Security Working Group meeting scheduled for this Wednesday April 15
This is a reminder of the OpenBMC Security Working Group meeting scheduled for this Wednesday April 15 at 10:00am PDT.
We'll discuss current development items, and anything else that comes up.
The current topics:
1. Remove default private image signing key from openbmc
2. Discuss issues from the “ipmi password storage” email thread.
3. Which algorithm should sign OpenBMC images?
Access, agenda, and notes are in the wiki:
https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group
- Joseph
Re: Security Working Group meeting - Wednesday April 15 - results
Quoted 1 line · Joseph Reynolds
This is a reminder of the OpenBMC Security Working Group meeting scheduled for this Wednesday April 15 at 10:00am PDT.
The meeting was held, and minutes are linked off the wiki page. A fourth agenda item was added. A summary is below.
- Joseph
Quoted 6 lines
We'll discuss current development items, and anything else that comes up.
The current topics:
1. Remove default private image signing key from openbmc
The leading idea is to disable the recipe that signs the image, but leave the private signing key in the source tree. Then someone who builds will get an unsigned image. If they enable the image signing recipe or use it as an example, they will hopefully see the instructions that say to use their own key pair.
Note that an unsigned image is a good starting point for build processes that use a separate image signing step, such as when the image is signed by a hardware security module (HSM). One difficulty with this approach is that the public key needs to be put into the BMC's root file system.
Followup in the email list or https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/issues/3615
Quoted 2 lines
2. Discuss issues from the “ipmi password storage” email thread.
We pretty much re-hashed the ideas from the email thread with no conclusions. One more idea was added, that we can the BMC's TPM to hold the RMCP+ keys.
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3. Which algorithm should sign OpenBMC images?
The answer will vary between projects that are downstream from OpenBMC. We'll keep the default as RSA-SHA256. Going forward, the plan is: the OpenBMC release process will give visibility to this and other ciphers per:
https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group#security-end-of-release-checklist
4. Use the Yocto cvecheck vulnerability scan for OpenBMC repos No CVE checking is done at the project-level, but similar check are being done in projects that are downstream from OpenBMC. The idea is a nightly Jenkins job to generate a report of all the unfixed vulnerabilities, something like: bitbake -c cvecheck obmc-phosphor-image.
Quoted 6 lines
Access, agenda, and notes are in the wiki:
https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group
- Joseph