.

Root is required to access files with any uid/gid.

Dave Gilbert is working on xattr support without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. He may be able to find a way to drop unshare (at least in containers).

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something which k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

There is a Moby PR to change the default seccomp.json file here but it's unclear if it will be merged:
https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/41244

Stefan

Why not try Podman?

#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Walsh
Quoted 8 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 7 lines · Roman Mohr
Quoted 2 lines · On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 3:07 AM [email protected] <…
Quoted 1 line

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an

error

"Just" pointing docker to a different seccomp.json file is something which k8s users/admin in many cases can't do.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

There is a Moby PR to change the default seccomp.json file here but it's unclear if it will be merged:
https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/41244

Stefan

Why not try Podman?

Absolutely, Podman allows unshare(2) in its default seccomp policy so it does not have this problem.

I think Roman's point was mainly about the upstream user experience where Docker is common.

Stefan

#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 16 lines · * [email protected] ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 6 lines

Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

An assertion failure is raised during request processing if unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can be detected right away.

Quoted 7 lines

Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json

Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the default seccomp.json is missing unshare.

Hi, sorry for a bit late.

Quoted 7 lines

unshare() was added to fix xattr problem:
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bdfd66788349acc43cd3f1298718ad491663cfcc#
In theory we don't need to call unshare if xattr is disabled, but it is hard to get to know if xattr is enabled or disabled in fv_queue_worker(), right?

So, it looks good to me.

OK, I think it might also be OK to just fail the xattr operation on a non-file/directory in this case.

Dave

Quoted 40 lines

Regards,
Misono

Quoted 36 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +16 -1
index 3b6d16a041..9e5537506c 100644
@@ -949,6 +949,22 @@ int virtio_session_mount(struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /*
+     * Test that unshare(CLONE_FS) works. fv_queue_worker() will need it. It's
+     * an unprivileged system call but some Docker/Moby versions are known to
+     * reject it via seccomp when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not given.
+     *
+     * Note that the program is single-threaded here so this syscall has no
+     * visible effect and is safe to make.
+     */
+    ret = unshare(CLONE_FS);
+    if (ret == -1 && errno == EPERM) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_FS) failed with EPERM. If "
+                "running in a container please check that the container "
+                "runtime seccomp policy allows unshare.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     ret = fv_create_listen_socket(se);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
--

2.26.2

Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
#22 lore raw
In reply to Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 22 lines · * Stefan Hajnoczi ([email protected]) wrote:

v2:
* Update virtiofsd.rst documentation on sandboxing modes
* Change syntax to -o sandbox=namespace|chroot
* Add comment explaining that unshare(CLONE_FS) has no visible side-effect while single-threaded
* xfstests and pjdfstest pass. Did not run tests on overlayfs because required xattrs do not work without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Mrunal and Dan: This patch series adds a sandboxing mode where virtiofsd relies on the container runtime for isolation. It only does chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), seccomp, and drops Linux capabilities. Previously it created a new mount, pid, and net namespace but cannot do this without CAP_SYS_ADMIN when run inside a container. pivot_root("path/to/shared-dir") has been replaced with chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), again because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is unavailable. The point of the chroot() is to prevent escapes from the shared directory during path traversal. Does this ring any alarm bells or does it sound sane?

Container runtimes handle namespace setup and remove privileges needed by virtiofsd to perform sandboxing. Luckily the container environment already provides most of the sandbox that virtiofsd needs for security.

Quoted 8 lines

Introduce a new "virtiofsd -o sandbox=chroot" option that uses chroot(2) instead of namespaces. This option allows virtiofsd to work inside a container.

Please see the individual patches for details on the changes and security implications.

Given that people are starting to attempt running virtiofsd in containers I think this should go into QEMU 5.1.

I've queued 1 and 3; waiting for someone with better knowledge of chroot to review 2.

Dave

Quoted 14 lines

Stefan Hajnoczi (3):
virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot option
virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error

 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c    | 16 +++++++++
 tools/virtiofsd/helper.c         |  8 +++++
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst         | 32 ++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK