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mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC

[email protected] linux-hardening linux-kselftest linux-mm linux-security-module lkml 7 versions – Applied

Status from this message: [merged mm-stable] selftests-memfd-add-tests-for-mfd_noexec_seal-mfd_exec.patch removed from -mm tree

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Versions newest first · linked by author and title

  1. v8 Latest5 patches 6 repliesApplied 5/5
  2. v76 patches 19 repliesSuperseded
  3. v66 patches 21 repliesSuperseded
Earlier versions · 4
VersionPostedPatchesRepliesStatus
v56 patches7 repliesSuperseded
v4 posting 2/23 of 6 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v4 posting 1/26 patches0 repliesSuperseded
v31 patch2 repliesSuperseded

Changes in v8 from the cover letter

- Update ref bug in cover letter.
- Add Reviewed-by field.
- Remove security hook (security_memfd_create) patch, which will have its own patch set in future.

Patches in v8 All 5 applied

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/5mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXECinclude/uapi/linux/fcntl.h mm/memfd.c mm/shmem.c+9 -00 repliesApplied
2/5selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXECtools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c+122 -10 repliesApplied
3/5mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXECinclude/linux/pid_namespace.h include/uapi/linux/memfd.h kernel/pid_namespace.c +2 more+133 -26 repliesApplied
4/5mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfdmm/memfd.c+6 -00 repliesApplied
5/5selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXECtools/testing/selftests/memfd/fuse_test.c tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c+224 -50 repliesApplied

Reviews trailers per patch

All 5 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.

PatchKees Cook
1/5R-b
2/5R-b
3/5R-b
4/5R-b
5/5R-b

Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.

Read the v8 thread

Cover letter [PATCH v8 0/5] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC

From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>

Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting it differently.

However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm process created a memfd to share the content with an external process, however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind.

On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].

To address those above, this set of patches add following:
1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit.
3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of
X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy.

Change history:
v8:
- Update ref bug in cover letter.
- Add Reviewed-by field.
- Remove security hook (security_memfd_create) patch, which will have its own patch set in future.

v7:
- patch 2/6: remove #ifdef and MAX_PATH (memfd_test.c).
- patch 3/6: check capability (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) from userns instead of global ns (pid_sysctl.h). Add a tab (pid_namespace.h).
- patch 5/6: remove #ifdef (memfd_test.c)
- patch 6/6: remove unneeded security_move_mount(security.c).

v6:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Address comment and move "#ifdef CONFIG_" from .c file to pid_sysctl.h

v5:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Pass vm.memfd_noexec from current ns to child ns.
- Fix build issue detected by kernel test robot.
- Add missing security.c

v3:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Address API design comments in v2.
- Let memfd_create() to set X bit at creation time.
- A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control behavior of X bit.
- A new security hook in memfd_create().

v2:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- address comments in V1.
- add sysctl (vm.mfd_noexec) to set the default file permissions of memfd_create to be non-executable.

v1:https://lwn.net/Articles/890096/

[1] https://crbug.com/1305267
[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20memfd%20escalation&can=1
[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/

Daniel Verkamp (2):
mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC
selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC

Jeff Xu (3):
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC
mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC

 include/linux/pid_namespace.h              |  19 ++
 include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h                 |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/memfd.h                 |   4 +
 kernel/pid_namespace.c                     |   5 +
 kernel/pid_sysctl.h                        |  59 ++++
 mm/memfd.c                                 |  56 +++-
 mm/shmem.c                                 |   6 +
 tools/testing/selftests/memfd/fuse_test.c  |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 9 files changed, 489 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 kernel/pid_sysctl.h

base-commit: eb7081409f94a9a8608593d0fb63a1aa3d6f95d8

Signature · 1 line
2.39.0.rc1.256.g54fd8350bd-goog