fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup
PATCH 1/1 fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup
Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
--- fs/namei.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +41 -18
@@ -693,46 +693,69 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) }/** +* safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions +* @inode: the source inode to hardlink from +* +* Return false if at least one of the following conditions: +* - inode is not a regular file +* - inode is setuid +* - inode is setgid and group-exec +* - access failure for read and write +* +* Otherwise returns true. +*/ +static bool safe_hardlink_source (struct inode *inode) +{ +mode_t mode = inode->i_mode; + +/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if (!S_ISREG (mode)) +return false; +/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if (mode &S_ISUID ) +return false; +/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if ((mode & (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) == (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) +return false; +/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */ +if (inode_permission (inode,MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE )) +return false; + +return true; +} + +/** * may_linkat - Check permissions for creating a hardlink * @link: the source to hardlink from * * Block hardlink when all of: * - sysctl_protected_hardlinks enabled * - fsuid does not match inode -* - at least one of: -* - inode is not a regular file -* - inode is setuid -* - inode is setgid and group-exec -* - access failure for read and write +* - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above) * - not CAP_FOWNER * * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ static int may_linkat (struct path *link) { -int error =0 ;const struct cred *cred;struct inode *inode; -int mode;if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)return 0 ; cred =current_cred (); inode = link->dentry->d_inode; - mode = inode->i_mode; -if (cred->fsuid != inode->i_uid && - (!S_ISREG (mode) || (mode &S_ISUID ) || - ((mode & (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) == (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) || - (inode_permission (inode,MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE ))) && - !capable (CAP_FOWNER )) - error = -EPERM ; - -if (error) -audit_log_link_denied ("linkat" , link); +/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like, +* otherwise, it must be a safe source. +*/ +if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid ||safe_hardlink_source (inode) || +capable (CAP_FOWNER )) +return 0 ; -return error; +audit_log_link_denied ("linkat" , link); +return -EPERM ; }#else static inline int may_follow_link (struct path *link)
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
Quoted 34 lines · Kees Cook
Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- fs/namei.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)fs/namei.c +19
-0@@ -693,46 +693,69 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) }/** +* safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions +* @inode: the source inode to hardlink from +* +* Return false if at least one of the following conditions: +* - inode is not a regular file +* - inode is setuid +* - inode is setgid and group-exec +* - access failure for read and write +* +* Otherwise returns true. +*/ +static bool safe_hardlink_source (struct inode *inode) +{ +mode_t mode = inode->i_mode; + +/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if (!S_ISREG (mode)) +return false; +/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
fs/namei.c static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) · line 724
Quoted 10 lines
fs/namei.c +10
-0+if (mode &S_ISUID ) +return false; +/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ +if ((mode & (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) == (S_ISGID |S_IXGRP )) +return false; +/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */ +if (inode_permission (inode,MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE )) +return false; + +return true;
A really minor nitpick, could we use this form please:
static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
{
mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
if (!S_ISREG(mode))
return false;
/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
if (mode & S_ISUID)
return false;
/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
return false;
/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
return false;
return true;
}Those separate blocks of comments and conditions stand out much nicer this way, making it way easier on the eyes - to my eyes at least ;-)
Thanks,
Ingo
Quoted 70 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 34 lines · Kees Cook
Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>---
fs/namei.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)fs/namei.c +19
-0@@ -693,46 +693,69 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) } /** +* safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions +* @inode: the source inode to hardlink from +* +* Return false if at least one of the following conditions: +* - inode is not a regular file +* - inode is setuid +* - inode is setgid and group-exec +* - access failure for read and write +* +* Otherwise returns true. +*/ +static bool safe_hardlink_source (struct inode *inode) +{ + mode_t mode = inode->i_mode; + + /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ + if (!S_ISREG(mode)) + return false; + /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */fs/namei.c static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) · line 724
Quoted 10 lines
fs/namei.c +10
-0+ if (mode & S_ISUID) + return false; + /* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ + if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) + return false; + /* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */ + if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)) + return false; + + return true;A really minor nitpick, could we use this form please:
static bool
safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode){
mode_t mode =inode->i_mode;/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ if (!S_ISREG(mode))
return false;/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ if (mode &
S_ISUID)
return false;/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ if ((mode & (
S_ISGID|S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID|S_IXGRP)) return false;/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */ if (
inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)) return false;
Quoted 6 lines
return true;
}Those separate blocks of comments and conditions stand out much nicer this way, making it way easier on the eyes - to my eyes at least ;-)
Heh, sure. I've sent v2 now. :)
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook ChromeOS Security