fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup
PATCH v2 1/1 fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup
Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v2:
- add eye-strain-reduction-whitespace for Ingo. ;)
--- fs/namei.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +44 -18
@@ -693,46 +693,72 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) }/** +* safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions +* @inode: the source inode to hardlink from +* +* Return false if at least one of the following conditions: +* - inode is not a regular file +* - inode is setuid +* - inode is setgid and group-exec +* - access failure for read and write +* +* Otherwise returns true. +*/ +static bool safe_hardlink_source (struct inode *inode) +{ +mode_t mode = inode->i_mode; + +/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if (!S_ISREG (mode)) +return false; + +/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if (mode &S_ISUID ) +return false; + +/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if ((mode & (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) == (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) +return false; + +/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */ +if (inode_permission (inode,MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE )) +return false; + +return true; +} + +/** * may_linkat - Check permissions for creating a hardlink * @link: the source to hardlink from * * Block hardlink when all of: * - sysctl_protected_hardlinks enabled * - fsuid does not match inode -* - at least one of: -* - inode is not a regular file -* - inode is setuid -* - inode is setgid and group-exec -* - access failure for read and write +* - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above) * - not CAP_FOWNER * * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ static int may_linkat (struct path *link) { -int error =0 ;const struct cred *cred;struct inode *inode; -int mode;if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)return 0 ; cred =current_cred (); inode = link->dentry->d_inode; - mode = inode->i_mode; - -if (cred->fsuid != inode->i_uid && - (!S_ISREG (mode) || (mode &S_ISUID ) || - ((mode & (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) == (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) || - (inode_permission (inode,MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE ))) && - !capable (CAP_FOWNER )) - error = -EPERM ; -if (error) -audit_log_link_denied ("linkat" , link); +/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like, +* otherwise, it must be a safe source. +*/ +if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid ||safe_hardlink_source (inode) || +capable (CAP_FOWNER )) +return 0 ; -return error; +audit_log_link_denied ("linkat" , link); +return -EPERM ; }#else static inline int may_follow_link (struct path *link)
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4