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Linux 4.19.266

DISCUSSION Greg Kroah-Hartman 1 participant 2 messages Nov 23, 2022 Stable branch

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

I'm announcing the release of the 4.19.266 kernel.

All users of the 4.19 kernel series must upgrade.

The updated 4.19.y git tree can be found at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-4.19.y
and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser:
https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary

thanks,

greg k-h

------------

 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |   13 
 Makefile                                        |    2 
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                        |   68 +++-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S                       |    2 
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                       |   34 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S                |   11 
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h            |  168 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h              |   18 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h             |    6 
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                |   10 
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            |   53 +--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                       |   21 -
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      |  368 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                    |   60 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c                     |   44 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c                 |    1 
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                       |    2 
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                              |    1 
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                              |   53 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                              |    4 
 drivers/base/cpu.c                              |    8 
 drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c                  |    1 
 drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c          |    1 
 drivers/idle/intel_idle.c                       |   43 ++
 include/linux/cpu.h                             |    2 
 include/linux/kvm_host.h                        |    2 
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h                 |    4 
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h        |    1 
 28 files changed, 814 insertions(+), 187 deletions(-)

Alexandre Chartre (2):
x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter

Andrew Cooper (1):
x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO

Daniel Sneddon (1):
x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections

Greg Kroah-Hartman (1):

      Linux 4.19.266

Ingo Molnar (1):
x86/cpufeature: Fix various quality problems in the <asm/cpu_device_hd.h> header

Josh Poimboeuf (8):
x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit
x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS

Kan Liang (1):
x86/cpufeature: Add facility to check for min microcode revisions

Mark Gross (1):
x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id

Nathan Chancellor (1):
x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current

Pawan Gupta (4):
x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts

Peter Zijlstra (10):
x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value
x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx
x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes
x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability
intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle
x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness

Suleiman Souhlal (2):
Revert "x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections" Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id"

Thomas Gleixner (2):
x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros

author maintainer
#1 lore raw
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +13 -0
index 500032af0192..68f31b666032 100644
@@ -4132,6 +4132,18 @@
 
 	retain_initrd	[RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
 
+	retbleed=	[X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary
+			Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
+			vulnerability.
+
+			off         - unconditionally disable
+			auto        - automatically select a migitation
+
+			Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
+			time according to the CPU.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.
+
 	rfkill.default_state=
 		0	"airplane mode".  All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,
 			etc. communication is blocked by default.
@@ -4377,6 +4389,7 @@
 			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
 			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
 			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+			ibrs		  - use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
Makefile +1 -1
index 592e6928e020..a0cfded5d0cc 100644
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 19
-SUBLEVEL = 265
+SUBLEVEL = 266
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = "People's Front"
 
arch/x86/entry/calling.h +59 -9

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arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +0 -2
index 37d9016d4768..78b308f2f2ea 100644
@@ -643,7 +643,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movl	%ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -652,7 +651,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
 	popfl
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +29 -5
index dfe26f3cfffc..3f418aedef8d 100644
@@ -235,6 +235,10 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	/* IRQs are off. */
 	movq	%rax, %rdi
 	movq	%rsp, %rsi
+
+	/* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	call	do_syscall_64		/* returns with IRQs disabled */
 
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ		/* we're about to change IF */
@@ -311,8 +315,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	 * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
 	 */
 syscall_return_via_sysret:
-	/* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
-	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 skip_r11rcx=1
+	IBRS_EXIT
+	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
 
 	/*
 	 * Now all regs are restored except RSP and RDI.
@@ -363,7 +367,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movq	%rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_union)+stack_canary_offset
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -372,7 +375,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
 	popfq
@@ -685,6 +687,7 @@ GLOBAL(retint_user)
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
 
 GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+	IBRS_EXIT
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
 	/* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
 	testb	$3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -1250,7 +1253,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	 */
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
 
-	ret
+	/*
+	 * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like
+	 * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register.
+	 */
+	IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15
+
+	RET
 END(paranoid_entry)
 
 /*
@@ -1278,12 +1287,20 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
 	jmp	.Lparanoid_exit_restore
 .Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs:
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
+
+	/*
+	 * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access
+	 * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable.
+	 */
+	IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3	scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14
 .Lparanoid_exit_restore:
 	jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
 END(paranoid_exit)
 
+
 /*
  * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
  */
@@ -1303,6 +1320,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	/* We have user CR3.  Change to kernel CR3. */
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
 	/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
@@ -1367,6 +1385,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	SWAPGS
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 	/*
 	 * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1472,6 +1491,8 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx)
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	/*
 	 * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
 	 * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
@@ -1695,6 +1716,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
 	movq	$-1, %rsi
 	call	do_nmi
 
+	/* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */
+	IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
 
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +10 -1
index 40d2834a8101..85dd05de648c 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
  *
  * Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
  */
-#include "calling.h"
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/current.h>
 #include <asm/errno.h>
@@ -17,6 +16,8 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 
+#include "calling.h"
+
 	.section .entry.text, "ax"
 
 /*
@@ -106,6 +107,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
 	xorl	%r15d, %r15d		/* nospec   r15 */
 	cld
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	/*
 	 * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
 	 * ourselves.  To save a few cycles, we can check whether
@@ -253,6 +256,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
 	 */
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	call	do_fast_syscall_32
 	/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
@@ -262,6 +267,9 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
 	/* Opportunistic SYSRET */
 sysret32_from_system_call:
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
+
+	IBRS_EXIT
+
 	movq	RBX(%rsp), %rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
 	movq	RBP(%rsp), %rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
 	movq	EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11	/* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */
@@ -403,6 +411,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 	 * gate turned them off.
 	 */
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	call	do_int80_syscall_32
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h +161 -7

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arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +14 -4
index e9b79bac9b2a..caaab0a20e26 100644
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS		( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT		( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
@@ -283,7 +283,15 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 6) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 7) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 8) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 9) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+10) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL		(11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		(11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
@@ -296,6 +304,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD		(13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD		(13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO		(13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO		(13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -397,6 +406,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
-#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +6 -0
index db06f16627b0..1f2f52a34086 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
  * that group keep the CPUID for the variants sorted by model number.
  */
 
+/* Wildcard match for FAM6 so X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ANY) works */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ANY			X86_MODEL_ANY
+
 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		0x0E
 
 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM		0x0F
@@ -101,6 +104,9 @@
 #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		0x57 /* Knights Landing */
 #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		0x85 /* Knights Mill */
 
+/* Family 5 */
+#define INTEL_FAM5_QUARK_X1000		0x09 /* Quark X1000 SoC */
+
 /* Useful macros */
 #define INTEL_CPU_FAM_ANY(_family, _model, _driver_data)	\
 {								\
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +10 -0
index 7a73799537bf..dbe98e8ed164 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -73,6 +75,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA			BIT(2)	/* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
@@ -120,6 +123,13 @@
 						 * bit available to control VERW
 						 * behavior.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA			BIT(19)	/*
+						 * Indicates RET may use predictors
+						 * other than the RSB. With eIBRS
+						 * enabled predictions in kernel mode
+						 * are restricted to targets in
+						 * kernel.
+						 */
 #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
 						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +24 -29

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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +15 -6
index 98c23126f751..f1f41c96d319 100644
@@ -885,12 +885,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
 
-	/*
-	 * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID.
-	 * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor.
-	 */
-	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+	/* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+
+		/* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */
+		if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+
+		/*
+		 * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
+		 * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
+		 * BTC_NO bit.
+		 */
+		if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
+	}
 }
 
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +293 -75

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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +36 -24

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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c +40 -4

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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
index 5a52672e3f8b..90bd155d7e7a 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
 static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF,       CPUID_ECX,  0, 0x00000006, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_EPB,		CPUID_ECX,  3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL,	CPUID_EDX,  2, 0x00000007, 2 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC,		CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC,	CPUID_EDX,  0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL,	CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -1
index cd138bfd926c..a95b9e090f9e 100644
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
 	}
 
 	if (updmsr)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false);
 }
 
 static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +1 -0
index e1492a67e988..5b68ec68fc13 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
 #include "trace.h"
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +46 -7

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arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -2
index be4697d91bb2..3c6c2253c2fb 100644
@@ -9736,9 +9736,9 @@ void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment);
 
-bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
+	return arch_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device);
 
drivers/base/cpu.c +8 -0
index cd204be1f4b7..ce5b3ffbd6ee 100644
@@ -577,6 +577,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -587,6 +593,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -599,6 +606,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
 	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
+	&dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c +1 -0
index 9e86404a361f..40c969432f45 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Paul Diefenbaugh, Dominik Brodowski");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ACPI Processor P-States Driver");
drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c +1 -0
index be926d9a66e5..4b4f128c3488 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 
 #include "cpufreq_ondemand.h"
 
drivers/idle/intel_idle.c +37 -6

108 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/cpu.h +2 -0
index 8cc06e1d4fc2..12ed4cb751de 100644
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
 					struct device_attribute *attr,
 					char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -1
index 4f96aef4e8b8..f67ab4e9b665 100644
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+static __always_inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	return false;
 }
include/linux/mod_devicetable.h +1 -3
index 610cdf8082f2..9e3600572e9c 100644
@@ -636,9 +636,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 	__u16 steppings;
 };
 
-#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \
-	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY, X86_FAMILY_ANY, X86_MODEL_ANY, x }
-
+/* Wild cards for x86_cpu_id::vendor, family, model and feature */
 #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
 #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
 #define X86_MODEL_ANY  0
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
index beab4d4e4a35..5882ff3e7094 100644
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:0 (EDX), word 11 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC		(11*32+ 1) /* LLC QoS if 1 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:1 (EDX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC	(12*32+ 0) /* LLC occupancy monitoring */